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A Regulatory Capture Explanation of South Africa's Private Health 
Insurance Legislation 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Private healthcare financing in South Africa has undergone several 
regulatory reforms, the most recent of which saw the enactment of the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. The stated reforms, most 
especially open enrolment and community rating, were touted by the 
government as necessary to address the undesirable effects of adverse 
selection.  However, it was never questioned whether in fact adverse 
selection is a feature of the South African medical schemes landscape. 
Adverse selection is found to be absent. Thus, government’s supposition 
that adverse selection, as a consequence of the deregulation that took place 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, is responsible for the deterioration in 
medical scheme coverage for the elderly, unhealthy or poor is fallacious. 
Since the ostensible reason for the current legislation does not stand up to 
scrutiny, regulatory capture is offered as the plausible alternative 
explanation for the promulgation of the current legislation governing 
medical schemes business.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
Derived from Folland, Goodman and Stano (2010: 568-574) unless otherwise stated. 
Actuarially Fair: Insurance under which the expected pay-outs (claims) are equal to 
the premiums paid by policyholders. 
Adverse Selection: refers to the situation whereby high-risk individuals demonstrate a 
greater propensity to purchase insurance than low-risk individuals (Rejda, 2005). 
Adverse selection arises in insurance markets when the purchaser of insurance has 
more information about either the probability of a loss or the distribution of the 
magnitude of the loss should the loss event occur, than the insurance company. 
Capitation: under managed care health plans, a fixed amount is paid to a healthcare 
provider per enrolee over a given time period regardless of the amount of healthcare 
services rendered.  
Chronic Disease List (CDL): a list of chronic diseases, outlined in the Regulations to 
the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, that medical schemes are required to 
cover in full; including the diagnosis, treatment and medication prescribed with these 
chronic diseases (McLeod, Matisonn, Fourie, Grobler, Mynhardt, & Marx, 2004). 
Claims Review: the procedure by which an enrolee’s healthcare claims are reviewed 
prior to reimbursement. The objective is to establish the medical necessity for the 
healthcare services to be provided to the enrolee and to ensure that the cost of any 
healthcare services provided to the enrolee is not excessive. 
Community Rating: requires that medical schemes offer cover for healthcare 
expenditure at effectively the same price to a heterogeneous group of members 
irrespective of their risk profile (health status) (Neuhaus, 1995). In other words, 
medical underwriting is abandoned in favour of the application of pre-defined criteria, 
which are often not directly related to risk.   
Co-payment: the portion of a claim in relation to healthcare expenditure that a medical 
scheme member is required to pay out of his or her own pocket. 
xi 
 
Council for Medical Schemes: the statutory body responsible for medical schemes 
supervision in South Africa. Section 7 of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 
outlines the statutory functions and duties of the Council for Medical Schemes. 
Gatekeeper: a primary healthcare provider, usually a general practitioner, who is 
responsible for overseeing and coordinating all aspects of a patient’s healthcare. 
Fee-for-Service (FFS): A method of payment under which the healthcare provider is 
paid for each medical procedure that is provided to the medical scheme beneficiary.  
Health Maintenance Organisation (HMO): a form of managed care organisation that 
provides enrolees with relatively comprehensive healthcare services, rather than 
reimbursements for healthcare expenditure. Therefore, for a fixed (or capitation) fee, 
enrolees face few out-of-pocket expenses and are covered for most inpatient and 
outpatient treatment, which includes medical consultation (diagnosis), surgery and 
prescribed medication.   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): A measure of market concentration that 
incorporates the market share of the largest firms within an industry or sector. The 
HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the fifty largest firms 
within an industry, where the market share is expressed as a proportion of the total 
market share. 
Independent Practice Association (IPA): Healthcare providers who operate within 
independent, sole or small group practices that contract out their healthcare services to 
a health maintenance organisation (HMO). 
Managed Care: Managed care refers to an organised delivery system whereby there is 
a network of organisations (hospitals, physicians, clinics and other healthcare 
providers such as hospices) that provides or arranges to provide a coordinated 
continuum  of services (from primary healthcare to emergency surgery) to a defined 
group of individuals. The managed care system is held clinically (treatment) and 
fiscally (financially) accountable for the outcomes and/or health status of its members 
(Reekie, 1999).  
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Medical Aid Schemes: are akin to what nowadays one would refer to simply as 
medical schemes. In return for a regular contribution fee, medical aid schemes pay 
healthcare providers on a fee-for-service basis based upon a pre-determined or pre-
negotiated tariff schedule. Historically, members of medical aid schemes were 
permitted to select their own healthcare providers.  
Medical Benefit Schemes: Members of medical benefit schemes are restricted to a 
panel of healthcare providers. In return for a regular contribution fee, medical benefit 
schemes pay healthcare providers either on a salaried basis or on a capitation basis (a 
pre-determined fixed monthly or annual fee based upon the number of scheme 
members and their dependents receiving treatment from the relevant healthcare 
provider). Medical benefit schemes are thus more akin to managed care type 
organisations. 
Medical Savings Account (MSA): A member of a healthcare plan with a Medical 
Savings Account (MSA) pays a monthly contribution fee to the health insurer that 
consists of both a traditional health insurance (risk) premium and a fixed amount  that 
is set aside ‘within’ the person’s medical savings account. Funds that accumulate 
within the MSA are designed to cover day-to-day healthcare expenses. 
Medical Scheme Business: The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 defines the 
‘business of a medical scheme’ as the business of undertaking an obligation to 
reimburse healthcare providers for services received by a member in return for a 
contribution fee.  
Moral Hazard: refers to the tendency of insurance coverage to alter the behaviour of 
the insured in such a way that it may change the probability of loss, upon which the 
insurance company has relied in the determination of the appropriate premium and 
extent of coverage to offer to the insured (Shavell, 1979).   
National Health Insurance (NHI): is the proposed South African government-
sponsored national health insurance programme whereby a system of compulsory 
contributions (funded via multiple sources including additional taxation) is pooled 
into a designated fund, from which reimbursements are made to both public and 
private healthcare providers such that the population-at-large receives prescribed 
healthcare benefits free at the point of service.  
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Open Enrolment: Under the principle of open enrolment, open medical schemes have 
to accept any individual who wishes to join their medical scheme and are required to 
charge them according to the standard schedule of contribution rates offered to current 
members. 
Open Medical Schemes: are medical schemes that permit new members from the 
public to join the scheme, subject to a mandatory waiting period and possible 
penalties. 
Preferred Provider Organisation (PPO): An arrangement under which an enrolee is 
given appropriate financial incentives, such as no co-payments, to seek healthcare 
from selected healthcare providers with which the payer has contracted.  
Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs): The Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PBMs) set 
a minimum package of healthcare benefits that must be offered by all medical 
schemes. Annexure A to the Regulations of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 
1998 defines the PMBs in terms of some 270 diagnosis-treatment pairs. 
Restricted Membership Schemes: are medical schemes that only permit individuals 
that meet the specified criteria of the scheme to become members. The basis of the 
restriction can only be employment or former employment in a profession, trade, 
industry or calling, or by a particular employer or class of employer.   
Risk Equalisation Fund (REF): receives funds from medical schemes with lower risk 
profiles and pays out funds to medical schemes with a higher risk profile (McLeod et 
al., 2004). The REF serves as a mechanism that equalises contribution schedules (or 
tables) across medical schemes. 
Utilisation Review: the procedure by which an enrolee’s utilisation of healthcare 
services as well as their appropriateness, and quality of care are reviewed and 
controlled. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulation is widely considered to be a necessary intervention by the government to 
address market failures and enhance social welfare. According to Pigou (1932), the 
intervention ought to be based upon the identification of market failures requiring the 
government to intervene through a policy aligned to correct these failures. Regulation 
may also be required to protect property rights. Thus, it is not a response to correct 
some form of market failure or imperfection, but rather a mechanism to entrench 
certain natural rights. Another important reason for regulation to be enacted is as a 
framework of codification. It codifies the rules and regulations that individuals and 
firms have to operate within, defining appropriate (prudent) behaviour and activities 
that participants may or may not undertake.  Regulatory capture occurs when an 
interest group within a market uses its influence or resources to acquire a favourable 
regulatory decision, or for that matter regulatory indecision. It may be possible for 
interest groups to acquire a series of regulations or an entire regulatory framework. 
This is undertaken so that the group can extract a benefit for themselves rather than 
benefit society as a whole. 
  
The twenty-eighth President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, described the 
regulatory capture process coarsely as:   
"If the government is to tell big businessmen how to run their business, then 
don't you see that big businessmen have to get closer to the government even 
than they are now? Don't you see that they must capture the government, in order 
not to be restrained too much by it? Must capture the government? They have 
already captured it" (Wilson, 1913: 201-2).  
 
Private financing of healthcare expenditure in South Africa has traditionally been 
provided through medical schemes. These institutions have effectively provided 
insurance cover for healthcare expenditures to a select minority of South Africans that 
could afford cover in the absence of a coordinated public sector health insurance 
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system (Reekie, 1999). The primary function of a medical scheme is to provide 
members with protection against the healthcare expenditure that they (or indeed their 
dependents) may incur due to the diagnosis, treatment or long-term care of a medical 
condition (incident) that can include illness, bodily injury, congenital disease or 
hereditary condition from which the member suffers a deterioration in their health or 
general well-being.  The member is required to compensate the medical scheme 
through a monthly contribution paid over to the scheme timeously and in return the 
member can expect the medical scheme to reimburse healthcare providers for the 
healthcare expenditure that the member or their dependants incur according to a pre-
defined schedule of benefits.  
 
Medical schemes in South Africa are currently regulated by the Medical Schemes Act 
No. 131 of 1998,1 and they operate on a not-for-profit basis. Several entities that 
interact with medical scheme, healthcare providers and members do operate under the 
profit motive. These entities provide administration, marketing, managed care; 
consulting and advisory services to medical schemes (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). It is 
precisely the high-profile medical scheme administrators that tend to attract much of 
the attention concerning the alleged exploitation of medical scheme members through 
higher contribution rates and lower benefit coverage levels. While medical scheme 
administrators do not directly charge members for health insurance cover, 
administrators indirectly extract a fee from members through the fees that they charge 
medical schemes for their services.  
 
According to Pearmain (2000), private financing of healthcare expenditure in South 
Africa is not a new phenomenon. De Beers Consolidated Mines established a medical 
scheme for their employees, in as early as 1889 (Pearmain, 2000). After World War 
II, medical aid schemes proliferated and from 1956, medical aid schemes (including 
medical benefit schemes) had to register as friendly societies in terms of the Friendly 
Societies Act No. 25 of 1956. By 1960, there were 169 schemes covering 
approximately 1.5 million individuals. One might anticipate that the number of 
                                                     
1 The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 refers to the original Act, subsequent amendments and 
regulations.  
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medical schemes and their members (and beneficiaries) would have risen sharply over 
the past five decades. However, surprisingly quite the opposite has taken place.  
 
At the time when Reekie (1999) concluded his examination of the medical scheme 
industry in South Africa, the number of beneficiaries (principal members and 
dependents) covered by medical schemes had increased to just under 7 million 
individuals whilst the number of medical schemes (open and restricted schemes)  had 
fallen to 160.  By the end of 2009, the total number of beneficiaries covered by 
medical schemes stood at 8,068,505 individuals. As a proportion of the total South 
African population it represents approximately 16% of all individuals in the country. 
The number of registered medical schemes had declined even further to 110 as at 31 
December 2009.  One of the key objectives of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 
1998 was to increase access to affordable private healthcare through the principles of 
community rating and open enrolment.2 However, the number of individuals covered 
by medical schemes has only risen by around 18.15 percent over the entire ten-year 
period ending 2009. This translates into a compound per annum growth rate of 1.4 
percent. 
 
Reekie (1999) describes the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 as an indictment 
by the South African government of the manner in which the local medical schemes 
industry had responded to the legislative framework prior to the implementation of the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. More specifically, how the medical scheme 
industry had responded to the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and 
the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993. Before the 1990s, medical 
schemes reported frequent underwriting losses, which meant that the industry was 
unable to maintain prudential solvency ratios. The author argues that a financial 
turnaround was only possible due to the structural changes that followed the 1989 and 
                                                     
2 In terms of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, community rating requires medical schemes to 
charge contributions that are differentiated only on the basis of income and number of dependants, and 
not on the age or the health status of the member. Open enrolment makes it compulsory for every open 
scheme to accept all eligible applicants. 
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1993 Medical Schemes Amendment Acts.3 Doherty and McLeod (2003) claim that 
these amendments were in response to calls from the medical scheme industry to free 
it from restrictions that the industry claimed limited its ability to deal with cost 
escalation. McIntyre, Bloom, Doherty and Brijlal (1995) point out that between 1982 
and 1992, medical scheme contributions as a proportion of the average monthly 
salary, had risen steadily from 7.1 percent to 15.2 percent.4   
 
In South Africa, the process of deregulation that followed the 1989 and 1993 Medical 
Schemes Amendment Acts, permitted medical schemes to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour, through contribution loadings and the restructuring of benefit plans, to 
attract the young and healthy. By redesigning the menu of medical cover options it 
effectively reduced benefits for the elderly and unhealthy segment of the population. 
Senior citizens found it practically impossible and unaffordable to maintain the level 
of cover that they had previously enjoyed. In addition, policies were designed to 
actively encourage a healthy lifestyle by offering incentives to members to exercise 
regularly and refrain from unhealthy activities. Thus, government correctly identified 
that senior citizens and the unhealthy had seen their benefits greatly reduced as a 
direct result of the deregulation that took place during the 1990s. However, the 
deterioration in coverage and to all intents and purposes higher contribution rates for 
the elderly and unhealthy was misinterpreted by the South African government as a 
manifestation of adverse selection.  
 
Under the prior regulatory environment, it was argued that low-risk individuals (the 
young and healthy) were essentially driving out the high-risk individuals (the elderly 
and unhealthy) from the market. Through the mechanism of risk rating, medical 
schemes would offer lower premiums to low-risk individuals, while requiring those 
who are high risk, such as the elderly or unhealthy, to pay significantly higher 
premiums. The result is a fragmentation of members into ‘homogenous’ risk pools 
and the menu of policies (options) would be differentiated across the various risk 
                                                     
3 According to Reekie (1999), the application of sound insurance and risk management principles only 
became a reality once managed care became a legal possibility.  
4 This occurred while salaries in real terms remained fairly constant. 
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classes. Consequently, health insurance cover became extremely expensive for those 
who were expected to need it the most. From the South African government’s 
perspective, the prior regulatory framework translated into an increasing number of 
the elderly and unhealthy requiring healthcare services from the public healthcare 
system. 
 
Government’s argument that adverse selection was at the heart of the failure of the 
prior regulatory framework to provide access to affordable private healthcare to those 
who required it most is fallacious (Pearmain, 2000; Reekie, 1999). The observation 
that risk rating induces adverse selection is erroneous. Risk rating is a mechanism that 
reduces information asymmetry and therefore mitigates the negative consequences of 
adverse selection. Akerlof (1970)’s Lemons Principle describes the situation whereby 
adverse selection occurs within the automobile market. In the presence of quality 
uncertainty, ‘bad’ cars (or lemons) drive out the good cars (Akerlof, 1970). In the 
insurance context, this would translate into the fact that in the presence of information 
asymmetry, high risks drive out low risks. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstrate 
that in the presence of imperfect information, equilibrium may not exist within a 
competitive insurance market or at least equilibrium may have strange properties. The 
theory suggests that in competitive insurance markets adverse selection results in risk 
pools forming and if these are unable to form, the pervasive presence of adverse 
selection may result in the market (or parts of it) not forming.5 From Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis it is possible to infer that when medical schemes are 
prohibited from using risk-related characteristics to assess the risk profile of an 
individual and thereby charge differentiated risk-based contribution rates, an enforced 
asymmetry of information ensues which prevents risk pools from forming. It is under 
these circumstances that the theory would predict adverse selection to be pervasive 
and lead to market failure.  
 
                                                     
5 This was a feature in the United States with so-called Redlined areas. Redlining is the practice of 
denying, or increasing the cost of insurance coverage to residents in certain predetermined areas. It 
describes the practice of delineating geographical areas where insurers would often deny coverage to 
individuals living within those areas. Redlining was often seen as a mechanism to racially profile 
segments of the population and subsequently the term has been applied to discrimination against any 
particular demographic profile irrespective of geographic location. 
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Therefore, government’s rationale behind the repeal of the Medical Schemes Act No. 
72 of 1967, the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and the Medical 
Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993, and subsequent promulgation of the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 was to overcome adverse selection within the 
private health insurance sector is questionable. According to the government, the new 
legislation was sought to address the “destructive” practices of risk rating and 
reinstate the statutory minimum benefits (Pearmain, 2000; Reekie, 1999).6 Hence, the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 prohibits risk-rating on the basis of age, prior 
or current health status. In addition, the legislation requires medical schemes to offer a 
minimum benefits package.7 In terms of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, 
the Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMB) cover the healthcare costs related to the 
diagnosis, treatment and care of any emergency medical condition8, a limited set of 
270 medical conditions and 25 chronic conditions.9   
  
                                                     
6 In addition, Section 68(1) of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 repealed the Medical 
Schemes Amendment Act No. 95 of 1969, Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 49 of 1972, Medical 
Schemes Amendment Act No. 43 of 1975, Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 51 of 1978, Medical 
Schemes Amendment Act No. 42 of 1980, Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 72 of 1981 and 
Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 59 of 1984. 
7 According to the Council for Medical Schemes (2010) the Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMB) is a 
set of defined benefits that all medical schemes have to offer to their members. It ensures that all 
medical scheme members and their dependants have access to certain minimum healthcare services 
with respect to a set of pre-defined conditions. Access to the Prescribed Minimum Benefits is 
regardless of the benefit option that members have selected. Beneficiaries must be covered in full for 
these conditions with no limits or co-payments. Medical schemes may insist on the use of a contracted 
network of providers and formularies (medication) in the treatment of the set of conditions defined 
under the Prescribed Minimum Benefits. 
8 An emergency medical condition refers to the sudden and unexpected onset of a medical condition 
that requires immediate medical treatment and/or an operation. If the treatment is not administered 
timeously, the emergency could result in weakened bodily functions, serious and permanent damage to 
organs, limbs or other body parts, or ultimately death (Council for Medical Schemes, 2008).  
9 In Annexure A of the Regulations to the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 a list of conditions 
identified as Prescribed Minimum Benefits are presented in the form of Diagnosis and Treatment Pairs 
(DTPs). The Chronic Disease List (CDL) specifies the 25 chronic diseases. Medical schemes are 
required to cover the healthcare costs associated with both the medication and treatment of these 
chronic diseases (Council for Medical Schemes, 2008). 
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1.1. Demand for Health and Health Capital 
 
It is important to acknowledge that individuals do not demand healthcare for the same 
reasons that they would demand other goods or services, such as food or public 
transport. Arrow (1963: 948) describes the demand for medical services as being “not 
steady in origin”, but rather “irregular and unpredictable”. Generally, individuals seek 
healthcare only as a response to the deterioration in their health (or health capital). It 
is rather health per se that is sought by the individual. Grossman (1972), Fuchs (1982) 
and Becker (1993, 1995 and 2006) have all used the theory of human capital to 
explain the demand for health and healthcare. Individuals are seen as rational 
economic agents that invest in themselves through education, skill enhancement and 
health to achieve greater returns from employment. These returns translate into the 
capacity to obtain goods and services that they need and desire. But further it allows 
individuals to access leisure time and once again invest in their health capital.  
 
Grossman (1972) explains that individuals use health capital to produce ‘healthy 
days’, which in turn can be allocated to either work or leisure. Work enables 
individuals to generate income and this permits the purchase of goods and services, 
but also allows for further health investment. The greater allocation of resources (both 
time and funding) towards health investment augments health capital and this 
generates a greater number of ‘healthy days’. This self-enforcing cycle describes the 
demand for healthcare services. To increase the stock of health capital allows one to 
produce more time (‘healthy days’) that are available for work and leisure pursuits.  
 
He summarises the important elements of health demand that differ from the 
traditional approach to demand: 
1. Individuals seek health rather than healthcare per se. The demand for healthcare is 
a derived demand for an input to produce health. 
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2. Individuals do not simply transact within the market to purchase health, but also 
actively produce health. This is achieved through the purchase of healthcare inputs 
and allocating time to health-enhancing efforts. 
3. Health can be seen as a capital good as it exists for more than one period. 
Although, it does depreciate over time, it does not do so instantaneously. 
4. Health can be treated as both a consumption good and investment good. As a 
consumption good, health is sought since one derives utility from feeling healthy. 
In relation to an investment good, health is desired as it increases the number of 
‘healthy days’ produced, thereby allowing one to work more and earn a greater 
income.   
 
Health capital depreciates over time and although one is able to increase one’s stock 
of health capital through health investment, eventually the rate at which health capital 
depreciates exceeds the rate at which one is able to augment health capital through 
health investment. The theory does not preclude the possibility that the rate at which a 
person’s health stock depreciates can vary over time. For example, it is possible that 
during periods of great stress, a person’s depreciation rate increases and then falls 
once the stressful situation has dissipated. Nevertheless, Grossman (1972)’s model 
suggests that as one ages, the depreciation rate has a greater propensity to increase, 
which causes the optimal level of health capital to fall. Higher depreciation rates 
increase the cost of holding health capital.  Therefore, over time individuals have no 
choice but to allow their health capital to deteriorate to a minimum level, ܪ௠௜௡, where 
an individual is no longer able to produce ‘healthy days’, thereby they are unable to 
sustain life and their life terminates (Grossman, 1972).     
 
The phenomenon can be described as follows: 
“Gross investment’s life cycle profile would not, in general, simply mirror that of 
health capital...This follows because a rise in the rate of depreciation not only 
reduces the amount of health capital demanded by consumers but also reduces 
the amount of capital supplied to them by a given amount of gross investment” 
(Grossman, 1972: 238). 
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Extensions to Grossman (1972)’s model imply that people are more likely to increase 
their investment in health as they age, which confirms our general observations that 
the elderly demand more healthcare services than young individuals.  
 
1.2. Role of Healthcare and Medicine 
 
The private financing of healthcare is a more contemporary phenomenon when 
compared to other traditional lines of insurance such as marine or fire insurance. In 
South Africa, it was only after the Second World War that medical schemes became 
commonplace. This is partly due to the fact that the healthcare services that society 
has become accustomed to, including medical interventions such as effective 
medicines and modern surgical treatment, have only been readily available in the last 
60 years or so. Global access to what could be referred to as ‘effective’ healthcare is 
in fact a recent occurrence. By implication, it suggests that the improvement in the 
health status10 of the general population would only be observable from 1950 
onwards. What is more surprising is that research, such as that undertaken by 
McKeown, Brown and Record (1972) and McKeown (1976) suggest that historical 
downward trends in mortality rates in England and Wales cannot be explained by 
practitioner-provided healthcare.   
 
The role of healthcare in society can be viewed as a production question. The 
production function describes the relationship between inputs and outputs. When 
examining the health production function, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationship between healthcare inputs and health. A primary concern for public 
policymakers and medical historians alike is what contribution has healthcare, and 
thus medical interventions, made to the overall health status of the population. To 
                                                     
10 Measuring health status is not as straightforward as one might believe. Various measures have been 
suggested, including the number of healthy days experienced by the population per capita or the 
reciprocal of a reverse indicator such as mortality or morbidity rates. 
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assess the impact upon health status, it is common to focus upon population growth to 
assess the success that medical interventions have had in lowering mortality. 
Population increases are the result of three factors; increased birth rates, reduced 
mortality or increased net-migration. In the case of England and Wales, the sudden 
rise in the population after 1750 can largely be attributed to a reduction in mortality. 
McKeown, Brown and Record (1972) and McKeown (1976) examine the historical 
trends in mortality and investigate specifically which diseases contribute to the 
patterns observed in mortality rates. Interestingly, airborne infectious diseases account 
for the largest single portion of mortality reduction. In particular, the decline in 
mortality rates related to the following diseases tuberculosis, bronchitis, pneumonia 
and influenza, can be viewed as the primary contributors to the overall fall in 
mortality (McKeown, 1976).   
 
McKeown (1976) point out that many would believe that medical interventions are 
the main reasons for the observed decline in mortality rates with respect to these 
diseases; however, effective medical interventions were not available until much later 
in the period examined, well after the most significant decline in mortality had already 
been observed.  Rather factors such as improved nutrition, public health measures and 
improvements in the environment in which people lived and worked, appear to be the 
principle reasons for the marked decline in mortality since 1750. 
 
1.3. Chapter Outline 
 
To test whether adverse selection is indeed a feature of the South African private 
health insurance sector and to refute government’s claim that the current legislation 
governing medical scheme business was a necessary intervention to address the 
destructive consequences of adverse selection, the following chapters will be 
presented in the thesis. 
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Chapter Two provides a comprehensive review of the South African private health 
insurance sector. This includes the background into how medical schemes came about 
and particular, the evolution of the regulatory environment. Pearmain (2000) asserts 
that the deregulation that occurred during the 1990s in South Africa’s private health 
insurance sector, allowed medical aid schemes to actively discourage membership by 
high-risk individuals. At the same time, government undertook an ambitious plan to 
provide free primary health care, at the point-of-service, to those who did not have 
access to private healthcare.11 As a result there was an increased demand for public 
sector healthcare services by those that had fallen outside of the private-sector 
medical scheme net. With the promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 
1998, some may argue that the government acted in the public interest to arrest the 
benefit deterioration observed for the elderly and poorly.  However, a more plausible 
explanation is that the South African government hastily sought to relinquish its social 
responsibility to provide healthcare to those citizens that were unable to obtain 
medical cover within the private sector (Reekie, 1999).  
 
The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 saw the introduction of the concepts of 
community rating and open enrolment. These concepts were part of an attempt by the 
South African government to undertake an ambitious social health engineering 
exercise, whereby a national health system is established through private sector 
medical schemes (Pearmain, 2000).12 Discrimination on the basis of age, gender, 
medical history or current health status was prohibited under the new regulatory 
framework. Moreover, contribution rates can only be determined on the basis of 
income level and/or number of dependents. Access to medical schemes is ensured 
through the principle of open enrolment, whereby medical schemes may not exclude 
any applicants or their dependents for membership except under certain prescribed 
conditions. The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 does provide for some 
protection against anti-selection by members through the imposition of waiting 
                                                     
11 Access to free primary health care is offered at public hospitals and clinics.  
12 A national health system was not an outcome of the new regulatory framework, which suggests that 
industry interest groups were successful in protecting their interests. The failure to establish a national 
health system has mobilised politically-charged organisations, such as the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), to start advocating in 2009, the establishment of a National Health Insurance 
(NHI) system.    
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periods and late-joiner penalties under predefined circumstances. The chapter also 
includes an assessment of the medical schemes industry and specifically, considers 
the competitiveness of the market by examining the degree of concentration over the 
period 1993 to 2009.  
 
Chapter Three examines the seminal contributions of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973, 
1974) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in relation to theory of adverse selection. In 
particular, the thesis will discuss how competitive insurance markets respond in the 
presence of imperfect information. This requires a detailed discussion of both Akerlof 
(1970)’s Lemons Principle and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s well-renowned model 
that explains how both insurers and insureds behave in the presence of information 
asymmetry. The chapter also includes a discussion of the primary indicator often 
utilised to empirically detect the presence of adverse selection, which involves 
detecting a positive coverage-risk correlation. A review of the empirical literature 
testing the theoretical predictions of adverse selection are presented, which highlight 
the contradictory evidence relating to the presence of adverse selection within selected 
insurance lines and markets. 
 
Chapter Four outlines the empirical methodology to test for the presence of adverse 
selection. Testing for a positive coverage-risk relationship within South Africa’s 
private health insurance sector would be the ideal avenue to detect the presence of 
adverse selection, as a positive coverage-risk correlation is a necessary condition for 
adverse selection to be present. However, due to data limitations, specifically the 
aggregated data constraint, an innovative empirical procedure is devised based upon 
Akerlof (1970)’s Lemon Principle and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis to 
directly test for the presence of adverse selection in South Africa’s medical scheme 
sector. The empirical results are then presented and discussed. In addition, within this 
chapter, several reasons why the absence of a positive coverage-risk correlation may 
be observed in insurance markets are examined. This is necessary to highlight the 
important aspects that may explain the absence of adverse selection within South 
Africa’s private health insurance sector.  
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Chapter Five outlines the theories of economic regulation that explain the observed 
behaviour of government intervention. This is done by reviewing the theoretical 
literature in this area including Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Priest (1993), Adams 
and Tower (1994), Laffont (1994) and Shleifer (2005). The four distinct schools of 
thought regarding regulatory capture will be discussed extensively.  
 
Chapter Six provides a discussion into the findings of the thesis including an 
argument that provides an alternative explanation for the current legislation governing 
medical scheme business – namely, regulatory capture. The limitations of the research 
and recommendations for future research are also discussed in the concluding chapter.  
 
1.4. Contribution of the Thesis 
 
The South African government considered that the Medical Schemes Act No. 72 of 
1967 and in particular, the subsequent amendments, inconsistent with the objective to 
provide universal access to affordable healthcare for all South Africans. Hence, a 
comprehensive reformulation of the legislation governing private health insurance 
sector was called for by the mid-1990s. Although the Medical Schemes Act No. 72 of 
1967 had survived a number of amendments, it was finally repealed in 2000 with the 
enactment of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. The stated reforms, most 
especially open enrolment and community rating, were touted by the government as 
necessary to address the undesirable effects of adverse selection.  It is precisely the 
contribution of this thesis in that it offers an alternative explanation as to why 
government reformulated the regulatory environment governing medical scheme 
business – namely, regulatory capture.   
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1.4.1 Objective of the Thesis 
 
The thesis highlights the fact that the government had completely misinterpreted the 
concept of adverse selection, but importantly, the question was never raised whether 
or not in fact adverse selection is a feature of the South African private health 
insurance market. A significant body of empirical literature indicates that adverse 
selection may not be present in all insurance lines or markets.13 The key test utilised 
to detect adverse selection is to establish the presence of a positive coverage-risk 
relationship. The evidence has been mixed with a coverage-risk correlation present 
within some insurance markets but absent in others (Löfgren, Persson & Weibull, 
2002). It is necessary to answer the question whether adverse selection is indeed a 
feature of the South African private health insurance market. This is achieved by 
empirically testing for the presence of adverse selection utilising a panel dataset of all 
registered medical schemes in South Africa over the period 1993 to 2009. 
Notwithstanding, the new regulatory framework, the South African medical scheme 
industry remains sufficiently competitive. Therefore, it is possible to utilise an 
innovative empirical procedure based upon Akerlof (1970)’s Lemon Principle and 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis to directly test for the presence of adverse 
selection in South Africa’s medical scheme sector. If adverse selection is found to be 
absent then government’s supposition that adverse selection (as a consequence of the 
deregulation that took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s) is responsible for 
the deterioration in medical scheme coverage for the elderly, unhealthy or poor would 
prove to be fallacious.  
 
Once it is established that the ostensible reason for the current legislation does not 
stand up to scrutiny, the primary objective of this thesis is to offer a plausible 
alternative explanation for the reasoning behind the promulgation of the current 
legislation. The stated objective of the South African government in the provision of 
private healthcare is for certain members (young, healthy or wealthy) to subsidise 
others (elderly, unhealthy or poor). Cross-subsidisation within the private health 
                                                     
13 Refer to Chiappori and Salanié  (2000), Cardon and Hendel (2001), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), 
Cohen (2005), Saito (2006), and Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008). 
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insurance market as envisaged by the government is simply not amenable to the 
functioning of a competitive insurance market (Reekie, 1999). Therefore, the key 
question is whether this objective is inconsistent with the concept of in the public 
interest. A detailed account of the theories of economic regulation is presented to 
provide the framework for the exposition of an alternative explanation behind the 
implementation of the current legislation. It is the view of this thesis that the principal 
argument of Stigler (1971) is correct and therefore, regulatory capture is the more 
plausible explanation behind the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 
of 1998 and accompanying regulations.   
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2 SOUTH AFRICA’S PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE SECTOR 
 
In this chapter a comprehensive review of the South African private health insurance 
sector is presented. An overview of the regulatory evolution governing medical 
scheme business is discussed. The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 represented 
the South African government’s attempt to reformulate the legislation so as to address 
what it identified as the deterioration in private health insurance coverage for the 
elderly, unhealthy and poor.  
 
Also broadly discussed in this chapter is an assessment of the performance of the 
medical scheme market including an analysis of the competitiveness of the sector. 
Explanations are sought in relation to the higher healthcare costs observed since the 
implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 in 2000.  
 
2.1 Background 
 
In South Africa, medical schemes are the principal vehicle for providing insurance 
cover against healthcare expenditure incurred within the private health sector 
(McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). A medical scheme provides members with protection 
against the healthcare expenditure that they (or their dependents) may incur due to the 
diagnosis, treatment or long-term care of a medical condition that can include illness, 
bodily injury, congenital or hereditary disease from which the member suffers a 
deterioration in their health or general well-being.  The member is required to 
compensate the medical scheme by means of monthly contribution paid over to the 
scheme timeously and in return the member can expect the scheme to reimburse 
healthcare providers for the healthcare expenditure that the member or their 
dependents incur according to a predefined schedule of benefits. Medical schemes 
operate on a not-for-profit basis and are regulated in South Africa by the Medical 
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Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. A medical scheme acts essentially as a mutual society 
that is managed by a board of trustees (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
 
The two broad types of medical schemes that operate within South Africa are open 
and restricted schemes. Open medical schemes permit new individuals from the 
general public to become members, subject to a mandatory waiting period and in 
certain cases late joiner penalties. Restricted membership schemes only permit 
individuals that meet the specified criteria of the scheme to become members. The 
basis of the restriction can only be employment or former employment in a 
profession, trade, industry or calling, or by a particular employer or class of employer. 
 
The Council for Medical Schemes is the statutory body responsible for medical 
schemes supervision in South Africa. Section 7 of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 
of 1998 outlines the functions of the Council for Medical Schemes. Pearmain (2000: 
186) points out that these functions are “…far more purposeful and consumer-
oriented” than the Council’s functions under the prior legislation. Pearmain (2000: 
186) describes that under the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, the Council for 
Medical Schemes is required to: 
“Protect the interests of [medical scheme] members at all times;  
Control and co-ordinate the functioning of medical schemes in a manner that is 
complementary with the national health policy; 
Make recommendations to the Minister [of Health] on criteria for the 
measurement of quality and outcomes of the relevant health services provided 
for by medical schemes, and such other services as the Council may from time to 
time determine; 
Investigate complaints and settle disputes in relation to the affairs of medical 
schemes as provided for in the [Medical Schemes] Act [No. 131 of 1998]; 
Collect and disseminate information about private health care; 
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Make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of the [Medical Schemes] Act 
[No. 131 of 1998], for the purpose of the performance of its functions and the 
exercise of the Council’s powers; 
Advise the Minister [of Health] on any matter concerning medical schemes; and 
Perform any other functions conferred on the Council by the Minister [of Health] 
or by the [Medical Schemes] Act [No. 131 of 1998]”. 
 
The Council for Medical Schemes is required to measure the delivery, quality and 
outcomes of healthcare services that medical scheme members receive from private 
healthcare providers (Pearmain, 2000). The Council for Medical Schemes has the 
authority to collect and disseminate information concerning the operation of both 
open and restricted medical schemes in the country. In addition, it is able to assess the 
quality of private healthcare provision to medical scheme members.    
 
Whilst short and long-term insurers are permitted to sell health insurance policies, the 
demarcation between medical scheme business and health insurance sold by short and 
long-term insurers was clearly redefined within the Long-Term Insurance Act No. 52 
of 1998, Short-Term Insurance Act No. 53 of 1998 and Medical Schemes Act No. 131 
of 1998. Health insurance policies are not allowed to indemnify policyholders against 
actual healthcare expenditure, but must rather offer a defined sum assured in advance 
of any healthcare provision. Further, health insurance policies may not directly 
reimburse healthcare providers. Even though there is this distinction between medical 
scheme business and health insurance in law, for the most part medical scheme 
business is nevertheless by its nature also health insurance. After all medical schemes 
are indemnifying members for uncertain future healthcare expenditure in return for a 
contribution fee (premium). Unlike medical scheme policies, health insurance policies 
sold by short and long-term insurers in South Africa are supervised by the Financial 
Services Board (FSB).     
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The legislative framework that has governed medical scheme business in South Africa 
can be segmented into three distinct regimes; namely, the pre-deregulation, 
deregulation and current regulatory periods.  
 
2.1.1 Medical Schemes Prior to the Deregulation 
 
De Beers Consolidated Mines first introduced the forerunner of today’s medical 
schemes in 1889 for its employees (Pearmain, 2000). After the Second World War, 
medical aid schemes proliferated and from 1956, medical aid schemes (including 
medical benefit schemes) had to register as friendly societies in terms of the Friendly 
Societies Act No. 25 of 1956. Medical aid schemes were akin to what nowadays one 
would refer to simply as medical schemes. In return for a regular contribution fee, 
medical aid schemes paid healthcare providers on a fee-for-service basis based upon a 
pre-determined or pre-negotiated tariff schedule. Members of medical aid schemes 
were allowed to choose their own healthcare providers. Medical benefit schemes did 
not operate on a fee-for-service basis, but rather members were restricted to a panel of 
healthcare providers that were paid by the medical benefit scheme either on a salaried 
basis or on a capitation basis.14 Medical benefit schemes were thus more akin to 
managed care type organisations. Reekie (1999) argues that medical schemes 
provided insurance cover for healthcare expenditures to a select minority of South 
Africans that could afford cover in the absence of a coordinated public sector health 
insurance system. 
 
The first key piece of legislation that was introduced to regulate and coordinate the 
functioning of the medical aid schemes and medical benefit schemes was the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 72 of 1967. By 1967, there were 256 medical schemes operating in 
South Africa, covering over 1.87 million individuals. Between 1967 and 1975, 
medical schemes were concurrently regulated by the Ministries of Finance and Health 
                                                     
14 Under the capitation basis, healthcare providers received a pre-determined fixed monthly or annual 
fee based upon the number of benefit scheme members and their dependants to whom they provided 
treatment. 
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in terms of the Friendly Societies Act No. 25 of 1956 and the Medical Schemes Act 
No. 72 of 1967 respectively. However, through the enactment of the Medical Schemes 
Amendment Act No. 43 of 1975, medical schemes became only subject to the 
regulations provided within the Medical Schemes Act No. 72 of 1967 (as amended). 
The Medical Schemes Act No. 72 of 1967 survived a number of amendments, the 
most important of which included the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 
1989 and the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993. These amendments 
signalled a significant shift in direction by the government at the time, whereby the 
medical scheme business was deregulated. 
 
Prior to the deregulation that took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
medical schemes operated largely on a pay-as-you-go basis. There was little or no 
provision made for the funding of future events beyond the financial accounting year 
(Reekie, 1999). Reekie (1999) indicates that prior to 1993, contribution fees were 
usually determined on a historic claims experience basis. Thus, medical schemes 
failed to account for future liabilities that arose from certain medical conditions over 
short-term horizons, or even to consider the fact that the elderly once retired would 
expect to pay lower contribution fees whilst submitting more frequent and/or larger 
claims to the medical scheme. 
 
Reekie (1999) points out that even though contribution revenue had risen between the 
years of 1982 and 1989, it was insufficient to meet the higher costs experienced by 
medical schemes.  The result was annual underwriting losses that occurred on no 
fewer than eight occasions during the nine year period between 1982 and 1990. 
Hence, as he explains these underwriting losses were of great concern, especially 
since the cost increases could not be explained simply by the growth in the number of 
dependants or by the depreciation of the local currency as measured by general price 
inflation. It was suggested by Reekie (1999) that the problem lay with the regulatory 
environment that medical schemes operated within at the time whereby incentives 
were misplaced. Since healthcare providers received a statutory guaranteed fee-for-
service from medical schemes and medical schemes were legally obligated to provide 
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full cover (first rand cover) to members, the regulatory framework diminished the 
incentives to contain costs (Reekie, 1999). As the author articulated the regulatory 
framework governing the private financing of healthcare expenditure encouraged the 
production and consumption of healthcare, rather than assisting the industry to 
economise upon scarce resources. 
 
During the 1980s, the largest single item of expenditure for medical schemes was 
pharmaceuticals, which constituted approximately 30% of all reimbursements 
(Reekie, 1999).  Almost all medicines dispensed to the private sector passed through a 
limited number of wholesalers to retail pharmacies. The author notes that price 
competition was rare as pharmacies were prohibited from advertising price 
differentials. In addition, the Pharmacy Act No.53 of 1976 stipulated that only 
pharmacists could own shares in businesses that operated as retail pharmacists. Hence, 
the expansion of retail pharmacies was severely restricted, since pharmacists could 
only gain access to additional capital by approaching other pharmacists. Hence, 
according to Reekie (1999: 3), medical schemes and effectively their members had to: 
“…pay for a retail structure which offered the worst of all possible worlds, 
namely; a multiplicity of high-cost, small-scale retailers which, as a whole, 
operated as a government-protected monopoly”. 
Despite the relatively high margins applied by pharmacists to medicines, it did not 
translate into significant profits for the retail pharmacies. The reason being that the 
turnover generated by retail pharmacies was simply too low due to the excessive 
number of pharmacies present within the market (Reekie, 1999). He suggests the 
retail pharmaceutical market’s incentive to innovate was all but eliminated by the 
regulatory framework. Reekie (1999) points out that the system prevented the 
adoption of innovative retailing technologies, which would translate into large-scale 
retail pharmacy chain stores that would offer a more cost-effective service. This 
would include more affordable medication to medical scheme members as monopoly 
mark-ups would dissipate. The author believed that it was inevitable that monopolistic 
mark-ups in the pharmaceutical retail sector, reinforced by regulatory protection of 
distribution channels, would give rise to new distribution mechanisms that would 
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escape the regulatory net.  At the beginning of the 1990s, medical practitioners took 
advantage of the exorbitant mark-ups in the pharmaceutical retail sector and began 
dispensing medication directly to patients.15  
 
Before the reforms of the 1990s, medical schemes had to fend off a direct threat to 
their very existence – the emergence of new health insurance policies offered by 
insurance companies. Large-scale insurers recognised the restricted environment that 
medical schemes operated within and therefore identified an opportunity to offer a set 
of cost-effective health insurance policies that would not be subject to the legally-
constrained framework governing medical schemes (Reekie, 1999). The dire situation 
that faced medical schemes towards the end of the 1980s prompted the government to 
revaluate its regulatory framework with a view to radically reform the legislation to 
address the incentive mechanisms that had led to the observed cost escalation.  
 
2.1.2 Deregulation during the 1990s 
 
The Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and the Medical Schemes 
Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 was a direct response to calls by the medical schemes 
industry to free it from the controls that it claimed hampered its ability to address cost 
escalation (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). The Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 88 of 
1997 also assisted in addressing the cost escalation observed with respect to 
medicines. Medicines had been a significant cost constituent in terms of the 
reimbursements made by medical schemes on behalf of their members. From Reekie 
(1999)’s perspective, the underwriting losses experienced during the 1980s were 
untenable and it was acknowledged by the government that at the time a drastic 
reformulation of the regulatory framework governing medical scheme business was 
required. 
 
                                                     
15 At the beginning of the 1980s almost 100% of private sector sales of medication passed through 
retail pharmacies, but by 1993 this had diminished to 41.3% in terms of value (Reekie, 1999).  
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According to Reekie (1999) the financial turnaround experienced by the medical 
schemes industry after 1993 can be attributed to the introduction of the principle of 
managed care. Under the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989, medical 
schemes were now able to apply the concept of risk-rating in their computation of 
contribution rates and benefit coverage options. This represented a key reform 
whereby medical schemes could align the expected claims experience of members 
(benefits that they would receive under the medical scheme policy) to the level of 
their contributions. As a consequence, medical schemes were permitted to charge 
higher contribution rates to those individuals who represented a higher risk to the 
scheme. In effect, it would eliminate the cross-subsidisation that had existed between 
the young and old, and between the healthy and unhealthy.   
 
The Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 removed the statutory 
minimum benefits and guaranteed payment of claims. Thus, medical schemes were 
allowed to ration coverage or even exclude coverage completely for certain 
procedures. Furthermore, the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 
permitted medical schemes to provide healthcare services directly to their members 
through a wide spectrum of options. Reekie (1999) suggests that the fee-for-service 
based upon a member’s free choice of healthcare provider remained an option at the 
one extreme, alternatively medical schemes could specify an approved list of 
healthcare providers (Preferred Provider Organisations – PPOs), enter into 
partnerships with healthcare providers (Health Maintenance Organisations – HMOs), 
or simply employ healthcare providers by establishing their own healthcare clinics, 
hospitals and pharmacies. The Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 was 
based upon revised legislation and practices in the United States (Reekie, 1999). He 
suggested that the competitive nature of health insurance providers in the United 
States generally ensured an efficient system of healthcare provision, with providers 
minimising costs to maximise their residual surplus.  
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Reforms with respect to the Supply of Pharmaceuticals 
The Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 88 of 1997 repealed the ban on the corporate 
ownership of pharmacies thereby opening up access to capital for the retail 
pharmaceutical industry that would permit the creation of larger retail outlets. This in 
turn would translate into lower medicine prices at the point-of-service. Reekie (1999) 
also highlights an important income redistributive mechanism that takes place 
between the public sector (government) and the private sector (medical schemes) with 
respect to the purchasing of pharmaceuticals. In South Africa, the public sector 
purchases pharmaceuticals through competitive tender, whilst the private sector’s 
purchases of pharmaceuticals are initiated by individual prescribing healthcare 
practitioners. With approximately 8,068,505 individuals serviced by the private sector 
through medical scheme membership, at least four out of every five South Africans 
remain reliant upon the public sector for receipt of their prescribed medicines. The 
author points out that the pharmaceutical manufacturers sell roughly two-thirds of all 
medicines to the state and one-third to the private sector. In monetary terms, this 
proportion is reversed.  
 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers simply apply price discrimination principles in 
response to varying price elasticities of demand. Individuals serviced by the private 
sector are generally in full employment and are less price sensitive than poorer 
individuals serviced by the state (Reekie, 1999). In South Africa, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have merely responded to the observable price sensitivities by pricing 
at a lower a level in the more price sensitive sector (Reekie, 1999). This is referred to 
as third-degree price discrimination or market segmentation. Through pursuing their 
own self-interest and attempting to maximise expected profits, pharmaceutical 
companies achieve a redistribution of income across the public and private sectors.  
 
For price discrimination to be effective it requires that firms must be able to identify 
market segments according to their relative price elasticities and further be able to 
enforce such price discrimination (Samuelson & Marks, 2006). Samuelson and Marks 
(2006) consider the airline industry, where airlines routinely segment their product 
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offerings into various travel classes. Airlines charge customers with relatively 
inelastic demand (first and business-class passengers) significantly higher ticket 
prices, whilst offering discount ticket prices to customers with relatively elastic 
demand (economy-class passengers). Although product differentiation is clearly 
applicable, it does not adequately translate into the price differential observed. To 
discourage business travellers from purchasing discounted economy-class tickets, 
airlines often impose advance ticketing requirements or minimum stay requirements - 
conditions that would prove difficult for the average business traveller to adhere to 
(Samuelson & Marks, 2006). 
 
Summary of Reforms and Risk Rating 
A key objective of the reforms was to permit medical schemes to provide healthcare 
services themselves with no restrictions as to the required minimum benefit level that 
could be offered to members (Reekie, 1999). In addition, first rand cover was no 
longer a legal requirement (Reekie 1999). According to Pearmain (2000), the reforms 
had a direct impact upon medical scheme operations by:  
 Abolishing compulsory direct payment to healthcare providers; 
 Permitting medical schemes, at their discretion, to vary benefit levels and options; 
 Removing the statutory status of the scale of benefits; 
 Introducing risk-rating in the computation of contribution rates and coverage 
levels; and 
 Letting medical schemes operate pharmacies, hospitals and other healthcare 
facilities. 
 
The reforms and in particular the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993, 
effectively removed unnecessary regulation from the medical scheme industry and 
allowed a more competitive environment to flourish (Reekie, 1999). Pearmain (2000: 
185) identifies that the deregulation: 
“…allowed detailed and individual specific risk rating and many variations in 
both the level and structuring of benefits”.  
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Pearmain (2000) was less enthusiastic by the deregulation that took place during the 
1990s as she viewed the new reforms as destructive and harmful to those who needed 
access to affordable private healthcare the most; namely, the elderly and those 
individuals in poor health. According to the author, the Medical Schemes Amendment 
Act No. 23 of 1993 Act had adverse effects for the elderly and ailing whereby the 
benefits offered to them by medical schemes diminished significantly.  
 
Pearmain (2000) provides a useful explanation of risk rating in the context of the 
South African health insurance sector. According to the author, risk rating principles 
dictate that medical schemes would analyse the historical claims experience of 
relatively homogenous risk groups, and in addition, schemes would examine the 
medical history and current health status of members. New applicants to an open 
medical scheme would be assessed and classified according to the relevant risk group 
that best-described their risk characteristics. Based upon the risk classification 
procedure the appropriate contribution rate can be determined whereby the: 
“standard or average contribution levied by [the medical scheme] is loaded…in 
proportion to the increased risk to the scheme represented by the group or 
individual applying for membership” (Pearmain, 2000: 185).  
Moreover, she highlights that risk rating can be undertaken on a continual basis 
instead of a single point in time – when the member is admitted into the medical 
scheme. An example by Pearmain (2000) illustrates; if an open scheme admits a 
group of employees from a single employer and the risk classification procedure is 
based upon the risk profile of the group as a whole, then it is possible for the medical 
scheme to re-examine the group’s claims experience dynamically to determine if the 
“…health profile of the group has improved or deteriorated [over] time” (Pearmain, 
2000: 185). If the health (risk profile) of the group deteriorates then the medical 
scheme can conceivably adjust contributions upwards to reflect the increase in risk 
(Pearmain, 2000). Thus, Pearmain (2000: 185) emphasises that it is possible where 
risk rating is applied within an open scheme: 
“…different employer groupings might end up paying very different levels of 
contributions for the same level of benefits depending [upon] their risk profiles”. 
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Medical schemes responded to the deregulation by structuring their benefits in such a 
way, as to attract young and healthy individuals, and also in some cases actively 
discouraging membership by high-risk individuals through benefit restructuring and 
contribution loadings on the basis of risk profile (Pearmain, 2000). Consequently, 
Pearmain (2000) argues that this form of risk rating would result in an increase in the 
demand on the public healthcare service by the elderly and those individuals who 
were in poor health since they could no longer access affordable private healthcare 
cover. She contends that risk rating diminishes or even eliminates the operation of 
cross-subsidization and the consequence of this is that low-risk individuals benefit 
from lower premiums, whilst premiums for high-risk individuals (elderly and 
unhealthy) rise in line with their corresponding risk status. The author reiterates the 
concern that under these circumstances health insurance cover becomes unaffordable 
for those who are precisely in need of such cover. However commendable Pearmain 
(2000)’s disparaging comments concerning risk rating may be in a social context, it is 
easy to overlook an important objective of risk rating; namely, to align the 
contributions charged to members and the benefits received by members.  
 
Pearmain (2000) does not adequately consider an important feature of insurance 
markets, namely; adverse selection, when discussing the application of risk rating. 
The principle of adverse selection is inextricably linked to the application of risk 
rating within the health insurance market. Key to the discussion of adverse selection is 
the notion that the premiums charged to an individual (or homogenous risk group that 
they belong to) should reflect their risk status – and thereby, the benefits that members 
are expected to receive under a medical scheme policy. If this is not the case, 
individuals who end up subsidising other individuals that have a higher propensity to 
require healthcare services than themselves, will be more likely to opt out of 
insurance – the old adage where the “lemons” drive out the good (Akerlof, 1970).  
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2.1.3 Rationale behind the enactment of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 
 
A serious consequence of the apartheid government’s reign of oppression was a 
legacy of inequality. If one considers, measures of income inequality, such as the Gini 
coefficient,16 it is apparent that there is a significant disparity between the wealthy and 
poor in South Africa.  By 1993, South Africa’s Gini coefficient was 0.5933 (World 
Bank, 2009).17 Most developed European countries, Australia, Japan and Canada all 
have Gini coefficients ranging between 0.25 and 0.36 (Firebaugh, 2003; World Bank, 
2009). South Africa’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita18 had risen only 
marginally from $2,984 in 1960 to $3,217 by 1993 (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1996). If one considers more developed countries, South Africa’s real 
GDP per capita was considerably lower - Australia ($18,530), United Kingdom 
($17,230), United States ($24,680) and the Republic of Ireland ($15,120) (United 
Nations Development Programme, 1996). In 1993, South Africa also compared 
unfavourably against other emerging economies; such as Brazil ($5,500), Poland 
($4,702), Russian Federation ($4,760) and Botswana ($5,220) (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1996).  
 
The patterns of economic inequality in South Africa were also mirrored in relation to 
the patterns observed with respect to healthcare inequality (McIntyre, Thiede, Nkosi, 
Mutyambizi, Castilo-Riquelme, Gilson, Erasmus & Goudge, 2007). Life expectancy 
at birth in South Africa continued to lag behind most developed economies during the 
                                                     
16 The Gini coefficient, as formulated by Corrado Gini and published in 1912, is a measure of the 
inequality of a distribution (Gini, 1912, 1937). The Gini coefficient can be calculated by considering a 
two-dimensional graphical representation of the Lorenz curve, which plots the proportion of the total 
income of a country’s population (y-axis) that is cumulatively earned by the bottom x% of the country’s 
population (Firebaugh, 2003). A 45-degree line denotes perfect equality, and thus the coefficient can be 
determined by considering the ratio of the area between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve. The 
Gini coefficient can take on a value between 0 and 1 (in some cases, the coefficient is multiplied by 
100, to scale the coefficient to lie between 0 and 100). A low Gini coefficient indicates a more 
equitable income distribution, with a value of 0 corresponding to perfect equality.  
17 Interestingly, the disparity between the wealthy and poor in South Africa, has deteriorated further 
since the first democratic elections held in 1994. By 2009, South Africa’s Gini coefficient stood at 
0.679 (EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, 2010). 
18 Real GDP per capita is converted into US dollars on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) 
relative to the domestic currency. 
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late 1980s and early 1990s.19 Life expectancy at birth increased only modestly from 
61 years in 1987 to 63.2 years in 1993 (United Nations Development Programme; 
1990, 1996).20 Gilson and McIntyre (2001) observe that the ratio of the infant 
mortality rate between the poorest and richest quintiles was as high as 2.9 during the 
early 1990s.  
 
Bradshaw and Steyn (2001) go further to suggest that the relationship between health 
and socio-economic status is so strong in South Africa. For example, so-called 
lifestyle diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, which traditionally affect mainly 
higher-income individuals, have impinged upon all socio-economic groupings in the 
country (Bradshaw & Steyn, 2001). Moreover, the authors indicate that poorer 
communities were inadequately serviced with respect to preventative care and the 
treatment of both lifestyle diseases and chronic illnesses. By 1994, hospital-based 
curative care rather than preventative care was particularly favoured within the public 
healthcare sector as reflected in a high hospital bed to population ratio concentrated in 
urban areas and at higher levels of care (McIntyre et al., 2007). McIntyre et al. (2007) 
suggest that district hospital capacity was inadequate and primary healthcare had been 
systematically neglected throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
Health policy under the apartheid government created a healthcare system that 
ensured that the minority white population benefitted from a higher-quality of care, 
through primarily the private healthcare sector, but also through a carefully 
constructed system of public healthcare provision that favoured the white population. 
Until the late 1980s, access to public healthcare was delineated along racial lines, 
thereby creating effectively a two-tiered public healthcare sector. Preventative and 
                                                     
19 In 1993, the life expectancy at birth in the following developed and emerging economies were - 
Australia (77.8 years), United Kingdom (76.3 years), United States (76.1 years), the Republic of 
Ireland (75.4 years), Brazil (66.5 years), Poland (71.1 years), Russian Federation (67.4 years) and 
Botswana (65.2 years)  (United Nations Development Programme, 1996). 
20 By 2010, South Africa’s life expectancy at birth had deteriorated significantly to only 52 years 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2010). The rapid deterioration in life expectancy has been 
attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the related issue of a significant growth in multi-drug and 
extreme-drug resistant tuberculosis. According to Dorrington, Bradshaw, Johnson and Daniel (2006), 
approximately 5.4 million individuals in South Africa were HIV positive. This constituted more than 
11 percent of the total South African population.   
30 
 
curative primary healthcare services were provided in separate healthcare facilities 
(hospitals and clinics) and administered by different healthcare authorities for the 
white and non-white population groupings (McIntyre & Gilson, 2002). McIntyre and 
Gilson (2002) note that the considerable inequalities established through the apartheid 
legislation were further exacerbated by a funding bias towards public healthcare 
facilities that were located in white-dominated geographical areas. Thus, the majority 
non-white population had to rely upon a deliberately under-resourced and effectively 
second-tier public healthcare sector that delivered a lower quality of care (McIntyre et 
al., 2007).  
 
The provision of private healthcare has an extensive history in South Africa. 
Healthcare professionals have always been permitted to operate within a private 
practice setting. Naylor (1988) points out that by the early 1980s, approximately 40 
percent of all general practitioners operated within a single or group private practice. 
Rispel and Behr (1992) indicate that by 1990, 62 percent of all general practitioners 
and 66 percent of medical specialists were in private practice. Private hospitals were 
initially limited to non-profit mission healthcare facilities that served rural 
communities and industry-aligned onsite hospitals, such as those healthcare facilities 
located at large mines (McIntyre et al., 2007). As the government sought to contract 
out long-term tuberculosis and psychiatric care in the first half of the 19th century 
there was an initial spurt in the growth of for-profit private hospitals (McIntyre et al., 
2007). But it is only since the early 1980s that for-profit private hospitals have 
become a more prominent feature of the healthcare provision landscape. McIntyre et 
al. (1995) report that private hospital beds nearly doubled between 1988 and 1993. 
The rapid increase in private hospital beds exacerbated the exodus of medical 
specialists into private practice. The authors explain that due to the increased 
availability of private hospital beds, medical specialists would be encouraged to move 
into private practice since typically they operate their consulting practices within 
private hospitals and subsequently admit their patients to these hospitals.  
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The voluntary financing of private healthcare through medical schemes served as the 
complementary device that augmented demand for private healthcare provision in 
South Africa. Between the Second World War and the early 1990s, the number of 
medical schemes grew significantly, which raised concerns about the sustainability of 
the private health financing mechanism (McIntyre et al., 2007).  From the mid-1980s 
until the early 1990s, they note that medical scheme expenditure per beneficiary rose 
sharply. The rise in expenditure was attributed to increases in expenditure on 
medication and private hospital care. According to McIntyre et al. (2007: 15), “... [b]y 
the late 1980s, increases in medical scheme expenditure, and in contribution rates, 
were of the order of 30 [percent] per annum in nominal terms”.  
 
Medical schemes’ fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements with private hospitals 
and healthcare professionals encouraged utilisation as earnings were directly linked to 
the volume generated (McIntyre et al., 2007). The authors point out one clear-cut 
example is the purchase of expensive advanced diagnostic equipment, such as 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners.21  Owners of private healthcare facilities 
that purchased advanced diagnostic equipment would actively encourage healthcare 
practitioners to utilise the equipment so as to generate greater revenue (McIntyre et 
al., 2007). Since many private healthcare professionals benefit from ownership stakes 
in private healthcare practices or similar profit-incentive programmes, private 
healthcare professionals had every incentive to increase utilisation.22  
 
McIntyre (1997) argue that the underlying incentive structure was a significant 
contributor for the observable trends in higher levels of hospitalisation and the 
increased utilisation of advanced diagnostic equipment. Unlike healthcare expenditure 
in the public sector, healthcare expenditure in the private sector continued to increase 
                                                     
21 An MRI machine utilises the property of nuclear magnetic resonance to generate images of the nuclei 
of atoms within the human body. This is achieved by utilising a powerful magnetic field, which triggers 
the nuclei of atoms within the body to produce a rotating magnetic field, which is detectable by the 
MRI scanner. 
22 Van den Heever (2007) discusses other examples of financially beneficial relationships that can exist 
between the private healthcare institutions and their contracted healthcare practitioners. For example, 
rent-free or subsidised consulting rooms. In particular, medical specialists would be offered rent-free or 
subsidised consulting rooms if they achieved certain performance targets.  
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unabated during the 1980s and early 1990s - far exceeding consumer inflation 
(McIntyre et al., 1995). Until the promulgation of the Medical Schemes Amendment 
Act No. 19 of 1989 and the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993, 
medical schemes could only differentiate contributions on the basis of the principal 
member’s income and their number of dependents.  Thus, excessive private healthcare 
cost escalation (exacerbated by higher levels of private healthcare utilisation) coupled 
with the inability of medical schemes to align the expected claims experience of 
members to their contributions caused medical schemes to suffer successive 
underwriting losses (Reekie, 1999). Medical schemes did respond by increasing 
contributions, but as these contributions were community-based rather than risk-
based, it did not address the underlying causes of the financial distress experienced by 
many medical schemes.23 Therefore, out of necessity, medical schemes lobbied 
successfully for the deregulation of the medical scheme industry.  
 
For Reekie (1999) the deregulation that took place during the late 1980s and early 
1990s was a significant move in the right direction to create a regulatory framework 
that: 
“…effectively removed a host of unnecessary regulations…and introduced a 
much more competitive environment than before” (Reekie, 1999: 4). 
Reekie (1999) suggests that the reforms resulted in: 
“…improved solvency and financial stability and increased coverage across the 
whole spectrum of society, the [healthcare] cost explosion had been reigned in” 
(Reekie, 1999: 4). 
Reekie (1999) believed that the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 
and the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 created a regulatory 
environment that promoted competition, and removed the obstacles that hindered the 
application of insurance and risk management principles within the private healthcare 
financing sector. The regulatory changes permitted medical schemes to utilise risk-
rating to determine contributions, which according to van den Heever (1997) were 
                                                     
23 Contributions during the 1980s and early 1990s increased on average at a rate in excess of 25 percent 
per annum in real terms (McIntyre et al., 1995). 
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along the lines of private health insurance in the United States. Minimum benefits 
were also abolished with the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 and 
medical schemes were permitted to ration coverage.  
 
The deregulation that took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s did not address 
the inequalities and disparities in healthcare provision between the public and private 
healthcare sectors. Most importantly, the first democratically-elected government 
inherited a healthcare system that was deeply fragmented and reflected broader socio-
economic inequalities (McIntyre et al., 2007). According to McIntyre et al. (2007), the 
major challenge facing the South African health system was to address the inefficient 
and inequitable distribution of resources between the public and private healthcare 
sectors. The authors emphasise the apartheid government’s policy of privatisation and 
deregulation as key determinants in exacerbating a public-private healthcare sector 
mix that did not reflect the new government’s objective of creating a high-quality 
healthcare system that was accessible to all South Africans (Department of Health, 
2004). The government sought to improve the health status of individuals by 
focussing upon preventative care, the promotion of healthier lifestyles and providing 
an equitable healthcare delivery system (McIntyre et al., 2007).   
 
Despite Reekie (1999: 4)’s assurances that “…the [healthcare] cost explosion had 
been reigned in” once the principle of managed care had become a legal possibility 
with the deregulation of the late 1980s and early 1990s; Doherty and McLeod (2003) 
observed that the healthcare cost escalation lingered well into the first term of office 
of the post-apartheid government. Reekie (1999) argued that the regulatory reforms 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s would facilitate greater access to medical scheme 
coverage for all South Africans. However, the deregulation that occurred over this 
period did not translate into greater medical scheme coverage; in fact medical scheme 
membership remained relatively stagnant until the end of the 1990s. Doherty and 
McLeod (2003) argued that medical scheme practices, such as the application of the 
concept of risk-rating, had a negative impact upon medical scheme coverage. 
According to the authors, high risk individuals, such as the elderly and/or unhealthy, 
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had their monthly contributions loaded as they represented a greater risk to the 
medical scheme due to their higher expected claims experience. Medical schemes also 
imposed life-long exclusions for pre-existing conditions and in certain cases, the 
elderly and/or unhealthy were simply excluded from coverage altogether.  
 
Another practice that intensified after the deregulation of the late 1980s and early 
1990s “…was the ‘dumping’ of private patients on the public healthcare sector once 
their (now more limited) benefits had been exceeded” (Doherty & McLeod, 2003: 
42). Rationing coverage and excluding coverage altogether were, according to 
Doherty and McLeod (2003), simply a means of cost avoidance as opposed to 
improvements in efficiency as implied by Reekie (1999). The result was that these 
measures merely reduced medical scheme coverage for those private patients who 
required healthcare services the most. As a result, the public healthcare sector was left 
to bear the additional burden of private patients who had exhausted their medical 
scheme benefits (Doherty & McLeod, 2003).  
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) maintain that the application of risk-rating undermined the 
principle of cross-subsidisation between high-risk and low-risk individuals, which 
according to the authors was a central tenet behind the initial design of medical 
schemes in South Africa. When De Beers Consolidated Mines was set up as the 
forerunner of today’s medical schemes back in 1889, the underlying reason was to 
fund employee healthcare in the face of what was often risky mining activities. Cross-
subsidisation was a consequence of the funding arrangement under the scheme rather 
than a deliberate design feature. Although, cross-subsidisation can serve a beneficial 
function within insurance markets, it may have unintended adverse consequences. If 
one considers Dahlby (1983)’s analysis into the prohibition of statistical 
discrimination with respect to gender in the Canadian automobile insurance market at 
the end of 1970s, the outcome of regulatory-imposed cross-subsidisation is proved to 
be less than favourable. Dahlby (1983) illustrates that once insurers are no longer 
permitted to discriminate against males by charging them higher premiums than 
females ceteris paribus, society is worse off since the discount received by males with 
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respect to their premiums for collision insurance is smaller than the increase in 
premiums experienced by females.24 Thus, cross-subsidisation leads to the situation 
whereby society pays more for the identical level of collision insurance coverage. 
Moreover, Dahlby (1983) demonstrates that the proportion of females purchasing 
collision insurance within the different classes would decline once statistical 
discrimination is prohibited. Lower-risk females are likely to opt out of collision 
insurance as they are not prepared to subsidise the male population that has an overall 
higher-associated risk. Not surprisingly, she finds that the proportion of males 
purchasing collision insurance rises as their premiums are being subsidised by the 
females. However, the author illustrates that the overall demand for collision 
insurance is expected to fall.    
 
In South Africa, the desire to ensure that private health insurance remains affordable 
for particularly the elderly and unhealthy does have moral traction. Observing that 
certain high-risk individuals including senior citizens were unable to obtain affordable 
medical scheme cover, the South African government inferred that a form of adverse 
selection was taking place whereby medical schemes were ‘cherry-picking’ or self-
selecting low-risk individuals (Reekie, 1999). Despite the validity of this observation 
that the elderly and unhealthy found it progressively more difficult to maintain their 
levels of medical scheme coverage once the deregulation took place with the 
promulgation of the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and the 
Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993, it is unfortunate that the principle 
of adverse selection is ascribed to this phenomenon. Rejda (2005) describes the 
principle of adverse selection as the observation that high-risk individuals are more 
likely to demand insurance than low-risk individuals. Adverse selection arises in 
insurance markets when the purchaser of insurance has more information about either 
the probability of a loss or the distribution of the magnitude of the loss should the loss 
event occur, than the insurance company. For the party that possesses superior 
information, it is advantageous to withhold such information from the other party. 
                                                     
24 Premiums within the different classes (single versus married and age category) for males and females 
converge to a single level ceteris paribus, as insurers cannot charge differential premiums to reflect the 
different risk associated with gender characteristics (Dahlby, 1983). Without a significant loss in 
generality, it is assumed that the number of males and females purchasing collision insurance following 
the prohibition of statistical discrimination. 
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Under health insurance, each individual would select amongst a set of contracts based 
upon their expected probability of utilising healthcare services in the future. High-risk 
individuals (elderly and/or unhealthy) opt for more generous healthcare plans as 
opposed to low-risk individuals that anticipate requiring limited utilisation of 
healthcare services.  
 
Government viewed the risk selection or ‘cherry-picking’ practices by medical 
schemes as a manifestation of adverse selection (Reekie, 1999). However, adverse 
selection would in fact advocate the opposite. Where insurers find it difficult to 
distinguish between high and low-risk individuals due to information asymmetry or 
through regulation that forces insurers to exclude certain risk factors in the 
determination of premiums, low-risk individuals are likely to exit the private health 
insurance market as they are unwillingly to subsidise the high-risk individuals. At the 
same time, high-risk individuals would be induced to continue with medical scheme 
coverage and in some cases even increase coverage levels (move to more generous 
medical scheme plans) as they are effectively purchasing coverage at a discount. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that high-risk individuals were either reducing existing 
medical scheme benefits, opting out of medical scheme coverage or simply being 
excluded from coverage altogether, this is contrary to what the theory of adverse 
selection would predict (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, government’s proposition that the 
exodus of high-risk individuals from the medical scheme market can somehow be 
ascribed to adverse selection is a complete misinterpretation of the concept (Reekie, 
1999).  
 
A key concern that emerged after the promulgation of the Medical Schemes 
Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 
1993 was that medical scheme coverage became increasingly unaffordable for those 
who required healthcare services the most. This in turn, lead to what Doherty and 
McLeod (2003: 42) referred to as  the “dumping” of private patients on the public 
healthcare sector, which further entrenched the disparities between the public and 
private healthcare sectors. Throughout the 1990s, real per capita spending in the 
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public healthcare sector remained relatively constant, whilst there was a significant 
rise in real per capita spending on medical scheme members (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
Even by 2005, the authors point out that the disparities between the public and private 
healthcare sectors has yet to be resolved. On average, spending per medical scheme 
member per annum was almost R9500 in 2005; whereas for those who rely solely 
upon the public healthcare sector for both hospital and primary care, spending was 
less than R1300 per person per annum (McIntyre et al., 2007).25 The disparities also 
extend to the availability of healthcare professionals between each sector. For 
example, in 2005, the ratio of medical specialists to the number of individuals 
serviced by the private sector was one in less than 500 versus one in almost 11000 in 
the public sector (McIntyre et al., 2007). Despite the apparent advantageous position 
that individuals serviced by the private sector find themselves in versus their public 
sector counterparts, Doherty and McLeod (2003) refer to the World Health Report 
published by the World Health Organisation in 2000, where they identify the poor 
value for money that South Africa’s private healthcare sector offers to consumers. 
Thus, the World Health Organisation (2000) promotes a greater role for the South 
African government in stewarding the private provision and financing of healthcare to 
achieve social objectives, which includes the affordability of medical scheme 
contributions and equitable outcomes with respect to healthcare delivery (Doherty & 
McLeod, 2003).     
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) argue that the quintessential challenge for the South African 
healthcare system was to develop a mechanism to promote cross-subsidisation 
between the healthy, younger (and wealthier) population and the unhealthy, elderly 
(and poor) population. Thus, they advocate that it was necessary to reformulate the 
healthcare regulatory environment and in particular the legislation governing medical 
scheme business, to create a legislative framework that would function as a 
redistribution device to address the inequitable distribution of resources (and quality 
of care delivered) between the public and private healthcare sectors.  
 
                                                     
25 The spending per capita in the private healthcare sector may exaggerate the disparity, since it based 
upon spending per medical scheme member rather than per medical scheme beneficiary.  
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2.2 The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) argues that medical schemes started out as having community-
rated contributions and initially, the private financing of healthcare expenditure 
essentially adhered to the principle of solidarity. However, through the enactment of 
the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and the Medical Schemes 
Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993, the government at the time embarked upon a process 
that significantly deregulated the medical scheme industry.  As discussed previously, 
the deregulation permitted detailed and individual risk rating, and provided for 
variations in both the level and structure of benefits. Hence, as Pearmain (2000) 
asserts the average contribution levied by a particular scheme for a representative risk 
pool is loaded or increased in proportion to the increased risk to the scheme 
represented by the group or individual applying for membership. According to the 
author, risk rating severely hinders the operation of cross-subsidisation within a 
medical scheme. Nevertheless, this represents a narrow view of the nature of cross-
subsidisation and its application within insurance markets.  Whilst it is true that risk 
classification does indeed permit insurers to offer lower premiums to individuals that 
represent a lower risk to the medical scheme, it does not preclude medical schemes 
from engaging in cross-subsidisation should they choose to do so. Medical schemes 
can still elect to charge low-risk individuals more for coverage than their risk status 
would dictate. The success of such a strategy would depend upon a number of factors, 
not least of all the principle of adverse selection - a distinct possibility can occur 
whereby the low-risk members would exit the health insurance market as they are 
unwillingly to effectively subsidise the high-risk members (Akerlof, 1970). This is 
indeed a strong argument in favour of risk-rating. Yet, other factors such as risk 
aversion and the degree to which people are willing to sacrifice health insurance cover 
may curtail the adverse selection effect.26  
 
Pearmain (2000)’s view that cross-subsidisation and risk classification are mutually 
exclusive mechanisms is mistaken. Eggleston (2000) puts forward the idea of cross-
subsidisation across time (or dynamic cross-subsidisation) and he argues that it is 
                                                     
26 Refer to a more detailed discussion about adverse selection in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
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indeed prudent for health insurers to incorporate cross-subsidisation across time. The 
author examines how the design of a health insurance financing system can have a 
significant impact with respect to the equity and efficiency to which healthcare is 
delivered to the public at large. Medical scheme cover, as in any other line of 
insurance, does create a propensity for moral hazard to occur whereby fully-covered 
members “tend to over-utilise services that appear to be "free" or are heavily-
subsidised” (Eggleston, 2000: 174). Hence, medical schemes argue that it is necessary 
to introduce demand-side cost sharing mechanisms such as medical savings accounts, 
deductibles and co-insurance to discourage over-utilisation, and thus reduce the 
problem of moral hazard. Whilst, it is precisely the elderly that increase their 
utilisation of healthcare and thus demand greater healthcare cover, medical schemes 
have failed historically to utilise risk financing across time. Young and healthy 
members’ individual contributions should be seen as contributions to finance their 
future demand for healthcare. Therefore, medical schemes can inflate the 
contributions of low-risk members, such as the young and healthy, with the view that 
a portion of these contributions are allocated towards funding the low-risk’s future 
healthcare expenditure.  
 
Pearmain (2000: 185) goes further to criticize the utilisation of risk rating:  
“It facilitates offers of attractively low premiums to persons who are good risks, 
[for example] the young and healthy, while requiring those who are old or sick to 
pay greatly increased premiums which they often cannot afford”.  
Despite the fact that it is precisely the objective of risk rating to segment any 
insurance market into ‘homogenous’ risk pools with the members of a pool having 
essentially the same risk profile27, this is in line with the definition of equity that leads 
                                                     
27 Therefore, members of a pool that represent a higher risk to the medical scheme can expect to pay 
higher contributions than the contributions charged to members from a pool with a lower risk.  
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to efficient outcomes (Eggleston, 2000).28 Eggleston (2000) asserts that risk 
classification (and as a consequence risk rating) can improve the trade-off between 
inefficient utilisation and inequitable coverage. In fact, risk classification and risk 
rating is a response by medical schemes to overcome the problem of adverse selection 
(Reekie, 1999).  
 
Hence, after the first-democratic elections in 1994, the South African government 
began redrafting the legislation governing medical scheme business, with the view to 
bring it in line with the government’s objective of providing universal access to 
affordable private healthcare for all South Africans. The Medical Schemes Act No. 
131 of 1998 represented a return to the principle of solidarity and according to 
Pearmain (2000: 185): 
“…the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and its regulations is substantially 
different, both in terms of focus and government policy, from the preceding 
law”.  
According to McIntyre et al. (2007) the primary focus of the new legislation was to 
ensure that medical schemes remain financially sound and to ensure that their benefit 
offerings continue to be sustainable. In addition, the Act promotes the effective 
governance of medical schemes, through a Board of Trustees (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
Trustees of a medical scheme are required to have the requisite skills to manage the 
scheme and to ensure that the interests of the medical scheme members and their 
beneficiaries are safeguarded. The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 established 
an Office of the Registrar of Medical Schemes, which serves at the executive body of 
the Council for Medical Schemes (McIntyre et al., 2007). Under the prior legislative 
framework, the Registrar of Medical Schemes had only a small staff complement and 
the Office served merely as a deputy directorate under the Department of Health. 
                                                     
28 As discussed previously, this definition of equity proposes that an individual’s medical scheme 
contribution should be aligned with the benefits that the member receives. A person who is high-risk 
has a greater likelihood of claiming under a health insurance policy (claiming against the medical 
scheme for healthcare expenditure incurred) and the expected value of any claim is also likely to be 
larger in comparison to a person with a lower risk profile. Therefore, a high-risk individual is likely to 
receive greater and more frequent claim reimbursements from the medical scheme for healthcare 
expenditure incurred than an individual with a lower risk profile – the expected benefits are greater and 
thus, so should the high-risk person’s contributions be greater. 
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Under the new legislation, the Council for Medical Schemes is a statutory body that 
has the power to approve, suspend or revoke the registration of medical schemes and 
medical scheme administrators (McIntyre et al., 2007). As stated by McIntyre et al. 
(2007: 45): 
“…the creation of a strong regulatory authority, in the form of the Council for 
Medical Schemes, has been critical to the successful implementation of these 
regulations. Unfortunately, to date, no comprehensive assessment of the 
effectiveness of these regulations has been undertaken”. 
McLeod and Ramjee (2007) point out that under the Act; the Council for Medical 
Schemes is tasked with protecting the interests of members of medical schemes and 
their dependents rather than those of the medical scheme industry. The Council for 
Medical Schemes is funded by a levy on medical scheme members. Besides 
regulating medical schemes, the Council for Medical Schemes is also responsible for 
accrediting medical scheme intermediaries, administrators and managed care 
organisations that provide services to medical schemes (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). 
 
2.2.1 Three Core Pillars of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 
 
The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and accompanying regulations that were 
published in 1999 came into effect after January 2000. Three key issues were 
identified by McLeod and Ramjee (2007) as being at the core of the new legislation 
and they can be summarised as follows: 
 Open enrolment: Medical schemes are required to accept all eligible applicants 
who wish to enrol as a member of the scheme. The Act also requires medical 
schemes to allow members who retire from employment to continue with 
membership of the medical scheme. 
  
 Community-rating: Contributions charged to members may only be differentiated 
according to income and the number of dependents. Thus, community-rating 
effectively replaced risk rating as medical schemes could no longer discriminate 
42 
 
against members on the basis of age, current health status and prior health status 
(Doherty & McLeod, 2003).  
 
 
 
 Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs):  The Prescribed Minimum Benefits 
(PBMs) set a minimum package of healthcare benefits that must be offered by all 
medical schemes. Annexure A to the Regulations of the Medical Schemes Act No. 
131 of 1998 defines the PMBs in terms of some 270 diagnosis-treatment pairs. 
McLeod, Matisonn, Fourie, Grobler, Mynhardt and Marx (2004) discuss the 
subsequent Regulations published in November 2002, which provided much-
needed clarification with respect to PMB requirements, and further extended the 
PMB package to include emergency procedures. The authors point out that in the 
case of PMBs, medical schemes may utilise managed care principles to ration 
care. These include pre-authorisation, the stipulation of a network of healthcare 
providers and medicine formularies that members and their dependents would be 
required to use in relation to the diagnosis-treatment pairs covered under the 
PMBs. Members and their dependents must be covered in full with respect to a list 
the diagnosis-treatment pairs and emergency procedures with no limits or co-
payments permitted (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).29 From 1 January 2004, the 
PMBs were further extended to include a list of 25 chronic disease conditions 
(Chronic Disease List – CDL).30 The Regulations pertaining to the Chronic 
Disease List (CDL) require that medical schemes cover, in full, the diagnosis, 
treatment and medication prescribed with these chronic diseases (McLeod et al., 
2004). 
 
General Waiting Periods 
Although, the Act permits individuals to switch medical schemes at any time due to 
for example a change in employment, the medical scheme is permitted to impose a 
waiting period of up to three months for new members and their dependents (McLeod 
                                                     
29 Co-payments may be levied if a member voluntarily elects to use a healthcare provider outside of 
medical scheme’s list of designated healthcare providers (McLeod et al., 2004). 
30 The CDL has subsequently been extended to include 27 chronic disease conditions. 
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& Ramjee, 2007).31 Hence, the medical scheme will not reimburse healthcare 
providers for services rendered to the new member or their dependents, during the 
waiting exclusion period. Within the Act, a provision permits the medical scheme to 
waiver the waiting period if the new member pays the medical scheme a fee as 
determined by the medical scheme. In addition, new members and their dependents 
may not be penalised with a waiting period stipulation if and only if: 
1. At the date of the application to the new medical scheme, the applicant had 
previously belonged to a medical scheme for a continuous period of two years or 
more; and  
2. The application for membership to the new medical scheme must take place 
within a period of three months since the applicant left their previous medical 
scheme.  
 
Pre‐Existing Illness and Medical Conditions 
Under the current legislation, in the case of a pre-existing illness or medical condition, 
a medical scheme may impose a waiting period of up to 12 months on new applicants 
and their dependents. The waiting period is only applicable if at the date of 
application, the applicant or any of their dependents had a specific medical condition, 
and if the diagnosis or treatment for the aforesaid condition was sought or received 
during the past year (Pearmain, 2000; Doherty & McLeod, 2003; McLeod & Ramjee, 
2007). However, the Act does not permit medical schemes to enforce any such 
waiting period if the pre-existing medical condition relates to a diagnosis-treatment 
pair covered under the PMB package.  
 
Penalties for "late joiners" 
To provide some protection against so-called anti-selection, whereby individuals 
delay membership of a medical scheme until they are elderly or unhealthy, the Act 
permits medical schemes to impose penalties upon persons who decide to join a 
                                                     
31 Note if a child is born to a member of a medical scheme during their period of membership, cover 
will automatically extend to the child.  
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medical scheme, as a member or a dependent of a member, much later in life 
(Pearmain, 2000; McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). The starting age for penalties is 35 years 
old. The penalty is based on the number of years after age 30 an applicant was without 
medical scheme cover. If left unchecked, anti-selection can impose a significant cost 
upon the medical scheme, since at outset; the newly-joined member (or dependent) is 
likely to make more frequent and extensive claims against the scheme without having 
made a meaningful contribution to the funding of the scheme. In other words, the late-
joiner penalties are necessary to discourage opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
individuals seeking to delay their medical scheme contributions to a time when they 
are more likely to receive benefits under the medical scheme policy. As Eggleston 
(2000) argues, ideally people should start contributing towards their medical schemes 
whilst they are young and healthy, and medical schemes should then set aside the 
contributions to pay for future claims. 
 
Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs)  
As discussed previously, medical scheme cover, as any in other insurance policy, may 
diminish the incentives for the member to prevent loss (in this case incur healthcare 
expenditure) and therefore medical scheme membership may alter the behaviour of 
the member or their dependents in such a way that encourages over-utilisation of 
healthcare services (Shavell, 1979). In other words, medical scheme membership 
creates a propensity for moral hazard to occur whereby fully-covered members “tend 
to over-utilise services that appear to be "free" or are heavily-subsidised” (Eggleston, 
2000: 174). Since the full cost of healthcare is not paid for by the member at the 
point-of-service, there is little incentive to curtail utilisation. Hence, medical schemes 
argue that it is necessary to introduce demand-side cost sharing mechanisms such as 
medical savings accounts, deductibles and co-insurance to discourage over-utilisation, 
and thus reduce the problem of moral hazard. 
 
Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) became a feature of the medical scheme landscape 
in South Africa during the 1990s, but only with the enactment of the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 were they formally defined as a financing mechanism 
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for healthcare expenditure.32 In South Africa, a member of a medical scheme plan 
with a MSA pays a monthly contribution to the medical scheme that consists of both a 
traditional health insurance (risk) premium and a fixed amount  that is set aside 
‘within’ the person’s medical savings account. Funds that accumulate within the MSA 
are designed to cover day-to-day healthcare expenses, which includes general 
practitioner consultations, acute treatment and out-patient hospital care. Treatment 
related to a chronic medical condition or in-hospital care would be covered by the 
‘insurance’ portion of the member’s contribution. Therefore, MSAs are simply 
viewed as a mechanism whereby medical scheme members deposit funds into their 
medical savings account, which is held by the medical scheme and used by members 
to pay for healthcare expenditure without risk pooling. Once the funds in a MSA are 
exhausted, the member becomes responsible for the day-to-day healthcare expenses. 
If at the end of the year, the member’s medical savings account is in a credit balance, 
the funds are carried over into the subsequent year to cover future healthcare 
expenditure not covered by their ‘risk’ portion of their medical scheme policy.  
 
According to McLeod and Ramjee (2007), prior to 2006 many benefit options allowed 
members to choose their level of medical savings account contributions (subject to the 
regulatory maximum) or annual routine benefit. This effectively allowed members to 
tailor their benefits according to their health needs and to pay differential contribution 
rates (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). This was identified as a means to effectively risk-
rate members and consequently this practice was disallowed. Members who change 
medical schemes can transfer the funds currently in their MSA to the new medical 
scheme. If a member terminates their medical scheme membership and does not 
subsequently join another scheme, the accumulated funds in their MSA are payable to 
the member, subject to paying the appropriate income tax to the South African 
Revenue Service. 
 
                                                     
32 MSAs were permitted under the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 subject to limitations with 
respect to the value of a member’s annual contribution. According to the Regulations attaching to the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, the amount allowed to accumulate in a member’s medical 
savings account has been capped at 25 percent of his or her total annual contribution. an individual’s 
annual contributions to a MSA may not exceed 25 percent of the total annual contribution paid to the 
medical scheme.    
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2.2.2 Community Rating and the Adverse Selection Death Spiral 
 
Observable characteristics such as age, gender and health status are statistically 
significant determinants of the risk that an individual is likely to require healthcare 
within a given period of time. Thus, at the outset it is easy to accept that the ability to 
observe such variables at relatively low cost precludes the presence of information 
asymmetry. First, health status is not necessarily observable with perfect accuracy 
(Crocker & Snow, 1986). Second, prohibiting the ability to use such variables in the 
determination of contribution rates is tantamount to placing a ‘veil’ in front of the 
‘eyes’ of the medical scheme.  Even though the medical scheme is fully aware of 
these risk-related characteristics, they are compelled through regulation to exclude 
them from the determination of the risk profile of each member. Hence, community 
rating creates an artificial dichotomy of information asymmetry between the medical 
scheme and the member. Thus, community rating enforces information asymmetry 
between the two parties.  
 
Community rating is not a unique feature to South Africa’s private health insurance 
sector; many countries have applied the principle in various lines of insurance. 
Neuhaus (1995) examines the salient features of community rating with respect to 
private health insurers in Australia. Australian insurers are required by law to apply 
community rating, whereby they are not permitted to differentiate their contribution 
rates by risk-related characteristics such as age, gender and health status (Neuhaus, 
1995: 95). Insurers can only discriminate with respect to contribution rates in relation 
to a single person requiring cover versus family-related cover. As in South Africa’s 
case, there is no explicit regulation governing contribution rate levels (Neuhaus, 
1995).  
 
MacIntyre (1962) suggests that the reason for imposing a mandatory community 
rating system is based upon social equity. Equitable outcomes can take the form of 
various guises. One might interpret equity to mean that all medical scheme members 
should pay identical contributions or receive identical benefits (claim payments to a 
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member) irrespective of their relative risk. A variation of this view is based upon the 
notion of a member’s ability to pay. Hence, those members with greater resources 
would be expected to pay more for medical scheme cover than those with fewer 
resources. Alternatively, equity can be defined to mean that members should pay 
according to the benefits that they receive. This interpretation advocates that equity 
within the health insurance sector is achieved when members pay contributions that 
are commensurate with their relative risk.   
 
There exists a trade-off between the first interpretation of equity and efficiency – 
equal contribution rates across members with different levels of risk will reduce 
efficiency. Low-risk individuals will be induced to purchase less medical scheme 
cover than required, whilst high-risk individuals are likely to purchase greater levels 
of medical scheme cover than their relative risk demands. In addition, members’ 
incentives to mitigate losses will be distorted through the equalisation of contribution 
rates. Members who do not pay the full cost of their health insurance will have less 
incentive to reduce their risk since they are already paying effectively discounted 
contribution rates. With respect to the final interpretation of equity there is no trade-
off between equity and efficiency. Aligning the full costs of medical scheme cover to 
the benefits received is consistent with maximising efficiency. Members are 
encouraged to reduce their risk (and/or magnitude of loss) if the ensuing contribution 
rate savings exceeds the costs of reducing their risk. 
 
Unlike in South Africa, all Australian residents are also covered by an adequate public 
healthcare system (Medicare). Medicare has led to far less reliance upon private 
healthcare, thereby reducing the privately-insured population significantly. Neuhaus 
(1995) does indicate that it is debatable whether community rating can achieve its 
social objective of higher enrolment through universal affordability. Buchmueller and 
DiNardo (2002: 283) put forward that pure community rating: 
“...is often depicted primarily as a mechanism to transfer wealth from consumers 
whose expected medical expenses are lower than [the] average to those whose 
expected expenses are higher than [the] average”. 
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Studies have argued that community rating leads to a reduction in societal insurance 
coverage through a mechanism described as the adverse selection death spiral 
(Gradison, 1995; Hartnedy, 1994). In the absence of community rating, contribution 
rates would be risk-rated, whereby the young and healthy members are charged lower 
rates due to their lower expected claims. In view of the fact that community rating 
requires medical schemes to charge identical contribution rates with respect to age, 
gender and health status; the rate charged to younger individuals is expected to rise in 
response to the higher costs associated with the older members of the pool. Depending 
upon the age-specific price elasticity of demand for medical scheme cover, younger 
members (lower risk) are likely to reduce their coverage. The reduction in coverage 
by lower-risks induces higher future expected claims for the pool. This inducement 
translates into a further increase in contribution rates, which once again impacts 
negatively upon coverage levels. Therefore, the risk pool could disintegrate into a 
single member with the highest expected claims (highest risk). 
 
2.2.3 Risk‐Related Cross‐Subsidisation and the Risk Equalisation Fund 
 
Government’s future vision for the South African healthcare system was outlined in a 
report published in 2002 by the health sub-committee of the Committee of Inquiry 
into a Comprehensive System of Social Security – also referred to as the Taylor 
Committee (Department of Social Development, 2002). A follow-up and more 
comprehensive report discussing this vision was published by the Department of 
Health in that same year (Department of Health, 2002). The key recommendation that 
emanated from these publications was that South Africa should move towards a 
National Health Insurance system that would integrate both the public sector and 
private medical schemes within the context of a universal contributory system 
(McLeod et al., 2004). The central feature of government’s plan would be to have a 
national health insurance system that provided universal coverage to all South 
Africans, whilst simultaneously ensuring accessibility, equity and efficiency in the 
delivery of healthcare outcomes (Theron & van Eeden, 2009). Even though the 
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National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 does not refer directly to mandatory health 
insurance, it is clear from the legislation that government’s objective is to address the 
pervasive inequalities between the public and private healthcare sectors. And although 
the transformation of the national health system may have moral traction, the move 
towards a mandatory national health insurance system will have several consequences 
– intended and unintended – for both the public and private healthcare sectors, 
including the private financing of healthcare within the country. 
 
By implementing the principles of open enrolment, community rating and the 
prescribed minimum benefits through the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, 
government sought to force a cross-subsidisation to take place between those who 
represent lower risks (the young and healthy) to the medical scheme and the higher 
risk individuals, such as the elderly and unhealthy. McIntyre et al. (2007) notes that 
the open enrolment coupled with community-rated contributions have provided a 
degree of cross-subsidisation to occur within individual medical scheme’s pools. 
Moreover, the introduction of the PMBs offered a guaranteed minimum package of 
healthcare benefits, which was a uniform standard across all medical scheme 
beneficiaries. Thus, the authors suggest the introduction of the PMBs encouraged 
further risk-related cross-subsidisation. Theron and van Eeden (2009) examine the 
extent of cross-subsidisation within the private health insurance sector and find that: 
“…wealthier individuals, which tend to use private healthcare, receive 
proportionally more healthcare benefits than the rest of the population, [but] they 
also pay more for healthcare [cover] than the benefits they receive” (Theron & 
van Eeden, 2009: 4).  
Thus, Theron and van Eeden (2009) conclude that there is significant cross-
subsidisation between the wealthy and poor in South Africa. Although, Theron and 
van Eeden (2009) do not investigate the success of risk-related cross-subsidisation, 
that is the cross-subsidisation between the young and elderly, or between the healthy 
and unhealthy, it nevertheless suggests that government’s objective to address some 
of the disparities between the public and private healthcare sectors are having some 
success.  A key criticism of community rating is that it may lead to adverse selection 
given the artificial information asymmetry that is created between the member and the 
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medical scheme. But there appears to be little evidence that this is indeed taking place 
in South Africa (Theron & van Eeden, 2009). Moreover, Buchmueller and DiNardo 
(2002) argue that despite the prevailing belief that an insurance coverage reducing 
death spiral is a likely consequence of community rating, it is not necessarily the 
outcome that models of insurance markets would predict.33 
 
Under the current regulatory framework, McLeod et al. (2004) argues that medical 
schemes can still market themselves and design their benefit offerings in such a way 
as to attract younger and healthier enrolees, whilst discouraging the elderly and 
unhealthy from joining. McIntyre et al. (2007) suggest that a substantial amount of 
resources are allocated to the marketing activities of various open medical schemes so 
as to attract the young and healthy, which include as McIntyre et al. (2007: 66) put it 
“…the perverse incentivisation of intermediaries”. Hence, under the current 
regulatory environment the so-called cherry-picking (or cream-skimming) of low risk 
individuals by medical schemes could continue to flourish albeit in a more subtle 
manner. McLeod and Ramjee (2007) also mention that medical schemes are able to 
design their benefit options in such way so as to benefit from the requirement that 
each option be treated as a separate risk pool for community-rating purposes. Since 
each benefit option is required by law to be self-sustaining, it induces a risk-pooling to 
occur at an option level (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). Whilst restricted schemes tend to 
offer very few benefit options, open schemes tend to offer a large variety of different 
options, partly for competitive reasons, but also as a subtle mechanism to classify 
individuals into appropriate risk pools.34 Therefore, this together with the cherry-
picking undertaken by medical schemes via their marketing activities would to some 
extent defeat the purpose of the regulatory reforms introduced by the government and 
it implies that one would simply return to the status quo prior to the introduction of 
the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. As a result of the cherry-picking, some 
medical schemes may find themselves with a greater proportion of older and 
unhealthy members compared to the average ‘representative’ scheme, which would 
                                                     
33 Refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion. 
34 The Registrar of Medical Schemes has become aware of this practice, whereby medical schemes 
attempt to construct multiple benefit options to take advantage of the separate risk pools that these 
benefit options can create. Thus, the Registrar is increasingly refusing to authorise minor variations in 
benefit packages as separate benefit options (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
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translates into these schemes bearing a greater burden with respect to a higher 
community rate for the PMB package (McLeod et al., 2004). The practice of cherry-
picking diverts healthcare resources away from those who require it the most and this 
can only be overcome if mechanisms of financial compensation between schemes 
with different risk profiles can be created (McIntyre et al., 2007).  
  
McIntyre et al. (2007) identify the important feature that is absent from the regulatory 
structure; namely, a mechanism to facilitate risk cross-subsidisation across individual 
medical schemes and benefit options.35 The proposed solution is the introduction of a 
system of risk equalisation. Indeed, McLeod et al. (2004) mention that South Africa is 
unusual in having applied the principles of open enrolment and community-rating 
without risk equalisation.  Neuhaus (1995) asserts that risk equalisation is a theoretical 
solution to the problem of supporting community rating where one has, as in South 
Africa’s case, different medical schemes that are offering a multitude of different 
benefit offerings. For the author, the crucial issue is to design an appropriate risk 
equalisation system based upon the criterion that any risk equalisation for deciding 
upon a suitable risk equalisation mechanism should be that it minimises the 
opportunities for arbitrage between medical schemes.  
 
Under risk equalisation, a Risk Equalisation Fund (REF) is established, which in its 
simplest form, receives funds from medical schemes with lower risk profiles and pays 
out funds to medical schemes with a higher risk profile (McLeod et al., 2004). It is 
suggested that risk equalisation between medical schemes will remove the age and 
health status factors as competition parameters amongst the medical schemes 
(McIntyre et al., 2007). The REF serves as a mechanism that equalises contribution 
schedules (or tables) across medical schemes. The objective of the REF is to 
discourage medical schemes from cherry-picking the younger and healthier members 
of society, which simultaneously erodes the balanced age and health profiles of other 
                                                     
35 McLeod et al. (2004) argue that the absence of a mechanism such as risk equalisation was not a 
policy oversight on behalf of the government, but rather a question of timing. It is suggested by the 
authors that it is only now possible to effectively to implement such a strategy to facilitate the risk 
cross-subsidisation across medical schemes and benefit options. 
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medical schemes (McLeod et al., 2004). The proposed REF has been designed in such 
a way that financial transfers across medical schemes will be based upon the industry 
community-rate for the PMBs (McIntyre et al., 2007). Therefore, the overall risk 
profile of all medical scheme members and their corresponding beneficiaries will be 
considered in calculating the actuarial costs that relate to the benefits provided under 
the PMB package (including the benefits provided under the Chronic Disease List). 
McLeod (2004: 9) views the risk equalisation system that has been proposed as: 
“…a mechanism to ensure that everyone pays the same industry community rate 
for the common package of benefits, not the rate determined by the age and 
health profile of the medical scheme they have chosen to join”. 
 
Another related policy issue that is raised by McLeod et al. (2004) refers to the 
subsidy framework for medical schemes. According to the Taylor Committee, the tax 
expenditure subsidy to medical schemes of R7.8 billion (at the time the Committee 
reported their findings in 2002), represented an effective tax subsidy of over R1000 
per medical scheme beneficiary per month. This figure represents more than the total 
amount spent per individual who depends upon the public sector for the receipt of 
their healthcare services. In addition, the tax rebate that individuals receive in relation 
to medical scheme contributions, further rewards high income individuals and those 
that elect the more comprehensive (and expensive) medical scheme options.  Thus, it 
has been suggested that this is perhaps part of the reason why the medical scheme 
contribution tax rebate is likely to be abandoned, once the National Health Insurance 
framework is implemented in South Africa (McLeod et al., 2004).  
 
After the Taylor Committee’s findings were presented in 2002, the Formula 
Consultative Task Team was established by the Department of Health in July 2003 to 
spearhead the design of an REF in South Africa. On behalf of the Formula 
Consultative Task Team, McLeod et al. (2004) published a report outlining a 
proposed structure for the design of the REF.  An International Review Panel of 
experts from six different countries supported McLeod et al. (2004)’s findings and 
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further emphasised that the introduction of the REF in South Africa should be an 
urgent priority (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
 
In 2005, a ‘shadow process’ for the REF was introduced with Cabinet approval, 
whereby all medical schemes were required to submit information regarding the age, 
gender and chronic disease profile of their beneficiaries. From this information, an 
industry community-rate for the PMB package was calculated to be R224.90 per 
beneficiary per month (McIntyre et al., 2007). Under the proposed REF framework, 
the financial compensatory transfers to and from the fund will be based upon this 
industry community-rate for the PMB package. Thus, medical schemes with a better-
than-average risk profile will be required to make certain contributions towards the 
fund, whilst the medical schemes with a worse-than-average risk profile will receive 
payments from the REF (McIntyre et al., 2007). In addition, medical schemes will be 
informed in advance concerning the amount that they may need to pay towards the 
REF or the amount that they can expect to receive from the REF. Therefore, McIntyre 
et al. (2007) claim that the prospective nature of the REF will permit medical schemes 
to determine their expected revenue streams with greater certainty at the beginning of 
each operating period. 
 
After a rigorous process of testing various factors, McLeod et al. (2004) suggest that 
the following factors should be included in the determination of the risk equalisation 
formula: 
 Age; 
 A pregnancy/maternity indicator; and 
 Measures of the chronic disease burden of the medical scheme, which includes 
the number of medical scheme beneficiaries with: 
 one of the identifiable 25 PMB-CDL chronic conditions 
 multiple CDL diseases; and 
 HIV/AIDS members who are currently on Anti-Retroviral therapy. 
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Equation 2-1 describes the general formula for obtaining the subsidy per medical 
scheme beneficiary under the REF that was outlined in a Technical Report by 
Grobler, Theron and Cooper (2003). From Equation 2-1, it is evident that the subsidy 
per medical scheme will be dependent upon the average cost of treating the PMB-
CDL conditions. 
 
Equation 2-1: General Formula for the Determination of the Subsidy per Medical Scheme 
Beneficiary under the REF framework (Grobler, Theron & Cooper, 2003) 
ࡿ࢛࢈࢏࢐ ൌ ൛
࡭࡯ ൈ ∑ ∑ ࡹ࢏࢐࢐ ൈ࢏ ൣ൫ࢃ࢏࢐ ∑ ∑ ൫ࢃ࢏࢐ ൅ ࡹ࢏࢐൯࢐࢏⁄ ൯ ൈ ∑ ∑ ࡹ࢏࢐࢐ െ ૚࢏ ൧ ൅ ࢀࡿൟ
∑ ∑ ࡹ࢏࢐࢐࢏  
where	ࡿ࢛࢈࢏࢐	represents	the	subsidy	per	annum	for	medical	beneficiaries	with	disease	࢏	and	age	
band	࢐,	࡭࡯	is	the	average	cost	of	the	PMB‐CDL	condition	for	the	total	medical	scheme	population	
per	 beneficiary	 per	 annum,	 ࢃ࢏࢐	 represents	 the	 cost	 weighting	 attached	 to	 medical	 scheme	
beneficiaries	 with	 disease	 ࢏	 and	 age	 band	 ࢐,	 ࡹ࢏࢐	 is	 the	 total	 number	 of	 medical	 scheme	
beneficiaries	with	disease	࢏	and	age	band	࢐	across	all	medical	schemes	and	ࢀࡿ	is	the	total	subsidy	
available	for	all	medical	scheme	beneficiaries	in	all	medical	schemes. 
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) suggest that the REF framework is merely the starting point in 
an attempt to achieve an optimal level of risk-related cross-subsidisation. They go 
further to point out the shortcomings with the REF framework. The proposed REF 
framework excludes any risks associated with the healthcare benefits that fall outside 
of the PMB package. This is essentially because the PMB package represents the only 
common set of healthcare services covered by all medical schemes (McIntyre et al., 
2007). Therefore, the ability to adequately implement risk cross-subsidises through 
the REF is restricted. Moreover, the REF framework does not consider other risk 
factors outside of those outlined in the contribution tables, such as demographic 
profile of medical scheme members (McLeod et al., 2004; McIntyre et al., 2007). 
Hence, the REF compensatory transfers may not accurately reflect the differences in 
the risk profile of the medical schemes. However, McIntyre et al. (2007) does note 
that the risk factors included within the REF framework are far more extensive than 
those found in the risk equalisation systems utilised by many other countries. 
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After the “shadowing process” that took place during 2005, the medical scheme 
industry expected the full implementation of the REF by early 2007 (McLeod & 
Ramjee, 2007). However, the process of drafting the new legislation that would 
introduce the REF framework took much longer than anticipated. Ultimately, the 
efforts to incorporate the REF framework into the current regulatory environment 
culminated in the drafting of the Medical Scheme Amendment Bill No. 58 of 2008.  
 
The Medical Scheme Amendment Bill No. 58 of 200836 proposes to amend the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, to expand the role of the Council for Medical 
Schemes to take responsibility for the operation of a Risk Equalisation Fund (REF), 
which McLeod and Ramjee (2007) argue will enhance the risk-pooling function of 
medical schemes by creating an industry-wide risk pool and simultaneously, an 
industry-wide community rate for PMBs. The Medical Scheme Amendment Bill No. 
58 of 2008 sets out clearly the purpose of the legislative changes; namely, to amend 
the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 in such a way so as to allow for the 
establishment of a risk equalisation fund whereby medical schemes would be required 
to participate. The proposed reforms would extend the functions of the Council for 
Medical Schemes in relation to operating the REF and create a framework to facilitate 
the collection of information from medical schemes to the Council for Medical 
Schemes for purposes of risk equalisation. Part 4 of the Medical Scheme Amendment 
Bill No. 58 of 2008 sets out the methodology and procedures to be adopted to 
calculate the appropriate financial compensatory transfers that will ensure the sharing 
of expected costs (claims) across all medical schemes. Therefore, it is necessary to 
amend the provisions relating to benefits and contributions as set out in the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. The Bill also seeks to amend the provisions relating to 
the composition of the Boards of Trustees of medical schemes and adjunct to this the 
eligibility of persons to serve as trustees or principal officers of medical schemes. The 
Medical Scheme Amendment Bill No. 58 of 2008 goes further to outline the 
respective duties and functions of the Board of Trustees and those of the principal 
officers.  
                                                     
36 From here on also referred to as ‘the Bill’.  
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The promulgation of the Medical Scheme Amendment Bill No. 58 of 2008 has as yet 
to be completed, the Bill has been withdrawn from Parliament on a number of 
occasions and according to the Council for Medical Schemes (2010) it is only likely 
to be passed into law during 2011.37 This is despite the International Review Panel’s 
recommendation back in 2005 that the REF should be implemented as a matter of 
urgency. It appears that a delay of six years is sufficiently urgent. With the delay in 
the implementation of risk-adjusted transfers through the REF, McLeod and Ramjee 
(2007) argue that certain medical schemes, that would be net contributors under the 
REF, have taken the opportunity to become more vocal in their attempts to be 
excluded from REF. Legislators have been urged to ignore these special requests for 
exclusion from the REF, since it implies that the remaining schemes (and ultimately 
medical scheme beneficiaries) will end up bearing the additional cost (McLeod & 
Ramjee, 2007).  
 
McLeod and Ramjee (2007) claim that one of the primary purpose of the REF is to 
discourage medical schemes from competing on the basis of risk-selection (cherry-
picking the young and healthy), but rather encourage schemes to compete on the basis 
of ensuring that their members receive cost-effective healthcare delivery.  Those 
medical schemes that reduce the cost of healthcare delivery for their members will be 
able to retain that benefit and pass this onto their members through lower contribution 
rates for the PMB package (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). According to McIntyre et al. 
(2007), the REF is necessary to transform medical schemes into a vehicle that extends 
private healthcare coverage to a broader and more diverse public. 
 
  
                                                     
37 Even though the Risk Equalisation Fund (REF) has not yet been implemented, the Council for 
Medical Schemes has continued to collect the necessary information from medical schemes that it 
would require to compute the financial transfers across medical schemes. The Council for Medical 
Schemes (2010) states that it is currently evaluating the information collected thus far.  
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2.2.4 Government’s Initiatives to Extend Medical Scheme Cover to Low‐Income Earners and the 
Proposed National Health Insurance System 
 
An important set of recommendations that arose out of the health sub-committee of 
the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security of 2002 (or 
Taylor Committee) related to a phased roll-out set of reforms in view of establishing a 
National Health Insurance (NHI) system. According to Magennis and van Zyl (2009), 
the sub-committee simply defines the NHI as a “universal contributory environment”. 
After the successful implementation of the voluntary contributory environment, the 
second phase would involve extending the framework into a mandatory environment 
(Magennis & van Zyl, 2009).  
 
Following the publication of the findings of the Taylor Committee, the Department of 
Health established a Ministerial Task Team in 2004. The task team was asked to 
decide upon which of the Taylor committee’s proposals to take forward. It was 
determined that at the time, the goal to pursue a NHI system would not be possible in 
the short term, but in the interim it would be beneficial to pursue certain elements of a 
social health insurance (SHI) system (Magennis & van Zyl, 2009). The Department of 
Health felt that the REF and the reform of the tax subsidy with respect to medical 
scheme contributions would be the precursors to implementing a mandatory health 
insurance system for all South Africans. In particular, through the consultative process 
of the Ministerial Task Team, it was determined that extending health insurance 
coverage to low-income individuals would be an important step in steering the 
healthcare sector towards universal access to affordable healthcare for all South 
Africans. 
 
Low‐Income Medical Scheme (LIMS) initiative 
The Ministerial Task Team recognised that the income cross-subsidies envisaged as 
part of a social health insurance system may take some time to be realised (McLeod & 
Ramjee, 2007). Thus, the task team launched the Low-Income Medical Scheme 
58 
 
(LIMS) consultative process in 2005. It was hoped insights could be gleaned from a 
range of stakeholders to determine the best way to extend medical scheme coverage to 
low-income employees from the formal sector (Magennis & van Zyl, 2009).38 The 
LIMS initiative garnered significant industry support, and McLeod and Ramjee 
(2007) claim that it contributed significantly to the market’s understanding about the 
challenges in providing affordable medical scheme cover to the low-income segment. 
Several factors were identified as being significant obstacles in extending medical 
scheme coverage to the low-income segment. These include the high levels of 
unemployment in South Africa, the lack of affordability of current medical scheme 
contribution rates and the high actuarial cost of the PMB package (McLeod & 
Ramjee, 2007). 
 
The LIMS process highlighted the absence of any affordable low-cost options that 
would directly cater for the low-income earners. In accordance with the risk profile of 
the current lower cost options that are available in the market, McLeod and Ramjee 
(2007) argue that they appear to be competitively priced offering reduced benefits and 
aggressive managed care interventions. If a common set of benefits were to be offered 
to the low-income segment and these members were pooled at the scheme level rather 
than at option level (which is currently the case), they suggest that the contributions 
would need to rise sharply to compensate for the lack of income cross-subsidies since 
a LIMS would have a largely homogenous group of low-income earners. Magennis 
and van Zyl (2009: 20-21) list the key recommendations that emerged from the LIMS 
consultative process as follows: 
 LIMS should be open to any formal sector employee or self-employed person (and 
their dependents) who earns less than R6 500 per month (in 2005 terms). 
 LIMS should be offered by new schemes and also under any new benefit options 
offered by existing schemes. 
 Employers and employees should each make a 50 percent contribution towards the 
monthly premium. In addition, the employee’s share of the premium should not 
exceed 8 percent of household income.  
                                                     
38 Low-income was broadly defined as being between R2 000 and R6 000 per month (McLeod & 
Ramjee, 2007).  
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 Government should directly subsidise the monthly LIMS membership 
contributions. 
 The common set of benefits offered under LIMS should include a package with 
certain acute and some chronic out-patient or ambulatory care. LIMS members 
would be expected to obtain in-patient care at public healthcare facilities at no 
cost. 
 LIMS schemes would be ring-fenced from other medical schemes and thus, any 
cross-subsidisation across other medical schemes or even financial transfers under 
the REF would not be permitted. 
 
The LIMS initiative proposes to extend risk-pooling to a larger proportion of the 
South African population, who often bear an excessive amount of out-of-pocket 
expenses with respect to their healthcare expenditure. Nevertheless, Magennis and 
van Zyl (2009) criticise the LIMS recommendations for a number of reasons. First, to 
make medical scheme coverage affordable for LIMS members, the recommendation is 
to simply offer LIMS members a restrictive benefit package. As the authors correctly 
argue the focus should rather be upon curtailing the high cost of medical scheme 
coverage by addressing the problem of supply-induced demand. Second, the LIMS 
process did not adequately consider the option of extending medical scheme 
membership to low-income individuals within existing medical scheme structures 
(Magennis & van Zyl, 2009). It does not preclude the possibility of some form of 
government subsidy or income cross-subsidisation to assist low-income earners with a 
lower contribution rate. Finally, Magennis and van Zyl (2009: 21) are concerned that 
the creation of LIMS schemes may “…compound inequities and entrench further 
fragmentation [within] South Africa’s healthcare financing [sector]”.  
 
Whilst the LIMS proposals were well-received in 2006, there has been little further 
movement with respect to their implementation. In addition, before the proposals 
could be implemented enabling legislation would still be required. The Medical 
Scheme Amendment Bill No. 58 of 2008 does include a single enabling line, but it 
does appear that the LIMS initiative has lost impetus. This may be partly due to 
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government’s determination to press forward with its plan to adopt a National Health 
Insurance (NHI) system.  
 
National Health Insurance (NHI) 
The government has publicly announced its intention to introduce a mandatory health 
insurance system with the view to provide universal health coverage for all South 
Africans. Until only recently, the details surrounding the National Health Insurance 
(NHI) system were somewhat sketchy and most of the debate tended to revolve 
around conjecture and speculation rather than factual discussion. Nevertheless, the 
Taylor Committee’s findings that were published in 2002, Department of Social 
Development (2002) and Department of Health (2002) all provided some insight into 
the direction in which government was likely to proceed with its roll-out of a NHI 
system for the country. More details have since emerged about the proposed NHI 
system with the release of a series of documents during 2009 (Econex, 2009a).39 
Further confirmation that the government was determined to press ahead with its plan 
for a NHI system was evident when the Department of Health established a National 
Health Insurance Advisory Committee back in 2009. The National Health Insurance 
Advisory Committee is expected to advise the Minister of Health with respect to the 
development of policy and legislation relating to the phased roll-out of a NHI system 
in the country.  
 
Under new proposals tabled by the African National Congress (ANC) in 2010, a 
National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme is to be implemented for all South Africans 
from 2012 onwards and is to be funded by dedicated new taxes. The scheme – to be 
implemented over 14 years – would guarantee a full range of healthcare services to 
                                                     
39 Department of Health. (2009a). National Health Insurance Plan for South Africa. Pretoria: National 
Health Insurance Task Team – Department of Health. 
African National Congress. (2009a). National Health Insurance Policy Proposal. ANC National 
General Council. Released 22 June 2009. 
African National Congress. (2009b). National Health Insurance: A unified, equitable and integrated 
national health system that benefits all South Africans. ANC Today, 9(29) 24–30 July 2009. 
African National Congress. (2009c) National Health Insurance (NHI). ANC National General Council. 
Released September 2010. 
Department of Health (2009b) Establishment of the National Health Insurance Advisory Committee. 
Government Gazette, 11 September 2009. 
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everyone, regardless of their ability to pay and it is intended to make some private 
sector facilities available to people currently denied access to private healthcare 
services (Department of Health, 2010). The forecasted initial increase in the South 
African government's health budget of R117 billion for 2012 will see health's share of 
government spending to increase by one fifth, from 12 percent to 14.5 percent. To pay 
for this increase in public healthcare expenditure South Africans can be expected to 
brace themselves for significant tax increases. Under the plan, all South Africans 
would have to be members of the scheme. Everyone earning an income would have to 
contribute, whilst no one would be obliged to use the services. Private hospitals would 
be encouraged to join the system but would not be obliged to do so. Individuals would 
be free to buy private medical insurance and to go to hospitals that did not participate 
in the scheme. NHI members will be free to decide which participating clinic or 
doctor in their area to register with, but will not have any choice with respect to 
specialists or hospitals that they will be referred to in the event that the primary 
healthcare facility or practitioner is unable to treat their illness or injury. Medical 
treatment will be free at the point of service. According to government's proposal the 
greatest portion of the cost for the new NHI will come out of the existing healthcare 
budget. The outstanding amount will be funded by one or more of the following: a 
ring-fenced VAT increase, a surcharge on personal income tax, a special payroll levy 
and the abolition of tax exemptions for medical costs.  
 
In accordance with the information available thus far, a National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA) will be established to oversee and operate a single-payer fund 
(Econex, 2009a). The NHIA will pool resources and purchase healthcare services on 
behalf of the entire South African population. Econex (2009a) posit that funding will 
be sourced from a combination of employer and employee contributions, and existing 
fiscal funding from the national and provincial health budgets. The employer and 
employee contributions would immediately imply that a further payroll tax will be 
levied.  Despite the African National Congress (2009b)’s assurances that the 
additional tax is likely to be modest, it does raise concerns about further increasing the 
burden of taxation. Moreover, the current proposals advocate the removal of the tax 
deductibility of medical scheme contributions, which will further increase the tax 
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burden for current medical scheme members. The current proposals also provide for 
some tax relief for certain categories of low-income employees, whereby they will be 
exempt from making contributions to the NHIA. Whilst the government argues that 
this funding arrangement should be sufficient to fund the NHIA, it is unclear whether 
the pool of resources will be sufficient to cover the healthcare needs of the entire 
South African population (Econex, 2009a).  
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the proposed funding arrangement under the South African NHI 
system. Contributions from the three sources of funding are pooled together to 
purchase healthcare services from both the public and private healthcare sectors 
(Econex, 2009a).  
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Figure 2-1: Proposed Funding Arrangement for the South African NHI System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Econex (2009a: 4) 
 
Government believes that through the NHI system significant cost savings will be 
realised. In particular, the creation of a single funder and purchaser of healthcare 
services will translate into considerable cost savings with respect to administration. 
Econex (2009a) mention that these cost savings are a result of the move towards a 
single purchaser of healthcare services as opposed to the multi-purchaser model, 
whereby medical schemes reimburse healthcare providers for services rendered to 
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medical scheme beneficiaries.  It is put forward that under the NHI framework, 
healthcare services will be delivered by both public and private healthcare providers, 
and funding for these healthcare services will be forthcoming from the NHIA. 
Healthcare service providers would have to be accredited by the NHIA based upon 
certain predefined criteria (Econex, 2009a).  The service delivery model will see 
public and private healthcare providers, including healthcare facilities, contracted by 
the NHIA (Econex, 2009a).  Thus, the preferred model for the purchase of the 
healthcare services would be on a contracted basis, but the nature of the contracting 
relationship between the government and in particular, the private healthcare sector 
requires further clarification. According to Econex (2009a), contracted healthcare 
providers would render their services to both contributory and non-contributory 
households based upon the principle of universal access on a per capitation basis.  
 
From the African National Congress (2009a) NHI policy proposal document, Table 2-
1 outlines the suggested list of healthcare services that would be covered under a 
proposed standard NHI benefit package. The proposed standard NHI benefit package 
represents a considerable improvement over what is currently being offered through 
the public healthcare sector (Econex, 2009a). 
 
Table 2-1: Suggested List of Healthcare Services covered under the Proposed Standard NHI 
Benefit Package 
 
Primary Care and Preventative Healthcare Services  Mental Healthcare Services 
In‐Patient Care  Dental Services (excluding cosmetic dentistry) 
Out‐Patient Care  Substance Abuse Treatment 
Emergency and Trauma Care  Chiropractic Services 
Prescription Medication  Rehabilitation Care 
Appropriate Technologies for Diagnosis and Treatment Hearing Care (including the supply of hearing‐aids)  
Basic Vision Care and Vision Correction Devices (excluding laser vision correction for cosmetic purposes) 
 
Source: African National Congress (2009a) - NHI Policy Proposal Document 
 
The newly-introduced standard benefit package that would be offered under the NHI 
framework with zero co-payments is likely to induce a significant increase in the 
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demand for healthcare services and this would occur in the context of an already 
capacity-constrained healthcare sector. One need only consider the shortages currently 
being experienced with respect to generalist and specialist practitioners.40 Econex 
(2009a: 5) argue that given the finite healthcare resources available in the country, 
“…it is inevitable that a major increase in demand for healthcare will require some 
form of rationing to match demand and supply”. Under the proposed framework, it is 
clear that private healthcare providers cannot be mandated to sell their services to the 
NHIA. Therefore, unless the capitation remuneration arrangements are sufficient to 
persuade private healthcare providers to contract with the NHIA, the public-private 
partnership to supply healthcare services will simply revert to a public healthcare 
delivery system. African National Congress (2009a) envisages no differentiation in 
the price paid to public and private healthcare providers, which implies that the 
capitation price will have to converge towards a price that private healthcare providers 
are willing to accept for their services. Econex (2009a) argues that this may lead to 
doubts about the financial sustainability of the NHI framework, if indeed; the NHIA 
decides to pursue contracting quality healthcare services from the private healthcare 
sector.  
 
Another contentious issue relates to the role that current medical schemes will play 
under the NHI system. One model suggests that medical schemes could continue to 
operate as private health insurers offering additional top-up health insurance cover for 
those private healthcare services not covered under the standard NHI healthcare 
package. This would be similar to how private health insurance operates in the United 
Kingdom, whereby individuals can purchase top-up private health insurance over and 
above the healthcare benefits they receive under the National Health Service (NHS).41 
In the United Kingdom, private health insurance policyholders also benefit by being 
able to secure private healthcare treatment timeously - thereby escaping the NHS 
waiting lists. An alternative idea could see medical schemes acting as intermediaries 
                                                     
40 Refer to the further discussion in Subsection 2.3 relating to the regulation of healthcare provision in 
South Africa. 
41 The National Health Service (NHS) was established in 1948 in the United Kingdom. It provides free 
healthcare for all United Kingdom citizens and permanent residents, regardless of their age, occupation 
or ability to pay. The NHS is funded through National Insurance contributions (a payroll tax) and 
general taxation via the national health budget. 
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between healthcare providers and the NHIA; however, it is unclear as to what would 
be their exact role or function under this model.  
 
The central premise behind the introduction of the NHI system is to expand healthcare 
coverage to all South Africans. The principle of solidarity forms the backbone to the 
current set of proposals underlying the NHI system, whereby government advocates 
the notion that the delivery of healthcare services should be based upon need rather 
than upon the ability to pay. By implication, free access to healthcare services with 
zero co-payments, at the point-of-service, regardless of the person’s ability to pay, 
will require a significant degree of income cross-subsidisation between those 
individuals who can pay for healthcare and those who are unable to do so (Econex, 
2009a).  The proposed NHI framework does pose several challenges with respect to 
implementation and operational procedures. Nevertheless, government is determined 
to proceed on this path to provide universal coverage within a fourteen-year 
timeframe. Econex (2009a) point out that this is indeed an extremely optimistic target, 
considering that only two countries in the world have managed to achieve universal 
coverage in less than 40 years from their initial enabling social health legislation – 
Japan (36 years) and South Korea (26 years).  
 
Taxpayers are likely to see a rise of more than 10% in their total tax liability There are 
approximately only 5.3 million taxpayers in South Africa and of these, 1.2m pay 
approximately three-quarters of all personal and company tax collected. South African 
taxpayers are going to be expected to fork out an additional R247 billion to finance 
the government's proposed social security fund (National Security Savings Fund), a 
basic income grant for the unemployed and the national healthcare insurance scheme 
(NHI). This will increase government expenditure from around 31 percent to more 
than 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the tax burden from 27 percent 
to 37 percent.  
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Given that most of the burden of taxation falls upon only a fraction of the employable 
adult population, it raises the question whether or not South Africa’s massive social 
and healthcare spend is sustainable in the medium term.42 At present South Africa is 
already one of the countries with the highest proportion of people depending upon 
social grants. Approximately 13 million (or 26 percent of the total population) depend 
upon these social grants. Therefore, it translates into the fact that each taxpayer is 
effectively supporting two people on social grants. Furthermore, government's plans 
for a basic income grant to the unemployed will add another 7 million to the list of 
dependents. A sharp rise in taxation and contributions to retirement and medical 
scheme funds is unavoidable if the plans for a social security fund and the NHI are to 
be realised. 
 
From Pauly (1974)’s analysis one can infer that public intervention, as in the case of 
introducing mandatory health insurance via the NHI, may be a solution to improve the 
market outcome observed under imperfect information. He explains that compulsory 
insurance could ultimately assist insurers in collecting more accurate information 
about the purchasers of voluntary additional insurance cover. According to theory of 
adverse selection, high-risk individuals would demand more insurance coverage and 
hence, buy coverage over and above that of the mandatory NHI insurance. Therefore, 
health insurers, in this case medical schemes, can potentially identify more accurately 
the high-risk individuals from the low-risk individuals. Thus, by implication those 
who seek say, top-up medical scheme cover, will be revealing themselves as higher 
risks. However, it is not appropriate to extend the adverse selection theory predictions 
too far in relation to the South African private health insurance sector. Risk aversion, 
wealth and income, the actual (or even perceived) quality of healthcare treatment that 
one might expect to receive under the NHI, the ability to secure treatment timeously 
may all be factors that affect whether or not a person decides to purchase additional 
top-up health insurance cover (over and above the standard NHI benefit package). The 
principles of open enrolment and particularly, community rating would in any event 
hinder any advantage one could possibly hope to glean from such information. Thus, 
                                                     
42 All South Africans consumers do contribute to the state’s coffers via indirect taxes, such as Value-
Added-Tax (VAT), or through customs and excise duties, when goods are imported into the country. 
Therefore, it is perhaps presumptuous to suggest that only a fraction of the population bears most of the 
tax burden. It does imply that the tax base is broader than one might anticipate.  
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the application of Pauly (1974)’s analysis may not be amenable to South Africa’s 
private health insurance sector. 
 
2.2.5 Brief Assessment of the South African Private Health Insurance Industry 
 
Since 1994, the South African private health insurance industry has undergone a 
substantial shift towards the principle of solidarity and away from the principle of 
mutuality. A key mechanism to achieve government’s objective of extending coverage 
in terms of both the number of medical scheme members and the benefits that they 
(and their dependents) enjoy has been the rewriting of the legislation governing 
medical scheme business (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). The Medical Schemes Act No. 
131 of 1998 reflects the underlying changes in government policy in favour of 
increased regulatory control of not only medical schemes but also those entities that 
are contracted out by medical schemes to perform various allied services. These 
entities include medical scheme administrators, managed care organisations and 
medical scheme intermediaries (brokers) (Pearmain, 2000).  
 
Doherty and McLeod (2003) argue that the explicit tool utilised by the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 to achieve the stated objective of increased medical 
scheme coverage is the combination of three key factors; mandatory open enrolment, 
community-rating and the Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs) package. Although, 
it is acknowledged that community-rating and PMBs would likely lead to an increase 
the costs of cover for younger (and/or more healthy) individuals, it was hoped that the 
new legislation would, through the application of these three factors, open up medical 
schemes to a large and more diverse population of potential members. In particular, it 
was hoped that the low-income segment of the market would have greater access to 
affordable medical scheme coverage. If successful, it would create larger risk pools 
and thus, encourage medical schemes to compete on the basis of efficiency, which 
would ultimately lead to lower overall costs of health insurance cover for the majority 
of medical scheme members (Doherty & McLeod, 2003).  
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Considering the significant legislative changes that have taken place with respect to 
medical scheme business since the first democratically-elected government took 
office in 1994, it is necessary to evaluate the success that the regulatory reforms have 
had in achieving the stated-objective of increased medical scheme coverage.  
 
Recent Trends in the Number of Registered Medical Schemes, Membership and Solvency 
The number of medical schemes has steadily declined since the early 1990s.  In fact, 
according to McLeod and Ramjee (2007), this downward trend has been observable 
since as far back as 1974. In 1974, there were a total of 305 medical schemes, of 
which, 252 were registered medical schemes and 53 so-called exempt medical 
schemes (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).43 Over time many of these exempt (or 
Bargaining Council) schemes have gained registered status and for those that remain 
they represent only a small fraction of the total number of medical scheme 
beneficiaries covered.44 Doherty and McLeod (2003) indicate that of the Bargaining 
Council schemes that remain, they tend to offer only primary healthcare benefits by a 
salaried panel of healthcare providers. 
 
Excluding the Bargaining Council medical schemes, Figure 2-2 illustrates that the total 
number of registered medical schemes has declined steadily from 187 in 1993 to only 
110 by 2009. The decline in the total number of registered medical schemes may be 
viewed as a period of consolidation as many amalgamations have occurred during this 
time.  A more recent development is to classify registered medical schemes along 
                                                     
43 Exempt medical schemes, later referred to as Bargaining Council schemes, were medical schemes 
that were granted certain exemptions from medical scheme legislation – originally, with respect to the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 72 of 1967 and later the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. 
Historically, these schemes covered members of the police, defence force and correctional services 
(Doherty & McLeod, 2003).  
44 The Council for Medical Schemes has for the most part ceased reporting on Bargaining Council 
medical schemes within their Annual Reports (Council for Medical Schemes, 2004). 
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open versus restricted lines.45 From Figure 2-2, it is clear that the number of both open 
and restricted medical schemes has steadily declined over the period 1999 to 2009. 
Since 1999, the number of medical scheme members in open and restricted schemes 
has diverged significantly, with open schemes benefitting from medical scheme 
intermediaries (brokers) aggressively targeting people in restricted schemes in order 
to move them over to open schemes.  In addition, some restricted medical schemes 
have simply opted to open up their membership and thus, convert their restricted 
medical scheme status to that of an open medical scheme.  
 
Figure 2-2: Trends in the Total Number of Registered Medical Schemes, Number of Open and 
Restricted Medical Schemes (1993 – 2009) 
  
Source: South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010) 
 
                                                     
45 As note previously, open medical schemes permit new individuals from the general public to become 
members, subject to a mandatory waiting period and in certain cases late joiner penalties; whilst 
restricted membership schemes only permit individuals that meet the specified criteria of the scheme to 
become members. The basis of the restriction can only be employment or former employment in a 
profession, trade, industry or calling, or by a particular employer or class of employer. 
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As at the 31 December 1993, the total number of registered medical scheme members 
stood at 1,993,417 and the total number of registered medical scheme beneficiaries 
(principal members and dependents) was 5,399,886 individuals.46 Over the next six-
year period there was modest growth in the number of members purchasing cover 
from registered medical schemes – the average annual growth rate over this period 
was 2.21 percent over the period 1993 to 1999. By the end of 1999, the number of 
members covered by registered medical schemes stood at 2,276,495 and the total 
number of beneficiaries was 6,025,550. Therefore, the membership data refutes the 
common belief that the deregulation that took place towards the end of the 1980s and 
the early 1990s had led to a significant decline in medical scheme membership.  
 
Once the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 became effective from 1 January 
2000, one can observe a sharp rise in the number of medical scheme members; 
however, rather than being the result of government’s regulatory reforms, it can be 
explained by the reclassification of Polmed and Transnet from exempt to registered 
medical scheme status.  Figure 2-3 confirms that after the initial increase in the number 
of medical scheme members during 2000, for the next six years the trend in medical 
scheme membership reverted to the prior growth rates. The total number of medical 
scheme members increased from 2,598,865 in 2000 to 2,985,350 individuals by the 
end of 2006 – an average annual growth rate of 2.31 percent over the period 2001 to 
2006. Medical scheme beneficiaries increased from 6,729,551 in 2000 to 7,127,343 
individuals by the end of 2006 – an average annual growth rate of only 0.96 percent 
over the same period.  Thus, growth in medical scheme membership that followed the 
implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 did not translate into a 
significant increase in medical scheme coverage.  
 
                                                     
46 Exempt (or Bargaining Council) medical scheme members and their dependents were excluded from 
the assessment of membership, as the reporting of these schemes by the Council for Medical Schemes 
is inconsistent. In fact, the Council for Medical Schemes ceased reporting the detailed membership 
figures for these schemes from 2005 onwards. The analysis is further complicated by changes in the 
definition of registered schemes over the 1993 to 2009 period, since medical schemes such as Transnet 
and Polmed that were previously classified as ‘exempt’, were suddenly redefined as registered medical 
schemes from the year 2000 onwards (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). Thus, it is important to acknowledge 
the once-off rise in membership figures due to the Transnet and Polmed reclassification.  
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Since the end of 2006, the growth rate in medical scheme membership has improved 
marginally. By 2009, medical scheme membership had increased to 3,488,009 
individuals - an average annual growth rate of only 5.19 percent over the period 2007 
to 2009.  Correspondingly, medical scheme beneficiaries have increased to 8,068,505 
individuals by the end of 2009 – an average annual growth rate of only 4.13 percent 
over the period 2007 to 2009.47 However, if one examines the data from the Council 
for Medical Schemes (2007)’s Annual Report, it is unclear whether suddenly the 
number of members and dependents are inflated by the reclassification of the 
remaining Bargaining Council medical schemes. In addition, the increase in medical 
scheme beneficiaries may in part be due to previously uncovered lives being 
incorporated into the Government Employee Medical Scheme (GEMS), which has 
been in operation since 2006 (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
 
As McLeod and Ramjee (2007) point out, perhaps a more meaningful measure of 
medical scheme coverage is to relate the number of beneficiaries to the total 
population. Based upon mid-year estimates of South Africa’s total population from 
Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), the ratio of the number of medical scheme 
beneficiaries to the total population has marginally increased from 15.4 percent in 
2000 to 16.36 percent in 2009.48 However, McLeod and Ramjee (2007) note that in 
1994, the ratio of the number of medical scheme beneficiaries to the total population 
was 17 percent. Thus, these findings are indicative of the failure of the new regulatory 
framework to broaden the scope of coverage to the population-at-large.  
 
                                                     
47 The difference in the growth rates observed in relation to medical scheme members versus total 
medical scheme beneficiaries can be attributed to the problem of affordability rather than any real 
changes in family size (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). 
48 Statistics South Africa. (2000). Mid-year Population Estimates 2000. Pretoria: Statistics South 
Africa. Retrieved February 13, 2010 from http://196.25.65.5/publications/P0302/P03022000.pdf. 
Statistics South Africa. (2009). Mid-year Population Estimates 2009. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
Retrieved February 13, 2010 from http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022009.pdf. 
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Figure 2-3: Total Number of Medical Scheme Beneficiaries – Members and Dependents (1993 – 
2009) 
 
Source: South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993– 2010) 
 
The new regulatory framework that emerged with the enactment of the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 did place considerable emphasis on ensuring that 
medical schemes maintain adequate solvency levels. Regulation 29 of the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 prescribes the minimum accumulated funds that need 
to be maintained by registered medical schemes, where accumulated funds refers to 
net asset value of the scheme excluding funds set aside for specific purposes and 
unrealised non-distributable profits (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010). 
Accumulated funds expressed as percentage of gross contributions, or solvency ratio, 
must be maintained at a minimum level of 25 percent.49 The solvency ratio is a useful 
measure of the financial soundness and sustainability of the medical scheme, and it 
further gives an indication of the ability of the medical scheme to withstand 
unforeseen (or unexpected) fluctuations in incurred claims (benefits paid out to 
healthcare providers for healthcare services rendered to medical scheme members and 
                                                     
49 The minimum accumulated funds required to ensure that the solvency ratio is kept at the required 
level of 25 percent, is more commonly referred to as the reserves of the medical schemes (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2010). 
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their dependents). Moreover, with improvements in the skills and capacity at the 
Council for Medical Schemes, monitoring the solvency of medical schemes has 
essentially become part of the ‘daily’ routine. Indeed, there is now detailed quarterly 
monitoring of all schemes and monthly reviews of medical schemes identified to be in 
financial distress (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
 
From Table 2-2, in 2000, approximately 3.22 million individuals were beneficiaries of 
registered medical schemes with a solvency protection of less than 10 percent of 
contributions (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).50 By December 2009, this number had been 
significantly reduced to only 2.25 million individuals who were beneficiaries of 
registered medical schemes with a solvency protection level of less than 25 percent of 
contributions – an improvement of 36.1 percent.  
 
Table 2-2: Prescribed Solvency Levels and the Number of Medical Scheme Beneficiaries 
 
Year  Number of Medical Scheme 
Beneficiaries within Medical 
Schemes that were Below the 
Prescribed Solvency Ratio 
Number of Medical Scheme 
Beneficiaries within Medical 
Schemes that were Above the 
Prescribed Solvency Ratio 
Total Number of 
Medical Scheme 
Beneficiaries 
2000  3,224,080   3,505,460    6,729,540  
2001  3,227,396   3,537,004    6,764,400  
2002  3,770,379   2,943,755    6,714,134  
2003  3,649,418   3,022,383    6,671,801  
2004  2,614,433   4,048,130    6,662,563  
2005  2,819,467   4,016,154    6,835,621  
2006  3,363,751   3,763,592    7,127,343  
2007  3,829,041   3,776,195    7,605,236  
2008  2,058,427   5,816,399    7,874,826  
2009  2,246,674  5,821,831   8,068,505  
 
Source: South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (2000 – 2010) 
 
Since 2000, the average solvency ratio for all registered medical schemes has been 
consistently higher than the prescribed level. Figure 2-4 illustrates that in 2000, the 
average solvency ratio for all registered medical schemes was 20.2 percent, it rose 
                                                     
50 The minimum solvency ratio initially started out at 10 percent in 2000 and through a transitional 
period, the solvency ratio was gradually increased to its current level of 25 percent.   
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steadily to reach a peak of 39.1 percent by 2005 and then it edged progressively lower 
to touch 32.9 percent by 2009 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010).   
 
The average solvency ratio for open schemes was 27.4 percent in 2009 compared to 
13.3 percent back in 2000. Although, from Figure 2-5 it is clear that the solvency ratio 
has dipped below the prescribed level on two occasions within the 2000 to 2009 
period. It is however, currently above the prescribed level of 25 percent (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2010).  Open medical schemes do have greater difficulty in 
maintaining solvency levels when compared to restricted members schemes, since by 
definition, their pool of members can have a greater diversity of risks. In certain cases, 
open schemes may be reluctant to apply interim increases in members’ contributions 
or indeed raise contributions too excessively as medical scheme brokers may persuade 
members to leave the scheme, thereby causing solvency ratios to deteriorate further 
(McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). Moreover, medical schemes that are growing their 
membership base rapidly, risk suffering strain with respect to having sufficient 
reserves to maintain appropriate solvency levels. 
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Figure 2-4: Industry Solvency Trends for all Registered Medical Schemes (2000 - 2009) 
 
 
Source: South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Report (2010: 199) 
 
Figure 2-5: Industry Solvency Trends for Open Medical Schemes (2000 - 2009) 
 
 
Source: South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Report (2010: 199) 
10
13.5
17.5
22
25 25 25 25 25 25
20.2 20.4
22.9
29.3
37.3
39.1
37.5 38 36.6
32.9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
So
lv
en
cy
 Ra
tio
 (%
)
Prescribed Solvency Ratio Registered Medical Scheme Average Solvency Ratio
10
13.5
17.5
22
25 25
25
25 25
25
13.3
13.5
15.1
20
28.5
29.6
27.7
28.6 29.8
27.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
So
lv
en
cy
 Ra
tio
 (%
)
Prescribed Solvency Ratio Open Medical Scheme Average Solvency Ratio
77 
 
 
The average solvency ratio for restricted schemes was 42.5 percent in 2009 compared 
to 34.2 percent back in 2000. Although, 2009’s figure of 42.5 percent is considerably 
higher than the prescribed level, it nevertheless represents a significant drop from the 
peak of 64.7 percent in 2006. Whilst restricted schemes tend to maintain higher 
solvency levels than their open scheme counterparts, Figure 2-6 illustrates that the 
average solvency ratio for restricted schemes has progressively deteriorated since 
2006 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010).   
 
Figure 2-6: Industry Solvency Trends for Restricted Medical Schemes (2000 - 2009) 
 
 
Source: South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Report (2010: 200) 
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competitive, it is then possible to test for the presence of adverse selection as 
described in the empirical section of this thesis.  
 
Despite the decline in the number of registered medical schemes from 187 in 1993 to 
only 110 by 2009, South Africa’s medical schemes market is characterised by few 
entry and exit barriers. Over the 1993 to 2009 period, many new entrants to the 
medical schemes market have been observed. Indeed, the current largest private open 
medical scheme by gross contribution income, Discovery Health Medical Scheme, is 
a relatively newcomer to the market, having only been established in March 1992. In 
addition, a significant number of registered medical schemes have also been 
liquidated, either voluntarily or involuntarily over this period. The number of new 
entrants in any given year has largely offset those medical schemes exiting the market 
through liquidation. Thus, the primary reason for the decline in the number of 
registered medical schemes between 1993 and 2009 has been due to a period of 
consolidation as evidenced by the large number of amalgamations. Hence, at first 
glance it does appear that South Africa’s private health insurance sector is a vibrant 
and competitive market with few entry and exit barriers. 
 
As a consequence of the extensive consolidation that has taken place within the 
medical schemes market; many observers have questioned whether the industry has 
become plagued by a high degree of concentration. Some may argue that as a direct 
result of the consolidation, the industry may have become far more concentrated in 
the hands of a few medical schemes (McIntyre et al., 2007).  
 
To test whether the South African private health insurance sector is sufficiently 
competitive, the thesis adopts a simple index that will measure the size of medical 
schemes in relation to the industry as a whole; namely, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). The HHI may be a simple measure, but it is a useful indicator of the 
degree of competition (concentration) within a market (Hirschman, 1964; Brown & 
Warren-Boulton, 1988). The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market 
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shares of the fifty largest firms within an industry, where the market share is 
expressed as a proportion of the total market share.51 The HHI can range between 0 
and 1, with increases in the index indicating a decrease in competition, whilst the 
converse would be true if the index were to fall.  Mathematically, the HHI can be 
described by Equation 2-2. 
 
Equation 2-2: General Formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Hirschman, 1964; 
Brown & Warren-Boulton, 1988) 
ࡴࡴࡵ ൌ෍࢙࢏૛
ࡺ
࢏ୀ૚
 
where	ࡴࡴࡵ	 represents	 the	 value	 of	 the	Herfindahl‐Hirschman	 Index,	 ࢙࢏	 is	 the	market	 share	 of	
medical	scheme	࢏	and	ࡺ	represents	the	number	of	registered	medical	schemes	(in	this	case	the	
fifty	largest	registered	medical	schemes	by	gross	contribution	income). 
 
The HHI as described by Equation 2-2 can take on value of between 1 ܰ⁄  and one. 
Brown and Warren-Boulton (1988) suggest that an HHI value of less than 0.1 
indicates a sufficiently competitive market, whilst values between 0.1 and 0.18 
indicate a certain degree of concentration and finally, a value in excess of 0.18 
indicates a high degree of concentration.  
 
In the case of South Africa’s medical scheme industry, an HHI was calculated for 
each year corresponding to the period analysed in the empirical section of this thesis; 
namely, between 1993 and 2009. For each year, the fifty largest registered medical 
schemes by gross contribution income were considered, and the market shares utilised 
in the computation of the HHI corresponded to each of these medical scheme’s share 
of the total gross contribution income of all registered medical schemes. The results of 
the HHI computation are summarised in Table 2-3. The results suggest the South 
African medical scheme industry is sufficiently competitive, but it is evident that the 
                                                     
51 If there are fewer than fifty firms making up an industry, it is appropriate to sum the squares of the 
market shares of all the firms within that specific industry (Hirschman, 1964). 
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degree of concentration has become progressively higher over the period 1993 to 
2009.  
 
Table 2-3: Degree of Competition within South Africa's Private Health Insurance Sector (1993 - 
2009) 
Year  Herfindahl‐
Hirschman Index 
(HHI) Value 
1993  0.0261 
1994  0.0296 
1995  0.0310 
1996  0.0309 
1997  0.0265 
1998  0.0289 
1999  0.0345 
2000  0.0406 
2001  0.0477 
2002  0.0599 
2003  0.0740 
2004  0.0815 
2005  0.0910 
2006  0.1004 
2007  0.0991 
2008  0.0996 
2009  0.1047 
 
Source: Own calculations and the South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 
2010) 
 
Figure 2-7 illustrates that there has been a noticeable upward trend in the HHI since 
1998 for South Africa’s medical scheme industry. In 1998, the HHI stood at 0.0289, 
but by 2009 it had reached 0.1047.  Although, the degree of competition remains 
adequate, it is concerning that competition is becoming progressively weaker as 
measured by the HHI. In addition, it is noted that after 1993, the HHI does appear to 
trend marginally downwards, indicating a period of increased competition, which 
coincides exactly with Reekie (1999)’s view that the deregulation that took place 
towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, created a regulatory framework that 
promoted competition. 
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Figure 2-7: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for South Africa's Medical Scheme Industry 
(1993-2009) 
 
Source: Own calculations and the South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 
2010) 
 
2.3 Regulation relating to Healthcare Provision 
 
At present total annual healthcare expenditure by both the public and private sectors is 
in excess of R220 billion and this represents approximately 8.5 percent of South 
Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Erasmus & Fitchen, 2010). The revised 
national health budget for 2010 was R101.9bn52, which represents 3.9 percent of GDP 
(National Treasury, 2010).  South Africa’s healthcare expenditure relative to GDP 
exceeds that of many countries with a similar level of economic development and in 
some cases healthcare expenditure is at levels comparable with those observed in 
high-income countries such as the United Kingdom (McIntyre et al., 2007). Despite 
healthcare expenditure being relatively high by international standards, South Africa 
                                                     
52 This represents the amount allocated towards healthcare expenditure in the fiscus in real terms (2010 
prices). 
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performs poorly with respect to many health status indicators, such as infant mortality 
and life expectancy. Thus, McIntyre et al. (2007) suggest that a strong argument can 
be made that South Africa rather than facing a lack of resources with respect to 
healthcare provision should utilise existing resources more efficiently and equitably.    
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) points out that with respect to healthcare provision, South 
Africa has a two-tier healthcare system, which is delineated along socio-economic 
lines. A wealthy minority is serviced by the private healthcare sector and in this case, 
healthcare is typically financed through medical scheme cover, whilst the majority of 
South Africans rely upon a relatively under-resourced public healthcare sector 
(McIntyre et al., 2007). Although, individuals without medical scheme cover have 
access to free primary healthcare at public sector healthcare facilities, in many 
instances they still incur out-of-pocket expenditure for items such as non-prescription 
medication and general practitioner consultations (McIntyre et al., 2007). The authors 
emphasise the disparities in resources across the two-tiers. According to McIntyre et 
al. (2007), resources in the public healthcare sector have been relatively constant in 
real per capita terms, whereas there has been a significant rise in real capita spending 
per medical scheme beneficiary.  
 
When one considers access to appropriate healthcare services or healthcare 
professionals within each sector, the disparities become quite palpable. Each public 
sector pharmacist serves between 12 and 30 times as many patients as their private 
sector counterparts (McIntyre et al., 2007). Each public sector generalist practitioner 
serves between 7 and 17 times more patients than private sector generalist 
practitioners. The figure for specialist practitioners is a shocking 23 times as many. 
Whilst for nurses the figure is 6 times as many patients.  Furthermore, there are more 
than twice as many private hospital beds available to medical scheme beneficiaries 
than for those who depend upon the public healthcare sector (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
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From 1994 onwards, the first democratically-elected South African government made 
a concerted effort to abandon the principle of mutuality in favour of the principle of 
solidarity with respect to access to healthcare and the financing thereof.  This 
paradigm shift was first articulated within the White Paper for the Transformation of 
the Health System in South Africa (Department of Health, 1997). McIntyre et al. 
(2007)53 outlines the proposals from this white paper, some of the suggestions 
included: 
 Primary healthcare should be the guiding approach that steers the transformation 
of the South African health system. 
 Within the health system, equitable outcomes should be promoted and address 
past historical injustices. In particular, certain vulnerable groupings, such as 
women, children, the elderly, disabled and the poor should receive priority. 
 Healthcare financing should serve as a redistributive mechanism with respect to 
resources. 
 Mandatory social health insurance is an important tool in promoting equity within 
healthcare financing. 
 
Many of the principles contained within the white paper were later reflected in the 
National Health Act No. 61 of 200354. The objective of the National Health Act No. 
61 of 2003, as set out in Section 2 of the Act, refers to the establishment of a national 
health system that encompasses both the public and private sectors in healthcare 
delivery. In fact, Section 45 (1) of the Act empowers the Minister of Health to 
“prescribe mechanisms to enable a co-ordinated relationship between private and 
public health establishments in the delivery of health services”. The National Health 
                                                     
53 McIntyre, D., Thiede, M., Nkosi, M., Mutyambizi, V., Castilo-Riquelme, M., Gilson, L., Erasmus, 
E., Goudge, J. (2007). A Critical Analysis of the Current South African Health System. Health 
Economics Unit, University of Cape Town and Centre for Health Policy, University of the 
Witwatersrand. This paper is also referred to as the SHIELD Report, as it is a report into the findings of 
the Strategies for Health Insurance for Equity in Less Developed Countries project. McIntyre et al. 
(2007) is merely the first report outlining the initial findings of the SHIELD project. The project’s 
objective is to investigate existing healthcare financing arrangements in three countries, namely; 
Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa – with a view to identify the major challenges for equitable 
outcomes within healthcare provision and delivery. The project has examined alternative approaches to 
health insurance to address equity challenges within national health systems. 
54 The National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 is also referred to as the National Health Act (2004), since it 
was only promulgated in July 2004. 
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Act No. 61 of 2003 goes further by actively promoting the rights of women, children, 
the elderly and disabled to have access to affordable healthcare. McIntyre et al. (2007) 
point out that the legislative changes, such as the National Health Act No. 61 of 2003, 
represent an explicit expression of government’s intention to create a national health 
system that is far more inclusive whilst at the same time adopting redistributive 
mechanisms to correct the historical injustices of the previous apartheid government.   
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) separate the regulation relating to healthcare provision into the 
following three categories:  
 quantity and distribution of healthcare provision; 
 quality of healthcare provision; and 
 price of  healthcare services and products. 
 
Regulation with respect to the Quantity and Distribution of Healthcare Provision 
In South Africa, legislation that directly influences the quantity and distribution of 
healthcare providers has been lacking (Cornell, Goudge, McIntyre & Mbatsha, 2001). 
Prior to 1994, private hospital groups were required to apply to the national 
Department of Health for permission to build new hospitals, increase the number of 
hospital beds in established hospitals or even obtain approval for the purchase of 
advanced equipment  (McIntyre et al., 2007). After the first democratic elections in 
1994, there was a considerable degree of confusion surrounding whether the national 
or provincial health authorities would be responsible for the licensing of private 
healthcare facilities. As a consequence and to allow for some time to develop 
appropriate policy guidelines surrounding the licensing of private healthcare facilities, 
the first democratically-elected government decided to impose a temporary 
moratorium on the building or expansion of private hospitals (Cornell et al., 2001).  
 
Legislative clarification with respect to the responsibilities surrounding the licensing 
of private healthcare facilities was forthcoming with the promulgation of the National 
85 
 
Health Act No. 61 of 2003 (McIntyre et al., 2007). Under the new legislation, 
responsibility for the planning and development of new private healthcare institutions 
was devolved to the provincial health departments. Accordingly, a Provincial Health 
Council was established within each province to give advice concerning best practice 
and standards for healthcare institutions.55 In addition, each council directs the 
development, procurement and the utilisation of healthcare technology within their 
respective province (McIntyre et al., 2007). The Director-General of the national 
Department of Health is tasked with the responsibility of issuing licenses (referred to 
as a ‘certificate of need’) for all private hospitals. According to Section 36(1) of the 
National Health Act No. 61 of 2003, a person may not:  
“…establish, construct, modify or acquire a health establishment or health 
agency; increase the number of beds in or acquire prescribed health technology 
at a health establishment or health agency; or provide prescribed health 
services…without being in possession of a certificate of need”.  
 
Before the Director-General issues (or renews) a certificate of need, he/she is required 
to consider the following criteria: 
“(a) the need to ensure consistency of health services development in terms of 
national, provincial and municipal planning; 
(b) the need to promote an equitable distribution and rationalisation of health 
services and health care resources, and the need to correct inequities based 
[up]on racial, gender, economic and geographical factors; 
(c) the need to promote an appropriate mix of public and private health services; 
(d) the demographics and epidemiological characteristics of the population to be 
served; 
(e) the potential advantages and disadvantages for existing public and private 
health services and for any affected communities; 
(f) the need to protect or advance persons or categories of persons designated in 
terms of the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act No. 55 of 1998), within the 
emerging small, medium and micro-enterprise sector; 
                                                     
55 Each Provincial Health Council consists of provincial and local government officials, and healthcare 
officials. 
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(g) the potential benefits of research and development with respect to the 
improvement of health service delivery;  
(h) the need to ensure that ownership of facilities does not create perverse 
incentives for health service providers and health workers; 
(i) if applicable, the quality of health services rendered by the applicant in the 
past; 
(j) the probability of the financial sustainability of the health establishment or 
health agency; 
(k) the need to ensure the availability and appropriate utilisation of human 
resources and health technology; 
(l) whether the private health establishment is for profit or not; and 
(m) if applicable, compliance with the requirements of a certificate of non-
compliance”.  
(Section 36(3) of the National Health Act No. 61 of 2003) 
 
Therefore, the “certificate of need” is ostensibly a mechanism by which the South 
African Department of Health can control the distribution of healthcare services, 
influence the quantity and quality of healthcare services within the country (McIntyre 
et al., 2007). The National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 and in particular, the 
“certificate of need” have garnered considerable criticism from healthcare 
professionals and private hospital groups. Despite the vociferous opposition from 
these groups, the legislation was promulgated successfully (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
But it is only in 2006 that government initiated the implementation of the National 
Health Act No. 61 of 2003 and it has to be said that many of the provinces are still in 
the process of aligning their provincial legislation with the Act. Some of the criticism 
levelled against the new legislation stems from a view that government appears to be 
antagonistic towards for-profit private healthcare. It is regrettable that this is the 
perceived view of many private healthcare stakeholders. However, Biermann  (2004) 
emphasises that it is important that in order to achieve a more equitable public-private 
healthcare mix that offers a sustainable (and adequate) healthcare delivery system for 
all South Africans, government needs to acknowledge that there is no such ideal as 
free healthcare – to coin the old adage – there is after all no free lunch. Healthcare 
services provided by the public sector are in any event funded by taxpayers, which 
include businesses and individuals. Without the profit motive, so much of what is 
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produced would simply cease to exist and this includes healthcare technologies and 
even medicines (Biermann, 2004).  
 
As free market provocateurs would argue, in a free society, consumers reign supreme 
since profits accrue to those who serve the customer best (Biermann, 2004). The 
author points out those who do not meet customer’s needs simply go out of business. 
Therefore, under the public provision of healthcare where there is no profit motive, it 
is difficult to ascertain whether or not patients’ requirements are being met. 
Nevertheless, according to Biermann (2004) government appears to eschew the profit 
motive in the provision of healthcare, viewing it somehow as immoral. Without 
profits little or no progress would be made with respect to technological medical 
advancements, new medical treatments or pharmaceutical drugs. For example, the 
pharmaceutical industry devotes a considerable amount of resources and effort in the 
development of new medicines and by their very nature these ventures are fraught 
with uncertainty as there is no guarantee of success (Reekie, 1999). Arrow (1971: 
223) states that: 
“By definition, research is a venture into the unknown…The outcome of any 
research project is necessarily uncertain, and the most important results are likely 
to come from projects whose degree of uncertainty to begin with was greatest”. 
Pharmaceutical companies rely entirely upon the efficacy of the cures that these 
medicines may offer to patients (Biermann, 2004). Therefore, it is the pursuit of 
profits that ultimately determine the path of new innovation with respect to medical 
advancements.  
 
Biermann (2004) also considers the impact that the National Health Act No. 61 of 
2003 will have with respect to healthcare professionals. Once again a free society 
advocates that healthcare providers are free to practise their trade where they wish and 
to provide their services to whom they choose – provided that these transactions are 
voluntary (Biermann, 2004). Contrast this with a system that dictates where healthcare 
providers may offer their services, the nature of what services and equipment they 
88 
 
may offer to patients, the fees that they can charge for their services, the type of 
medicines (generic or otherwise) they may prescribe, what prices pharmaceutical 
companies may charge for medicines, and even how many hospital beds there should 
be within healthcare facilities (Biermann, 2004). The author argues that these 
draconian measures to rebalance the public-private healthcare mix are a planning tool 
of a society that is not free.  For Biermann (2004), the pre-eminent planning tool of a 
free society is the profit and loss system.  
 
Some proponents of the new legislation, such as McIntyre et al. (2007) argue that the 
profit-loss system, leads to a misallocation of healthcare resources. This is perhaps 
clearly evident when one considers the over-concentration of capacity in terms of 
private healthcare facilities and providers within urban areas versus the under-
provision experienced by rural communities (Biermann, 2004). Hence, the “certificate 
of need” is ear-marked as the mechanism that can address these imbalances. However, 
as Biermann (2004) indicates that there is little evidence to suggest that attempts by 
government to control the distribution of healthcare services are indeed successful. He 
argues that after decades of government control in the provision and delivery of 
healthcare in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom, the principle of 
equity continues to remain an elusive goal. 
 
Biermann (2004) goes further to assert that government’s introduction of the 
“certificate of need” is a precursor to chaos. The National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 
requires the Director-General of the national Department of Health to make accurate 
and informed decisions with respect to the healthcare requirements of the country. 
Moreover, the Director-General is tasked to align the current healthcare infrastructure 
and capacity with the healthcare requirements of the South African population 
(Biermann, 2004). In his seminal paper entitled “Der Wettbewerb als 
Entdeckungsverfahren”56, Hayek (1968) asserts that entrepreneurs can discover the 
exact needs of consumers only through the trial and error process of the competitive 
market and its guiding device – the price system (Biermann, 2004). Thus, without the 
                                                     
56 The English title of Hayek (1968)’s paper is “Competition as a discovery procedure”. 
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profit motive, Biermann (2004) argues that it is questionable to suggest that 
government officials will be capable of allocating healthcare resources efficiently and 
equitably.  
 
The Pharmacy Act No. 53 of 1974 together with the Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 
88 of 1997 governs the licensing of wholesale and retail pharmacies. A person or 
entity wishing to establish a pharmacy must apply to the Director-General of the 
national Department of Health for a license (McIntyre et al., 2007). The Pharmacy 
Amendment Act No. 88 of 1997 established the new South African Pharmacy Council 
and set out the council’s functions under the legislation, including the investigative 
and disciplinary powers of the council.57 The ambit of the council was also extended 
to include the public sector. Moreover, the Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 88 of 1997 
amended the provisions relating to pharmacy education and training, registration 
requirements and the ownership of pharmacies (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
 
Whilst the “certificate of need” is an attempt to address the distribution of healthcare 
provision, McIntyre et al. (2007) maintain that it does not directly address the supply 
of healthcare professionals. South Africa is currently facing a severe shortage of 
healthcare professionals. Some estimates of the number of generalist and specialist 
(medical) practitioners and nurses appear to be woefully over-estimated (Econex, 
2009b). Official estimates from the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) indicate that at present the total number of generalist and specialist 
practitioners practicing in the country is equal to 36,912 (African National Congress, 
2010). Furthermore, it is suggested that there has been a steady increase in the number 
of generalist and specialist practitioners since 2002.58 Venter, Erasmus and Theron 
(2010) highlight the difficulties in obtaining accurate data regarding the number of 
healthcare professionals actively working in South Africa.  The HPCSA figures 
include all medical practitioners who are registered with the council; however, some 
practitioners practice overseas and simply maintain their registration status with the 
                                                     
57 Before a licence is granted to a new pharmacy, the South African Pharmacy Council is required to 
inspect the premises and report back to the Director-General of the Department of Health. 
58 Refer to Figure 2-8. 
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council (Venter et al., 2010). In addition, the HPCSA data include medical 
practitioners that no longer practice, for example, those individuals occupying 
managerial or other administrative positions.  
 
Figure 2-8: Growth in Medical Practitioners (GPs and Specialists), 2002-2010 
 
Source: HPCSA data from African National Congress (2010). 
 
To obtain a more accurate assessment of the numbers of generalist and specialist 
practitioners practising within South Africa, Venter et al. (2010) explore alternate data 
sources. For the public sector, one possible source is to examine the government’s 
personnel and salary administration system (PERSAL). In 2010, the number of 
generalist and specialist practitioners on the government’s payroll was 11,309 and 
4,442 respectively (Venter et al., 2010). Medical scheme data estimates that the total 
number of generalist practitioners to be 6,949 and 5,695 specialist practitioners 
operating within the private sector (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010).59 To avoid 
double counting, Venter et al. (2010) point out that one should exclude from the 
public sector part-time and sessional medical practitioners that work primarily in the 
private sector and also exclude medical practitioners in the private sector that work 
primarily in the public sector. According to Venter et al. (2010), many industry 
                                                     
59 The data was based upon the number of medical practitioners visited by medical scheme members 
and subsequently reimbursed by the schemes (Venter et al., 2010).  
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experts believe that the incidence of public sector medical practitioners working part-
time in the private sector is far more prevalent than the reverse. Since neither dataset 
adequately captures the incidence of public and private sector cross-overs by medical 
practitioners, Venter et al. (2010) apply various possible scenarios to arrive at an 
estimate of the absolute number of generalist and specialist practitioners actively 
working in the country.60  
 
Venter et al. (2010) estimate that in 2010, the absolute number of generalist and 
specialist practitioners actively working in the country to be equal to 27,431. Of 
which the total number of general practitioners was 17,801, which equates to 
approximately 35.9 general practitioners per 100,000 people. The total number of 
specialist practitioners was equal to 9,630 or 19.4 per 100,000 people. Thus, the ratio 
of generalist and specialists practitioners per 100,000 people equates to 55.3. This is 
significantly lower than developed countries, such as Australia (247 per 100,000), 
United Kingdom (230 per 100,000) and the United States (256 per 100,000). It is even 
lower than other emerging economies, such as Brazil (185 per 100,000) and Mexico 
(198 per 100,000) (Venter et al., 2010). By 2020, based upon the current ageing 
profile of medical practitioners, training and attrition rates, Venter et al. (2010)’s 
analysis suggest that this ratio will deteriorate further to only 45.8 per 100,000.61   
 
Various data sources can be combined to determine the total number of nurses 
practicing within South Africa. Once again utilising PERSAL, one is able to ascertain 
the number of nurses working within the public sector. Other alternative data sources 
include the All Media and Product Survey (AMPS), the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
or registration information from the South African Nursing Council (SANC) (Econex, 
2009b). In 2008, the AMPS data estimated the number of nurses to be 256,000, whilst 
LFS estimated a total of 189,000. According to SANC, there were 213,000 registered 
                                                     
60 The scenario that Venter et al. (2010) finally decided upon as being the most appropriate was to 
adjust both the PERSAL and medical scheme industry figures in the following way: a 2.5 percent 
downwards adjustment was applied to the number of generalist practitioners in both the public and 
private sectors, whilst a further 5 percent was subtracted from the specialist figures in both sectors. 
61 For low income countries, the mean value for the ratio of medical practitioners per 100,000 people is 
found to be in the region of 50 (Venter et al., 2010). Hence, by 2020, the ratio of medical practitioners 
per 100,000 people in South Africa is expected to fall well-below that level.  
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nurses in 2008 (Econex, 2009b). As Econex (2009b) note, both the AMPS and SANC 
data appear to overstate the true number of nurses in the country. In particular, SANC 
registration data includes nurses that could either not be working or working overseas, 
but are simply maintaining their registration status. The PERSAL data indicates that 
in 2008, 104,571 nurses were working in the public sector.62 Unfortunately, there is 
no reliable source of information relating to the number of nurses employed in the 
private sector. In 2008, SANC estimated there were 82,000 nurses employed in the 
private sector (Econex, 2009b). As noted already, this is likely to be overstated. The 
Hospital Association of South Africa (HASA) estimated only 40,000 nurses were 
employed in the private sector during 2008 (Econex, 2009b). Thus, based upon 
PERSAL and HASA’s estimate, in 2008, a total of approximately 144,571 nurses 
were employed in the public and private healthcare sectors. 
 
The common perception is that the quantity of healthcare professionals is significantly 
skewed in favour of the private sector. For example, Wadee and Kahn (2007)’s 
analysis of the proportion of healthcare professionals across the public and private 
healthcare sectors, supports the view that the public healthcare sector appears to be 
woefully under-staffed in comparison to the private sector with respect to generalist 
and specialist practitioners. However, they acknowledge the paucity of the data that 
they utilised in arriving at their conclusion. It is therefore, not surprising that the 
paucity in the data has led many to believe that the disparity with respect to the 
quantity of healthcare professionals favours the private sector so greatly. Venter et al. 
(2010)’s analysis provides a more accurate assessment of the public-private mix with 
respect to the quantity of healthcare professionals employed within the South African 
healthcare sector. Contrary to popular perceptions, the authors find that the proportion 
of healthcare professionals across the public and private sectors are more equitable 
than previous studies suggested.63 In particular, the majority (61.9 percent) of 
generalist practitioners are employed in the public sector. On the hand, the majority 
                                                     
62 Of the 104,571 nurses working in the public sector; 47,834 are professional/registered nurses (RNs), 
22,702 are enrolled/staff nurses (ENs) and 34,030 are enrolled auxiliary/assistant nurses (ENAs) 
(Econex, 2009b). 
63 However, The number of individuals serviced by the public and private sectors are very different and 
therefore, despite the near equality with respect to the proportion of healthcare professionals across the 
two sectors, the reality is nevertheless  
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(56.2 percent) of specialist practitioners are employed within the private sector 
(Venter et al., 2010).  Table 2-4 presents a summary of the results obtained by Wadee 
and Kahn (2007). Table 2-5 presents a summary of the results obtained from Econex 
(2009b) and Venter et al. (2010).  
 
Table 2-4: Summary of Public versus Private Sector Mix - Healthcare Professionals (Wadee & 
Kahn, 2007) 64 
Healthcare 
Sector 
Generalist 
Practitioners (percent) 
Specialist 
Practitioners (percent) 
Nurses (percent)
Public  27.4  24.8  58.9 
Private  72.6  75.2  41.1 
 
Source: Wadee and Kahn (2007: 143). 
 
Table 2-5: Summary of Public versus Private Sector Mix - Healthcare Professionals (2010) 
Healthcare 
Sector 
Generalist 
Practitioners (percent) 
Specialist 
Practitioners (percent) 
Nurses (percent)65 
Public  61.9  43.8  72.3 
Private  38.1  56.2 27.7
 
Source: Econex (2009b), Venter et al. (2010) and own calculations. 
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) argue that the main instrument available to government to 
influence the production of health professionals is to direct how many students are 
admitted for suitable training within the various education institutions, such as 
universities and nursing colleges. In 2006, the Department of Health initiated a 
programme to evaluate the human resource constraints within the healthcare sector 
and a plan (Human Resource Plan) was outlined to provide broad guidelines on how 
to address the staff shortages observed within the healthcare sector in the country 
(Department of Health, 2006). According to the Human Resource Plan, the 
Department of Health would be responsible for planning the production of healthcare 
professionals and establish certain targets for increases in the number of healthcare 
professional graduates relative to the total number of graduates produced in the 
country.  
 
                                                     
64 Wadee and Kahn (2007)’s data is adapted from the work undertaken by Sanders and Lloyd (2005). 
65 Estimates for the number of nurses within each sector relates to the year 2008. 
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An adjunct to this mechanism would be to create an environment that is conducive to 
retain healthcare professionals trained within the country. One quarter of all medical 
practitioners trained in the country have left to pursue their careers elsewhere 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2009). In the case of specialist practitioners, the 
country is currently unable to replace at a fast enough rate those specialists who are 
either emigrating or retiring. The African National Congress (2009: 20) state that:  
“…it is estimated that about 67% of nurses who trained in the period 1997 to 
2005 do not appear on the South African Nursing council register…Some leave 
the country to seek greener pastures in countries that pay them higher salaries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, [United Kingdom], [United States], Canada and 
Australia.” 
In addition, the public healthcare sector struggles to retain staff since private practice 
is always an attractive alternative to public service.  In the public sector, just under 50 
percent of general practitioner posts, 44 percent of specialist practitioner posts and 
42% of all other healthcare professional posts are vacant (Council for Medical 
Schemes, 2010). As such there are no legal constraints applied to a healthcare 
professional wishing to enter into the private healthcare sector, with the exception of 
medical doctors and pharmacists who are now required to spend a year completing 
community service in a public healthcare institution upon graduation (McIntyre et al., 
2007). The government has attempted to retain public healthcare professionals by 
implementing rural and ‘scarce skills’ allowances, which supplement their 
remuneration packages, for certain categories of healthcare professionals. Moreover, 
the South African government has entered into bilateral agreements with for example, 
the United Kingdom, to promote “ethical recruitment practices” (McIntyre et al., 
2007: 38). In essence, these represent attempts by the government to restrict the 
ability of locally-trained healthcare professionals from seeking employment outside of 
South Africa. These measures are draconian and they may simply encourage school-
leavers, interested in the healthcare professions, to pursue their studies elsewhere if at 
all possible. The notion that the government believes that it can (and should) dictate 
labour mobility with respect to the healthcare sector is unfortunate. The government 
should rather concentrate on creating a local environment that is conducive for 
individuals to remain in the country. Although, there are a myriad of factors that are 
causing many healthcare professionals to seek employment outside of South Africa, 
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addressing these common concerns should be a high priority for the government as 
they have deep and dire consequences for the wider population. Some of these factors 
include the excessive crime rate, deteriorating criminal justice system, corruption, 
mismanagement of government funds, lack of accountability, practices that promote 
mediocrity rather than excellence and the enrichment of a minority of elite, well-
placed and well-connected individuals at the expense of the majority of South 
Africans. It is only through courageous leadership and moral fortitude that the South 
African government will be able to begin to place the country on a more prosperous 
and sustainable path that will ultimately benefit all South Africans.  
 
Another policy instrument available to the government to improve the supply and 
distribution of healthcare professionals is to recruit healthcare professionals from 
other countries (McIntyre et al., 2007). The policy as discussed within Department of 
Health (2006) emphasises the objective of recruiting foreign healthcare professionals 
with the relevant skill set and competencies to work in particularly, under-serviced 
and remote areas of the country. Indeed, since 1994, South Africa has already 
recruited a number of general practitioners from countries such as Tunisia, Cuba and 
Iran. In 2004, the South African government also launched the Community Health 
Worker Programme to create community-based generalist healthcare workers that 
would assist with health promotion, disease prevention and primary healthcare 
(McIntyre et al., 2007).  
 
Regulation with respect to the Quality of Healthcare Provision 
The regulation governing the quality of healthcare provision in South Africa primarily 
involves imposing strict controls surrounding the production and sale of medicines, 
and safeguarding the high standard of education and training for healthcare 
professionals (McIntyre et al., 2007). Certain regulatory provisions permit the 
inspection of healthcare facilities; however, capacity is limited to carry-out such 
inspections or even to enforce compliance with directives to improve standards. 
Nevertheless, it is possible for a healthcare facility’s licence to be revoked should it be 
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found that the quality of healthcare provided at a facility is deficient (McIntyre et al., 
2007). 
 
Significant emphasis has been placed upon regulating the quality of medicines 
supplied within the country. The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 
101 of 1965 (as amended)66 specifies that only medicines that have been approved by 
the Medicines Control Council (MCC) and registered with the Medicine Regulatory 
Authority (MRA) may be distributed within South Africa (McIntyre et al., 2007). The 
primary function of the MCC is to evaluate applications for the registration of any 
new medicines. The MCC also applies a schedule to each medicine registered and 
these stipulate who may distribute these medicines and under what conditions they 
may do so. For example, Schedule 0 medicines may be sold by any retailer, whilst 
Schedule 1 to 6 medicines can only be sold by qualifying healthcare practitioners, 
subject to pre-specified conditions. Schedule 7 to 8 medicines may only be sold by a 
supplier who has the pre-requisite permit from the Director-General of the 
Department of Health. In addition, medical practitioners, nurses or dentists are 
required to attend a course and pass an examination before they can be licensed to 
dispense medication (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
 
The MRA is responsible for licensing and inspecting the facilities of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. Moreover, the MRA frequently tests locally-produced medicines and 
those medicines that are imported into the country to ensure that they adhere to 
specific quality and safety standards (McIntyre et al., 2007). A more recent 
phenomenon is the distribution and sale of counterfeit or unregistered medicines, the 
authors argue that the MRA has to a large extent been successful in curtailing these 
criminal practices.  
 
                                                     
66 These amendments include the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 
of 1997, Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act No. 59 of 2002 and Medicines and 
Related Substances Amendment Act No. 72 of 2008. Other relevant legislation includes the Medicines 
and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act No. 132 of 1998, Prevention of and Treatment for 
Substance Abuse Act No. 70 of 2008, Pharmacy Act No.53 of 1974 and Pharmacy Amendment Act 
No. 88 of 1997.   
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In South Africa, the responsibility with respect to the quality of training of healthcare 
professionals is largely delegated to professional councils (or associations). Thus, 
these councils are tasked to safeguard the level of competency for their respective 
healthcare professionals and to ensure that an appropriate standard of quality is 
maintained. The four primary professional councils in the country include the: 
 Health Professions’ Council; 
 Nursing Council; 
 Pharmacy Council; and 
 Allied Health Professions’ Council. 
These bodies are also responsible for the registration of the qualifying healthcare 
professionals within their respective vocation. Although, these professional councils 
are responsible for maintaining a certain level of competency, the practicalities often 
translate into merely determining whether a candidate has obtained the necessary 
qualifications and completed any requisite practical training (including community 
service, residency or internship).67 Therefore, McIntyre et al. (2007) state that the 
professional councils have very limited influence with respect to increasing the supply 
of healthcare professionals or for the matter directly influencing the level of 
competency of the healthcare professionals – it appears to be largely a ‘rubber-
stamping’ exercise of certification rather than quality enhancement. Regulatory 
authority is devolved to these councils through primarily four pieces of legislation (as 
amended); namely, the Health Professions Act No. 56 of 197468, Pharmacy Act No.53 
of 197469, Allied Health Professions Act No. 63 of 198270 and Nursing Act No. 33 of 
2005. 
 
   
                                                     
67 The requisite training qualifications may be obtained either locally or internationally. 
68 As amended by the Health Professions Amendment Act No. 29 of 2007. 
69 As amended by the Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 6 of 1995, Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 88 of 
1997 and Pharmacy Amendment Act No. 1 of 2000. 
70 As amended by the Allied Health Professions Amendment Act No. 6 of 2000. 
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Regulation with respect to the Price of Healthcare Services and Products 
At present, price regulation in the South African healthcare sector is dominated by 
legislation that relates to the prices of medicines. The Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965 (as amended71) makes provision for a Pricing 
Committee to formulate recommendations regarding medicine pricing regulation to 
the Minister of Health (McIntyre et al., 2007). McIntyre et al. (2007) summarises the 
significant elements of the current South African legislation and accompanying 
regulations with respect to the pricing of medicines. The current legislation and 
accompanying regulations, emphasise transparency with respect to the pricing of 
medicines to ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the manufacturer price for 
medicines, wholesaler or distributor fee and the dispensing fee.  
 
A single exit price policy is in effect whereby all pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
required to sell a particular medicine at the identical price to all purchasers.72 As 
Davie and Urbach (2006) indicate, the single exit price requires pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and pharmaceutical importers to incorporate all their costs into the 
medicine’s price. This includes the costs of distributing and delivering medicines to 
the final user (Davie & Urbach, 2006). Hence, this requirement does not permit the 
application of a different pricing structure to take into account factors such as the 
physical location of the patient, the cost to maintain medicines at appropriate 
temperatures or even consideration about the shelf life of certain medicines. In the 
past, pharmaceutical manufacturers simply applied price discrimination principles in 
response to varying price elasticities of demand.73 Reekie (1999) argues that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers merely responded to observable price sensitivities by 
pricing at a lower a level in the more price sensitive sector such as in the public 
healthcare sector. Therefore, through pursuing their own self-interest and attempting 
to maximise expected profits, pharmaceutical companies achieved a redistribution of 
income across the public and private sectors. However, by applying the single exit 
                                                     
71 As amended by the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997, 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 59 of 2002 and Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act No. 72 of 2008. 
72 The Single Exit Price must be printed on the medicine packaging (McIntyre et al., 2007). 
73 Individuals serviced by the private sector are generally in full employment and are less price 
sensitive than poorer individuals serviced by the state (Reekie, 1999). 
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price policy it removes the possibility for this redistributive mechanism to flourish. In 
addition, Reekie (1999) contends that the enactment of the Pharmacy Amendment Act 
No. 88 of 1997, which repealed the ban on the corporate ownership of pharmacies, 
would have resulted in lower medicine prices at the point-of-service. Reekie (1999) 
claims that the establishment of larger retail outlets would encourage greater 
competition and at the same these outlets would be able to benefit from economies of 
scale. 
 
Discounting of medicines is prohibited under the current legislation. McIntyre et al. 
(2007) state that prior to the current legislation, it was common practice for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to offer private healthcare facilities and dispensing 
medical practitioners a substantial discount on medicines to ensure that these 
medicines were dispensed regularly and in the case of a private hospital included on 
the hospital’s formulary. 
 
Previously, significant mark-ups were applied to medicines throughout the supply 
chain. Thus, government sought to move retail pharmacies and dispensing medical 
practitioners away from the ‘trade in medicine’, and towards a model whereby they 
would simply receive a professional dispensing fee (McIntyre et al., 2007). However, 
these regulatory reforms have attracted significant opposition from wholesalers and 
retail pharmacy groups, and implementation has been plagued by several delays due 
to litigation. Therefore in 2010, the Minister of Health decided to propose a new 
dispensing fee structure. Under the current proposals, the dispensing fee structure 
would be applied across four categories of medicines – these categories would be 
determined by the medicine’s single exit price.  
 
The suggested four-tier structure would be as follows: medicines costing less than 
R75 would attract a dispensing fixed fee of R6 plus a dispensing variable portion of 
no more than 46 percent of the medicine’s single exit price; medicines costing 
between R75 and R200 would attract a dispensing fixed fee of R51 plus a dispensing 
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variable fee of no more than 33 percent of the medicine’s single exit price; medicines 
costing between R200 and R700 would attract a dispensing fixed fee of R15 plus a 
dispensing variable fee of no more than 15 percent of the medicine’s single exit price; 
and medicines costing in excess of R700 would attract a dispensing fixed fee of R121 
plus a dispensing variable fee of no more than 5 percent of the medicine’s single exit 
price. If these adjustments to the dispensing fee structure are implemented, South 
African consumers can look forward to exorbitant increases in the price of medicines 
at the point-of-service as these dispensing fees are factored into prices.  
 
Regulation exists enforcing a maximum that may be charged with respect to logistics, 
such as the transportation and distribution of medicines (McIntyre et al., 2007).  
Under the logistics fee cap, government’s stated objective of improving access to 
affordable medicines for the poor will have the contrary effect. As Davie and Urbach 
(2006) argue the poor tend to reside far from major urban centres, thus the logistics 
fee cap will discourage distributors of medicines to supply these outlying areas. 
Moreover, the longer this policy is in force, it will ensconce a greater a misallocation 
of affordable medicines in favour of more wealthy consumers (Davie & Urbach, 
2006). The logistics fee cap, as with any price control, is often promoted and devised 
as a mechanism to assist the poor and alleviate poverty. However, in almost every 
case, it achieves the exact opposite effect.  
 
In South Africa, wealthier individuals tend to have access to high-volume, low mark-
up retailers that are located in the major urban centres, whilst the poor tend to shop at 
low-volume, high mark-up retailers in a more rural setting. Indeed, Davie and Urbach 
(2006) point out that rural areas are typically not well-serviced by large high-volume 
retailers or pharmacies. Therefore, poorer patients purchase medicines from small-
scale retailers that tend to have higher margins due to their low trade volume (Davie 
& Urbach, 2006). The fact that the poor tend to shop at these outlets is a factor of 
convenience, the travelling costs (and opportunity costs, such as time and effort) is 
likely to offset any discount received at the urban retailer. Hence, the authors suggest 
that poor consumers are merely behaving rationally by choosing to purchase their 
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medicines at these rural establishments. As with any form of price control, such as the 
logistics fee cap, it will not and cannot protect consumers or indeed induce lower 
medicine prices (Davie & Urbach, 2006). The authors claim that attempts by 
government to control prices simply interfere with the normal market process, reduces 
competition and ultimately harms the consumer.74 Davie and Urbach (2006: 1) go 
further to explain that: 
“…consumers are most effectively protected by open competition, which gives 
the maximum power to consumers to punish or reward [companies] based [up]on 
their performance”.  
A policy whereby government endeavours to micro-manage the distribution of 
medicines through a logistics fee cap can, according to Davie and Urbach (2006), be 
expected to have a number of adverse effects and unexpected consequences. Hence, 
the bid to control economic outcomes through regulation is often based upon a narrow 
set of preferences, which risks alienating the general preferences of all market 
participants (Davie & Urbach, 2006).  
 
Whilst the government recognises that modern medicines do require considerable 
research effort and cost to develop, and it further acknowledges that purchasers of 
these medicines should expect to contribute towards these costs, it believes that these 
costs75 should be borne according to each country’s ability to pay (Pillay, 2006).  
Pillay (2006) concedes that World Health Organization (WHO) endorses the view that 
the principle of differential pricing of essential medicines is an acceptable practice by 
certain pharmaceutical manufacturers. However, the Pricing Committee’s view is that 
the purchase prices of medicines should relate to their therapeutic performance and 
take into account national socio-economic factors. According to Pillay (2006), many 
countries have managed to negotiate medicine prices with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers using evidence-based comparisons. It is therefore the desire of the 
Pricing Committee and the Department of Health to establish such a programme in 
                                                     
74 Price controls essentially deviate from the notion that Posner (1974) espouses whereby government 
intervention should address market failures and enhance social welfare rather than attempt to tackle 
market ‘problems’, such as pricing behaviour.  
75 Government believes that these costs should first be accurately determined before the costs can be 
distributed amongst the purchasers of medicines.  
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South Africa (Pillay, 2006). At the outset, the Pricing Committee sought to ensure that 
South African purchasers of pharmaceuticals were not paying higher prices than their 
counterparts in other countries. Thus, the Pricing Committee proposed the 
implementation of a method for international benchmarking of manufacturer prices. 
Countries were selected on the basis of their stringent regulation with respect to the 
quality and price of medicines, and the easy accessibility of pricing data. Under the 
regulations, each pharmaceutical manufacturer of originator medicines76 will be 
required to compare the price they charge for their product in South Africa with that 
charged in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Spain (McIntyre et al., 2007). If the 
price is lower in any of the identified jurisdictions, they will be required to lower that 
price accordingly.  McIntyre et al. (2007) state that in the case of generics, the price 
must be set at a level that is at least 40 percent below the price of the originator 
equivalent.  
 
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965 (as amended) 
also promotes generic substitution. Pharmacists are required to inform patients about 
generic equivalents and to discuss with the patient the benefits of using the generic 
alternatives.  McIntyre et al. (2007) actually stipulates that the legislation requires 
pharmacists to dispense the generic equivalent unless specifically instructed to by the 
patient; or expressly stipulated within the prescription or if the generic equivalent 
happens to be more expensive than the originator medicine. The legislation also 
permits compulsory licensing and parallel importation. In other words, a judicial 
authority such as the Minister of Health or Competition Board, may issue a license for 
the domestic manufacture of a medicine still under patent without the agreement of 
the patent holder (McIntyre et al., 2007).77 This represents a significant move away 
from the protection of intellectual property; however, the government claims that this 
would only be undertaken under circumstances where the availability of the medicine 
                                                     
76 Medicines can be classified into either originator medicines or independent multi-source medicines 
(generics). Originator medicines refer to medicines registered in South Africa that are currently 
protected by a patent or had been previously protected by a patent. Generics refer to medicines 
registered in South Africa that have never been protected by a patent. Generics are manufactured by 
companies other than the company that originally held the patent.    
77 An acceptable royalty payment would be paid to the patent holder. The question immediately raised 
would be acceptable to whom? It is unclear who will determine the “acceptability” of such a 
compensatory payment. 
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is critical to public health or as recourse to anti-competitive practices, such as 
excessive prices or the failure to supply sufficient quantities. Parallel importation 
refers to the practice whereby an entity, such as government, imports a medicine from 
sources other than the original manufacturer. Typically, where pharmaceuticals are 
sold at lower prices in other countries, it may be possible to take advantage of the 
price differential offered to purchasers in alternate jurisdictions (McIntyre et al., 
2007).   
 
The opposition to many of the provisions within the legislation and accompanying 
regulations has been vociferous, which has resulted in a plethora of legal challenges 
testing the validity of such provisions (McIntyre et al., 2007). Despite government’s 
success in promulgating the relevant legislation, in particular, the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 59 of 2002, it is yet to make use of 
the provisions relating to either compulsory licensing or parallel importation 
(McIntyre & Doherty, 2004).   
 
The National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 also makes provision for a National Health 
Reference Price List (NHRPL), which recommends the fees that should be charged 
for different healthcare services provided by private healthcare professionals or 
private healthcare facilities (McIntyre et al., 2007). The NHRPL outlines a reference 
price list for healthcare services rendered, diagnostic and treatment procedures 
performed, and consumable items utilised by healthcare establishments, healthcare 
providers or allied healthcare workers within the private healthcare sector. 
Remarkably, the National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 explicitly states that medical 
schemes are permitted to use the NHRPL to determine their own benefit offerings and 
in the case of private sector healthcare providers including healthcare practitioners, 
the Act permits the use of the NHRPL to construct their fee schedules (McIntyre et 
al., 2007).  
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As the NHRPL serves merely as a guideline for prices, McIntyre et al. (2007) argues 
that within the South African private healthcare sector there is no regulatory control of 
prices, with the exception of medicines and associated dispensing services. However, 
in 2010, the Department of Health released a discussion document proposing the 
creation of a statutory price determination authority.78 The purpose of the draft policy 
framework is set out as follows: 
“…for achieving stability in the determination of prices in the South African 
health private health system…The policy framework seeks to achieve price 
stability through the establishment of an enabling mechanism for the rational and 
fair determination of final prices used by suppliers of health services for billing 
patients and medical schemes and the tariffs used by schemes as a basis for 
determining their levels of reimbursement” (Department of Health, 2010: 10). 
The proposal seeks to bring back multilateral tariff negotiations under the auspices of 
the statutory price determination authority. Mandatory arbitration will be utilised to 
break deadlocks, and steer medical schemes and healthcare providers towards 
equitable and affordable outcomes. The Department of Health (2010) points out that 
medical schemes have traditionally operated according to a fee-for-service 
reimbursement system, whereby the healthcare expenditure incurred by a medical 
scheme member or beneficiary is simply paid to the relevant healthcare provider by 
the medical scheme.  
 
Considering that medical scheme members typically select their healthcare service 
provider, the medical scheme ends up acting merely as an indirect and third-party 
payer with little influence over the tariff negotiation between the medical scheme 
member (or beneficiary) and healthcare provider (Department of Health, 2010). 
Furthermore, since the healthcare provider relies almost exclusively upon the 
reimbursements from medical schemes as the predominant source of their income, 
and as the medical scheme member is essentially not paying in full for the healthcare 
services received at the point-of-service, there is a tendency for over-utilisation.  
Moreover, the medical scheme member or beneficiary is typically at an informational 
                                                     
78 Department of Health (2010) Discussion Document – The Determination of Health Prices in the 
Private Sector. Pretoria: National Department of Health. 
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disadvantage with respect to the diagnosis and treatment of any medical condition or 
healthcare incident. Therefore, the medical scheme member or beneficiary is inclined 
to accept any diagnosis or treatment prescribed by their healthcare provider. Hence, 
the Department of Health (2010: 10) argues that the medical schemes “…will face an 
infinite liability” if they do not negotiate appropriate reimbursement prices with 
healthcare service providers. It is important to note that these “reimbursement prices” 
do not necessarily need to equate to the actual prices charged by the healthcare 
providers. Thus, by implication the difference between the reimbursement and actual 
price charged by the healthcare provider would represent an out-of-pocket expense for 
the medical scheme member.  
 
The Department of Health (2010) draft policy framework represents probably the 
most significant reform to South Africa’s private health insurance sector since the 
enactment of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. If the draft policy is 
implemented and if it works as intended, the Department of Health (2010) argues it 
will arrest the oligopoly power that effectively resides with private healthcare 
institutions and private healthcare professionals. Therefore, the proposed reforms 
relating to the creation of a statutory price determination authority would directly 
address the high medical inflation that has plagued the private healthcare sector for 
more than two decades. 
 
2.4 Cost Containment 
 
Contracted periods of high medical inflation have been associated with the ability of 
healthcare providers to ‘capture’ the regulatory environment partly as a result of the 
fee-for service reimbursement structure for healthcare services, which creates 
incentives for over-supply. Doherty and McLeod (2003) review the strategies adopted 
by medical schemes to contain costs. These strategies have been successful in 
controlling utilisation, but have had several adverse consequences with respect to 
equity (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). Unless the strategies are able to address the 
problem of the over-supply of healthcare services in the private sector, there is little 
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optimism that cost escalation can be arrested. The authors concur with Reekie (1999) 
that only once managed care is implemented properly can cost containment be 
achieved through the extensive use of healthcare provider networks that are 
reimbursed through risk-sharing arrangements. Another factor which has played a role 
in the observed cost escalation is the flight of skills to other countries and the scarcity 
of quality healthcare facilities. McIntyre et al. (2007) argue that the key weakness 
with the current regulatory environment governing medical scheme business in the 
country is that it does not address the: 
“…vicious cycle between supply (quantity and distribution) and price issues 
within the private [healthcare] sector” (McIntyre et al., 2007: 48).  
They describe the exodus of generalist and specialist practitioners, and other allied 
healthcare professionals from the public to the private healthcare sectors as deeply 
concerning. In the early 1980s, approximately 40 percent of generalist and specialist 
practitioners were employed in the private healthcare sectors, but by 1990 this had 
increased to well over 60 percent and to over 70 percent by the late 1990s (McIntyre 
et al., 2007). The authors note that this trend is mirrored in the number of private (for-
profit) hospital beds over a similar period. In the early 1980s, there were about 8,000 
private (for-profit) hospital beds, which increased to over 11,000 by the late 1980s 
(McIntyre et al., 2007). Significant rises were recorded thereafter to 16,415 by 1994 
and 23,706 by 1999. Since then the increase has been modest and by 2007, the 
number of private (for-profit) hospital beds had levelled off to approximately 25,000 
(Cornell et al., 2001; van den Heever, 2007; McIntyre et al., 2007).  
 
Despite the significant rise in the supply of healthcare providers, McIntyre et al. 
(2007) assert that the number of individuals able to afford these private healthcare 
services, in particular medical scheme members, had not increased at the same pace.  
According to the authors, the end result was an excess supply of private healthcare 
providers relative to their designated clientele that they serve – medical scheme 
members and their dependents. Interestingly, they raise the question, how could the 
private healthcare professionals and the private healthcare facilities expect to generate 
sufficient income in the face of what was an apparent over-supply of their services to 
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the private healthcare sector. McIntyre et al. (2007) suggest that the primary response 
of private healthcare providers was to promote increased utilisation of healthcare 
services. As most healthcare expenditure that is incurred by consumers tends to be 
non-discretionary, funding healthcare expenditure via a risk pool is more appealing to 
insurers since healthcare services are demanded due to medical necessity rather than 
personal preference. However, medical scheme beneficiaries are at an informational 
disadvantage when compared to the healthcare professionals that advise them with 
respect to the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions or incidents. 
Furthermore, since the fee-for-service reimbursement model does not require medical 
scheme beneficiaries to pay for the full cost of the healthcare services they receive at 
the point-of-service, the incentive to reduce utilisation is diminished considerably. 
The authors suggests that as a result over time the balance of power with respect to 
influencing prices has shifted away from medical schemes towards private healthcare 
providers.  McIntyre et al. (2007: 50) goes further to argue that: 
“…these factors have contributed to unconstrained cost spiral in the private 
[healthcare] sector, which has resulted in a rapidly widening public-private mix 
gap.” 
 
2.4.1 Is Medical Scheme Coverage becoming more affordable? 
 
Medical scheme contributions have increased significantly over the last decade. This 
is despite the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and the 
government’s stated-objected of providing universal access to affordable medical 
scheme coverage. Specifically, the corresponding principles of open enrolment, 
community-rating and the Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs) package were meant 
to directly address the cost escalation in medical scheme contributions and 
deterioration in medical scheme benefits. Many commentators wish to attribute the 
blame for the inordinate increases in medical scheme contributions to the actual 
medical schemes; however, as McIntyre et al. (2007) point out a considerable portion 
of that blame should rest with the private healthcare providers. Private healthcare 
providers have been allowed to wield undue power with respect to the quantity, 
distribution and pricing of private healthcare services (McIntyre et al., 2007; van den 
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Heever, 2007). Thus, by further extension, the government should also bear some of 
the blame for allowing private healthcare providers to “capture” the regulatory 
environment.  
 
To determine whether or not medical scheme members are being charged monthly 
contributions that are aligned with the benefits that they are receiving per month, it is 
necessary to examine the medical scheme data from the Annual Reports published by 
the Council for Medical Schemes over the period 1993 to 2010.79 The methodology to 
analyse the trends in medical scheme contributions and net claims incurred require a 
number of adjustments before any appropriate comparisons can be drawn.  
 
The inconsistent reporting of accurate information regarding exempt or Bargaining 
Council schemes over between 1993 and 2009 may contaminate any inferences that 
can be made if one were to include these schemes in the dataset. Moreover, the fact 
that the Bargaining Council schemes are exempt from certain provisions of the 
legislation may lead to further inconsistencies. Once Polmed and Transnet medical 
schemes were reclassified as registered schemes rather than exempt schemes in 2000, 
the relative size of the Bargaining Council medical schemes segment within the 
overall medical scheme sector shrank considerably. In fact, the Council for Medical 
Schemes stopped reporting the details about Bargaining Council medical schemes 
from their 2005 Annual Report onwards. In 2004, members of the Bargaining Council 
schemes constituted only 4.1 percent of the total number of both registered and 
Bargaining Council medical scheme members. Therefore, for the purposes of 
consistency, it was necessary to exclude the so-called exempt or Bargaining Council 
schemes from the dataset and thus, only registered medical schemes are considered in 
this thesis. The registered medical scheme data provided in the Council for Medical 
Schemes Annual Reports are of an annual frequency.  
 
                                                     
79 The nature of the reporting cycle requires one to examine the subsequent year’s publication to obtain 
the relevant data for medical schemes in that particular year. For example, to obtain the medical 
scheme data for the year ending 2009, it is necessary to examine the Council for Medical Schemes 
Annual Report published in 2010. 
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Second, the data series that were required for these initial computations included the 
following: 
 South African Consumer Price Index (excluding interest rates on mortgage 
bonds - CPIX): can be used to derive a measure of the annual consumer inflation 
rate. The CPIX was utilised to convert the other monetary data series from 
nominal into real terms (relative to 2009 prices). 
 Total number of medical scheme beneficiaries: represent the total number of 
registered medical scheme members and their dependents.  
 Net Annual Contribution Income (or Gross Annual Risk Contribution Income): 
refers to gross annual contribution income less the contributions made towards 
medical savings accounts during that corresponding year. Gross annual 
contribution income simply refers to the contributions (premiums) paid annually 
by medical scheme members to registered medical schemes in return for medical 
scheme cover. These contributions include the non-risk contributions (savings 
contributions) paid into medical savings accounts on behalf of the medical scheme 
member. Since the savings contributions represent contributions made by medical 
scheme members to pay out-of-pocket healthcare expenses, they essentially do not 
represent a benefit that the medical scheme beneficiary receives as part of the 
“insurance” portion of their medical scheme cover.   
 Net annual claims incurred: Net annual claims incurred are the annual claims 
paid out to healthcare providers for services rendered to the medical scheme 
member or their dependents. Net annual claims incurred do not include out-of-
pocket expenses paid to healthcare providers from members’ medical savings 
accounts.  
 Gross annual administration expenses: refer to the annual administration 
expenses of operating the medical scheme, but they do not include broker fees, 
managed healthcare expenditure or the net income / (expense) on commercial 
reinsurance. 
 
In real terms, the total net contribution income collected by registered medical 
schemes from medical scheme members has risen sharply from R28.9 billion in 1993 
to over R77.1 billion by 2009. This is despite only modest increases in the total 
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number of medical scheme beneficiaries over the same period (from approximately 
5.4 million individuals in 1993 to just over 8 million by 2009). As illustrated in Figure 
2-9, total net claims incurred have followed a similar trend. In 1993, total net claims 
incurred stood at R26.5 billion versus R68.9 billion in 2009. What is perhaps more 
interesting is the fact the gap between total net contribution income and total net 
claims incurred has widened considerably since 2000. By implication, it suggests that 
medical scheme members are paying considerably more for the benefits that they 
receive under medical scheme coverage. The divergence between total net 
contribution income and total net claims incurred suggests that medical schemes are 
increasingly charging over-and-above the actuarially fair premium for medical 
scheme coverage. Therefore, the argument that the increases in medical scheme 
contributions can be explained by the higher fees charged by healthcare providers for 
services rendered is thrown into doubt by these results. It can be argued that the 
difference may be a direct result of the new regulatory reforms, whereby in particular, 
community-rating force medical schemes to apply widespread income cross-
subsidisation (between the wealthy and poor) and risk-related cross-subsidisation 
(between the healthy and unhealthy), which has induced an additional redistributive 
‘tax’.80   
 
                                                     
80 This is may be indicative of a similar situation in Dahlby (1983)’s analysis of the Canadian 
automobile insurance market where statistical discrimination was prohibited with respect to an 
individual’s gender. Dahlby (1983) finds that enforced risk-related cross-subsidisation between females 
and males, leads to society paying more for automobile insurance. 
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Figure 2-9: Total Net Contribution Income versus Total Net Claims Incurred (1993 – 2009) (in 
2009 prices) 
 
Source: Own calculations; South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010); 
and values are adjusted by CPIX to reflect 2009 prices.  
 
In 2009, R796.63 (in 2009 prices) was paid per month by the average registered 
medical scheme beneficiary (excluding the contributions paid towards medical 
savings accounts) for medical scheme cover. In real terms, this represents almost 
double the amount paid by a medical scheme beneficiary in 1993 (R446.23). 
Interestingly, 2009’s figure is more than 30 percent higher than the amount paid by 
the average medical scheme beneficiary per month (R584.45) at the time when the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 became effective in 2000. The average net 
claims incurred per beneficiary per month in 2009 was R711.19, which is higher than 
the corresponding values observed in 2000 (R521.63) and 1993 (R408.97).81 From 
Figure 2-10, it is evident that both the average net contribution and net claims incurred 
per beneficiary per month has increased consistently between 1993 and 2009.  
 
                                                     
81 These values have been adjusted by CPIX to reflect 2009 prices. 
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Figure 2-10: Net Contribution Income versus Net Claims Incurred (1993 – 2009) (pabpm) (in 
2009 prices) 
 
Source: Own calculations; South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010); 
pabpm – per average beneficiary per month; and values are adjusted by CPIX to reflect 2009 prices.  
 
 
Figure 2-11 demonstrates the annual real increases in net contribution income and net 
claims incurred, per registered medical scheme beneficiary, between 1993 and 2009. 
The annual growth rate in both net contribution income and net claims incurred per 
average medical scheme beneficiary has not always outpaced consumer inflation since 
1993. For the period just after the deregulation, net contribution income per average 
medical scheme beneficiary declined in real terms, it fell by 2.08 percent over the year 
1995-1996 and further 1.86 percent during 1996-1997. Over the same two periods, net 
claims incurred per average medical scheme beneficiary, fell by 4.79 percent and 2.87 
percent respectively. Therefore, Reekie (1999: 4)’s argument that the deregulation 
would address the healthcare “cost explosion” is supported by these results.  
 
The reclassification of Polmed and Transmed from exempt to registered medical 
scheme status in 2000 can partially explain the significant rise in both net 
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contributions (22.54 percent) and net claims (20.66 percent) per average beneficiary 
over the 2000-2001 period. However, absolute increases in net contributions and net 
claims incurred as a result of Polmed and Transmed’s inclusion would have been 
partly offset by the increase in the total number of medical scheme beneficiaries. 
Therefore, the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 from the 
year 2000, appears to have had a significant effect in increasing both net contribution 
income and net claims incurred per average beneficiary. Indeed, for the next four 
years after the implementation of the new regulatory framework, net contributions and 
net claims per average beneficiary recorded considerable increases above inflation. 
 
In 2009, the annual increase in net contribution income per average medical scheme 
beneficiary was 4.48 percent above inflation. The annual increase in net claims 
incurred per average medical scheme beneficiary was 6.82 percent above inflation 
over the same period.   
 
 
Figure 2-11: Annual Real Growth Rate in Net Contribution Income and Net Claims Incurred 
(pabpm) (1993 - 2009) 
 
Source: Own calculations; South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010); 
pabpm – per average beneficiary per month; and values are adjusted by CPIX to obtain real changes.  
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From 2000 onwards, the gap between the average net contribution and net claims 
incurred per beneficiary per month has widened significantly. Figure 2-12 displays the 
difference between the average risk contributions paid over to registered medical 
schemes per average beneficiary per month and the net claims incurred per average 
beneficiary per month (benefits received by the average registered medical scheme 
beneficiary per month). The difference has increased dramatically from R37.25 in 
1993 to R85.44 in 2009 (in real terms).  
 
Figure 2-12: Difference between the Average Real Monthly Net Contributions and Net Claims 
Incurred (pabpm) (1993 - 2009) (in 2009 prices) 
 
Source: Own calculations; South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010); 
pabpm – per average beneficiary per month; and values are adjusted by CPIX to reflect 2009 prices.  
 
The claims ratio, similar to the market loss ratio under traditional insurance, measures 
the ratio of total net claims incurred over total net contribution income. Therefore, the 
claims ratio can be interpreted as the Rand amount of protection medical scheme 
beneficiaries receive for every Rand paid in contributions.  The claims ratio has 
started to once again rise from its low of 79.15 percent in 2004 to 89.28 percent by 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
Rands (pabpm) (in 2009 prices)
115 
 
2009. The general upward trend in net claims incurred versus net contribution 
suggests that it may be premature to conclude that there has been no discernable 
deterioration in the risk profile of registered medical scheme beneficiaries. However, 
the increase in net claims incurred versus net contributions may simply be further 
evidence that healthcare providers are continuing to drive-up healthcare costs 
unilaterally (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010).  
 
Figure 2-13: Claims Ratio of South Africa's Private Health Insurance Sector (1993 - 2009) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations and South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 
2010). 
 
From the above results it appears that the claims ratio is rising, in other words the 
ratio of benefits received versus contributions is increasing, and therefore over the 
long term medical scheme membership will become more costly.  
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2.4.2 Medical Scheme Cost Drivers 
 
If one considers the annual real growth rate in net contribution income (and not per 
average medical scheme beneficiary), then it is apparent that each year medical 
schemes raise their contributions rates faster than household income and consumer 
inflation.82 Even though the annual real growth rate in net claims incurred also 
demonstrates higher-than-inflation increases, it is argued that medical schemes offer 
the same, if not fewer, benefits. The reason for this is that healthcare providers are 
simply charging much higher fees each year for the equivalent quantity of healthcare 
services rendered.  
 
Figure 2-14: Annual Real Growth Rate in Net Contribution Income and Net Claims Incurred 
(1993 - 2009) 
Source: Own calculations; South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010); 
values are adjusted by CPIX to obtain real changes.  
 
                                                     
82 Refer to Figure 2-14 
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Many studies have examined the various causes of South Africa’s high and rising 
private healthcare financing costs (Doherty & McLeod, 2003; McIntyre et al., 2007; 
van den Heever, 2007; Magennis & van Zyl, 2009). Van den Heever (2007) suggests 
that non-healthcare costs such as administration expenses, broker fees and reinsurance 
were considerable cost contributors during the 1990s, but according to the author 
these have for the most part levelled off.  However, if one examines gross 
administration expenses per average medical scheme beneficiary per month between 
1993 and 2009, there has been a significant escalation in the general administration 
costs of a medical scheme.83 Although, it is fair to note that since 2005, gross 
administration expenses per average medical scheme beneficiary per month has fallen 
marginally. In 1993, R24.35 (in 2009 prices) was spent per medical scheme 
beneficiary per month on general administration (excluding managed care fees, broker 
fees, net reinsurance profit / loss and bad debts). But by 2009, this figure had more 
than tripled to R77.54 per beneficiary per month. Medical scheme administrators have 
argued that due to the complex nature of community-rating and the mandatory PMBs, 
there has been a corresponding increase in the costs of administering a medical 
scheme (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). 
 
  
                                                     
83 Refer to Figure 2-15
 
Figure 2-15. 
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Figure 2-15: Gross Administration Expenditure (pabpm) (1993-2009) (in 2009 prices) 
 
Source: Own calculations; South African Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports (1993 – 2010); 
pabpm – per average beneficiary per month; and values are adjusted by CPIX to reflect 2009 prices.  
 
 
Figure 2-16 depicts the distribution of healthcare risk benefits paid to the various 
categories of healthcare providers over the period 1993 to 2009 per average 
beneficiary per month.84 Since as far back as 1997, private hospitals have 
progressively devoured a larger slice of the private healthcare expenditure “pie”. The 
Council for Medical Schemes has stated categorically that private hospitals and 
specialist practitioners are the biggest culprits with respect to the surges in medical 
scheme costs over the last decade (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010). In 2000, the 
average medical scheme beneficiary paid R165.32 (in 2009 prices) over to private 
hospitals per month and this compares to R287.88 by 2009. As a portion of the total 
risk benefits paid to healthcare providers, private hospitals received a 40.44 percent 
share of all risk benefits during 2009. This compares to 17.99 percent in 1993 and 
32.38 percent in 2000. According to Magennis and van Zyl (2009), the increased 
billings to medical schemes by private hospitals are driven by increases in patient 
days (greater admission rates and longer duration stays at hospital) and the cost per 
                                                     
84 Benefits paid out of the medical scheme’s risk pool are only considered. Thus, payments made to 
healthcare providers out of members’ medical savings accounts are excluded. 
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by medical scheme beneficiaries is a direct result of the increase in the number of 
medical scheme beneficiaries, and the deteriorating risk profile of medical scheme 
pools. Young and healthy medical scheme members are allegedly exiting the market 
and thereby leaving behind an ageing medical scheme population, who have a rising 
disease burden that ultimately translates into greater utilisation of private hospital 
healthcare. Indeed, van den Heever (2007) nor the Council for Medical Schemes 
(2009) are convinced by HASA’s explanation, and they point out that at present most 
new entrants to the medical scheme market tend to be exactly the young and healthy, 
who have cost profiles below the existing market. Hence, as a consequence private 
hospital margins should be heading lower; however, South Africa’s private hospitals 
continue to maintain the highest margins of any private hospital group in the world.   
 
Another significant contributor to higher medical scheme costs is specialist 
practitioners. In 1993, the average medical scheme beneficiary paid R74.18 per month 
over to specialist practitioners. But by 2009, this had more than doubled to R157.57 
(in 2009 prices). Part of the reason for the increase in risk benefits paid to medical 
specialists can be attributed to the shortages in the supply of qualified specialist 
practitioners. Therefore, medical specialists enjoy a certain degree of market power 
and in the absence of regulation; they can charge patients up to 300 percent above 
medical scheme tariffs without any penalty.85 An adjunct to this may involve the 
relationships that exist between specialists and private hospitals. Private hospitals tend 
to compete amongst themselves for specialist practitioners rather than for medical 
scheme business. The belief is that patients tend to follow specialist practitioners. 
Hence, private hospitals in their attempts to secure the services of medical specialists, 
they are often prepared to fall into line with the specialist’s wishes (and / or demands). 
An example of this is the purchase and utilisation of new medical technology. New 
advances in medical technology often attract widespread attention as they offer 
significant benefits for patients in the diagnosis and treatment of many health-related 
conditions (Aaron, 1991; Newhouse, 1992; Fuchs, 1996). Private hospitals use new 
technological innovations, such as advanced medical equipment, to attract specialist 
practitioners to their facilities.  The high costs of new medical technologies does not 
                                                     
85 If a specialist practitioner charges a patient above the reimbursement price of the medical scheme, it 
simply forces the medical scheme member to pay the difference from out of their own pockets. 
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prove to be an obstacle for private hospitals, since the fee-for-service reimbursement 
system pays healthcare providers graciously for utilising new innovations (Weisbrod, 
1991). Private hospitals can simply recover the cost of these purchases from medical 
schemes by raising their facility fees. 
 
The high costs of medicines, which tended to keep pace with hospital expenditure 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, began to moderate from the mid-1990s. In 
particular, from 2002, with the establishment of a Pricing Committee to determine a 
Single Exit Price (SEP) for all medicines, van den Heever (2007) argues the 
regulatory reforms helped to negate any significant cost increases with respect to 
medicines. In 1993, the average medical scheme beneficiary paid R133.22 per month 
for medicines. By 2002, it stood at R135.24 (in 2009 prices). However, as a direct 
result of the introduction of the SEP, medicines started to have less of an impact in 
real (inflation-adjusted) terms. In 2009, the average medical scheme beneficiary paid 
R111.10 per month for medicines. Although, the Minister of Health has announced 
that for 2011, there will be a zero percent increase in the SEP, the new dispensing fee 
arrangements for pharmacists may add as much as 4 percent to medical scheme 
contributions for the year ahead.   
 
To explain the observable cost escalation in healthcare costs, healthcare providers 
often “…cite a number of unavoidable factors” and these include the following: the 
rising cost of medical technology and innovations, the ageing profile of the population 
requires ever more frequent and expensive healthcare interventions and finally, the 
emergence of new diseases or diseases that become increasingly difficult to treat, such 
as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) which is caused by the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (Doherty and 
McLeod (2003: 50). Although, all these factors certainly play a role in increasing 
healthcare costs; Reekie (1999), Doherty and McLeod (2003), and Erasmus and 
Fitchen (2010), all concur that the primary reason for the healthcare cost explosion is 
the persistence of the fee-for-service reimbursement system. The fee-for-service 
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reimbursement system creates incentives for healthcare providers to over-supply 
healthcare services.  
The Council for Medical Schemes (2010) is particularly scathing in its criticism of the 
role private hospitals and specialist practitioners play in driving healthcare costs 
upwards. The argument centres around the absence of normal competitive market 
pressures in the private healthcare sector, whereby healthcare costs rise due to both 
the prevalence of supernormal profits and endemic inefficiencies (van den Heever, 
2007; Council for Medical Schemes, 2010). Inefficiencies arise due to the over-supply 
of healthcare services including medicines and consumables, and the 
overcapitalisation within private healthcare institutions.  
 
2.4.3 Strategies to Contain Healthcare Costs 
 
Medical schemes employ a variety of mechanisms in their attempt to control 
healthcare costs. Doherty and McLeod (2003) discuss the techniques available to 
medical schemes and some of these include: 
 Rationing cover, imposing levies or co-payments and utilising medical savings 
accounts; 
 Attracting the young and healthy; 
 Formularies for Acute and Chronic Medication; 
 Hospital Pre-Authorisation and Case Management; 
 Disease Management Programmes; and 
 Negotiated Tariffs and Preferred Provider Networks. 
 
Rationing Cover, Levies or Co‐Payments and Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) 
The central tenet behind these mechanisms is that by shifting some of the risk back 
onto the medical scheme member it is likely to induce a reduction in moral hazard and 
discourage over-utilisation of healthcare services. Rationing cover requires medical 
schemes to set annual limits on the amount that an individual member and their 
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dependents may claim for certain categories of healthcare within a given timeframe, 
typically one year (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). By imposing these limits upon 
benefits, the expectation is that it will deter medical scheme beneficiaries from 
utilising healthcare services unnecessarily. The authors contend that it may allow 
medical schemes to avoid paying for legitimate healthcare expenses.   
 
Levies (excess or deductibles) and co-payments relate to individual claims as opposed 
to annual healthcare expenditure. A levy excludes a fixed portion of any claim from 
coverage. In other words, a medical scheme member is required, in the event of a 
claim against the medical scheme, to pay first out of his or her own pocket up until the 
levy amount is reached and only then does the medical scheme step in to cover any 
additional amount over and above the levy amount per claim made. Co-payments (or 
co-insurance) require the medical scheme member to pay a pre-defined percentage of 
any claim incurred by the member with respect to healthcare expenditure. 
 
A member of a medical scheme plan with a medical savings account (MSA) pays a 
monthly contribution to the medical scheme that consists of both a traditional health 
insurance (risk) premium and a fixed amount  that is set aside ‘within’ the member’s 
medical savings account. Funds that accumulate within the MSA are designed to 
cover day-to-day healthcare expenses, which includes general practitioner 
consultations, acute treatment and out-patient hospital care. MSAs were devised to 
encourage medical scheme members to control their own utilisation of healthcare 
services (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). 
 
Attracting the Young and Healthy 
Despite the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 specifically prohibiting medical schemes 
from discriminating persons with respect to their age, prior and current health status, it 
does not preclude medical schemes from marketing (and tailoring where possible) 
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their products (benefit options) for a specific target audience.86 Thus, medical 
schemes can surreptitiously attract the young and healthy rather than accept the 
overall age and risk profile of the market. In a competitive market, it is beneficial to 
keep annual contributions as low as possible relative to one’s competitors so that one 
can sustain and possibly augment your market share (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). In 
addition, low contributions ensure that you have a further competitive edge in 
attracting low risk individuals such as the young and healthy.  
 
Formularies for Acute and Chronic Medicine 
Doherty and McLeod (2003: 58) explain that: 
“…formularies are lists of drugs that a managed care organisation determines to 
be clinically appropriate and cost effective. Reimbursement by schemes is then 
restricted to items on the formulary, although members can obtain other products 
if they are prepared to pay the difference”. 
Formularies often include generics as these are typically, more cost-effective whilst at 
the same being clinically as effective as medicines under patent. Most medical 
schemes adopted formularies for chronic medication back in the 1990s and more 
recently, medical schemes require medical scheme beneficiaries to register on a 
chronic medicine management programme (Doherty & McLeod, 2003).  
 
Hospital Pre‐Authorisation and Case Management 
Hospital pre-authorisation is straightforward whereby medical scheme members or 
their dependents are required to obtain authorisation before admission to a hospital. If 
pre-authorisation is not obtained, claims arising from the hospital stay will not be 
reimbursed by the medical scheme (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). The intention is to 
prevent unnecessary treatment in what is an expensive treatment setting. Case 
management refers to the active monitoring of patients once in a private healthcare 
facility. The purpose is to ensure that the treatment delivered to the patient is taking 
                                                     
86 Doherty and McLeod (2003) mention the so-called “Swiss-Cheese” medical scheme benefit design, 
which intentionally leaves gaps in benefit cover so as to discourage higher risk individuals.  
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place in the correct care setting and at the same time is clinically appropriate. For 
example, once a patient’s health condition permits, moving the patient to a ward with 
a lower intensity of care can save inordinate sums of money. Increasingly, medical 
schemes are requiring members to move from private hospitals to so-called “step-
down” facilities once their condition permits. Step-down facilities do not provide the 
same intensity of care as private hospitals and thus, the treatment (and rehabilitation) 
of patients is at a much lower cost to the scheme than private hospitals.  
 
Disease Management Programmes 
Disease management programmes involve the active management by medical scheme 
administrators with respect to the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of pre-defined 
diseases such as, diabetes, pregnancy or asthma (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). The 
authors suggest that these programmes typically allow the more accurate collection of 
information about the member’s condition, but also the dissemination of best 
standards and practice to healthcare providers in relation to the treatment of the 
disease (Doherty & McLeod, 2003).  
 
Negotiated Tariffs and Preferred Provider Networks 
Medical scheme tariffs are negotiated between healthcare providers and medical 
schemes to determine the reimbursement prices that medical schemes are prepared to 
pay with respect to the rendering of healthcare services to their beneficiaries. The 
Board of Healthcare Funders (BHF), who represent most medical schemes, negotiates 
on behalf of medical schemes. Doherty and McLeod (2003) suggest that these 
negotiations should place downward pressure on the price of healthcare services. 
However, because of the market power that healthcare providers wield and their 
ability to manipulate the supply of healthcare services, they essentially end up 
dictating the prices that they are willing to accept for their services. The authors point 
out that medical schemes have been reluctant to exercise collective bargaining power 
and thus, they have failed to contain the healthcare cost escalation. One option 
available to medical schemes is to opt to negotiate directly with individual healthcare 
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providers (or networks of providers) in order to achieve cost savings; however, unless 
they represent a sufficient number of members it is difficult to envisage how they can 
influence pricing significantly.    
 
Government has realised that the “free-for-all” that allows private healthcare 
providers to dictate pricing and thereby drive up healthcare costs unilaterally cannot 
continue unchallenged any longer (Department of Health, 2010). Therefore, this is 
providing impetus for the creation of the statutory price determination authority.. sAt 
present, tariff negotiations between healthcare providers and medical schemes often 
end in angry standoffs; this typically arises due to the inevitable dichotomy between 
what medical schemes believe they can afford to pay for healthcare services versus 
what healthcare providers believe that they are entitled to. Therefore, the proposal is 
to introduce a mandatory dispute resolution mechanism by means of arbitration, 
whereby the arbitrator may only choose between the initial offerings of the two parties 
(Department of Health, 2010). In other words, the arbitrator cannot construct a 
compromise bid between the two positions. Furthermore, no additional evidence may 
be introduced. Nor are any appeals permitted under the proposal. Thus, the arbitration 
procedure ensures that no party presents unrealistic bids since they would risk losing 
out to the other party’s bid via arbitration. The arbitration mechanism will require 
healthcare providers to justify their prices for healthcare services and medical 
schemes will need to justify why they cannot afford to pay more (van den Heever, 
2007; Council for Medical Schemes, 2010). 
 
2.4.4 Principle of Managed Care 
 
Reekie (1999) argues that the application of sound insurance and risk management 
principles only became a reality once managed care became a legal possibility within 
the private health insurance. Under managed care, the delivery of healthcare services 
(from primary healthcare to complex surgical procedures) to a defined group of 
individuals (enrolees or members) is provided by a network of organisations such as 
hospitals, clinics, physicians and other healthcare providers. In return for a fixed (or 
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capitation) fee, enrolees of a managed care organisation receive healthcare services 
where required from a predefined network of healthcare providers. Traditionally, 
healthcare providers are either employed by the managed care organisation on a 
salaried basis or they receive a fixed fee for supplying healthcare services to 
members. A managed care organisation typically relies upon a general practitioner to 
act as the gatekeeper to ensure that the appropriate level of care is provided to the 
enrolee and to prevent over-utilisation. The general practitioner will assess whether an 
enrolee requires further specialised diagnosis and/or treatment, such as recommending 
a referral to specialists, surgery or physiotherapy. Thus, it is thought that the managed 
care organisation would be expected to control healthcare expenditure by removing 
the financial incentives for healthcare providers to overprescribe, over-treat and over-
hospitalise their patients. In essence, managed care creates incentives to keep enrolees 
healthy by emphasising preventative care and health promotion activities. In the event 
that enrolees do become ill, managed care attempts to treat these individual in the 
most cost-effective manner whilst simultaneously ensuring that the quality of care 
provided is adequate. 
    
While it is instructive to provide a general description of managed care organisations, 
it is important to recognise that the concept of managed care is undergoing continual 
evolution. As Reekie (1999) points out South Africa took direction from 
developments in the United States to create a legislative framework that permitted 
managed care to become a reality. This was achieved through the enactment of the 
Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993. Shortell, Gillies and Anderson 
(1994) outline the emergence of an organised model for health care delivery in the 
United States: 
“…the organizational landscape of health care delivery is being rearranged. The 
nation’s hospitals are merging, consolidating, and aligning at a dizzying pace; 
more than 40 percent of physicians are practicing in groups, and existing 
physician groups are beginning to consolidate; physicians and hospitals are 
forging new strategic alliances; and formerly hospital-based systems are 
reinventing themselves as broad-based, vertically integrated delivery systems” 
(Shortell et al., 1994: 47). 
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Shortell et al. (1994) go further to provide an early definition of an organised delivery 
network that can easily be interpreted as the definition for a managed care 
organisation: 
“…a network of organizations that provides or arranges to provide a coordinated 
continuum of services to a defined population and is willing to be held clinically 
and fiscally accountable for the outcomes and the health status of the population 
served. Most such systems own or are closely aligned with an insurance 
product.” (Shortell et al., 1994: 47).  
 
Two key features characterise the contemporary managed care organisation. The first 
being that managed care organisations tend to demonstrate extensive reliance upon 
healthcare (clinical) information systems. At the outset, healthcare information 
systems were created as part of the administration or clerical function of the health 
insurer – the objective being to assist in the billing and record-keeping processes. In 
the United States for example, Shortell et al. (1994) discuss how during the early 
1990s, many large health facilities budgeted millions of US dollars to integrate 
information systems. A significant challenge facing managed care organisations is the 
design of information systems that provide direct clinical support to improve the 
quality of healthcare delivered to enrolees. The second feature of managed care 
organisations is their disinclination towards acute hospital care. As most hospital 
procedures incur significant costs, acute hospital care represents an expensive method 
of healthcare delivery. As noted earlier, general practitioners often serve as the 
gatekeepers within the managed care environment. Their role is to direct patients 
towards the most cost-effective treatment setting.    
 
Types of Managed Care Organisations 
Broadly speaking managed care organisations can be classified into three main types: 
 Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) - provides enrolees with relatively 
comprehensive healthcare services, rather than reimbursements for healthcare 
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expenditure.87 Therefore, for a fixed (or capitation) fee, enrolees face few out-of-
pocket expenses and are covered for most inpatient and outpatient treatment, 
which includes medical consultation (diagnosis), surgery and prescribed 
medication. Upon joining the HMO, each enrolee is assigned a primary general 
practitioner (“gatekeeper”). HMOs generally require that all healthcare services be 
delivered through the plan’s network of healthcare providers and the primary 
general practitioner should authorise any healthcare services rendered.88 HMOs 
that directly employ healthcare providers within their network – including the 
primary general practitioner – are referred to as staff HMO plans. In general, 
healthcare providers would be paid salaries by the HMO. Alternative 
remuneration schemes do exist, for example, greater compensation to reflect a 
larger patient load. HMOs that establish their healthcare network by contracting 
with healthcare providers are called an Independent Practice Association (IPA). 
They provide healthcare services to IPA enrolees at a negotiated capitation or 
retainer fee, or even on a fee-for-service basis. Typically, an IPA may contract out 
healthcare services to a wide-spectrum of healthcare professionals such as general 
practitioners, specialists; physical, speech and occupational therapists. In some 
cases, an IPA may only offer primary healthcare services or a single 
specialisation. 
 Preferred Provider Organisations (PPOs) – also referred to as Participating 
Provider Organisations. PPOs offer enrolees two distinct tiers of coverage. 
Enrolees, who opt to receive healthcare services from the PPO’s network of 
preferred healthcare providers, would benefit from lower deductibles or 
coinsurance payments than if they chose to receive healthcare from non-network 
providers.89 Unlike HMOs, PPOs do not appoint a primary general practitioner to 
serve as the “gatekeeper”. By agreeing to charge reduced (or discounted) rates to 
PPO enrolees, healthcare facilities and providers become part of the PPO’s 
                                                     
87 Much of the scholarly discussion and healthcare policy research surrounding managed care 
organisations focus upon HMOs due to their pioneering role in combining health insurance and 
healthcare provision. 
88 The HMO enrolee is usually liable for any unauthorised healthcare services.  
89 PPOs simply create financial incentives for enrolees to opt for the PPOs’ own network of healthcare 
providers. 
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preferred network.90 Healthcare providers that join the PPO’s network typically 
submit themselves for utilisation reviews as part of the contractual terms. In 
particular, an utilisation review is required for any hospital stay that an enrolee 
may need. Many PPOs require that enrolees obtain a pre-admission certificate for 
any hospital stay and a second opinion in the event that a surgical procedure is 
necessary. 
 Point-of-Service (POS) plans – are effectively a hybrid form of an HMO and PPO. 
Similar to an HMO, a POS plan would assign a primary general practitioner who 
would authorize within-network healthcare that would be covered by the POS plan 
under more generous coverage terms. The second dimension of a POS plan 
involves the PPO element, whereby the plan offers two tiers of insurance cover. 
An enrolee that receives healthcare services from a network provider benefits 
from coverage levels that are far more generous when compared to receiving 
treatment from outside the network.91  
 
Conventional health insurance coverage tends to lead to an over-consumption of 
healthcare by an individual insured (moral hazard) and the insured is generally only 
concerned with the out-of-pocket cost of healthcare rather than the full cost at the 
point of service. Under fee-for-service health insurance plans, the healthcare provider 
advises the medical scheme member on the frequency, type and magnitude of 
healthcare services required. Since the consumer is at an informational disadvantage 
with respect to medical knowledge when compared to the healthcare professional and 
together with the structure of the fee-for-service remuneration scheme, the incentives 
created for the over-consumption of healthcare are significant. Managed care 
organisations appear to address the information asymmetries that arise within fee-for-
service arrangements and in particular, the over-consumption of healthcare 
exemplified by traditional health insurance cover.  
                                                     
90 Healthcare providers contracted by the PPO do not necessarily guarantee that they will treat every 
enrolee, but because of the favourable cost-sharing arrangements that enrolees enjoy, healthcare 
providers are more likely to take advantage of the greater volume of potential patients. Healthcare 
providers that are part of the PPO network are also likely to benefit from prompt payment for services 
rendered.  
91 Under a POS plan, out-of-pocket costs are lower (greater coverage) when enrolees utilise network 
providers for healthcare services and higher (less coverage) when they do not. Most POS plans do not 
require pre-authorisation for enrolees to obtain healthcare services from providers outside of the 
network. 
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Merging healthcare provision and health insurance allows managed care organisations 
to utilise financial incentives that encourage healthcare providers to limit utilisation, 
restrict the services that they provide through command-and-control methods, and to 
bargain with healthcare provider networks to obtain lower prices (Cutler, McClellan 
& Newhouse, 2000). Managed care encourages healthcare providers to keep enrolees 
healthy by emphasising preventive and health promotion practices. When enrolees do 
become ill, the managed care system will strive to treat them in the most cost-
effective way possible. In effect, managed care facilitates the process of risk-sharing 
between medical schemes and healthcare providers.  
 
Managed Care in Practice 
To gauge the success of managed care versus traditional fee-for-service health 
insurance plans, it is useful to examine a market where managed care is a well-
established phenomenon such as employer-sponsored health insurance in the United 
States. In the United States, employer-sponsored health insurance covers 
approximately 157 million non-elderly individuals, which represents more than half of 
the total population (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010). The 
Kaiser Family Foundation92 together with the Health Research and Educational Trust 
(HRET) conduct an annual national survey of employer health insurance benefits in 
the United States. In the Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health 
Benefits 2010, 2,046 public and private employers were interviewed over the period 
January to May 2010 (Claxton, DiJulio, Whitmore, Pickreign, McHugh, Osei-Anto & 
Finder, 2010). In most cases, employers offer only one type of health insurance plan 
to employees. However, some employers do offer a variety of health insurance plans 
from which employees select their preferred plan. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation/HRET (2010) survey questioned firms about how many plans of each 
given type they offer to employees. Interestingly, employers may differentiate their 
offerings according to the employee grade or location. For example, executive or 
                                                     
92 The Kaiser Family Foundation is a non-profit private organisation, based in California, United States. 
The Foundation produces research and analysis on health-related issues. 
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senior-level management may be offered a very different selection of healthcare plan 
types compared to intermediate-level management.  
 
The results indicate that in 2010, the average annual premium for single health 
insurance coverage was $5,049 (compared to $4,842 in 2009) and $13,770 (compared 
to $13,375 in 2009) for family coverage. For single health insurance coverage this 
represents an increase of 4.28 percent and for family coverage, an increase of 2.95 
percent. Over the same period, general inflation increased by 2.2 percent and wages 
rose by 2.3 percent (Claxton et al., 2010). Thus, for employer-sponsored health 
insurance the annual cost of coverage in the United States has only marginally 
outpaced general and wage inflation. If managed care is gaining market share versus 
conventional fee-for-service health insurance plans, it may be indicative that managed 
care indeed has positive implications with respect to containing healthcare costs as 
one might expect. Comparing the annual cost of coverage over a ten-year period 
(2000-2010), Figure 2-17 illustrates that for single coverage, annual premiums have 
been steadily rising from $2,471 in 2000 to $5,049 – representing a rise of 104.33 
percent. In the case of family coverage, the corresponding rise is 113.89 percent. 
From Figure 2-18, the average annual premium has increased from $6,438 in 2000 to 
$13,770 in 2010 (Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET, 2010).   
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Table 2-6: United States Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance - Average Employee 
Contribution towards the Cost of Coverage 
Year  Employee‐Share of 
the Total Average 
Premium 
(Single Coverage) 
Employee‐Share of 
the Total Average 
Premium 
(Family Coverage) 
2000  13.52%  25.15%
2001  13.20%  25.33% 
2002  15.12%  26.70% 
2003  15.02%  26.60%
2004  15.11%  26.74% 
2005  15.16%  24.94% 
2006  14.78%  25.89%
2007  15.49%  27.10% 
2008  15.33%  26.45% 
2009  16.15%  26.28%
2010  17.81%  29.03% 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and 
Education Trust, Employer Health Benefits 2000-2010 
Annual Surveys. 
 
Within the United States employer-sponsored health insurance sector there has been a 
considerable shift towards managed care plans as opposed to conventional fee-for-
service plans.  
“In response to high healthcare inflation, HMO enrolment grew rapidly [during] 
the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s in the [employer-sponsored health 
insurance] market” (Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET, 2000: 66). 
This together with the trends in the cost of coverage creates a suitable laboratory to 
explore whether or not managed care does indeed lead to lower healthcare costs, 
which Cutler et al. (2000) allude to.   
 
Towards the end of the 1990s the popularity of managed care in the employer-
sponsored health insurance market did wane as the cost of health insurance remained 
relatively stable (Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET, 2000). At the time, it appeared 
that there had been a consumer backlash against managed care, particularly against 
HMO plans; this was largely attributed to the restrictive conditions applicable under 
such arrangements. Since 2000, however, the trend once again reversed in favour of 
managed care with PPOs faring particular well as they offered enrolees the additional 
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feature of permitting treatment from non-network healthcare providers, albeit on less 
generous terms.   
 
Figure 2-21 illustrates the distribution of health plan enrolment for covered employees 
in the United States for selected years from 1988 until 2010. The market share of 
conventional fee-for-service plans within the employer-sponsored health insurance 
sector has shrunk from 73 percent in 1988 to a paltry 1 percent by 2010. PPO plans 
currently dominate the marketplace, enrolling 58 percent of covered employees. 
HMOs enrol 19 percent, whilst POS plans had a market share of approximately 8 
percent. A relatively new entrant to the marketplace, high-deductible93 health plans 
with a savings option (HDHP/SOs), has seen their market share grow rapidly in the 
United States from just 4 percent in 2006 to 13 percent by 2010.94 
 
  
                                                     
93 A general annual deductible is the amount an enrolee must pay before further healthcare expenditure 
is covered (partially or fully) by the health insurance plan. 
94 Only after legislative changes in the United States, did the establishment of savings arrangements for 
healthcare become a reality within employer-sponsored health insurance. Thus, prior to 2006 
HDHP/SOs were excluded from The Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored 
Health Benefits. 
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the selection of healthcare plans that they make available to their employees. 
However, employees can influence the choice of health insurance plan(s) that is made 
available by employees through consultation with employers, contract negotiation and 
trade union bargaining.  This is perhaps not surprising given the difficult economic 
conditions that arose as a result of the 2007-2010 global financial crisis (Claxton et 
al., 2010). 
 
If one examines the average annual contribution (premium) for covered employees by 
managed care health plan, Figure 2-22 indicates that HMOs and PPOs charge the 
highest annual contributions for family coverage, $14,125 and $14,033 respectively. 
HDHP/SOs charge $12,383 per annum for family. Thus, under family coverage, the 
difference between the most and least expensive plans (on average) is only $1,742. 
Whilst one would expect HDHP/SO plans to be more affordable due to the high 
deductible feature, but as noted previously 28 percent of HMO enrolees are now 
opting for a deductible as well. Interestingly, the extent to which employers contribute 
towards the cost of coverage varies across both managed care plan type and single 
versus family coverage. At the one extreme, under POS plans that offer family 
coverage, employers subsidise the cost of coverage on average by 60.68 percent. At 
the other extreme, under HDHP/SOs that offer single coverage, one observes that 
employers contribute on average 85.86 percent towards the cost of coverage.  
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Figure 2-22: Average Annual Contribution (Premium) for Covered Employees by Managed 
Health Care Plan Type in the United States for Single and Family Coverage, 2010. 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Education Trust, Employer Health Benefits 
2010. 
 
Managed Care, Utilisation and the Quality of Healthcare Delivered 
Some detractors of the managed care framework have argued that managed care may 
lead to an under-provision of healthcare services as cost containment is paramount. It 
is often argued by critics that managed care sacrifices high-quality healthcare for cost 
savings (Gottfried & Sloan, 2002). Thus, managed care is thought to provide inferior 
health insurance coverage when compared to fee-for-service plans. This is however 
tempered by the fact that under-provision may lead to more severe financial cost 
implications in the future as the health status of enrolees deteriorates. The 
deterioration in health status would dictate a greater utilisation of healthcare services 
by the enrolee going forward.  
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Miller and Luft (1994) employed a rigorous review of peer-reviewed literature to 
compare the performance of HMOs to that of fee-for-service plans. Their review 
suggests that compared to fee-for-service plans, HMO plans exhibit significantly 
lower utilisation with respect to hospital services, expensive or discretionary 
procedures and tests. However, HMO enrolees when compared to their fee-for-service 
counterparts received more preventative tests, procedures and examinations such as 
cancer screening, pelvic, rectal and general physical examinations. HMO enrolees 
were also found to be more likely to visit general practitioners. When comparing the 
quality of healthcare received (health outcomes) under HMO versus fee-for-service 
plans, the results appear mixed (Miller & Luft, 1994). In a subsequent study, Miller 
and Luft (1997) also considered Preferred Provider Organisations (PPOs), which for 
the most part they grouped with fee-for-service (FFS) plans.96 They concluded that the 
quality of care between managed care and fee-for-service plans were largely 
comparable.  
 
Dudley, Miller, Korenbrot and Luft (1998) examine how financial incentives may 
impact upon the quality of healthcare enrolees receive. According to the authors 
because of the difficulty in measuring healthcare quality and the absence of 
appropriate mechanism to correct for risk, financial incentives are unlikely to 
managed care health plans to maximise healthcare quality. Nevertheless, they also 
find that the quality of clinical outcomes between FFS plans and HMOs are similar. 
Thus, any discernible differences in quality between FFS and HMOs can be explained 
by benefits design and coverage decisions rather than an inherent preference to deliver 
high or low-quality healthcare.  
 
It is further argued that managed care may discourage healthcare providers from 
adopting new technological improvements through the purchase (lease or utilisation) 
of new equipment or other treatment tools, as these may translate into an increase in 
costs that cannot directly be passed onto patients. Hence, the diminution of financial 
                                                     
96 Although, often categorised as a managed care organisation, a PPO is strictly not a managed care 
organisation, but rather enters into a relationship (partnership) with health insurers (or third-party 
administrators).  
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incentives to adopt new technological improvements is expected to hamper 
innovation. An appropriate question therefore to ask is: whether a higher penetration 
of managed care within the medical scheme business could be expected to lead to a 
deceleration in the growth in availability of new medical treatment technologies? 
From empirical evidence the answer appears to be ambiguous – in some cases “yes” 
and in other cases “no” (Friedman & Steiner, 1999; Baker, 2001; Baker & Phibbs, 
2002).  
 
Baker (2001) investigates how managed care may influence technological diffusion 
by examining the relationship between Health Maintenance Organisations’ (HMOs) 
market share and the diffusion of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment. The 
results indicate that across various states, increases in HMO market share are 
associated with the slower diffusion of MRI into hospitals over a period between 1983 
and 1993, with substantially lower overall MRI availability through until the end of 
the 1990s. The author also finds that areas dominated by managed organisations 
display markedly lower rates of MRI procedure utilisation. Baker and Phibbs (2002) 
empirically examine the relationship between HMO market share and the diffusion of 
neonatal intensive care units. Once again higher HMO market share is associated with 
the slower adoption of intermediate neonatal intensive care units, but it is not the case 
with respect to the adoption of advanced neonatal intensive care units (Baker & 
Phibbs, 2002). Moreover, they infer that contrary to the common supposition that 
slower technological diffusion is harmful to patients; critically-ill new-borns may 
experience better health outcomes in areas where HMOs have a greater market share. 
The reason offered is that since health outcomes for seriously-ill new-borns are better 
when treated within an advanced neonatal intensive care unit, under an HMO-
dominated area the restricted availability of intermediate neonatal units may increase 
the chance of receiving care within a healthcare facility that has an advanced neonatal 
intensive care unit. Therefore, the slower diffusion of intermediate intensive care units 
within HMO-dominated markets may benefit patients.  
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Friedman and Steiner (1999) analyse the availability of hospital intensive care units 
by adult patients who are under age 65 and not covered by Medicaid97 in the United 
States. Utilising data for the states of Massachusetts and Florida during 1992, the 
authors consider factors such as the patient’s condition, severity of illness, type of 
admission, emergency status, and the extent to which the total intensive care unit of 
the hospital is utilised. In both states there is no discernible difference in admission 
rates under managed care versus fee-for-service arrangements. In Massachusetts, they 
find that the length of stay in an intensive care unit is less for managed care and 
uninsured patients than for other privately-insured patients.  
 
These empirical results of Friedman and Steiner (1999), Baker (2001), and Baker  and 
Phibbs (2002) all suggest, as Baker (2001) asserts, that technology diffusion in 
healthcare can respond (positively or negatively) to changes in financial and other 
incentives, which may have further implications for both healthcare costs and the 
welfare of patients.   
 
Cutler et al. (2000) examine how Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) differ 
from traditional health insurers with respect to the treatment of heart disease and they 
find that HMOs experience between 30 percent and 40 percent lower healthcare 
expenditures than traditional health insurance plans. Lower expenditures may 
translate into lower quality of healthcare provision. The authors do not find any 
discernible difference in the quality of care (actual treatment and health outcomes) 
provided by HMOs versus traditional health insurance plans.  
 
                                                     
97 In the United States, Medicaid is a means-tested social health insurance programme funded by both 
the federal and state government, and is managed at state-level. Medicaid provides health coverage or 
nursing home coverage to eligible individuals and families with low incomes and financial resources. 
Having limited financial resources is the primary determinant for eligibility, but poverty alone is not 
the only criteria for eligibility. Other criteria include age, pregnancy, having a disability and 
immigration status. Medicaid does not pay money directly to the Medicaid enrolee, but rather 
reimburses healthcare providers for healthcare services rendered. Depending upon the state's law, 
enrolees may also be asked to pay a small portion of the cost (co-payment) for certain healthcare 
services.  
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Success of Managed Care in South Africa 
In the United States, at the very least, managed care refers to the utilisation of 
selective networks of contracted healthcare providers, the implementation of 
mechanisms to incentivise enrolees to utilise these networks and some form of risk 
sharing with the networks (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). Doherty and McLeod (2003) 
contends that medical schemes in South Africa have until recently not taken 
advantage of establishing provider networks and negotiating risk-sharing 
arrangements with these providers. The authors claim that the reason may once again 
stem from the market power that these private healthcare provider groups wield.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 has not had the desired effect of lowering 
healthcare financing costs. On the contrary, it has led to a rapid increase in medical 
scheme contributions coupled with a widening gap between contributions and 
benefits. The upward trend in medical scheme contributions is of great concern from 
the perspective of equity let alone efficiency (Doherty & McLeod, 2003). The authors 
go further to suggest that as incomes tend to be inflation-linked, it is difficult to 
envisage how people can keep up with the present escalation in medical scheme 
contributions. Moreover, employers who subsidise their employee’s medical scheme 
contributions are also struggling to keep pace with the increasing cost of financing 
private health insurance. They note that increasingly, employers are opting to 
structure employee’s remuneration packages in such a way that it leaves the decision 
of whether or not to purchase medical scheme cover up to the employee. In addition, 
fewer employees are willing to offer new employees subsidised medical scheme cover 
that extends beyond retirement (Doherty & McLeod, 2003).    
 
Private hospitals have progressively consumed a larger slice of the private healthcare 
expenditure “pie”. Three major hospital groups dominate the private hospital 
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landscape in South Africa and this has permitted oligopolistic practices to flourish 
within private healthcare provision. Currently, approximately 5 percent of all private 
hospital beds are located outside of these three hospital groups and this compares to 
more than 50 percent just 15 years ago (van den Heever, 2007; Magennis & van Zyl, 
2009). Hence, these private hospital groups have become price setters rather than 
price takers. Another contributing factor to higher medical scheme costs is the 
shortages observed in the supply of healthcare professionals and in particular, 
specialist practitioners. These shortages have allowed specialist practitioners to enjoy 
a certain degree of market power and in the absence of regulation; they are able to 
charge patients well-above medical scheme tariffs without any penalty. 
 
Healthcare providers often cite various factors to explain the observable cost 
escalation in healthcare costs. These include the rising cost of medical technology and 
innovations; the ageing profile of the population and the emergence of new diseases 
or diseases that become increasingly difficult to treat, such as AIDS or multi-drug 
resistant tuberculosis (Doherty and McLeod (2003). Whilst these factors may explain 
a portion of the cost escalation in healthcare costs; Reekie (1999), Doherty and 
McLeod (2003), and Erasmus and Fitchen (2010), claim that the primary reason for 
the healthcare cost explosion is the persistence of the fee-for-service reimbursement 
system. These authors maintain that the medical scheme industry should move away 
from the fee-for-service reimbursement system and towards more risk-sharing 
arrangements with healthcare providers. 
 
Medical schemes have historically only concentrated upon implementing managed 
care elements that influence utilisation, such as rationing and co-insurance. Therefore, 
medical schemes have not attempted to tackle the incentives to over-supply healthcare 
services in the context of a fee-for-service reimbursement system (Reekie, 1999; 
Doherty & McLeod, 2003). Government’s proposed new statutory price determination 
authority that will bring back multilateral tariff negotiation between healthcare 
providers and medical schemes with a mandatory dispute resolution mechanism 
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through arbitration, should also be beneficial in arresting the cost escalation observed 
within healthcare provision.          
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3 THEORY OF ADVERSE SELECTION 
 
The objective of Chapter Three is to provide a detailed account of adverse selection 
theory. The chapter discusses the seminal literature in this area with the view to 
describe the response of insurance companies operating in a competitive insurance 
market to the problem of information asymmetry. Moreover, a suitable empirical 
framework based upon the theoretical literature is presented to directly test for the 
presence of adverse selection in insurance markets. The empirical evidence of 
numerous studies is also discussed in this chapter. 
 
The term adverse selection itself originated in the context of insurance and Arrow 
(1963) is one of the early sources analysing its welfare implications within the health 
insurance market. . Siegelman (2004) describes adverse selection as: 
“…the process by which insureds utilize private knowledge of their own 
riskiness when deciding to buy or forego insurance” Siegelman (2004: 1223). 
For example, consider two individuals; ܣ and ܤ.  Assume further that individual ܣ	 is 
aware that they have a much greater likelihood of dying within the next week than the 
insurance company would anticipate. For individual ܣ, life insurance that is priced 
according to the average likelihood of death for the overall population will appear to 
be a very attractive purchase (Siegelman, 2004). On the other hand, individual ܤ is 
aware that they are more likely to live much longer than the average person with the 
identical observable characteristics, such as age, gender and health status. Hence, 
individual ܤ will find that life insurance that is priced according to the average risk 
would not be an attractive purchase.  By implication ܣ is likely to demand more life 
insurance and ܤ would curtail their purchase of life insurance. Therefore, insurers end 
up charging an average premium rate to the population that consists of increasingly 
higher risk individuals. Unless insurers respond by increasing premiums they would 
incur significant losses (Siegelman, 2004).   
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The seminal literature developing the theory of adverse selection includes Akerlof 
(1970)’s “Market for Lemons”, Spence (1973)’s “Job Market Signaling”, Spence 
(1974)’s book “Market Signalling”, and particularly in the insurance context, 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”. Indeed, Löfgren, Persson and 
Weibull (2002) present a useful review of the contributions that this seminal literature 
has made in the understanding of adverse selection and particularly, in explaining how 
insurance markets respond to imperfect information.   
 
Akerlof (1970)’s classic paper examines the interaction between quality and 
uncertainty. Akerlof (1970) focuses upon the situation when one party to a transaction 
has more information about the characteristics of commodities exchanged than the 
other party to that transaction.  More specifically, Akerlof (1970) demonstrates that in 
the used car market, where the seller has superior information about the car that they 
are selling than the buyer, it leads to a situation whereby only “lemons” (or poor 
quality used cars) are traded.98  
 
Spence (1973, 1974) demonstrates how signalling can be utilised to counteract the 
effects of adverse selection.99  More specifically, Spence (1973, 1974) considers how 
education serves as a signalling mechanism within the labour market. For example, 
where employers cannot distinguish between prospective high- and low-productivity 
employees, Akerlof (1970)’s Lemons Principle suggests that the labour market would 
revert into a market for only low-productivity employees. Education is measured on a 
continuous scale, where ever-increasing values indicate higher levels of education. 
Spence (1973) assumes that the necessary cost (time, effort or expense) to acquire 
levels of education is lower for high-productivity individuals at each level of 
education. Note he assumes that education provides no improvement to productivity 
nor do individuals undertake education for any other reasons besides its value in 
                                                     
98 Refer to Sub-Section 3.1.1 for a more detailed discussion of Akerlof (1970)’s analysis.  
99 In this context, signalling refers to the observable actions taken by agents to persuade opposing 
parties about the value and quality of their products or services (Löfgren et al., 2002). 
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providing signalling capacity.100 Thus, individuals would choose the least amount of 
education that would be sufficient to serve as an appropriate signal to potential 
employers for their associated level of productivity. Assume further that new labour 
market entrants acquire education before entering the labour market. Under perfect 
information, perfect information and constant returns to scale, Spence (1973, 1974) 
demonstrates that individuals would elect to acquire no education before entering the 
labour market and each new employee would be paid according to their level of 
productivity (Löfgren et al., 2002). Under asymmetric information, high-productivity 
would acquire education as a signal of their productivity (ability) (Löfgren et al., 
2002). 
 
In Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s seminal article, they investigate how the insurer 
(who is uninformed about the risk profile of the insured) can respond to improve the 
market outcome in the presence of information asymmetry. Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) present a model to describe the presence of adverse selection within insurance 
markets under imperfect information. An important result emanates from this work 
whereby a market for insurance may fail to form, or as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976: 
629) declare “…not only may a competitive equilibrium not exist, but when equilibria 
do exist, they may have strange properties”. The authors offer the separating 
equilibrium as a possible solution to address the observed market failure, whereby 
insurers offer separate contracts designed in such a way so as to attract the appropriate 
risk (either high or low risk individuals). This is achieved by adjusting effectively the 
level of cover offered and thereby the premium charged for insurance – the so-called 
self-selection mechanism of Salop and Salop (1976). 101  
 
Belli (2001) describes adverse selection as strategic behaviour by the more informed 
party against the less informed party. The insured is often seen to have superior 
information about their risk profile than the insurance company. In the health 
insurance context, each individual will select amongst a set of contracts based upon 
                                                     
100 It is possible to extend the analysis whereby education does enhance productivity and this would 
merely affirm the conclusion  
101 Refer to Sub-Section 3.1.3 for a more detailed discussion of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s paper.  
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their expected probability of utilising health care services. Thus, those individuals 
who anticipate requiring medical care regularly choose more generous plans 
compared to those requiring limited use. Cutler (1996: 30) describes the pervasiveness 
of adverse selection within health insurance markets as: 
“Almost all health insurance systems where individuals are allowed choice of 
insurance have experienced adverse selection. Medicare [enrolees] who choose 
managed care102 are healthier than…[those] who do not. The Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Program…has adverse selection between more and less generous 
policies. The spread in premiums between more and less generous policies is 68 
percent greater than benefits alone would dictate…And almost every large firm 
that has encouraged employee choice has found the cost of the most generous 
policies increases sufficiently rapidly than these policies are no longer viable”.  
Cutler (1996)’s comments suggest that when offered a choice between generous and 
moderate healthcare indemnity plans, individuals who are more certain as to their 
need for coverage will seek out the more generous plans. 
 
Insurers attempt to overcome the problem of adverse selection by employing a 
screening device. Within a labour market context, Salop and Salop (1976) describe 
the screening device as a rule of thumb whereby a certain set of observable 
characteristics correlated with the parameter of interest are used to determine the 
anticipated job performance of a new applicant. In terms of insurance, information 
gathering and subsequent risk classification serve as the tools to appropriately assess 
the risk profile of an individual or homogenous group of individuals. Thus, allowing 
the insurance company to charge premiums that reflect the inherent risk profile of the 
insured. Through risk classification, insurers utilise certain individual characteristics, 
such as age, gender and past claim experience, in an attempt to classify individuals 
into homogenous risk pools.103 The premise is that the insurer can simply charge all 
members within the same pool an identical premium as their risk should be 
indistinguishable. Thus, the insurer is indirectly utilising the individual’s risk 
characteristics to charge the person a premium that is commensurate with their risk 
                                                     
102 Belli (2001) note that managed care plans impose stricter controls and restrictions over the 
utilisation of health services than traditional indemnity plans. 
103 These risk characteristics are generally based upon the historical claims experience of the insurer. 
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status. Premiums based upon this risk classification may be erroneous for two primary 
reasons: 
 The characteristics utilised in the classification procedure may not fully describe 
the risk profile of the individual; and/or 
 Information gleaned from the insured regarding their particular risk characteristics 
may be inaccurate.  
 
In the absence of accurate information concerning these characteristics, the insurance 
companies are unable to differentiate between various risks within a particular risk 
pool. Under the standard adverse selection setting, since insurers are unable to 
distinguish between the different risk classes within the same pool, all members must 
be offered the identical price for insurance coverage. If one assumes that there are 
only two distinct risk classes, namely, high risk and low risk individuals. The 
insurance company would charge a weighted-average premium based upon the 
proportion of high risk and low risk individuals within each pool. Once the premium 
is determined, a situation arises whereby the low risk individuals are being charged a 
premium that overestimates their true underlying risk. Whilst on the other hand, the 
high risk individuals are charged a premium that underestimates their true underlying 
risk. Thus, the low risk members of the pool perceive accurately that they are 
effectively subsidising the high risk members within their pool. In this case, these low 
risk individuals are more likely to opt out of the insurance market as the premium they 
are charged is not commensurate with their risk level. Whereas the higher risk 
members of the pool are likely to demand more insurance because they are being 
charged a discounted price for insurance. As the low risk members exit the pool, the 
risk profile of the pool deteriorates further, and consequently the premium is adjusted 
upwards to reflect the overall higher risk profile of the pool.104 The situation that 
arises is akin to that described by Akerlof (1970)’s ‘lemons’ principle whereby the 
lemons (high risks) drive out the low risks. In the case of two risk classes, namely, 
high and low risk, one can observe that each distinct risk profile causes individuals to 
behave very differently. When insurance companies offer a menu of policies, a 
                                                     
104 As the low risk members of the pool exit the insurance market, the risk profile of the pool 
deteriorates and this would be observed through higher actual claims experienced by the insurer. 
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coverage-risk correlation can be expected to manifest itself in a tendency among high-
risk individuals to select policies that offer more comprehensive coverage.105 The 
asymmetry of information between the purchaser and seller of insurance is what the 
theory suggests causes the adverse selection phenomenon to occur within insurance 
markets. In the health insurance sector, it is important because each individual 
chooses among the set of contracts offered by medical aid schemes according to their 
expected probability of utilising healthcare services. Hence, those who foresee an 
extensive use of healthcare will tend to choose plans that are more generous while 
those who expect to have limited use opt for more moderate plans.  
 
Individuals purchase insurance to protect themselves against possible adverse 
outcomes that can result in a loss. A key premise behind insurance is the principle of 
indemnification whereby individuals seek protection so that they can be placed in the 
identical financial position prior to the insured event occurring. If the insured believes 
that the premium charged by the insurer underestimates their underlying risk, it is 
possible that they may perceive that insurance offers them an expected monetary gain. 
This ability to profit from insurance coverage would violate the principle of 
indemnification. This, however, is unsustainable from the insurer’s perspective, as 
observed claims would exceed expected claims. The insurer would need to adjust 
premiums upwards to reflect the higher associated risk and offset future underwriting 
losses. Traditionally, risk aversion has been seen as the key determinant of the 
demand for insurance by individuals. The decision to purchase insurance by 
individuals is however driven by several factors. Adverse selection appears to be 
housed within a behavioural context whereby the decision to purchase insurance (and 
the choice of appropriate coverage levels) is determined by an individual’s relative 
risk status to that of their pool. The intrinsic mechanism used by medical schemes to 
overcome the problem of adverse selection, is through offering alternative contracts, 
where higher deductibles can be traded-off against lower contribution rates. Thus, 
members through their own self-selection effectively separate into distinct risk classes 
(Salop & Salop, 1976).  
                                                     
105 When insurers offer a single insurance product, the coverage-risk correlation can be expected to 
manifest itself through a greater tendency by high-risk individuals to purchase insurance. 
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Belli (2001) describe this particular self-selection screening strategy as even more 
critical to the sustainability of the insurance market when regulation is in place that 
does not allow premiums to reflect individual risk (premium rate restrictions) or as in 
South Africa’s case does not permit medical schemes to utilise certain pertinent 
information relating to a members’ health status.   
 
Our traditional view of adverse selection is from the supply side or from the insurers’ 
perspective. Insurers require accurate information concerning the risk characteristics 
of the insured so as to make optimal decisions about policy offerings and the 
appropriate pricing of these contracts. As discussed previously, adverse selection 
exists when the buyer has superior (more accurate) information than the seller. This 
implies heterogeneity of insureds with respect to their utility functions, risk profiles 
and hence their associated premiums (Valsamakis, Vivian & du Toit, 1999). If the 
insurer knew the true nature of risk (and was permitted to act upon that information) 
for each insured then the premium charged would accurately reflect the inherent risk 
of the individual, thereby averting the theoretical adverse selection death spiral.  
 
It is important to note that adverse selection can in fact affect both sides of the 
insurance market. Susceptibility to information asymmetry is a feature that is not only 
privy to the insurer. The insurer may possess superior information over the insured. 
Therefore, on the demand side (insured’s perspective), information asymmetry can 
occur when an individual is misinformed about the quality of products and services 
that an insurer offers as well as the appropriateness of coverage. The buyer of 
insurance is often faced with problems in acquiring the information they require to 
make informed purchasing decisions, these problems include difficulty in obtaining 
accurate information with respect to the: 
 appropriate price for insurance coverage (actuarially fair premium and risk 
premium); 
 interpretation of insurance contract provisions; 
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 quality of service offered by different insurers; 
 financial strength and soundness of insurers; and 
 ability of insurers to meet their contractual obligations. 
 
Due to this information asymmetry the insurance buyer will be at a disadvantage and 
might purchase a policy, which is unnecessarily expensive or perhaps contains 
inadequate coverage. Owing to the lack of technical knowledge and expertise on the 
part of the consumer, an insurance company may exploit their comparative advantage 
by selling the consumer sub-optimal insurance policies. Furthermore, the insured may 
suffer the consequences of being unaware (or at best partially informed) of the 
technical provisions contained within the policy documentation due to their lack of 
expertise and technical knowledge. Therefore, on the demand side of the insurance 
market, the consumer is susceptible to abuse by the insurance company. The insurer 
can exploit their comparative advantage because of the inherent information 
asymmetry.  
 
For example, an individual, say Mr X, who has just moved into a new property in a 
different geographical area, may approach an insurance company ABC to purchase a 
comprehensive homeowners insurance policy. Despite this particular area having 
infrequent natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes, company ABC 
recommends a policy which will compensate Mr X for damage arising from such 
natural disasters. As Mr X is unaware of the weather patterns and geomorphology of 
this area, Mr X pays an additional premium to protect his property against hurricane 
and earthquake damage. Mr X’s perception of the risk of such events is misplaced, 
which creates an opportunity for the insurance company to charge an additional 
premium for the hurricane and earthquake protection that is not commensurate with 
the risk. Company ABC is exploiting their informational advantages by encouraging 
Mr X to insure against an event that is unlikely to occur. In addition, Mr X may have 
an inherent fear of natural disasters, which would predispose him to this form of 
manipulation by the insurance company and ultimately alter his demand in favour of 
this type of insurance coverage.  
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The true extent of the insured’s risk with respect to a loss-causing event(s) may 
indeed be known to the insurer rather than the insured. Thus, the insured’s perception 
of their true risk may be erroneous, which once again may cause the insured to make 
sub-optimal insurance purchasing decisions. The insurance company can take 
advantage of their superior knowledge about the insured’s risk to influence demand 
decisions through contract offerings and pricing. Although, competitive forces should 
mitigate the extent to which the insurer can exploit the insured, it nevertheless has the 
potential to contaminate (or at least offset) our traditional view of how adverse 
selection may affect the insurance market. Informational asymmetries may operate in 
the opposite direction favouring insurance companies over the insured.   
  
The seminal papers by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973, 1974), and Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) have stimulated considerable discussion into the theory of adverse 
selection. Other papers, such as Pauly (1974), argue that in the absence of perfect 
information, competitive outcomes in insurance markets may be non-optimal. He 
proves that these outcomes are not only suboptimal when compared to the infeasible 
optimum obtained under perfect information, but also compared to the set of feasible 
optima. Spence (1976) elaborates further about signalling and screening with 
particular focus upon contingent contracts. The author concludes that exogenously 
costly signals can transmit information, but it is often at some discernible real social 
cost. Wilson (1977) also presents a model of insurance markets where one has 
incomplete information. By suggesting a less stringent definition of equilibrium than 
the one initially described by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), he is able to demonstrate 
that by permanently removing insurance contracts that make negative expected 
profits, equilibrium is far more likely to exist.106 Löfgren et al. (2002)’s account of the 
analytical contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence, Michael Rothschild and 
Joseph Stiglitz, do provide a useful backdrop to explaining the functioning of markets 
in the presence of asymmetric information. In addition, various surveys of empirical 
studies have specifically examined whether or not adverse selection is indeed present 
                                                     
106 Wilson (1977) was first elucidated in Wilson (1976)’s Ph.D. thesis entitled “Equilibrium in a Class 
of Self-Selection Models” and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) also included Wilson (1976)’s notion of 
equilibrium within their analysis. 
156 
 
within different insurance segments, lines and markets. The surveys of empirical 
studies include Dionne and Doherty (1992), Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Chiappori 
(1999, 2000), Dionne, Doherty, and Fombaron (2001), Chiappori and Salanié (2003), 
and Hall (2006).  
 
More recent contributions, such as Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008), Koufopoulos 
(2007), Seog (2009) and Wambach (2000) have extended the theory. Seog (2009) 
investigates the outcomes when each party to an insurance contract simultaneously 
has superior information. In the case of medical schemes, one would assume that 
medical scheme members have superior information about specific risks while 
medical schemes have superior information about general risks (Seog, 2009: 279). 
Under standard adverse selection theory, the insured is considered to possess private 
information about their specific risk.107  However, the author asserts that it is also 
conceivable for the insurer to possess superior information about certain risks. For 
instance, individuals would know the extent of their smoking habit (on average how 
many cigarettes they smoke per day), whilst health insurers may have superior 
information about how smoking affects the health condition of an individual (Seog, 
2009: 279-280). The author, utilising a similar methodology found in Chassagnon and 
Villeneuve (2005) and Villeneuve (2003), proves that under these assumptions, 
outcomes could well deviate from traditional adverse selection theoretical predictions.  
 
3.1. Imperfect Information in Competitive Insurance Markets 
 
Before presenting a model to describe the functioning of a competitive insurance 
market under imperfect information, it is beneficial to provide an account of the 
Lemons Principle as described by Akerlof (1970) to illustrate how information 
asymmetry through adverse selection can cause the failure of the insurance market to 
form.  
                                                     
107 Dionne, Doherty and Fombaron (2000) and Chiappori (2000) provide a detailed review of the 
standard adverse selection models. 
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3.1.1. Lemons Principle 
 
In Akerlof (1970)’s investigation into the relationship between quality and 
uncertainty, he identifies many applications whereby the interaction between quality 
differences and uncertainty can explain various observable features within several 
markets. He states that the ‘Lemons Principle’ may help to explain the reluctance of 
employers to employ minorities, to determine the costs of dishonesty, to understand 
the operation of credit markets within underdeveloped economies and to explain why 
individuals aged over 65 find it difficult to obtain insurance coverage against 
healthcare expenditure, disability or death. Information asymmetry develops between 
the buyer and seller of commodities because the buyer is uncertain as to the quality of 
the good being purchased. The seller on the other hand has superior information 
regarding the quality of the item that he/she is trying to sell to the buyer. The buyer 
generally uses a static market statistic, such as a price, to act as a measure for the 
quality of an item (Akerlof, 1970). Akerlof (1970: 488) goes further by stating: 
“...there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the 
returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group who statistic is 
affected rather than to the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a 
reduction in the average quality of goods and also in the size of the market”.  
 
This feature is illustrated precisely by Akerlof (1970)’s examination of the automobile 
market. The author was perplexed by the discrepancy observed between the price of a 
new car and the price of a used car. It is often the case that the price of a new car is 
significantly higher than that of a comparable used car. Surely, as he argued the fact 
of merely owning a new car cannot attract such a premium.  He introduces a simple 
example to illustrate. Assume that one has four types of cars; new, used, good and bad 
(“lemons”) cars. Table 3-1 describes the four possible outcomes when purchasing a 
motor vehicle.  
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Table 3-1: Possible Outcomes when Purchasing a Motor Vehicle 
 Good Bad 
New (New, Good) (New, Bad) 
Used (Used, Good) (Used, Bad) 
 
Assume further that the proportion of cars produced that are good is equal to p and 
thus the corresponding proportion of cars produced that are lemons is equal to 1-p. If 
new and used cars were priced identically, the following scenario would conceivably 
transpire; a buyer, say Mr X, of a new car would assign a probability of p that the car 
is a good and a corresponding probability 1-p that the car is a lemon. Once Mr X has 
an opportunity to drive the vehicle, he assigns a new probability that the car is good, 
say p*, and the corresponding probability 1-p* that the car is a lemon. Through 
driving the vehicle, Mr X is able to glean more accurate information concerning the 
quality of the car. For example, Mr X may become aware of a noise whilst driving the 
vehicle and this could be indicative of an underlying mechanical flaw, which would 
detract from the quality of the vehicle. In this case, p* would be lower than his 
original p. Importantly, Mr X now has superior information relating to the quality of 
the vehicle than at the time he initially purchased the vehicle. If ݌∗ ൏ ݌, Mr X would 
choose to sell his “used” car and using those proceeds he could purchase a new car 
with a higher probability of it being good. As Akerlof (1970) notes the purchaser of 
Mr X’s used car is at an informational disadvantage when compared to Mr X and as 
such can only assign a probability of p that the used car he is purchasing is a good car. 
If on the other hand, Mr X’s assessment of the original car that he purchased is 
݌∗ ൐ ݌ , then Mr X would be unwise to sell his used car and use the proceeds to 
purchase a new car. Under these circumstances he would be purchasing a new car 
with a lower probability of it being good. The result of this analysis is that if new and 
used cars were priced identically, then ultimately only lemons would be traded.  
 
Here as Lofgren, Persson and Weibull (2002:198) suggests Akerlof (1970)’s analysis 
illustrates “how private information may lead to the malfunctioning of markets”. The 
159 
 
seriousness of this exemplification cannot be underestimated. It is not difficult to 
extend this example into a context whereby the traded commodities with varying 
degrees of quality no longer need to be identically priced, and yet the outcome will be 
as serious. Consider only the used automobile market, where once again one has bad 
(“lemons”) and good cars in fixed proportions as before. Assuming that the proportion 
of cars available that are good is equal to p and thus the corresponding proportion of 
cars produced that are lemons is equal to 1-p. Each buyer seeks only to purchase one 
vehicle, but at the time of purchase the buyer cannot distinguish between the low and 
high quality cars. Suppose that buyers assign a value of ஻ܸ to a bad car and a value of 
ܸீ  to a good car, where ஻ܸ ൏ ܸீ . Sellers assign a value of ஻ܸ∗ to a bad car and a value 
of ܸீ∗ to a good car. Here the value that the seller assigns to good and bad cars is 
lower than the values assigned by buyers. Mathematically, ஻ܸ∗ ൏ 	 ஻ܸ and ܸீ∗ ൏ 	 ܸீ .  
 
Following a similar analysis as outlined by Lofgren et al. (2002), with separate 
markets for both bad and good used cars, it is conceivable that within the low quality 
used car market every price between ஻ܸ∗ and ஻ܸ would support beneficial transactions 
(Lofgren et al, 2002). Similarly, for the high quality used car market prices between 
ܸீ∗ and ܸீ  would also support beneficial transactions between the two parties (that is 
between the sellers and buyers)108. Since buyers are unable to distinguish between 
good and bad used cars at the time of purchase, the resultant information asymmetry 
actively encourages sellers to market low-quality used cars within the high-quality 
used car marketplace.  In the absence of suitable mechanisms to mitigate the 
information asymmetry, the low-quality and high-quality markets would merge into a 
single market for all used cars (Lofgren et al, 2002). The buyers’ valuation of used 
cars would thus converge towards a single price measure ሺ തܸሻ for all used cars, which 
can be described by Equation 3-1. 
 
  
                                                     
108 The beneficial transactions that would conclude between sellers and buyers would represent socially 
efficient outcomes as all gains from trade would be realised (Lofgren et al, 2002). 
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Equation 3-1: Buyers’ Weighted-Average Valuation of Used Cars once a Single Market Emerges 
ࢂഥ ൌ ࢖ࢂࡳ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢖ሻࢂ࡮ 
where	ࢂഥ	 represents	 the	weighted‐average	price	 of	 a	 used	 car	 that	 a	 buyer	 is	willing	 to	 pay,	 ࢖ 
represents the	proportion	of	cars	available	that	are	good	and	૚ െ ࢖	represents	the	corresponding	
proportion	of	cars	that	are	bad.	ࢂࡳ	and	ࢂ࡮	are	the	buyers’	assigned	values	for	a	good	and	bad	car	
respectively. 
 
Thus, if both good and bad used cars are sold, in the presence of information 
asymmetry buyers would be willing to pay at most തܸ  for a used car. However, if 
sellers’ valuation of a good used car fell below the weighted-average price buyers 
were willing to pay, that is	ܸீ∗ ൏ 	 തܸ , then sellers would refrain from selling any good 
used cars. Ultimately, a market for only bad used cars (lemons) would emerge and 
thus buyers’ weighted-average valuation of a used car would decline accordingly. The 
buyers’ weighted-average price that they would be willing to pay for a used car would 
decline towards ஻ܸ. Therefore, as long as ஻ܸ∗ ൏ 	 ஻ܸ, sellers would continue to offer 
only lemons. The result is a market for only lemons (Akerlof, 1970). Akerlof (1970: 
490) explains that the bad cars drive out the good cars “…because they sell at the 
same price as good cars since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference 
between a good and a bad car; only the seller knows”.  A useful extension to this 
analysis is to consider varying degrees of quality and as Akerlof (1970) points out that 
without loss of any generality, it is quite conceivable that the very bad would drive 
out the bad who drive out the not-so-bad who drive out the average who drive out the 
not-so-good who drive out the good who drive out the very good. Ultimately, at the 
extreme one would be left with a market with only the lowest quality item, which 
clearly would be no market at all.  
 
Akerlof (1970)’s presents an example that provides a mathematical confirmation of 
the assertion that information asymmetry with respect to quality may in the case of the 
automobile market lead to an inability of the market to form. The author assumes that 
the demand for automobiles is a function of two variables, namely, the price of the 
automobile ሺ݌ሻ and the average quality of the used cars traded denoted by ߤ. Thus, 
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the quantity of automobiles demanded is given by ܳௗ ൌ ܦሺ݌, ߤሻ.  The supply of 
automobiles is dependent upon price, ܵ ൌ ܵሺ݌ሻ and the average quality is also a 
function of the price such that ߤ ൌ ߤሺ݌ሻ. It is understandable to believe that an 
individual’s assessment of automobile’s quality will be influenced by the price of the 
car. Often people perceive that if an item is expensive it somehow possesses a higher 
quality compared to an item that attracts a lower price. In equilibrium, demand would 
equal supply at a given level of average quality (Akerlof, 1970). 
 
Using utility theory, Akerlof (1970) constructs a hypothetical example to illustrate the 
effect of quality uncertainty. Assume further that there are two groups of car traders, 
the first group who possess all the cars and the second group who has no cars. A total 
of ܰ cars are owned by the individuals making up Group One. As the cars are owned 
by Group One, they are effectively pre-owned (used) and thus the market that he is 
considering is a market for used cars only. The utility function of Group One is given 
by Equation 3-2 and Group Two’s utility function is given by Equation 3-3. Both utility 
functions describe a linear function with respect to utility. As the author notes 
assuming that individuals are risk neutral does not distract from the results of the 
analysis. Non-linear utility would essentially render the analysis unnecessarily 
complex. Further, by assuming linear utility functions, the author removes potential 
risk aversion affects that may contaminate the results. The nature of the utility 
functions also suggests that for an individual in either group, the addition of a second 
car, or indeed the ݇th car, will add the exact same amount of utility as the first car 
(Akerlof, 1970).   
   
Equation 3-2: Utility Function of Group One (Akerlof, 1970) 
ࢁ૚ ൌ ࡹ൅෍࢞࢏
࢔
࢏ୀ૚
 
where	ࢁ૚	 represents	 the	 utility	 function	 of	 Group	 One,	ࡹ represents	 the	monetary	 value	 the	
consumption	of	other	goods	besides	cars,	࢞࢏	the	quality	of	the	࢏th	car	and	࢔	the	number	of	cars. 
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Equation 3-3: Utility Function of Group Two (Akerlof, 1970) 
ࢁ૛ ൌ ࡹ൅෍૜ ૛ൗ ࢞࢏
࢔
࢏ୀ૚
 
where	 ࢁ૛	 represents	 the	 utility	 function	 of	 Group	 Two,	 ࡹ represents	 the	 monetary	 value	 of	
consumption	of	other	goods	besides	cars,	࢞࢏	the	quality	of	the	࢏th	car	and	࢔	the	number	of	cars. 
 
Akerlof (1970: 491) makes the following further assumptions: 
1. Both groups of individuals are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximisers. 
2. The ܰ cars have uniformly distributed quality ݔ, with 0 ൑ ݔ ൑ 2. ݔ௜ is the quality 
derived from “consuming” the ݅th car. As ݔ is uniformly distributed between 0 
and 2, the expected value of ݔ would be given by ܧሾݔሿ ൌ 1. 
3. The price of all “other goods” (everything except cars) ܯ is unity. For each group, 
individuals derive one util of utility for every one dollar worth of every other good 
consumed. 
4. Group One has income (wealth) ଵܻ and Group Two has income (wealth) ଶܻ.       
 
The average quality, ߤ, is itself assumed to be distributed uniformly between 0 and ݌ 
(that is 0 ൑ ߤ ൑ ݌).109 Here by implication ݌ represents the full price one would pay 
for a car essentially with “perfect” quality and at the other extreme, a price of 0 would 
be paid for a car with “zero” quality. The crucial element underpinning Akerlof 
(1970)’s analysis is the fact that the average quality, ߤ, is uncertain. He does not 
adequately emphasise that it is precisely for this reason that information asymmetry 
surfaces. By describing  ߤ as a random variable following a particular distribution, it 
subjugates average quality to take on any possible value within a pre-defined 
                                                     
109 The continuous uniform distribution is used for illustrative purposes, other distribution may be used 
but these would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. For a random variable ܺ that follows a 
continuous uniform distribution, all possible values within an interval of say ሾܽ, ܾሿ have an equal 
likelihood of occurring. The distribution would be defined by the two parameters, ܽ and ܾ, which 
represent the minimum and maximum values that the random variable can take. In 
summary	ܺ~ܷሺܽ, ܾሻ, with probability density function ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ቊ
ଵ
௕ି௔ , ܽ ൑ ݔ ൑ ܾ
0, ݔ ൏ ܽ	݋ݎ	ݔ ൐ ܾ and first 
moment of the distribution is given by ܧሾܺሿ ൌ ௔ା௕ଶ . 
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continuous interval with equal probability. It is thus left to the buyer to make an 
assessment of the likely quality of any car being purchased. Whilst at the same time it 
is understood that the seller views the quality of the car being sold as a certainty.  
Therefore, the buyer can only make an informed expectation of the likely outcome for 
the quality of the car and in this case this would translate into the expected value of ߤ. 
Given that the average quality can take on any value between 0 and ݌, and ߤ~ܷሺ0, ݌ሻ, 
the probability density function would be represented by Figure 3-1. 
Figure 3-1: Probability Density Function for the Average Quality μ 
 
“The [total] demand for used cars will be the sum of the demands by both groups” 
(Akerlof, 1970: 491). From the author’s model it is trivial to establish the demand 
equations for each group. Ignoring indivisibilities, Group One’s demand for used cars 
is described within Equation 3-4 and Group Two’s demand function for used cars is given 
by Equation 3-5. 
 
Equation 3-4: Demand for used cars by Group One (Akerlof, 1970) 
ࡰ૚ ൌ ቐ
ࢅ૚
࢖ ,
ࣆ ࢖ൗ ൐ ૚
૙, ࣆ ࢖ൗ ൏ ૚
 
where	 ࢅ૚	 represents	 the	 income	 of	 Group	 One,	 ࢖	 is	 the	 price	 of	 a	 car	 and	 ࣆ	 represents	 the	
average	quality	of	a	car.	 
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Equation 3-5: Demand for used cars by Group Two (Akerlof, 1970) 
ࡰ૛ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓࢅ૛࢖ ,
૜ࣆ ૛ൗ ൐ ࢖
૙, ૜ࣆ ૛ൗ ൏ ࢖
 
where	 ࢅ૛	 represents	 the	 income	 of	 Group	 Two,	 ࢖	 is	 the	 price	 of	 a	 car	 and	 ࣆ	 represents	 the	
average	quality	of	a	car.	 
 
To explain how the demand described in Equation 3-4 is derived, one notes that if the 
ratio of the average quality to the price of a car is greater than unity, it implies that an 
individual would be able to purchase a car at a “bargain” rate – the car bought would 
be worth more than the price paid for it. Effectively, individuals are purchasing cars 
with an average quality translated into a value that exceeds the underlying price paid. 
Hence, Group One would justifiably utilise all their income to purchase cars, since for 
every dollar spent on a car you are receiving in excess of a “dollar worth of 
quality”.110 Further, as individuals within Group One derive one util worth of utility 
for every dollar worth of quality “consumed” with respect to a car owned, it translates 
into the observation that individuals purchasing a car are in fact receiving more than a 
dollar worth of quality. This means that they receive more than one util for every 
dollar spent on a used car. Now because individuals only receive one util for every 
dollar spent on “other goods”, it is clear individuals would therefore rather allocate all 
their income to the purchase of used cars.  
 
If on the other hand, the ratio of the average quality to the price of a car is less than 
unity, it implies that individuals within Group One that purchase a used car would 
receive a car that is worth less than the price paid for it. Thus, they receive less than 
one util for every dollar spent on a used car and thereby individuals within Group One 
would allocate all their income to the purchase of “other goods” instead of used cars – 
the demand for used cars by Group One would be zero.  
                                                     
110 From the utility functions described in Equation 3-2 and Equation 3-3, it is apparent that 
individuals’ utility are a function of the quality they derive from owning a used car.  
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Similarly from Equation 3-5, it is possible to describe how the demand for used cars is 
derived for Group Two. From Equation 3-5, it is clear that individuals within Group 
Two derive one-and-a-half utils worth of utility for every dollar worth of quality 
“consumed” with respect to a car owned, which compares favourably against 
spending on “other goods” because individuals only receive one util for every one 
dollar spent. Now as long as the price of a car does not exceed one-and-half times the 
average quality of the car, individuals within Group Two would allocate all their 
income in the pursuit of purchasing cars. In other words, even if they receive less than 
one dollar worth of quality from a purchased car, the utility they derive from the car 
purchased exceeds one util thereby making it an attractive purchase over “other 
goods”. Notably, as long as they receive at least two-thirds of one dollar worth of 
quality for every dollar spent on a car, the utility derived from “consuming” the 
purchased car will exceed one util and therefore, individuals within Group Two would 
allocate all their income to purchasing used cars.  
 
When the price of a car exceeds one-and-half times the average quality of the car one 
receives, Group Two’s individuals even though they value cars more than “other 
goods” in terms of utility, would refrain from purchasing cars in favour of “other 
goods”. Thereby, their demand for used cars will revert to zero. 
 
The total demand ܦሺ݌, ߤሻ for used cars by both groups would simply be the 
summation of the individual demands (Akerlof, 1970). Equation 3-6 describes the total 
demand for used cars by both groups of individuals. 
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Equation 3-6: Total Demand for used cars by both Groups (Akerlof, 1970) 
ࡰሺ࢖, ࣆሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓࢅ૚ ൅ ࢅ૛࢖ , ࢖ ൏ ࣆ
ࢅ૛
࢖ , ࣆ ൏ ࢖ ൏
૜ࣆ ૛ൗ
૙, ࢖ ൐ ૜ࣆ ૛ൗ
 
where	ࢅ૚	represents	the	income	of	Group	One,	ࢅ૛	represents	the	income	of	Group	Two,	࢖	is	the	
price	of	a	car	and	ࣆ	represents	the	average	quality	of	a	car.	 
 
From Equation 3-6, three possible demand states occur depending upon the price of a 
used car relative to the average quality derived from a used car. Under the first 
scenario, if the price paid for a used is less than the average quality one derives from a 
used car, both groups would obtain in excess of one dollar worth of quality for every 
dollar spent on a car and hence this would translate into more than one util of utility 
for every dollar spent. Thus, both groups would allocate all their income in favour of 
purchasing used cars rather than “other goods”. For the second possibility, for every 
dollar spent on a used car, the buyer would only receive between 66. 6ሶ  cents and one 
dollar worth of quality. In terms of utility, for Group One the utility derived would be 
less than one util for every dollar spent and for Group Two the utility would still 
exceed one util for every dollar spent. Therefore, Group One would demand no cars 
whilst Group Two would still demand cars in favour of “other goods”. The final 
scenario occurs when for every dollar spent on a used car; the buyer would receive 
less than 66. 6ሶ  cents worth of quality. This translates into less than one util for every 
dollar spent on a used car for both groups and therefore every individual would 
allocate all their income in favour of “other goods” rather than used cars. 
 
Recall information asymmetry is present because buyers are uncertain as to the 
quality of any used car they purchase. Sellers on the other hand are understood to 
possess superior knowledge concerning the quality of the used car that they are 
selling. As a consequence buyers can at best make an informed assessment of the 
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average quality of used cars ߤ~ܷሺ0, ݌ሻ. The information asymmetry is captured by 
assuming that the average quality is a random variable following a continuous 
uniform distribution. Out of the class of estimates for the average quality, the first 
moment of the distribution would be the best unbiased and consistent estimate of the 
average quality of a used car. Hence, a buyer’s assessment of the average quality of a 
used car would equate to  ܧሾߤሿ ൌ ݌ 2ൗ  (the expected value of ߤ equals the price of a 
used car divided by 2).  
 
Since the expected value of ߤ is equal to ݌ 2ൗ , it is now possible to substitute the 
expected value of ߤ for each ߤ under the various constraints within Equation 3-6. From 
this one obtains Equation 3-7.  
 
Equation 3-7: Total Demand for used cars by both Groups substituting for the ࡱሾࣆሿ  
ࡰሺ࢖, ࣆሻ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓࢅ૚ ൅ ࢅ૛࢖ , ࢖ ൏
࢖
૛
ࢅ૛
࢖ ,
࢖
૛ ൏ ࢖ ൏
૜࢖ ૝ൗ
૙, ࢖ ൐ ૜࢖ ૝ൗ
 
where	ࢅ૚	represents	the	income	of	Group	One,	ࢅ૛	represents	the	income	of	Group	Two,	࢖	is	the	
price	of	a	car	and	ࣆ	represents	the	average	quality	of	a	car.	 
 
It is immediately noticeable that after the substitution for the expected average 
quality, the constraint under the first scenario stipulates that ݌ ൏ ௣ଶ, and since ݌, the 
price of a used car, can only be greater than or equal to 0 ሺ݌ ൒ 0ሻ – this constraint is 
untenable. Thus, the first scenario is not possible. Under the second scenario, 
whilst	݌ ൐ ௣ଶ is true, the second part of the constraint is once again false ݌ cannot be 
less than three-quarters of ݌ ൭݌ ≮ 3݌ 4ൗ ൱ – the second scenario is not feasible. For the 
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final scenario, the constraint ݌ ൐ 3݌ 4ൗ  is indeed true and thus the only possible 
scenario is that the demand for used cars is zero ሺܦሺ݌, ߤሻ ൌ 0ሻ. Therefore, from this 
mathematical exercise, Akerlof (1970) proves that the demand for used cars would 
revert to zero – no market for used cars would form.  
 
The Lemons Principle as advocated by Akerlof (1970) can easily be related to the 
health insurance context. The author indeed relates it to the medical insurance market 
where individuals over 65-year old often have difficulty in obtaining medical cover. 
Individuals who are over 65 generally have a higher propensity to require health care 
services compared to younger individuals holding all other factors constant. Claims 
experience suggests that senior citizens not only claim more frequently but the size of 
their claims tends to be larger. Akerlof (1970: 492) asks the question: “…why doesn’t 
the price rise to match the risk?”  He argues that if the price were to rise to reflect the 
greater risk, increasingly those over-65s who are more certain that they will require 
medical cover would seek or at least maintain their current level of cover. Over-65s 
with a lower risk profile are more likely to opt out as they would not be prepared to 
pay a premium that effectively subsidises their “high” risk counterparts.111 As the risk 
of the pool deteriorates, the premiums would need to rise once more to reflect the 
higher claims experience and the so-called adverse selection death spiral would 
manifest itself. It is clear that Akerlof (1970)’s analogy of bad cars (or lemons) 
driving out good cars can easily be translated into the notion that higher risk over-65s 
drive out lower risk over-65s. Ultimately, as with the case with the varying degrees of 
quality, which in this case would translate into the varying degrees of risk within the 
over-65 cohort; it is conceivable that no market for medical insurance for over-65s 
will form. 
 
 
                                                     
111 The premium they would pay far exceeds their expected claims experience and hence the risk 
premium – the amount which is over-and-above their actuarially fair premium – is substantially relative 
to the expected cost of claims. 
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Salop and Salop (1976: 619) highlight Akerlof (1970)’s contribution as: 
“…[Akerlof (1970)] showed that the inability of one side of the market to 
convey its information about the product convincingly to the other side of the 
market prevented the consummation of transactions, which would occur if the 
information transfer could be accommodated”. 
Akerlof (1970)’s analysis does accentuate the far-reaching consequences of 
information asymmetries within the automobile market and the difficulties that senior 
citizens experience in purchasing medical insurance.  
 
Lofgren et al. (2002) acknowledge that Akerlof (1970) outlines an important response 
by economic agents to address the consequences of adverse selection through the 
creation of institutions that mitigate information asymmetry. Guarantees, brand-name 
goods and chains, and licensing (certification) practices all reduce quality uncertainty. 
Many consumer purchases, particular large purchases such as motor vehicles or 
electrical appliances, all carry guarantees or at least some form of warranty to protect 
the consumer from quality uncertainty. Should a purchased item fail or malfunction, 
the consumer has recourse as he or she can return the item to be repaired or replaced 
(generally at no cost to the consumer) during the warranty or guaranty period. To 
some extent the risk of poor quality is shifted back onto the seller of the goods. 
Consumers have the prerogative to curtail purchases of brand-name goods should the 
quality of a purchased item not live up to their expectations (Akerlof, 1970). He states 
that restaurant or hotel chains alleviate quality uncertainty as consumers can once 
again refrain from utilising these services should the quality of service fall short of 
what they would expect to receive at any other member of that respective chain. 
Certification and licencing of skilled labour (and professions) indicate a reliable level 
of proficiency (Akerlof, 1970). Even qualifications from academic or vocational 
institutions serve as “brand names” that reflect either positively or negatively 
concerning the ability of a particular individual to perform a specific function. 
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3.1.2. Gresham’s Law 
 
An alternative exposition of this analysis is articulated within Gresham’s Law.112 
Gresham’s Law describes how bad money drives out good money if their exchange 
rate is set by law. “Bad” money refers to coinage that has a commodity value (the 
actual value of the metallic constituents of the coins) which is considerably less than 
its nominal (or face) value. While "good" money is money that has value which is 
indistinguishable between its commodity and nominal value. Gresham’s Law arises 
when both these forms of money are in circulation and have to be accepted as legal 
tender with identical face values for economic transactions. Non-trivial sanctions are 
imposed upon persons who attempt to discriminate against bad coins in favour of 
good coins. This is achieved by simply requiring, through legal-tender laws, that all 
coins must be accepted and accorded their nominal value. A so-called “Prisoners’ 
Dilemma” game forms, whereby only bad coins are employed for economic 
transactions between buyers and sellers (Selgin, 1996). Since sellers must accept 
either good or bad coins at their official face value, buyers offer only inferior coins for 
purchases. Sellers on the other hand, anticipate this behaviour by buyers and thereby 
price their wares accordingly (Selgin, 1996).  
 
A practical example of Gresham’s Law in practice occurred in Canada, where up until 
1968 silver coins were in wide-circulation. Once the market value of silver exceeded 
the nominal value of the coinage, Canada debased their coinage by switching to 
cheaper metal alternatives. Subsequently, the silver coins disappeared from circulation 
as individuals chose to retain these in anticipation of realising a greater future return 
from the silver content of the coins. Fetter (1932: 495-6) argued that the tendency for 
good coins to actually leave a country was the result, not of debasement per se, but 
rather the result of an adjustment in the prices of the associated metals. Prices rise in 
response to an excess supply of coins. This occurs since official debasement, and even 
the unofficial reduction of good coins into their metal constituents, increases the 
nominal stock of money to be derived from any given quantity of metal (Fetter, 1932). 
                                                     
112 Sir Thomas Gresham (c. 1519 – 1579) was an English merchant and financier who served in the 
court of King Edward VI, Queen Mary I and Queen Elizabeth I of England.  
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The expression “Gresham’s Law” was devised by Henry Dunning Macleod, a Scottish 
economist, who in his published work Elements of Political Economy decided to name 
the tendency for bad money to drive out good money after Sir Thomas Gresham 
(Macleod, 1858:  476). Sir Thomas Gresham was associated with the concept as he 
wrote a letter to Queen Elizabeth I on the occasion of her accession in 1558 urging 
Queen Elizabeth I to restore the debased currency of England. Gresham argued that 
bad and good coinage should not be in circulation simultaneously. He was concerned 
that after the debasements of English silver coins that took place during the reigns of 
King Henry VIII and King Edward VI, there was a discernible exodus from the 
country of not only the coinage with a higher silver content, but also the exit of gold 
coins (Burgon, 1965). Giffen (1891)’s claim that Gresham was only responsible for 
the suggestion that bad coinage drives good coinage of the same metal out of 
circulation was mistaken. Gresham's letter to Queen Elizabeth I explicitly express 
Gresham’s concern that the debasement of silver coins has led to the disappearance of 
gold from circulation (Fetter 1932: 490-1). 
 
At the time Macleod (1858) articulated Gresham’s Law, the notion that bad money 
drives out good money was not a new phenomenon and in fact it is mentioned as far 
back as 405 BC in a play written by Aristophanes entitled “The Frogs”. Within this 
play, Aristophanes describes the observation of how bad money replaced good money 
in respect to day-to-day transactions (Aristophanes, Barrett and Dutta, 2007).  Further 
references to this tendency occur in medieval writings; most notably in the works of 
Nicole Oresme and Nicolaus Copernicus.113 In 1357, Oresme published a treatise on 
the ethics and economics of money production, which examined the causes and 
effects of inflation.114 The insights gleaned from Oresme’s treatise concerning 
inflation still have applicability in contemporary contexts. Copernicus’ contribution 
                                                     
113 Nicole Oreseme (c. 1323 – 1382) was a theologian and philosopher who published works on various 
subjects including economics, mathematics, physics, astronomy, philosophy and theology. In addition, 
he served as a counsellor in the court of King Charles V of France. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473 – 1543) 
was a scientist, who most famously disputed the view that the Earth was the centre of the universe. 
114 The treatise was published in Latin as the Tractatus de Origine, Natura, Jure et Mutationibus 
Monetarum or translated into English as the Treatise on the Origin, Nature, Law and Alteration of 
Money. 
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occurred after he had advised the Prussian Diet115 about monetary reform (Volckart, 
1997). It was in 1526 when Copernicus published a study, which formulated an early 
iteration of the theory underlying Gresham’s Law.116 He concluded that bad coinage 
drives good coinage out of circulation as individuals exchange bad coins for good 
coins, and subsequently melt down the good coins to sell the metallic constituents 
(Volckart, 1997).117  
 
Although Gresham's Law was originally conceived within the context of bad coinage 
driving out good coinage of the same metal, since both forms of coinage have equal 
legal tender status, it is not difficult to extend the law’s application to other situations.  
Selgin (1996) suggests that legal-tender laws may compel people to treat coins and 
paper notes, as equivalents, thereby forcing the more esteemed form of money out of 
circulation. Some writers have applied Gresham’s Law more generally thereby 
deviating from the original premise of the law. Mundell (1998)’s assertion that the 
tendency of redeemable banknotes, which lacked legal tender status, to replace gold 
or silver coins is yet another application of Gresham’s Law is in fact erroneous.118  
 
Rolnick and Weber (1986) question the validity of Gresham’s Law as they argue that 
bad money will drive good money to a premium rather than driving it out of 
circulation. In particular, Rolnick and Weber (1986) discuss situations involving 
bimetallic legislation, the interaction between metallic money and the introduction of 
                                                     
115 The Diet of Prussia or Landtag, took place in the Duchy of Prussia, a vassal state of Poland.  The 
term diet is derived from Medieval Latin dieta, meaning parliamentary assembly. 
116 The study focused upon the value of money, and was entitled Monetae cudendae ratio. 
117 Copernicus also formulated a version of the quantity theory of money and his recommendations 
concerning monetary reform were actively implemented by the leaders of both Prussia and Poland to 
achieve a stable currency (Armitage, 1952 and Volckart, 1997). 
118 Selgin (1996) points out that in so far as the redeemable notes are regarded by their holders and by 
others who accept them, not as "bad" money, but rather as money that was just as "good" as the coins 
into which they can be readily converted. 
173 
 
paper substitutes for gold or silver coinage.119  An important omission from Rolnick 
and Weber (1986)’s discussion is any reference to the debasement of coinage. It is 
precisely debasements that are discussed in all early iterations of Gresham’s Law 
(Selgin, 1996). Moreover, Rolnick and Weber (1986) do not consider the influence of 
legal-tender legislation, which requires individuals to accept both good and bad 
money at par for economic transactions (Selgin, 1996). Although Gresham’s Law is 
often extended to argue against bimetallism, Giffen (1891) points out that Gresham 
made no direct reference to bimetallism or in fact to:  
“the analogous case of inconvertible paper when the paper drives the metal out of 
circulation” (Giffen 1891: 304). 
Selgin (1996) comments that one should err on the side of caution when applying 
Gresham’s Law outside of the law's original context. Akerlof (1970: 490) himself 
recognises that the analogy of bad cars (lemons) driving out good cars cannot be 
blanketly accepted as yet another example of Gresham’s Law without certain caveats. 
Under Gresham’s Law, both buyers and sellers can supposedly distinguish between 
bad and good money. Hence, the absence of information asymmetry is a serious 
omission for the general application of Gresham’s Law within the adverse selection 
context of insurance. 
 
3.1.3. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s Model 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) are critical of theorists who banish discussions 
surrounding imperfect information to footnotes. In this seminal work, Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976: 629) state the purpose of their study is to: 
                                                     
119 Bimetallism refers to a monetary standard where the country’s monetary unit is defined according to 
either a certain quantity of gold or a certain quantity of silver. For example, for most of the 19th century 
in the United States, one dollar was defined as consisting either of 22.5 grains (1.4625 grams) of gold 
or 371 grains (24.115 grams) of silver. Individuals were permitted to exchange quantities of either 
metal into gold or silver dollar coins. Effectively, bimetallism creates a fixed rate of exchange for the 
two metals. Giffen (1892) presents a detailed argument against bimetallism and he emphasises that if 
market forces lead to the value of the metal exceeding its nominal currency value, then the most likely 
outcome would once again be disappearance of coinage from circulation. 
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“… [analyse] competitive markets in which the characteristics of the 
commodities exchanged are not fully known to at least one of the parties to the 
transaction”. 
The authors investigate the effects of imperfect information in competitive insurance 
markets and their examination has proved to be a most valuable conceptual 
framework to assess the impact of information asymmetry within a competitive 
insurance context. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) study the response by insurers to 
information asymmetry and they explore whether or not equilibrium does exist. In 
their paper, they consider the particular situation where insurance companies do not 
have accurate information concerning the risk characteristics of a prospective 
policyholder. The key conclusion that emanates from this classical paper can be 
summarised as follows: 
“[Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)] are able to show that not only may a 
competitive equilibrium not exist, but when equilibria do exist, they may have 
strange properties… if individuals were willing or able to reveal their 
information, everybody could be made better off. By their very being, high-risk 
individuals cause an externality: the low-risk individuals are worse off than they 
would be in the absence of the high-risk individuals. However, the high-risk 
individuals are no better off than they would be in the absence of the low-risk 
individuals” (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976: 629). 
 
In a perfect world, the insurer would know the probability of loss for all individuals 
and thus insurance markets would be characterised by symmetric information. 
Therefore, both the policyholder and the insurance company would have perfect 
information regarding the probability of suffering a loss and the potential magnitude 
of the loss or economic consequence of suffering a loss. Hence, insurance markets 
would be viable since insurers would be able to charge premiums that were 
commensurate with the associated risk that they face and individuals would be 
prepared to pay an actuarially fair premium (pure premium) for protection against the 
loss-causing event(s). In fact, since individuals are risk averse, individuals would be 
prepared to pay in excess of the pure premium to cover the administration, claims 
handling and loading fees of the insurer.    
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However, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) consider the case that one party to the 
insurance transaction, namely the policyholder, has more information regarding their 
probability of suffering a loss than the other party, namely the insurer. For example, in 
the case of genetic testing, an individual would undergo genetic screening whereby 
so-called genetic-markers would be detected that indicate a predisposition to certain 
congenital diseases. Presumably, the individual would be eager to keep this 
information private when applying for health insurance. This situation of asymmetric 
information results in a problem of adverse selection. Hoy, Orsi, Eisinger and Moatti 
(2003) discuss the potential impact of the diffusion of genetic testing on health 
insurance markets and the authors utilise the theoretical approach underlying 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s model to obtain their findings. Despite the presence 
of information asymmetry, Hoy et al. (2003) demonstrate that a market equilibrium 
can be reached either on the basis of separating contracts, which discriminate between 
risk levels or through offering pooling contracts that are based upon the average risk 
of the cohort. The choice between separating and pooling contracts depends upon the 
relative proportion of high-risk individuals within each cohort. The authors examine 
specifically the hereditary risk associated with a predisposition to breast cancer. 
Breast cancer and the corresponding genetic research confirm that due to a limited 
incidence of gene mutations in the general female population, they argue that a 
pooling equilibrium is the likely outcome. Interestingly, Hoy et al. (2003) argue that 
the claim that the diffusion of genetic tests will inevitably lead to adverse selection 
within the health insurance market, if the utilisation of this information is prohibited, 
is unduly exaggerated.  
 
A useful starting point before explaining Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s model is to 
outline the basic framework to an example presented by the authors. Assume that 
there exists only two states of nature; the first being the situation where no loss event 
occurs (no accident state) and the second when a loss event takes place (accident 
state). Consider an individual who has wealth (income) denoted by ܹ should no 
accident take place. This would represent the situation whereby the individual is in the 
no accident state. However, should an accident occur, the individual’s wealth would 
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be given by ܹ െ ݀. Here ݀ refers to the size of the financial loss suffered by the 
individual. Now suppose the individual has an opportunity to purchase insurance, 
which would indemnify him or her against the loss should the accident occur.120 In the 
event that the person decides to purchase insurance, a premium of ߙଵ would be paid 
by the individual to the insurance company to gain protection against the loss-causing 
event. Hoy et al. (2003) defines this premium as ߙଵ ൌ ݌ݎ݀, where ݌ is the probability 
of an accident occurring (ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ represents the probability of no accident taking 
place), ݎ is the amount of cover afforded by the insurance contract in the case of a loss 
occurring. Hence, ߙଵ represents the pure premium (actuarially fair premium). ݎ is 
bound by the interval ሾ0, 1ሿ, if ݎ ൌ 1 then full cover is provided and thus the 
individual will pay a premium corresponding to full indemnification and if ݎ ൌ 0 then 
no insurance cover is provided, which implies that the premium charged would be 
zero ሺߙଵ ൌ 0ሻ.  
 
If an accident does indeed occur, the individual can expect to receive a reciprocal 
payment of ߙොଶ from the insurer – this would represent the payment received by the 
insured once a claim has been successfully lodged (and approved) with the insurer. 
Hence, the insured would receive a payout that would represent the claim payment net 
of the premium paid ሺߙଶ ൌ ߙොଶ െ ߙଵሻ. According to Hoy et al. (2003), the claim 
payment received by the insured would be a function of both the fractional level of 
cover afforded by the insurance contract ሺݎሻ and the magnitude of the loss ሺ݀ሻ. 
Therefore, the claim payment would simply equate to the fractional level of cover 
afforded by the insurance contract multiplied by the magnitude of the loss   ሺߙොଶ ൌ
ݎ݀ሻ.  
 
The different possible wealth combinations in the no accident and accident states 
would equate to ሺܹ,ܹ െ ݀ሻ without insurance and with insurance it would be 
ሺܹ െ ߙଵ,ܹ െ ݀ ൅ ߙଶሻ. Let the individual’s wealth in the no accident state be ଵܹ and 
let ଶܹ be the individual’s wealth in the accident state – this is irrespective of whether 
or not the person has purchased insurance. The various wealth combinations (with and 
                                                     
120 Indemnification against the insurable event may be full or partial. 
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without insurance) under the two possible states of nature are summarised within 
Table 3-2. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) use the vector ߙ ൌ ሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ to fully describe 
the insurance contract.121  
 
Table 3-2: Wealth-Combinations with and without Insurance  
 Without Insurance With Insurance 
No Accident State ଵܹ ൌ ܹ ଵܹ ൌ ܹ െ ߙଵ 
Accident State ଶܹ ൌ ܹ െ ݀ ଶܹ ൌ ܹ െ ݀ ൅ ߙଶ 
 
According to the authors, these insurance contracts ሺߙ′ݏሻare traded on the insurance 
market so the next step in the analysis is to present the framework that describes both 
the demand and supply functions of the participants in the insurance market. Assume 
further that there are only two types of entities in the insurance market, individuals 
who purchase insurance contracts and insurance companies that sell insurance 
contracts (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
 
Demand for Insurance Contracts 
Individuals purchase insurance so as to alter their pattern of wealth across the two 
states of nature; namely, no accident and accident states (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). 
Hence, individuals have pre-defined preferences between their wealth in the no 
accident and accident states. As individuals do not per se have control over which 
                                                     
121 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) indicate that an actual insurance contract may be far more 
complicated than their outlined framework dictates. An insurance contract may offer coverage against a 
vast array of potential losses. As the authors explain a formal generalization of the scheme can be 
achieved if one assumes that an individual will, in the absence of insurance, have an income of ௜ܹ if 
state ݅ occurs. An insurance contract is thus an array ሺߙଵ,… , ߙ௡ሻ	whose ݅-th coordinate describes the 
net payment of the individual to the insurance company if state i occurs (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
Hoy et al. (2003) attempt to extend the analysis by allowing the claim payment to reflect different 
coverage levels. But in fact Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) do not exclude this possibility within the 
outline of their framework and in any event their graphical analysis incorporates this feature.    
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state of nature that they will find themselves in122, they have to take a decision as to 
the level of wealth they prefer in either state. There exists a trade-off between the 
wealth in the no accident and accident states, which occurs as the person decides to 
purchase insurance (and at what coverage level) or not. To determine the demand for 
insurance contracts by individuals, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) employ the 
numerical utility of the type developed by von Neumann and Morgernstern (2007).123  
 
Nash (1950) uses of the concept of anticipation within an example to succinctly 
describe the idea of expected utility. In Nash’s example, an individual, Mr. Smith, 
anticipates an equal chance that he will receive a Buick or Cadillac motor vehicle the 
following day, which Nash (1950) describes as Buick anticipation or Cadillac 
anticipation. The outcome of which is to be decided by a simple coin toss. Nash 
(1950: 156) describes the individual’s anticipation “…as a state of expectation which 
may involve the certainty of some contingencies and various probabilities of other 
contingencies”. According to Nash (1950), the important property is that if ݌ is the 
probability of receiving the Buick (anticipation A) and ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ is the reciprocal 
probability of receiving the Cadillac (anticipation B) on that following day (where 
0 ൏ ݌ ൏ 1), then the combination of both individual anticipations is itself an 
anticipation represented by ܧሾܣ⋃ܤሿ ൌ ݌ܣ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܤ.  
 
The decision to purchase insurance by an individual is determined by considering the 
expected utility individuals derive from having insurance cover versus the expected 
utility they obtain by not purchasing insurance. Since one can assume that individuals 
attempt to maximise their expected utility, it follows that they will demand insurance 
only if their expected utility from purchasing an insurance contract exceeds the 
expected utility from not purchasing an insurance contract. The expected utility 
                                                     
122 Moral hazard is excluded from the analysis as it is a completely separate feature of insurance 
markets. If considered it would potentially contaminate the results of the analysis by preventing one 
from adequately separating the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition, one assumes 
that the principle of indemnification is applicable, as one does not assume individuals will have an 
opportunity to profit from insurance (speculate).   
123 Von Neumann and Morgenstern first published this applied utility framework in their book entitled 
the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
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theorem states under a few mild assumptions that an individual’s preferences for 
wealth in either state of nature can be described by a function of the form: 
 
Equation 3-8: Individual’s Expected Utility Function (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) 
ࢂ෡ሺ࢖,ࢃ૚,ࢃ૛ሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢖ሻࢁሺࢃ૚ሻ ൅ ࢖ࢁሺࢃ૛ሻ 
where	ࢂ෡	represents	the	expected	utility	function	of	an	individual,	࢖ represents	the	probability	of	
an	accident	occurring	and	thus	ሺ૚ െ ࢖ሻ	represents	the	probability	of	no	accident	occurring,	ࢁሺ∙ሻ	
represents	 the	 utility	 function	 of	 the	 individual	with	 respect	 to	wealth,	ࢃ૚	 is	 the	 individual’s	
wealth	in	the	no	accident	state	and	ࢃ૛	is	the	individual’s	wealth	in	the	accident	state. 
 
When an individual purchases insurance, their expected utility function can be 
described by Equation 3-9 and when they choose not to purchase insurance, their 
expected utility function by Equation 3-10. 
 
Equation 3-9: Individual’s Expected Utility Function under Insurance (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 
1976) 
ࢂ෡ሺ࢖, ࢻሻ ൌ ࢂ෡ሺ࢖,ࢃ െ ࢻ૚,ࢃ െ ࢊ ൅ ࢻ૛ሻ 
where	ࢂ෡	represents	the	expected	utility	function	of	an	individual,	࢖ represents	the	probability	of	
an	accident	occurring,	ࢃ	 is	 the	 individual’s	 initial	wealth,	ࢊ	 is	 the	 loss	suffered	by	 the	 insured	
should	the	insured	event	occur,	ࢻ૚	is	the	premium	paid	by	the	insured	for	insurance	cover	and	ࢻ૛	
is	 the	 payout	 received	 by	 the	 insured	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 claim	net	 of	 the	 premium	paid	 by	 the	
insured. 
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Equation 3-10: Individual’s Expected Utility Function under No Insurance (Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1976) 
ࢂ෡ሺ࢖, ૙ሻ ൌ ࢂ෡ሺ࢖,ࢃ,ࢃ െ ࢊሻ 
where	ࢂ෡	represents	the	expected	utility	function	of	an	individual,	࢖ represents	the	probability	of	
an	accident	occurring,	ࢃ	is	the	individual’s	initial	wealth	and	ࢊ	is	the	loss	suffered	by	the	insured	
should	the	insured	event	occur. 
 
From all the insurance contracts that are available to purchase, an individual will 
select the contract ሺߙሻ that maximises his or her expected utility. Note the model 
assumes that individuals can only purchase one insurance contract whereby the 
insurer specifies both the price and the quantity of insurance offered. A person does 
have the option not to purchase insurance. Therefore, an individual will only purchase 
insurance if	 ෠ܸ ሺ݌, ߙሻ ൒ ෠ܸሺ݌, 0ሻ.  
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) assume that all individuals are identical except with 
respect to the propensity of having an accident. In addition, individuals are assumed to 
be risk averse, their utility function with respect to wealth is concave and thus 
డమ௎
డௐమ ൌ ܷᇱᇱሺௐሻ ൏ 0.124 It is mentioned by the authors that ෠ܸ ሺ݌, ߙሻ would be a quasi-
concave function in this case.125  
 
If one assumes that the insurance market can be segmented into high-risk and low-risk 
individuals. High-risk individuals have a probability of having an accident ሺ݌ுሻ, and 
low-risk individuals have a probability of having an accident ሺ݌௅ሻ, where ݌ு ൏ ݌௅. ߣ 
represents the proportion of the total population that is high risk and ሺ1 െ ߣሻ 
                                                     
124A real-valued function ݂	defined on an interval is defined as being concave if, for any two points ݔଵ 
and ݔଶ in its domain ܦ and any ݄ in ሾ0,1ሿ, the following holds: ݂ሺ݄ݔଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݄ሻݔଶሻ ൒ ݄݂ሺݔଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݄ሻ݂ሺݔଶሻ. 
The function would be strictly concave if: 
݂ሺ݄ݔଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݄ሻݔଶሻ ൐ ݄݂ሺݔଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݄ሻ݂ሺݔଶሻ for any h in ሺ0,1ሻ and ݔଵ ് ݔଶ. 
125 A function is quasi-concave if the function is concave and has either no local maxima or at most one 
local maximum.   
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represents the proportion of the total population that is low risk, where 0 ൏ ߣ ൏ 1.126  
Another assumption by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is that individuals know their 
respective probabilities of having an accident, whilst insurers do not know the 
associated accident probability attaching to each individual. Under these 
circumstances, one reverts to the traditional adverse selection setting, where if 
everyone only revealed their risk status to the insurer, both groups of individuals 
would be better off. High-risk individuals impose an externality upon the low-risk 
individuals and this in turn makes low-risk individuals worse off. For instance, high 
risks would be eager to conceal their risk status in the hope that they will attract lower 
premiums. Now due to the information asymmetry, insurers are unable to distinguish 
between the high and low-risk individuals and therefore one option would be to 
charge a premium based upon a weighted average probability, ݌̅ ൌ ߣ݌ு ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݌௅, 
or a so-called pooling contract. But since the premium is not commensurate with each 
respective risk, low risks are likely to opt out of insurance as they would not be 
prepared to subsidise the high risks. To accommodate the two distinct risk classes, the 
expected utility functions described in Equation 3-9 and Equation 3-10 can be re-written 
as follows: 
 
Equation 3-11: Individual’s Expected Utility Function under Insurance (with two risk classes) 
ࢂ෡࢏ሺ࢖࢏, ࢻሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢖࢏ሻࢁሺࢃെ ࢻ૚ሻ ൅ ࢖࢏ࢁሺࢃെ ࢊ ൅ ࢻ૛ሻ, ࢏ ൌ ࡴ, ࡸ 
where	ࢂ෡࢏	represents	the	expected	utility	function	of	an	individual	who	is	either	a	high‐individual	
denoted	 by	 a	 subscript	ࡴ	 or	 a	 low‐risk	 individual	 denoted	 by	 a	 subscript	 ࡸ,	 ࢖ represents	 the	
probability	of	having	an	accident	for	an	individual	who	is	either	a	high‐individual	denoted	by	a	
subscript	ࡴ	or	a	low‐risk	individual	denoted	by	a	subscript	ࡸ,	ࢃ	is	the	individual’s	initial	wealth,	
ࢊ	is	the	loss	suffered	by	the	insured	should	the	insured	event	occur,	ࢻ૚	is	the	premium	paid	by	
the	 insured	 for	 insurance	cover	and	ࢻ૛	 is	 the	payout	 received	by	 the	 insured	 in	 the	event	of	a	
claim	net	of	the	premium	paid	by	the	insured. 
 
  
                                                     
126 It is not appropriate to allow ߣ ൌ 0 or ߣ ൌ 1, as this would imply that our cohort is either 
completely made up of only low-risk individuals or high-risk individuals respectively. Effectively, this 
would simply revert to the situation where one has a homogenous group with probability ݌ of having 
an accident.  
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Equation 3-12: Individual’s Expected Utility Function under No Insurance (with two risk classes) 
ࢂ෡࢏ሺ࢖࢏, ૙ሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢖࢏ሻࢁሺࢃሻ ൅ ࢖࢏ࢁሺࢃെ ࢊሻ, ࢏ ൌ ࡴ, ࡸ 
where	ࢂ෡࢏	represents	the	expected	utility	function	of	an	individual	who	is	either	a	high‐individual	
denoted	 by	 a	 subscript	ࡴ	 or	 a	 low‐risk	 individual	 denoted	 by	 a	 subscript	 ࡸ,	 ࢖ represents	 the	
probability	of	having	an	accident	for	an	individual	who	is	either	a	high‐individual	denoted	by	a	
subscript	ࡴ	or	a	low‐risk	individual	denoted	by	a	subscript	ࡸ,	ࢃ	is	the	individual’s	initial	wealth	
and	ࢊ	is	the	loss	suffered	by	the	insured	should	the	insured	event	occur. 
 
 
Supply of Insurance Contracts 
In terms of the supply side, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) note that the supply for 
insurance contracts is less straightforward to describe than the demand side. The key 
question is how do insurance companies decide exactly which insurance contracts to 
offer to individuals. Moreover, the return of an insurance contract is in fact a random 
variable, as an insurer can only make an assessment as to the expected cost of claims 
and as such objective risk is always present.127 The authors assume that insurance 
companies are risk-neutral, are only concerned with maximizing expected profits and 
are able (due to their financial resources) to sell any number of contracts that they 
think will make an expected profit. Therefore, to the insurer any insurance contract ߙ 
sold to an individual would be worth the following: 
 
Equation 3-13: Insurer’s Expected Profit Function for each ࢻ sold (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) 
࣊ሺ࢖, ࢻሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢖ሻࢻ૚ െ ࢖ࢻ૛ 
where	࣊	 represents	 the	 expected	 profit	 function	 for	 each	 insurance	 contract	 ࢻ	 that	 is	 sold,	 ࢖ 
represents	 the	probability	of	an	accident	occurring,	ࢻ૚	 is	 the	premium	received	by	 the	 insurer	
who	provides	insurance	coverage	to	the	insured	under	the	each	insurance	contract	ࢻ	and	ࢻ૛	is	
the	payout	to	the	insured	in	the	event	of	a	claim	net	of	the	premium	received	from	the	insured. 
 
                                                     
127 Objective risk refers to the difference between actual claims versus expected claims. 
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The insurance market is assumed to be competitive where free entry is evident.  With 
these set of assumptions, it is apparent that any contract which is demanded and that is 
expected to be profitable will be supplied (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). 
 
Further Assumptions 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) also outline a set of assumption regarding how 
individuals and insurance companies determine the accident probability, which is an 
essential element in both the demand and supply functions, described in Equation 3-8 
and Equation 3-13 respectively. A bold assumption is that individuals know precisely 
their accident probabilities, while insurers do not know the associated accident 
probability attaching to each individual. Hence, as the authors point out that since 
individuals are identical in all respects save their propensity to have accidents, it 
implies that insurance companies cannot discriminate among potential customers on 
the basis of their risk characteristics. Further, if one assumes that individuals can be 
segmented into only two risk classes; namely, high and low risks, it is important to 
note that insurers are believed to know the exact probability values for high and low-
risk individuals. To reiterate high-risk individuals have a probability of having an 
accident ሺ݌ுሻ, and low-risk individuals have a probability of having an accident ሺ݌௅ሻ, 
where ݌ு ൏ ݌௅. Moreover, insurers even know the proportion of high-risk to low-risk 
within the population. Where ߣ represents the proportion of the total population that is 
high risk and ሺ1 െ ߣሻ represents the proportion of the total population that is low risk, 
and 0 ൏ ߣ ൏ 1.The key element of information that insurers do not possess is the 
knowledge of exactly which individuals are high or low-risk. Insurers are able to 
generate a weighted-average probability of having an accident for the pool of 
individuals as a whole, ݌̅ ൌ ߣ݌ு ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݌௅, and insurers can then calculate a 
premium for the pooling contract based upon the weighted-average probability of 
having an accident. As already noted the premium computed in this way would not be 
commensurate with each respective risk, and thus low risks are likely to opt out of 
insurance as they would not be prepared to subsidise the high risks. With the low-risk 
individuals leaving the insurance market, the weighted-average probability of having 
an accident would increase since the proportion of high-risk to low-risk individuals 
rises concurrently. It is therefore conceivable that this would create a self-enforcing 
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cycle that continually discourages lower risk individuals to maintain their insurance 
coverage.  
 
The alternative is to offer a so-called separating set of contracts, one set for high-risk 
individuals and another for low-risk individuals. Seeing that insurers cannot 
distinguish between high and low-risk individuals, the idea is to offer contracts that 
through the selection by individuals end up revealing their true risk status. Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976) refer to this feature as the self-selection mechanism, as proposed 
by Salop and Salop (1976). The insurer is able to make inferences about an 
individual’s accident probability through the individual’s purchasing decisions. 
Holding all other factors constant, individuals with high accident probabilities will 
demand more insurance than those who have low accident probabilities (Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1976). Importantly, the self-selection mechanism is not a profitable method to 
determine an individual’s risk characteristics, because insurers have to offer less than 
full cover to low risk individuals to ensure that these contracts do not attract high-risk 
buyers, thereby foregoing potential premium income. Insurers utilise the self-selection 
mechanism in response to the failure of the pooling contract to provide cover for both 
high and low-risk individuals within a stable insurance market.  
 
Insurance companies would prefer to know their customers' individual risk 
characteristics to determine the appropriate terms under which they should offer 
insurance cover. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976: 632) indicate that: 
“Information that accrues after purchase may be used only to lock the barn after 
the horse has been stolen. It is often possible to force customers-to make market 
choices in such a way that they both reveal their characteristics and make the 
choices the firm would have wanted them to make had their characteristics been 
publicly known”. 
 
A further assumption made by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) considers that 
individuals can only purchase one insurance contract. In effect, it implies that insurers 
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specify both the price and quantity of insurance to be purchased (Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1976). This is perhaps a surprising assumption given that in most competitive 
markets, suppliers determine only price and have no control over the quantity of good 
that a customer wishes to purchase. It is equivalent to a person going to a local 
supermarket and wishing to buy twenty pints of milk, and the shop owner insisting 
that they can only purchase say five pints of milk. Naturally, this is an unlikely event, 
with the possible exception that a shop owner may want to limit quantities that can be 
purchased by each customer during a sale. By limiting, the quantities of an item that a 
customer may purchase, it effectively reduces revenue and thereby potential profits 
for the shop owner. Insurance is by its nature quite distinct from other traditional 
goods and services. Insurance is, as Arrow (1971) pointed out, an exchange of money 
now for money later contingent upon the occurrence of a certain event or events. 
Individuals do not demand insurance per se to meet an immediate specific need.  
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) defend their proposition of what they consider price 
and quantity competition in the insurance context as opposed to traditional price 
competition.  
 
Equilibrium Conditions 
The key feature of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is to examine whether or not a stable 
insurance market can form in the presence of information asymmetry (or imperfect 
information). To test whether this is indeed the case, the authors draw upon a 
methodology to formally test whether or not equilibrium in a competitive insurance 
market exists in the presence of imperfect information. Perfect competition is an ideal 
construct as many industries are characterised by a limited number of companies, 
entry barriers and other structural impediments including information asymmetries. 
Martin (1993) argues that perfect competition requires complete and perfect 
knowledge. Scherer and Ross (1990) discuss the concept of workable competition as a 
practical standard to evaluate the structure and performance of industries.128 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis holds within the context of workable 
competition and the characteristics of the insurance market include free entry, a large 
                                                     
128 It is accepted that workable competition exists when the structural characteristics of a market 
reasonably approximate the conditions for perfect competition (Scherer & Ross, 1990). 
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number of firms selling similar insurance contracts and no firm being able to affect 
the market price. 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) define equilibrium in a competitive insurance market, 
as a set of insurance contracts: such that when individuals: 
“…choose a contract to maximise their expected utility the following two 
conditions must hold (i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative 
expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that, if 
offered, will make a nonnegative profit” (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976: 633). 
 
The nature of the equilibrium proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is of a 
Cournot-Nash type, where insurers are assumed to be myopic.129 In other words, each 
insurer assumes that their actions are independent of their competitor’s actions 
(Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976; Hoy et al., 2003). Nash (1950) outlines the classical 
economic problem of a two-person bargaining or exchange situation that can be 
applied to other contexts, such as bilateral monopoly. Nash (1950: 155) sketches the 
situation where “…no action taken by one of the individuals without the consent of 
the other can affect the well-being of the other one”. He assumes that the two 
individuals are rational, they can accurately compare their satisfaction from different 
strategic decisions and they have perfection information concerning the tastes and 
preferences of the other individual. After a theoretical discourse, Nash (1950) 
                                                     
129 The Cournot-Nash Equilibrium is named after Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801 – 1887) and John 
Forbes Nash, Jr. (1928 –). Cournot was a French economist and mathematician. He was one of first 
individuals to successfully apply mathematics to economic questions. In 1838, Cournot proposed a 
version of the Nash equilibrium concept in his Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the 
Theory of Wealth (Schelling, 1960). But Nash can be ascribed with the formalisation of the properties 
that define an equilibrium in a bargaining context with two or more entities. 
John Nash is an American mathematician and 1994 winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences. His contribution within the areas of game theory, differential geometry and partial 
differential equations has been significant. In particular, Nash’s insights into the forces that govern 
randomness and the strategies that are employed within specific event spaces have drawn much 
acclaim. In 1950, Nash wrote a 28-page doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games, which formed 
the basis for a further four articles, and outlined the definition and properties of what is now referred to 
as a Nash equilibrium (Nash, Kuhn & Nasar, 2002). 
Cournot’s version of equilibrium considered the premise that firms determine their own output 
decisions based upon the expected profit maximisation motive. However, a firm’s optimal output 
decision depends upon the output decisions of competing firms (Schelling, 1960).  
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provides a solution to bargaining problems where “…two individuals who have the 
opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way” undertake some 
form of exchange (Nash, 1950: 155).130 In a game involving two or more players, 
where each player is believed to know the strategies of all the other players and if no 
player participating in the game has anything to gain by altering their own strategy 
unilaterally then the current set of strategic choices constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
Therefore, each strategy under a Nash equilibrium represents the best response to all 
other possible strategies within that equilibrium (Nash, 1950; Nash, 1953; Nash, Kuhn 
& Nasar, 2002). These ideas underpin the Cournot-Nash equilibrium proposed by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).  
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s first equilibrium condition stipulates that contracts in 
equilibrium have to generate positive expected profits, even if these profits are not 
actually realised. The second equilibrium condition considers insurance contracts 
outside of the equilibrium contract (or equilibrium set of contracts), if a contract 
outside of equilibrium exists that generates positive expected profits or at least breaks 
even, then this would represent a violation of equilibrium. 
 
Equilibrium with Perfect Information 
A useful starting point is to examine the situation where one has perfect information. 
This serves as a benchmark against which one can compare the situation of 
information symmetry against the situation where one introduces information 
asymmetry.  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) initially make the bold assumption that all 
individuals are identical even with respect to their probability of having an accident. 
By doing so, insurance companies are assumed to have perfect information about their 
policyholders’ probability of loss. Using historical claims experience and since all 
policyholders are identical, insurers can easily determine the probability of having an 
                                                     
130 According to Nash (1950: 155) a solution “…means a determination of the amount of satisfaction 
each individual should expect to get from the situation, or, rather, a determination of how much it 
should be worth to each of these individuals to have this opportunity to bargain”. 
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accident for the homogenous risk class. As the authors contend only when 
policyholders have different accident probabilities will imperfect information arise.  
 
The situation with perfect information is equivalent to the case where all individuals 
have different accident probabilities, but they reveal their true risk to the insurer. In 
this case, the insurer is able to classify all individuals according to their accident 
probability and thereby create homogenous risk classes. Each homogenous risk class 
would contain members with identical accident probabilities, which reverts to the case 
where one is considering equilibrium for a single risk pool with members having 
equal accident probabilities. Essentially, the insurance market splits into several sub-
markets for each different accident probability (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
 
Utilising Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s graphical representation one is able to test 
whether or not a Cournot-Nash type equilibrium exists under perfect information. 
Figure 3-2 depicts the situation where equilibrium is considered for a homogenous risk 
pool with members having identical probabilities of loss (information symmetry).  
 
Before explaining Figure 3-2, a number of points need to be noted. The horizontal and 
vertical axes represent states of nature defined previously – wealth in the no accident 
state ሺ ଵܹሻ and wealth in the accident state ሺ ଶܹሻ respectively. Any point within the 
Cartesian plane represents different combinations of wealth in the two states of nature 
– no accident and accident. In effect, it characterises a possible insurance contract 
with certain restrictions. The 45-degree line is important as it specifies the situation 
where the insured has equal wealth in both states of nature. It is precisely this feature 
of insurance that risk averse individuals seek – the principle of full indemnification.  
The principle of full indemnification states that after the loss-causing event has taken 
place, insurance coverage should place the insured in the identical financial position 
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that the insured was in prior to the loss.131 By implication, it also excludes the 
possibility of the insured profiting from insurance – for example, through speculation 
or over-insurance. Thus, all points along the 45-degree line represent the situation 
where the insured would have full insurance cover (complete coverage). Purchasing 
full insurance cover would place an individual on the 45-degree line thereby removing 
the uncertainty with respect to the pattern of wealth under either state of nature as the 
insured’s wealth is the same irrespective of whether or not an accident (loss event) 
takes place.  
 
 
 
The supply of insurance contracts is represented by the fair-odds line ሺܧܨሻ. Insurance 
companies attempt to maximise Equation 3-13 – the expected profit equation. But 
under Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s competitive market assumptions, in particular 
free entry, competitive forces within the insurance market ensure that policies bought 
in competitive equilibrium will have expected profits converging towards zero. 
Hence, Equation 3-13 can be re-written as follows: 
                                                     
131 The principle of full indemnification is a subset of the principle of indemnification. The principle of 
indemnification is defined as “the insured is restored to his or her approximate financial position prior 
to the occurrence of the loss” (Rejda, 1995: 22). With partial cover (incomplete coverage) the insured 
would not be fully restored to his or her financial position prior to the loss-causing event.  
Figure 3-2: Equilibrium with Perfect Information (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976)
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Equation 3-14: Insurer’s Expected Profit Function under Competitive Conditions – Expected 
Profit converges towards zero (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) 
࣊ሺ࢖, ࢻሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢖ሻࢻ૚ െ ࢖ࢻ૛ ൌ ૙ 
∴ ࢻ૛ࢻ૚ ൌ
ሺ૚ െ ࢖ሻ
࢖  
where	࣊	 represents	 the	 expected	 profit	 function	 for	 each	 insurance	 contract	 ࢻ	 that	 is	 sold,	 ࢖ 
represents	 the	probability	of	an	accident	occurring,	ࢻ૚	 is	 the	premium	received	by	 the	 insurer	
who	provides	insurance	coverage	to	the	insured	under	the	each	insurance	contract	ࢻ	and	ࢻ૛	is	
the	payout	to	the	insured	in	the	event	of	a	claim	net	of	the	premium	received	from	the	insured. 
 
Equation 3-14 suggests that the ratio of net pay-out on an insurance contract to the 
actuarially fair premium (pure premium) equates to the ratio of the probability of no 
accident to the probability of an accident taking place. Therefore, it follows that the 
fair-odds line describes all insurance contracts that if offered to individuals with an 
accident probability of ݌ would break even. Further from Equation 3-14, the slope of 
the fair-odds line would be given by  െ ሺଵି௣ሻ௣ ,132 that is it is equal to the ratio of the 
probability of not having an accident to the probability of having an accident.  
 
The graphical representation of the fair-odds line hides further insights, which 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) fail to adequately describe. Along the line ܧܨ, insurers 
offer insurance contracts the reflect the actuarially-fair premium for individuals with 
an associated accident probability of ݌. Thus, the slope of the fair-odds line reflects 
the inherent risk of the individual purchasing the contract if it is correctly specified, 
that is if the associated accident probability of the individual equals the probability 
used to determine ܧܨ.  
 
                                                     
132 By definition, the negative sign attaching to the slope of ܧܨ is traditionally ignored without any loss 
of generality. 
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For example, if ݌ ൌ 0.5 then the slope of ܧܨ can be computed as డሺாிሻడௐభ ൌ െ
ሺଵି௣ሻ
௣ ൌ
െ ଵି଴.ହ଴.ହ ൌ െ1. Now if individuals became more risky, assume say that their accident 
probability increases from 0.5 to 0.9 ሺ݌ ൌ 0.5 → ݌∗ ൌ 0.9ሻ. Then the slope of the new 
fair-odds line would equate to డሺாிሻడௐభ ൌ െ
ሺଵି௣∗ሻ
௣∗ ൌ െ
ଵି଴.ଽ
଴.ଽ ൌ െ0.111ሶ . Hence, the slope 
of the fair-odds line has become less negative (in essence the slope has become 
larger). This change would cause the fair-odds line to become flatter relative to the 
horizontal axis ሺ ଵܹሻ. In Figure 3-2, the fair-odds line ܧܨ would swivel towards the 
horizontal axis at the point ܧ. Therefore, the line ܧܨ′ would better reflect the fair-
odds line with new associated accident probability of ݌∗. Importantly, this highlights a 
key feature of the graphical representation of the fair-odds line, in that the flatter the 
fair-odds line the higher the risk of the individuals it is based upon. Conversely, if 
individuals became less risky, then the slope of the fair-odds line would become 
smaller (more negative), swivelling upwards at point ܧ. This would translate into a 
steeper fair-odds line, say ܧܨ′′ shown in Figure 3-2. Thus, a steeper fair-odds line 
implies a lower risk.  
 
Now as the slope of the fair-odds line reflects the risk of those individuals whose 
accident probability it is derived from, it follows that the actuarially premium is also 
reflected by the same fair-odds line with one important caveat. In fact, the flatter the 
fair-odds line, the higher the associated accident probability and the higher the 
premium charged to the insured per unit of coverage. Equally, the steeper the fair-
odds line, the lower the corresponding accident probability and the lower the premium 
charged per unit of coverage. Although, the premium charged under the insurance 
contract is reflected in the gradient of the fair-odds line, it also depends upon the 
degree of coverage afforded by the insurance contract. The coverage itself is 
intrinsically reflected in the relative position of the insurance contract to the 45-degree 
line and the initial uninsured state. In summary, all insurance contracts constructed 
along the fair-odds line ܧܨ, that is for individuals with an accident probability of ݌, 
charge individuals an actuarially fair premium based upon this precise accident 
probability for varying levels of insurance cover. Furthermore, these insurance 
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contracts are expected to break even as long as those individual purchasing the 
policies have the corresponding accident probability of ݌.  
 
In Figure 3-2, Point ܧ represents the initial endowment point or uninsured state. Thus, 
at point ܧ the person has no insurance cover. At ܧ individuals have wealth 
combination across the states of nature given by ሺ ଵܹா, ଶܹாሻ. Notice that the wealth in 
the no accident is significantly larger than the wealth in the accident state. As the 
individual is uninsured their wealth in the no accident state would simply be equal to 
ܹ, but if they had an accident their wealth is reduced by ݀, which is the financial loss 
suffered by the insured when an accident occurs. Therefore, ሺ ଵܹா ൌ ܹ, ଶܹா ൌ ܹ െ
݀ሻ. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) goes further to explain that as an individual 
purchases an insurance policy ൫ߙ ൌ ሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ൯ along the fair-odds line ܧܨ, wealth in 
either state of nature changes. Purchasing insurance requires the payment of the 
premium ߙଵ, the premium payment occurs irrespective of the state of nature (no 
accident or accident) and thus, wealth in both states of nature would be reduced. 
Movement away from ܧ and along the fair-odds line ܧܨ, reduces the individual’s 
wealth in the no accident state ሺ ଵܹ ൌ ܹ െ ߙଵሻ.  
 
In the accident state, despite paying the insurance premium and suffering the financial 
loss due to the accident, an individual’s wealth increases relative to the initial 
uninsured state of ܧ. This occurs because an individual can expect to receive a claim 
payment ߙොଶ from the insurance company once the insured-event takes place. Thus, the 
wealth combinations under either state of nature once insurance is purchased is given 
by ሺ ଵܹ ൌ ܹ െ ߙଵ, ଶܹ ൌ ܹ െ ݀ െ ߙଵ ൅ ߙොଶሻ. Recall the premium is a function of 
three variables; namely, the financial loss suffered by the insured when an accident, 
the accident probability and the proportion of cover afforded by the insurance policy. 
Therefore, ߙଵ ൌ ݂ሺ݀, ݌, ݎሻ, where ߙଵ ൌ ݌ݎ݀. ݎ is the proportion of cover afforded by 
the insurance contract in the case of a loss occurring and 0 ൑ ݎ ൑ 1 (Hoy et al., 
2003). When ݎ ൌ 1 the insurance policy affords full coverage and when ݎ ൌ 0 the 
insurance policy affords zero coverage. For a value between zero and one, this 
indicates that insurance policy affords the insured partial or incomplete coverage.  
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The claim payment itself is a function of the level of coverage purchased under the 
insurance contract. If full cover is purchased the claim payout under the policy should 
equate to the financial loss suffered due to the accident ሺߙොଶ ൌ ݀ሻ. Full coverage 
would occur where the person purchases a contract that lies at the intersection of the 
fair-odds line ܧܨ and the 45-degree line (at point ܨ). Recall at this point wealth in the 
no accident state and wealth in the accident state would be equal – adhering to the 
principle of full indemnification. When a person with an accident probability ݌ 
purchases an insurance contract at point ܨ, the wealth combination under each state of 
nature would be equivalent ሺ ଵܹி ൌ ܹ െ ߙଵ, ଶܹி ൌ ܹ െ ݀ െ ߙଵ ൅ ߙොଶ ൌ ܹ െ ߙଵሻ 
since ሺߙොଶ ൌ ݀ሻ. Note the fair-odds line cannot extend beyond the point ܨ as it would 
violate the insurance principle of indemnification. If one extended the fair-odds line 
beyond ܨ, it implies that individuals who purchase insurance contracts beyond ܨ are 
able to profit from insurance.133 Under these circumstances, the person’s wealth in the 
accident state would exceed their wealth in the no accident state. Therefore, an 
individual’s motive to prevent loss is diminished to the point where it is conceivable 
that they would in fact seek to cause an accident so as to profit from their insurance 
protection. Moral hazard would indeed be evident.  
 
In Figure 3-2, given perfect information insurers offer a set of insurance contracts 
along ܧܨ, as they attempt to maximise the expected profit equation (Equation 3-13). 
All insurance contracts along this fair-odds line ሺܧܨሻ if purchased would break even. 
In terms of the demand for insurance contracts, as previously discussed it is apparent 
that an individual’s decision to purchase insurance is driven by the motive to 
maximise their expected utility – as defined by Equation 3-8. Since the insurer 
determines both the price and quantity (level of coverage) the individual can purchase, 
the key decision left to the individual is to decide whether or not to purchase 
insurance. If the individual decides to purchase insurance, it is then possible to make a 
further decision by selecting the particular policy that maximises their expected utility 
out of the set of insurance contracts on offer. As already noted in Figure 3-2, the set of 
                                                     
133 This includes all insurance contracts that lie to the left of the 45-degree line. 
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contracts available to a person includes an infinite set of contracts along the fair-odds 
line ܧܨ, which includes point ܧ (the uninsured state – where the individual would 
choose not to purchase insurance) and point ܨ (full indemnification – the individual 
obtains full cover).  
 
To capture an individual’s motive to maximise their expected utility, Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) evaluate an individual’s preferences between wealth in the no accident 
state versus wealth in the accident state. In Figure 3-2, this is captured by the 
indifference curve തܸ , which slope is given by the marginal rate of substitution 
between wealth in the no accident state and wealth in the accident state (Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1976). Thus, the slope of തܸ  equals ܷ′ሺ ଵܹሻሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ܷ′ሺ ଶܹሻሺ݌ሻ⁄ . Importantly, 
the shape of the indifference curve തܸ  has meaning by reflecting the relative 
preferences between wealth in either state of nature. There is an indifference map with 
an infinite set of indifference curves that have the same shape as തܸ  – they are 
essentially “parallel” to തܸ  in either direction – each reflecting different combinations 
of wealth in the no accident state and wealth in the accident state.  
 
Along each indifference curve, the utility derived from each combination of wealth in 
the two states of nature offer the exact same amount of utility to the individual. Each 
successive indifference curve that is higher than തܸ  generates ever increasing utility 
than the wealth combination points along തܸ . Conversely, indifference curves that are 
lower than തܸ , attract lower amounts of utility for the individual. Considering that all 
individuals are identical including with respect to their propensity to have accidents, 
individuals have identical preferences with respect to wealth in the no accident state 
and wealth in the accident state. Hence, with perfect information all individuals’ 
indifference maps are identical.  
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) indicate that ߙ∗ in Figure 3-2 represents the equilibrium 
contract under perfect information. ߙ∗ is the proposed equilibrium contract under 
perfect information, if one considers that a risk averse individual seeks to maximise 
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their expected utility and this can only be achieved by starting at point ܧ (the initial 
endowment point and uninsured state) and moving along the fair-odds line towards ܨ 
by purchasing ever increasing amounts of insurance cover. Each successive insurance 
contract that affords greater cover allows an individual to move to a higher 
indifference curve reflecting greater expected utility. Therefore, the insurance contract 
at F ሺߙ∗ሻ allows the individual to reach their highest indifference curve given the 
available insurance contracts on offer (and in addition ߙ∗ is preferred to the uninsured 
state at point ܧ).  
 
Mathematically, the slope of the fair-odds line ܧܨ is equal to the ratio of the 
probability of not having an accident to the probability of having an accident ቀଵି௣௣ ቁ, 
while the slope of the indifference curve തܸ  is equal to  ܷ′ሺ ଵܹሻሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ܷ′ሺ ଶܹሻሺ݌ሻ⁄ . 
But by purchasing ߙ∗ at point ܨ, an individual obtains full cover whereby their wealth 
in the no accident state equals their wealth in the accident state, implying that the 
respective utility derived from this wealth is identical ⇒ ܷሺ ଵܹሻ ൌ ܷሺ ଶܹሻ ⇒
ܷ′ሺ ଵܹሻ ൌ ܷ′ሺ ଶܹሻ. Hence, the slope of the indifference curve തܸ  would revert to 
ቀଵି௣௣ ቁ, which is precisely the slope of the fair-odds line ܧܨ. By implication this can 
only occur where the two curves, the fair-odds line ܧܨ and the indifference curve തܸ , 
are tangential. This takes place at the point ܨ, that is at the insurance contract ߙ∗.  
 
It is not sufficient to accept that the insurance contract ߙ∗ is indeed the equilibrium 
contract without adequately testing the Cournot-Nash equilibrium conditions. The 
first condition requires that the equilibrium contract makes non-negative expected 
profits. Since ߙ∗ lies on the fair-odds line ܧܨ, it is based upon the accident probability 
݌ and thus the premium charged at ߙ∗ is the actuarially fair premium for individuals 
with an associated accident probability ݌. Further, ߙ∗ offers full coverage and 
therefore the premium attaching to the contracts reflects the “full” premium that an 
individual would pay to obtain full cover where their risk is reflected in the accident 
probability ݌. Now under perfect information, all individuals have the identical 
accident probability of ݌ and it is precisely an individual with the accident probability 
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݌ that would be purchasing such an insurance policy. Therefore, the insurance 
contract ߙ∗, which is offered by insurers and purchased by individuals will break 
even. The first condition is met.  
 
The second Cournot-Nash equilibrium condition requires that contracts outside of 
equilibrium do not generate non-negative expected profits. To test this condition 
requires slightly more thought. From Figure 3-2, consider two contracts outside of  
equilibrium; specifically, ߱ and ߠ. Looking at these two contracts it is possible to test 
whether or not these contracts would possibly disrupt our equilibrium contract 
contract ߙ∗. In the case of ߱, if individuals were to purchase this contract, insurers 
could expect to make positive expected profits and thus violate the second equilibrium 
condition. Insurers would make positive expected profits at ߱ if individuals purchased 
this contract because an individual purchasing this contract would have an accident 
probability	݌, but the policy ߱ would in fact be based upon a higher accident 
probability than ݌. Consequently, the computed premium rate attaching to ߱ would be 
considerably higher than the premium rate attaching to contract ߙ∗ as the fair-odds 
line ܧܨ′ passing through ߱ is much flatter than the fair-odds line	ܧܨ passing through 
ߙ∗. Thus, the insurance contract ߱ reflects a higher corresponding risk than the 
contract ߙ∗ dictates.  
 
The premium rate refers to the premium charged per unit of coverage. Whilst the 
accident probability is a key determinant in the premium calculation, the level of 
coverage is another important element. For example, based upon a particular accident 
probability, assume that an individual’s annual premium rate is equal to $0.05 per $1 
of insurance cover provided. Thus, for an insured item valued at $10000, an 
individual can expect to pay $500 per annum to have complete (full) coverage. 
However, if a deductible or co-insurance feature attached to the insurance policy, one 
would expect to pay a premium that was less than $500 per annum to reflect the 
incomplete (partial) cover being provided by the insurer. In the hypothetical example, 
it is important to note that the premium rate was unchanged, signifying that there is no 
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change in the risk profile of the individual purchasing the insurance policy simply 
because they are moving from complete coverage to incomplete coverage.  
 
In the case, of insurance policies ߱ and ߙ∗, it is evident that ߱ provides incomplete 
cover  (߱ lies to the south-east of the 45-degree line) and ߙ∗ provides complete cover 
(ߙ∗	lies on the 45-degree line). Thus, one might expect that the premium charged at ߱ 
would be less than the premium charged at ߙ∗. However, this inference would be 
misplaced, because the two contracts have very different associated risks. The 
respective accident probabilities corresponding to either contract are quite different 
and therefore, the premium rates are also dissimilar. Accordingly, it is quite 
conceivable that the overall premium charged at ߱ would be larger than the premium 
charged at ߙ∗. When compared to ܧܨ, ܧܨ′ reflects a higher associated accident 
probability than ݌, a higher corresponding premium rate and therefore a higher risk. 
An individual opting to purchase ߱ over ߙ∗  would effectively be over-charged by the 
insurer as the individual’s true risk is not being reflected in fair-odds line ܧܨᇱ.  
 
For the insurer, individuals purchasing ߱ over ߙ∗ would create an opportunity to 
generate positive expected profits, thereby violating the second equilibrium condition. 
Before arriving at that conclusion, it is necessary to ask the simple question: will 
individuals want to purchase ߱ over ߙ∗? The answer is categorically “no”. By opting 
for ߱ over ߙ∗, an individual would in fact be moving to a lower indifference curve, 
that is lower expected utility and this would contradict an individual’s motive to 
maximise expected utility. The reason why ߱ attracts a lower expected utility than at 
ߙ∗ is two-fold; first ߱ offers less than full cover and second the premium rate is 
significantly higher than at ߙ∗. An alternative way of looking at this can be obtained 
by carefully examining Figure 3-2. Movement from ߱ to ߙ∗ reduces the wealth in the 
no accident state as the overall premium charged by the insurer is significantly larger 
than at ߙ∗ (reflecting the higher associated risk). Moreover, the wealth in the accident 
state is also reduced at ߱ when compared to ߙ∗. This is due to the larger overall 
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premium that would still be paid at ߱ in the accident state and the drop in coverage 
experienced caused by moving from ߙ∗ to ߱.134  
 
Now consider the second contract outside of equilibrium ሺߠሻ. Individuals would 
prefer ߠ to ߙ∗, as they would be moving to a higher indifference curve and therefore 
experience greater expected utility. The reason for this would be because individuals 
despite experiencing a drop in coverage would pay a much lower premium rate (and 
overall premium). The fair-odds line ܧܨ′′, which passes through  ߠ is considerably 
steeper than the fair-odds line ܧܨ. Accordingly, the fair-odds line ܧܨ′′ reflects a much 
lower risk than the fair-odds line ܧܨ, and hence a lower probability of having an 
accident. From Figure 3-2, one can observe that the wealth in the no accident state at ߠ 
is larger than the wealth in the no accident state at ߙ∗, this is owing to the fact that the 
premium rate (and overall premium) being charged at ߠ is lower than the premium 
rate (and overall premium) at ߙ∗. In addition, the wealth in the accident state at ߠ is 
likewise larger than the wealth in the accident state at ߙ∗. Given the reduced coverage 
level at ߠ when compared to ߙ∗, which would translate into a lower payment from the 
insurer in the event of a claim, one might expect that under ߠ, the wealth in the 
accident would be less than the wealth in the accident state at ߙ∗. However, this is 
clearly not the case. The only possible explanation is given that an accident has taken 
place, the insured receives the lower claim payment (compared to the situation should 
an accident occur under ߙ∗) but at the same time pays a much lower overall premium 
under ߠ when compared to the situation at ߙ∗.  In essence, the lower premium 
‘offsets’ the lower pay-out received under the insurance policy	ߠ in the event of an 
accident. Therefore, at ߠ an individual experiences greater quantities of wealth in both 
the no accident and accident states than at ߙ∗. Undoubtedly, greater wealth in either 
state of nature would obviously translate into greater expected utility.  
 
Having established that individuals would opt for ߠ over ߙ∗, the key question to 
consider is whether or not ߠ will make positive expected profits or at least break even 
                                                     
134 The drop in coverage experienced by the individual moving from ߙ∗ to ߱ would translate into a 
lower claim payout under the policy should an accident occur. 
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as this would represent a violation of the second equilibrium condition. To answer this 
question one must consider the situation from the insurers’ perspective when 
individuals opt to purchase ߠ over ߙ∗. By selling ߠ, insurers would effectively open 
themselves up to making negative expected profits. The fair-odds line ܧܨ′′, which 
passes through ߠ, reflects a significantly lower risk than the risk attaching to 
individuals that would purchase ߠ. As a result the insurer would suffer greater than 
expected claims under ߠ, since the underlying probability of having an accident 
underestimates the true accident probability of those purchasing ߠ.  
 
In conclusion, if ߱ or ߠ  were offered to consumers, neither insurance contract would 
lead to non-negative expected profits. In the case of ߱, individuals would continue to 
prefer ߙ∗ to ߱, so no one would purchase ߱ and accordingly, it would not break even 
or generate any sort of expected profit. With respect to ߠ, individuals would opt for ߠ 
over ߙ∗ as it provides greater ‘consumption’ of wealth in both states of nature. But if 
insurers were to market ߠ to individuals with accident probabilities equal to ݌, ߠ 
would generate negative expected profits for the insurer.  As such, ߱	nor	ߠ would 
violate the second equilibrium condition.  
 
From the analysis of Figure 3-2, the contract ߙ∗ maximises the individual’s expected 
utility and breaks even (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). Furthermore, under perfect 
information, insurance contracts outside of equilibrium (selling any other contracts 
preferred to ߙ∗) do not violate the second equilibrium condition. Therefore, one can 
be satisfied that under perfect information equilibrium does exist – the insurance 
market will form.  The authors summarise the ‘ideal’ situation where one has perfect 
information, by stating that in equilibrium each individual who purchases insurance 
will do so at actuarially fair odds and obtain complete cover.  
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Equilibrium with Imperfect Information – Pooling Equilibrium 
The assumption that all individuals have identical risk profiles is unrealistic since no 
two individuals are identical and therefore individuals will have varying probabilities 
of loss. Hence, it is prudent to examine the more realistic situation where individuals 
face varying degrees of risk. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) segment the insurance 
market into two risk classes; namely, high and low risks. Low-risk individuals have a 
lower probability of loss than high-risk individuals, and accordingly should be 
charged a lower premium rate for insurance coverage than their high-risk 
counterparts. High-risk individuals are assumed to have a probability of having an 
accident ሺ݌ுሻ, and low-risk individuals have a probability of having an accident ሺ݌௅ሻ,  
where ݌ு ൏ ݌௅.  
 
Under these circumstances, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) argue that only types of 
equilibria can potentially exist: pooling equilibria where both high and low-risk 
individuals purchase the same contract and separating equilibria where high and low-
risk individuals purchase different contracts. The authors first consider the case for a 
pooling equilibrium. 
 
It is important to note that insurers are believed to know the exact probability values 
for high and low-risk individuals (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). In addition, insurers 
are assumed to know the exact proportion of high-risk to low-risk individuals within 
the population. Here ߣ represents the proportion of the total population that is high 
risk and ሺ1 െ ߣሻ represents the proportion of the total population that is low risk, 
where 0 ൏ ߣ ൏ 1. Absent from the insurers’ information set is the fact that insurers 
cannot identify which exact individuals are high or low-risk. Thus, when individuals 
present themselves to insurance companies in order to purchase insurance, insurers 
cannot distinguish between individuals belonging to either of these two risk classes. 
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Insurers are unable to distinguish between individuals with a high probability of 
having an accident (high-risk) and those with a lower probability of having an 
accident (low-risk). At the same time, individuals are thought to know their respective 
probabilities of suffering a loss. Under the pooling equilibria, the option available to 
insurers is to charge policyholders an average premium for insurance cover, where the 
average premium is determined using the weighted-average probability of loss and the 
proportions of high-risk and low-risk individuals within the total population. The 
result is that high-risk individuals end up paying a less than actuarially fair premium 
rate for insurance cover whilst low-risk individuals pay well-above their respective 
expected claims cost for the same level of cover.  
  
Insurers would compute the weighted-average probability of having an accident as 
follows: ݌̅ ൌ ߣ݌ு ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݌௅, and subsequently insurers would utilise the weighted-
average probability to determine the appropriate premium to charge the entire group. 
Considering that the premium calculated in this way would not be commensurate with 
the relative risk of either low-risk or high-risk individuals, one is likely to observe the 
low risks opting out of insurance as they would not be prepared to subsidise the high 
risks. With the low-risk individuals leaving the insurance market, the weighted-
average probability of having an accident would increase since the proportion of high-
risk to low-risk individuals rises concomitantly.  
 
The option to offer a single set of contracts to both high and low-risk individuals 
(pooling equilibrium) is considered by analysing Figure 3-3.  
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Figure 3-3: Pooling Equilibrium with Imperfect Information (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) 
 
Given the fact that one now has a segmented market with both high and low-risk 
individuals, the key difference between Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 is the observation 
that no longer does one indifference map fully describe the preferences between 
wealth in the no accident state and wealth in the accident state. It is necessary to 
describe a separate indifference map for each market segment that is a set of 
indifference curves for high-risk individuals and a separate set of indifference curves 
for low-risk individuals. In Figure 3-3, ܷு is a single indifference curve from the 
indifference map for high-risk individuals and ܷ௅ is a single indifference curve from 
the indifference map for low-risk individuals. 
 
The shape of each indifference curve has important implications for the nature of the 
risk of the group of individuals that it describes. In Figure 3-4, if one considers only 
low-risk individuals, the indifference curve ܷ௅ demonstrates quite clearly the trade-
off that exists between the wealth in the no accident state versus the wealth in the 
accident state. All points along the indifference curve ܷ௅ show wealth combinations 
in either state of nature that have exactly the same expected utility. The indifference 
curve ܷ௅ graphically summarises the preferences that low-risk individuals have 
between wealth in the no accident state and wealth in the accident state.  
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Movement from point A to point B in Figure 3-4 illustrates an important feature not 
discussed at length in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). A low-risk individual is willing 
to sacrifice a significant amount of wealth in the accident state just to obtain a small 
amount of wealth in the no accident state. Analytically, in Figure 3-4, | ଶܹ஺ െ ଶܹ஻| ≫
| ଵܹ஺ െ ଵܹ஻|. The may appear intuitively obvious as low-risk individuals are more 
likely to be in the no-accident state of nature than in the accident state of nature 
because of their lower probability of having an accident ሺ݌௅ሻ, and thus low-risk 
individuals would prefer to have most of their wealth concentrated in the no-accident 
state versus the accident state.  
 
Figure 3-4: Trade-Off between Wealth in the No Accident State and Wealth in the Accident State 
for a Low-Risk Individual 
 
 
To compare one can examine the case of high-risk individuals in Figure 3-5. Here 
high-risk individuals have a much flatter indifference curve (relative to the horizontal 
axis) than the low-risk indifference curve. Consider once again the movement from 
point A to point B. High-risk individuals would only be prepared to sacrifice very 
W2 
F
UL
UL
45o 
W1
E
ܹ1ܣ ܹ1ܤ 
ܹ2஺ 
A
Bܹ2஻ 
204 
 
little wealth in the accident state to obtain a great deal of wealth in the no accident 
state of nature. In this case, | ଶܹ஺ െ ଶܹ஻| ≪ | ଵܹ஺ െ ଵܹ஻|. Intuitively, high-risk 
individuals are more likely to be in the accident state of nature than in the no-accident 
state of nature because of their higher probability of having an accident ሺ݌ுሻ, and 
hence high-risk individuals would prefer to have most of their wealth concentrated in 
the accident state versus the no-accident state. 
 
Figure 3-5: Trade-Off between Wealth in the No Accident State and Wealth in the Accident State 
for a High-Risk Individual 
 
 
Emanating from this simple examination of the two distinct indifference curves for 
both low and high-risk individuals, one can conclude that the shape of the indifference 
curve captures the risk profile of individuals as they make choices between wealth in 
either state of nature. However, another feature inherent in the shape of the 
indifference curves that may be overlooked is the notion of risk aversion.135 In 
essence, if the indifference curves are meant to describe an individual’s preferences 
between wealth in the no accident and wealth in the accident, it surely also captures 
                                                     
135 Risk aversion may be described as the unwillingness of an individual to take on risk when faced 
with uncertain outcomes. Thus, the degree to which someone is risk averse translates into the degree to 
which they attempt to avoid risk. 
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the nature of the risk aversion of the individual as well. The difficulty occurs when 
one attempts to separate the effects of risk per se and risk aversion in determining the 
shape of the indifference curve. Some may argue that they are intrinsically 
intertwined.  
 
It is plausible to suggest that an individual who is extremely risk averse would display 
tendencies to protect wealth in either state of nature. Therefore, even though they 
might be low risk, their innate risk aversion may encourage them to trade larger 
amounts of wealth in the no accident state for ever smaller amounts of wealth in the 
accident state. Thus, the shape of the indifference curve for low-risk individuals could 
conceivably begin to mirror the shape of the indifference curve for high-risk 
individuals.  
 
Returning to Figure 3-3, recall because the insurance market is segmented into two risk 
classes; namely, high and low risks, one has two separate indifference maps for each 
risk class. ܷு is an indifference curve for high-risk individuals and ܷ௅ is an 
indifference curve for low-risk individuals. Furthermore, insurance companies as they 
are offering a single set of contracts for both risk classes, construct the pooling set of 
contracts based upon the weighted-average (or simply referred to as the average) 
probability of having an accident for the two risk classes combined. Therefore, the 
slope of the fair-odds line ܧܨ in Figure 3-3 is equal to ሺଵି௣̅ሻ௣̅ , which is the ratio of the 
probability of not having an accident for the entire risk pool to the probability of 
having an accident for the entire risk pool. Note since insurers decide to offer only a 
single set of contracts to both market segments (pooling equilibrium), a single fair-
odds line represents the insurance contracts offered to both high and low-risk 
individuals and is referred to as the true average fair-odds line. 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) argue it is simple to establish that there cannot be a 
pooling equilibrium where both high-risk and low-risk individuals are offered the same 
contract. If ߙ is designated as the pooling equilibrium in Figure 3-3. The argument put 
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forward by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976: 634 – 635) commences with the following 
statement: 
“If ߨሺ݌̅, ߙሻ ൏ 0, then firms offering ߙ lose money, contradicting the definition of 
equilibrium. If ߨሺ݌̅, ߙሻ ൐ 0, then there is a contract that offers slightly more 
consumption in each state of nature, which still will make a profit when all 
individuals buy it. All will prefer this contract ߙ, so ߙ cannot be an equilibrium. 
Thus, ߨሺ݌̅, ߙሻ ൌ 0, and ߙ lies on the [fair-odds] line ܧܨ (with slope ሺ1 െ ݌̅ሻ ݌̅⁄ )”. 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976: 635) go further to explain that: 
“…that at ߙ the slope of the high-risk indifference curve through ߙ, ܷு, is 
ሺ݌௅ 1 െ ݌௅⁄ ሻሺ1 െ ݌ு ݌ு⁄ ሻ times the slope of ܷ௅, the low-risk indifference curve 
through ߙ…The [indifference] curves intersect at ߙ; thus there is a contract 
ߚ…near ߙ, which low-risk types prefer to ߙ. The high risk prefer ߙ to ߚ. Since ߚ 
is near ߙ, it makes a profit when the less risky buy it, ሺߨሺ݌௅, ߚሻ ≃ ߨሺ݌௅, ߙሻ ൐
ߨሺ݌̅, ߙሻ ൌ 0ሻ. The existence of ߚ contradicts the second part of the definition of 
equilibrium; ߙ cannot be an equilibrium”.  
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s argument to explain the absence of a pooling 
equilibrium whilst accurate does not adequately utilise the graphical representation 
presented in Figure 3-3. First it is necessary to establish why ߙ is proposed as the 
pooling equilibrium contract. Individuals aim to maximise their expected utility from 
purchasing insurance and as they are risk averse they seek protection from financial 
loss. In fact, both high and low-risk individuals seek full insurance cover as this 
would remove uncertainty from the two possible state outcomes (no accident and 
accident states).  
 
Under imperfect information, it is now assumed that insurers do not have access to the 
exact risk status for each individual and therefore they can only determine the average 
premium for the entire population. Hence, insurers offer a set of contracts along the 
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fair-odds line ܧܨ with a slope equal to ሺଵି௣̅ሻ௣̅ , which is based upon the average 
probability of having an accident ݌̅. Thus, all available insurance contracts lie on the 
fair- odds line ܧܨ. Now it is not possible for both high and low-risk individuals to 
purchase an insurance contract that maximises their expected utility whilst 
simultaneously offering full coverage at ܨ.  
 
If one considers low-risk individuals, who attempt to maximise their expected utility 
by moving from point ܧ (the initial endowment point – uninsured state) upwards 
along the fair-odds line ܧܨ, they would not maximise their expected utility at point ܨ. 
By purchasing an insurance contract at point ܨ, low-risk individuals do not reach their 
highest indifference curve possible – there exist other points along ܧܨ that would 
result in low risk reaching a higher indifference curve than the low-risk indifference 
curve that is tangential at point ܨ. This can easily be observed if one considers low 
risk purchasing an insurance policy with less than full coverage, that is simply moving 
back downwards from ܨ towards ߮. As low risks select policies with ever decreasing 
levels of cover they would reach successively higher indifference curves until they 
reach point ߙ. In fact at some point between insurance contracts ߙ and ߮, do low risks 
reach their highest indifference curve possible amongst the set of possible insurance 
contracts. It is only once a low-risk individual opts for insurance contracts below 
point ߮ (and towards point ܧ) do they start to move onto lower indifference curves 
(compared to the indifference curves intersecting contracts ߙ and ߮) reflecting lower 
expected utility. The reason that point ܨ does not afford the low risk individual, the 
highest expected utility is quite straightforward. By purchasing full cover at ܨ, low 
risk individuals end up paying the ‘full’ premium (for full cover) but at a premium 
rate, which is significantly higher than their risk dictates. Hence, low risks suffer the 
greatest injustice at the point where they purchase full cover. Moreover, given that 
low risks would effectively subsidise the premium rate charged to high risk 
individuals136 through the pooling mechanism, they prefer to opt for an insurance 
policy with lower levels of coverage given that they are paying an inflated premium.  
                                                     
136 The premium rate charged to high-risk individuals is identical to the premium rate charged to low-
risk individuals under the pooling equilibrium. 
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At the same time high-risk individuals would most definitely prefer to purchase an 
insurance contract at ܨ out of all possible insurance contracts along the fair-odds line 
ܧܨ. At ܨ, high risks receive full cover but pay only a premium that is commensurate 
with the average risk of the population. Hence, the average premium rate that they are 
charged is low relative to their inherent probability of having an accident. By 
purchasing an insurance policy at  ܨ out of all possible insurance contracts that are 
available, high risks would reach their highest indifference curve possible and 
therefore maximise their expected utility. Every successive cut in cover that a contract 
below ܨ would afford to a high-risk individual would place a high risk individual on a 
lower indifference curve.  
 
However, since only a single contract is to be offered to both high and low-risk 
individuals under a pooling equilibrium, a compromise contract has to be arrived at 
whereby high and low-risk individuals are able to reach their best possible 
indifference curve simultaneously. This would occur at the intersection of the 
indifference curves ܷு and ܷ௅ in Figure 3-3. Therefore, the contract ߙ is proposed as 
the compromise contract that affords both segments of the markets the highest 
expected utility. 
 
To establish whether or not a pooling equilibrium exists, it is necessary to once again 
test if the equilibrium conditions hold. The first condition requires that the equilibrium 
contract makes non-negative expected profits. Since ߙ lies on the fair-odds line ܧܨ, it 
is based upon the average accident probability ݌̅ and thus the premium charged at ߙ is 
the actuarially fair premium for individuals with an associated accident probability ݌̅ . 
ߙ does not offer full coverage, the contract only offers partial (or incomplete) cover. ߙ 
is not on the 45-degree line and from Figure 3-3 one can observe that an individual’s 
wealth in the no accident state is larger than their wealth in the accident state. 
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If at the outset both high and low-risk individuals purchase ߙ, the accident probability 
that reflects the combined risk classes would be the average accident probability	݌̅. 
The true average fair-odds line ܧܨ is derived from precisely this average accident 
probability ݌̅. Insurance companies would break even as long as the individuals 
purchasing contracts along the true average fair-odds line ܧܨ have the combined 
average accident probability ݌̅. Therefore, the insurance contract ߙ, appears to break 
even as both high and low-risk individuals purchase it. Initially, the first equilibrium 
condition holds. 
 
The second equilibrium condition requires that contracts outside of equilibrium do not 
generate non-negative expected profits. To test if this condition holds, one can 
consider another insurance company introducing contract ߚ to the market. Contract ߚ 
represents a contract outside of equilibrium According to the assumptions underlying 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis, the insurance market is considered to be 
competitive with free entry. Thus, the introduction of a new contract by another 
insurer would not be unexpected. The underlying reason why another insurer would 
introduce contract ߚ to the market will become apparent momentarily.  
 
Low-risk individuals would prefer contract ߚ to ߙ, as they would move to a higher 
indifference curve and therefore, higher expected utility. The reason why low-risks 
would favour  ߚ over ߙ is because at ߚ low-risks would be charged at a premium rate 
that is much lower than the premium rate at ߙ. This can be seen in Figure 3-3 if one 
considers that there is a corresponding fair-odds line ܧܨ∗ that passes through ߚ. 
Assume that the associated accident probability used to construct the fair-odds line 
ܧܨ∗ is given by ݌∗. Therefore, the slope of the fair-odds line ܧܨ∗ would be given by 
ଵି௣∗
௣∗ . However, as the fair-odds line ܧܨ∗ is much steeper than the fair-odds line ܧܨ, it 
implies that the slope of ܧܨ∗ is smaller than the slope of ܧܨ. This would only be 
possible if ݌∗ ൏ ݌̅. Hence, the fair-odds line ܧܨ∗ reflects a considerably lower risk 
than the fair-odds line ܧܨ and thus, contracts along the fair-odds line ܧܨ∗ would 
charge a lower premium rate when compared to contracts along the fair-odds line ܧܨ. 
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Low-risk individuals would move to ߚ as it charges a lower premium rate, which is 
more in-line with their risk status and this is despite of the cut in coverage that would 
be experienced by moving from ߙ to ߚ. Lower premiums translate into higher 
expected utility as more wealth would be available in both states of nature. In other 
words, for low risks the cut in premium more than compensates them for the cut in 
coverage.  
 
High risks would remain at ߙ as the cut in premium would not be sufficient to offset 
the cut in coverage experienced. For a high risk individual that is more likely to find 
themselves in the accident state of nature when compared to a low risk individual, it is 
precisely the wealth in the accident state that they are perhaps more eager to protect.  
 
An important factor now concerns whether or not ߚ violates the second equilibrium 
condition. If one considers that the accident probability attaching to ߚ ሺ݌∗ሻ	is higher 
than the accident probability for a low-risk individual ሺ݌௅ሻ, that is ݌∗ ൐ ݌௅, then it is 
understandable why another insurance company would be interested in offering ߚ. 
The insurance company would recognise that contract ߚ would attract only the low-
risk individuals and since the premium at ߚ is based upon the accident probability ݌∗, 
it is essentially would be charging low-risk individuals too much relative to their risk. 
Hence, the insurance company would generate positive expected profits at ߚ. A 
contract outside of equilibrium is making non-negative expected profits, which 
violates the second equilibrium condition.  
 
In addition, as low-risk individuals move to ߚ, the high-risk individuals that remain at 
ߙ would cause the insurer to suffer negative expected profits, which would violate the 
first equilibrium condition – the equilibrium contract is making expected losses. This 
transpires because as the low-risk individuals leave ߙ, the true accident probability 
should rise to reflect the higher risk of the pool of individuals that remain at ߙ. 
However, ߙ’s premium rate (and subsequent premium) is determined by the average 
accident probability and in this case the individuals that are purchasing ߙ have an 
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accident probability ݌ு ൐ ݌̅. Thus, ߙ would start to generate losses for the insurer. It 
can therefore be seen that the presence of contract ߚ violates the second condition of 
equilibrium and further investigation reveals that the first condition of equilibrium is 
also violated as the proposed pooling equilibrium contract ߙ generates losses. 
Therefore, a pooling equilibrium as outlined in Figure 3-3 is unattainable. 
 
Equilibrium with Imperfect Information – Separating Equilibrium 
Considering that the insurance market is characterised by two risk classes; namely, 
high and low risks, insurers can choose to respond by rather marketing two separate 
sets of insurance contracts, one set for the high-risk individuals and the other for low-
risk individuals. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) posit that if there is to be an 
equilibrium, each risk type must purchase a separate insurance contract. Therefore, 
insurers would offer a set of contracts specifically for high-risk individuals, based 
upon their true probability of having an accident ݌ு. Thus, utilising Equation 3-14, the 
slope of ܧܪ would be given by ቀଵି௣ಹ௣ಹ ቁ, which is the high-risk probability of not 
having accident divided by the high-risk probability of having an accident. In Figure 3-
6, the fair-odds line ܧܪ describes a set of insurance contracts offering varying degrees 
of coverage, which will break even if and only if individuals that purchase policies 
along ܧܪ have accident probabilities ݌ு. Point ܧ represents once again the initial 
endowment point with no insurance coverage and ܪ represents full cover.  
 
Similarly, insurers would offer a set of insurance contracts specifically for low-risk 
individuals, based upon the low-risk accident probability ݌௅ (where ݌ு ൐ ݌௅). Thus, 
correspondingly, there would be a fair-odds line ܧܮ, with a slope of ቀଵି௣ಽ௣ಽ ቁ,  that 
describes all possible insurance contracts based upon the accident probability ݌௅ and 
as long as only low-risk individuals purchase insurance contracts along this line then 
insurance companies will break even.  
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Once again ܷு represents an indifference curve from the indifference map for high-
risk individuals that describes their preferences between their wealth in the no 
accident state ( ଵܹ) versus their wealth in the accident state ( ଶܹ). ܷ௅ is the 
corresponding indifference curve for low-risk individuals that describes their 
preferences between their wealth in the no accident state ( ଵܹ) versus their wealth in 
the accident state ( ଶܹ). 
 
 
 
Ignoring all other contracts, besides those that lie on the fair odds line ܧܪ, high-risk 
individuals starting out at point ܧ with no insurance would maximise their expected 
utility by moving towards ܪ. Hence, at point ܪ, ߙு represents the insurance contract 
that maximises their expected utility and offers them full cover as it lies on the 45° 
line. In addition, insurance companies would break even as individuals purchasing the 
contract have an associated accident probability ݌ு , which is exactly commensurate 
with their risk. Likewise if one considers only contracts along the fair odds line ܧܮ, 
low-risk individuals starting out at point ܧ with no insurance would maximise their 
expected utility by moving towards ܮ. Hence, at point ܮ, ߚ represents the insurance 
contract that maximises their expected utility and offers them full cover as it lies on 
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Figure 3-6: Separating Equilibrium with Imperfect Information (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) 
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the 45° line. Insurers selling ߚ to low-risk individuals would break even as the 
contract lies on a fair-odds line that is based upon the accident  probability ݌௅. 
 
Therefore, at the outset one might believe that the separating equilibrium pair of 
insurance contracts that would be offered to high and low-risk individuals would be 
ሺߙு, ߚሻ	. However, if these two contracts were marketed to both high and low-risk 
individuals, both groups of individuals would opt for contract ߚ, as high risk 
individuals would reach a higher indifference curve at ߚ than at ߙு. The reason being 
they would still have full cover at ߚ, but the premium that they would be charged 
would be much lower than the corresponding premium charged at ߙு – this is 
reflected in the fact the wealth in both states at ߚ is much greater than the wealth in 
both states at ߙு. The premium charged at ߚ is based upon the slope of the fair-odds 
line with a slope of ቀଵି௣ಽ௣ಽ ቁ, which reflects the risk for a low-risk individual and thus 
insurance companies would be charging too little to the high-risk individuals. In fact, 
as both high and low-risks are purchasing ߚ, the insurance company should be 
charging according to the average fair-odds line, with a slope of ሺଵି௣̅ሻ௣̅ . Hence, as 
insurers cannot distinguish between high and low-risk individuals (information 
asymmetry), if they marketed both contracts to high and low-risk individuals, there 
would be no to prevent high risks from purchasing ߚ and therefore, the insurance 
companies would be making negative expected losses. Thus, equilibrium condition 1 
would be violated, since no contract in equilibrium should make negative expected 
losses. Hence, the separating pair ሺߙு, ߚሻ cannot be the separating equilibrium. 
 
Insurance companies need to offer an insurance contract to low-risk individuals that 
will not attract the high risk individuals and thus as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976: 
636) indicate:  
“…[an] equilibrium contract for low-risk types must not be more attractive to 
high-risk types than αୌ; it must lie on the southeast side of Uୌ, the high-risk 
indifference curve through αୌ”.   
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Therefore, contract ߙ௅ meets that criterion, as it lies on the same high-risk 
indifference curve as αୌ and thus, high risks are essentially “indifferent” between the 
insurance contract combination ሺߙு, ߙ௅ሻ. It is important to note, that the low-risk 
individuals now have to settle upon a contract that no longer offers them full cover 
even though they are still charged a premium rate that reflects their risk, ߙ௅ will have 
a lower premium than  ߚ simply because at ߙ௅ they are only receiving partial cover. 
Moreover, low-risks have had to opt for a lower-indifference curve than at  ߚ, the 
reason being that the reduction in premium due to partial cover is not sufficient to 
offset the reduction in cover that low-risks have to endure.137 This establishes the 
proposed separating equilibrium pair ሺߙு, ߙ௅ሻ, whereby initially, at least, high-risk 
individuals would select contract αୌ and low-risk would opt for ߙ௅. The choice is 
indicative of Salop and Salop (1976)’s self-selection mechanism, where individuals 
through their choice of contract reveal the nature of their risk status.    
 
To establish whether or not the separating pair ሺߙு, ߙ௅ሻ	is in equilibrium, it is 
necessary to once again test if the equilibrium conditions hold. The first condition 
requires that both equilibrium contracts makes non-negative expected profits. Since 
ߙு lies on the fair-odds line ܧܪ, it is based upon the accident probability for high-risk 
individuals ݌ு and the premium charged at ߙு is the actuarially fair premium for 
individuals with an associated accident probability ݌ு. Thus, as  only high risks are 
purchasing ߙு, the insurance contract would break even. Low-risks would purchase 
ߙ௅ and as this lies on the fair-odds line ܧܮ with a slope of ቀଵି௣ಽ௣ಽ ቁ, it is based upon the 
accident probability for low-risk individuals ݌௅ and thus, the premium charged will be 
commensurate with that of a low-risk individual. Hence, ߙ௅ would also break-even. 
The first Cournot-Nash equilibrium condition holds.  
 
The second equilibrium condition requires that contracts outside of equilibrium do not 
generate non-negative expected profits. To test if this condition holds, one can 
                                                     
137 Note the premium rate per unit of cover is identical at both ߙ௅ and ߚ, since both lie on the same fair 
odds line and therefore, both are based upon the probability ݌௅ - the accident probability for a low-risk 
individual.  
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consider another insurance company introducing contract ߛ to the market as depicted 
in Figure 3-6. With contract  ߛ available, high risks would prefer ߛ over ߙு as they 
would reach a higher indifference curve implying greater expected utility. High risks 
move to a higher indifference curve at ߛ, because even they suffer a small decline in 
coverage (they would move away from the 45° line), the reduction in premium would 
more than compensate for the cut in cover.  The slope of the fair-odds line that goes 
through ߛ is steeper than the slope of ܧܪ, which implies a lower accident probability 
say ݌ఊ (where ݌ఊ ൏ ݌ு) and lower premium rate per unit of cover.  Low risks would 
also choose ߛ over ߙ௅. As they opt for ߛ over ߙ௅, they would experience an increase 
in their insurance coverage – ߛ is closer to the 45° line than their original choice ߙ௅. 
But they would be charged a much higher premium for two reasons. First, the increase 
in cover, ceteris paribus, automatically translates into a higher premium as they are 
effectively purchasing more cover. However, most importantly, the premium rate per 
unit of cover is higher at ߛ than at ߙ௅  and this is because the fair-odds line through ߛ 
is flatter than the fair-odds line through ߙ௅, implying that the accident probability is 
higher (݌ఊ ൐ ݌௅). Therefore, low-risks opt for ߛ over ߙ௅, since the increase in cover 
more than compensates them for the increase in premium. This indicated in Figure 3-6 
by the move to a higher indifference curve at ߛ.  
 
Does ߛ violate the second equilibrium condition? To answer this question one needs 
to consider where the true average fairs-odds line is situated. Since both high and low-
risk individuals are purchasing  ߛ, effectively you have the “average” or pooling 
contract, therefore, to break-even insurance companies would need to charge 
according to the true average accident probability ݌̅. Now if the true average fair-odds 
line, the line based upon the true average accident probability ݌̅  with a slope of ሺଵି௣̅ሻ௣̅ , 
is given by  ܧܨ as illustrated in Figure 3-6, that is below ߛ, then ߛ would make 
negative expected profits. Insurers would be charging both the high and low risk 
individuals (the average) too little for the risk profile they are representing. The fair-
odds line through ߛ is steeper than ܧܨ, implying a lower accident probability and 
thus, a lower premium rate per unit of cover than the true average fair-odds line ܧܨ. 
Hence, insurers would suffer losses at ߛ and the second condition would not be 
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violated – a contract outside of equilibrium must not make non-negative expected 
losses. Therefore, the pair of insurance contracts ሺߙு, ߙ௅ሻ would represent a 
separating equilibrium.  
 
However, if the true average fair-odds line is given by  ܧܨ′ as illustrated in Figure 3-6, 
above ߛ, then ߛ would make positive expected profits. Insurers would be charging 
both the high and low risk individuals (the average) too much relative to their 
combined risk. The fair-odds line through ߛ would be flatter than ܧܨ′, implying a 
higher accident probability and thus, a higher premium rate per unit of cover than the 
true average fair-odds line ܧܨ′. Hence, insurers would make profits at ߛ and the 
second condition would be violated, and ሺߙு, ߙ௅ሻ would not represent a separating 
equilibrium and thus, in this case the competitive insurance market will have no 
equilibrium, which implies no insurance market would form.  
 
Rothschild and Stilgitz (1976: 637) state the conclusion of their analysis as follows: 
“This establishes that a competitive insurance market may have no equilibrium”. 
In addition, Rothschild and Stilgitz (1976: 638) go further to suggest that: 
“…[one] of the interesting properties of the equilibrium is that the presence of 
the high-risk individuals exerts a negative externality on the low-risk individuals. 
The externality is completely dissipative; there are losses to the low-risk 
individuals, but the high-risk individuals are no better off than they would be in 
isolation”. 
 
The results of this analysis are disturbing because they imply a great deal of 
ambiguity. Depending upon where the true average fair-odds line is situated relative 
to the contract ߛ, will determine whether or not one will have a separating equilibrium 
and therefore, whether or not an insurance market will form. Furthermore, the analysis 
suggests that the greater the proportion of low-risk individuals to high-risk 
individuals, in other words the smaller the value of ߣ within the equation  ݌̅ ൌ ߣ݌ு ൅
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ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݌௅, the steeper would be the true average fair-odds line and therefore, the 
greater the likelihood that one would not have a separating equilibrium. 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s realise the serious implications of their analysis and 
thus they also test the robustness of the analysis with respect to a number of the 
assumptions. By simply modifying the Cournot-Nash equilibrium conditions to reflect 
Wilson (1976)’s notion of equilibrium, the ambiguity is removed and one does indeed 
arrive at a separating equilibrium.138   
 
Community Rating and Open Enrolment 
Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) argue that despite the prevailing belief that an 
insurance coverage reducing death spiral is a likely consequence of community rating, 
it is not necessarily the outcome that models of insurance markets would predict. 
Consider the two-state model described by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), when 
insurers are permitted to charge risk-based premiums, in equilibrium even though 
high-risk individuals (old and unhealthy) pay higher premiums, both high and low-
risk individuals (young and healthy) opt for full cover. Buchmueller and DiNardo 
(2002) indicate that the theory predicts two possible responses to the imposition of 
community rating.  
 
First, the market response would be a separating equilibrium in which lower-risk 
individuals purchase a lower level of cover (less than full cover). In this situation, 
low-risk individuals are worse off, but the number of individuals purchasing insurance 
remains unchanged. Therefore, there is no apparent death spiral in coverage. If the 
lower-coverage option is unavailable or unsustainable for a separating equilibrium, a 
second outcome would occur where low-risk individuals would exit the market 
implying the occurrence of the death spiral. An example of when this might occur 
                                                     
138 The Wilson (1976) equilibrium modifies the Cournot-Nash equilibrium conditions, by simply 
adding to the original conditions with the following proviso that if an insurance contract makes 
negative expected profits (losses) it is removed from the market never to return.  
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would be if regulations enforced a prescribed minimum benefit constraint.139 Likewise 
if young and healthy individuals view the reduced-coverage option as having no 
value, it could induce low-risk individuals to opt out of health insurance altogether. 
This may occur if they believe that they have access to free coverage through the 
requirement that public hospitals provide emergency care in the absence of payment 
(Buchmueller & DiNardo, 2002).  
 
Hence, Buchmueller & DiNardo (2002)’s analysis asserts that the introduction of 
mandatory community rating, such as that brought about with the promulgation of the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, generate two possible outcomes that can be 
empirically tested: 
 No death spiral – The number of individuals purchasing medical scheme cover 
does not decline and the age composition of covered individuals does not change, 
but health coverage is effectively reduced.140 Under this scenario, medical 
schemes offering more comprehensive medical scheme coverage will observe 
younger persons opting for lower coverage plans. Low-risk individuals do not 
abandon coverage altogether but rather purchase (cheaper) less complete coverage 
(Buchmueller & DiNardo, 2002). 
 A market-wide adverse selection death spiral – The number of individuals 
purchasing medical scheme cover would decline and there is an observable 
increase in the age of those individuals who have medical aid cover. At the same 
time the average benefits paid out per member would be expected to rise as the 
risk profile of members deteriorates. 
 
                                                     
139 This is indeed the case with medical schemes in South Africa where they are required by law to 
offer a prescribed minimum benefit (PMB) package to members. Recall PMBs entail a minimum 
package that must be offered by all schemes where beneficiaries are covered in full for a set of 
specified conditions with no limits or co-payments. Medical schemes may insist on the use of a 
contracted network of healthcare providers and formularies of drugs to manage the healthcare of 
members with these conditions. 
140 The reduction in health coverage would be detected by a greater utilisation of medical savings 
accounts, where individuals bear a greater proportion of their own risk, or simply a decrease in benefits 
(claims) paid out to medical aid members. 
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Neuhaus (1995) asserts that mandatory community rating in a competitive insurance 
market can lead to market instability and adverse selection against insurers. Therefore, 
the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 through open 
enrolment and community-rating is likely to induce adverse selection, unless medical 
schemes are able to respond by structuring benefit options that suitability discriminate 
against high and low risks. Medical schemes with a mature membership profile are 
particularly disadvantaged under community rating, since the cost of providing health 
insurance increases rapidly with a person's age. Therefore, Neuhaus (1995)’s analysis 
does support the necessity to introduce risk equalisation transfers amongst medical 
schemes through the Risk Equalisation Fund (REF). Under mandatory community 
rating, it is therefore urgent to facilitate risk equalisation transfers across medical 
schemes in order to address the cherry-picking of lower risks through careful 
manipulation of marketing activities and benefit options.  
 
3.2. Testing for the Coverage‐Risk Correlation 
 
Key to investigating the prediction of adverse selection within the medical scheme 
industry involves analysing the recent performance of South Africa’s medical 
schemes and to this end, it is apparent from the second chapter that contrary to the 
‘doomsday’ prediction, the new regulatory environment as epitomised by the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, has not led to the contraction of the medical scheme 
industry. Interestingly, the industry that has benefitted the most by the current 
regulatory environment appears to be the suppliers of private healthcare services. In 
particular, private healthcare providers have managed to take advantage of the fee-for-
service reimbursement system in the absence of adequate risk-sharing arrangements. 
 
Specifically, Spence (1978) alludes to the fact that not only can individuals differ in 
their expected cost that they impose upon the insurer, but they may also differ in their 
respective preferences for certain levels of coverage. According to the author, high 
risk individuals are more likely to place a higher value upon insurance coverage than 
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low risk individuals. Therefore, as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis suggests, 
in the presence of imperfect information, insurers can offer policies that vary in the 
amount of coverage and thereby, individuals can choose their level of coverage at 
different premium rates per unit of coverage. Spence (1978) explains that: 
“Thus individuals in an insurance market can differ in expected cost or risk to the 
insurer, and they can differ in their valuations of coverage. These two 
dimensions are often correlated. For example, with attitudes toward risk held 
constant, high risk people will have a higher expected cost to the insurer and 
place a higher value on insurance coverage than low risk people. We may then 
see a positive correlation between benefits and costs of coverage” (Spence, 1978: 
427). 
Therefore, a primary indicator often utilised empirically to detect the presence of 
adverse selection concerns the correlation between insurance coverage and risk. 
Adverse selection theory predicts that members who are known to themselves (but not 
to their medical scheme) to be high risk will tend to select higher levels of health 
insurance coverage (lower deductibles). Therefore, one would anticipate a positive 
correlation between health insurance coverage and risk.  
 
A positive coverage-risk correlation is not sufficient to confirm the presence of 
adverse selection as it is also a feature when moral hazard is present. Cohen and 
Siegelman (2010) emphasize that the coverage-risk correlation is not an exclusive 
predictor of adverse selection, but also an indicator within moral hazard theory. For 
example, under automobile insurance, an individual who purchases greater amounts 
of insurance coverage may be encouraged to be more reckless in their driving 
behaviour, which increases the likelihood of having an accident and claiming under 
the insurance policy. Hence, the insurance policy itself has altered the motive to 
prevent loss and thereby the probabilities (risk) upon which the insurance company 
has relied (Shavell, 1979). 
 
In spite of this, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) argue that the mere existence of the 
positive coverage-risk relationship is a necessary condition for adverse selection to be 
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present. Thus, the null hypothesis is that there is a positive coverage-risk correlation 
present within the South African private health insurance market. The absence of a 
positive correlation between coverage and risk is a sufficient condition for rejecting 
the presence of adverse selection.  
 
Insurance markets offer a relatively amenable setting for the empirical testing of 
adverse selection theory, due to the availability of adequate data (Cohen & Siegelman, 
2010). In many other contexts, where adverse selection occurs data, is often secondary 
and unverifiable. For example, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) mention that within the 
employment arena, an employee may have superior knowledge about their ability than 
the employer. Here even where a researcher may have full access to the employer’s 
employee performance reports, it may prove difficult to observe the quality of the 
employee’s work because their work is often combined with that of other employees 
to produce outcomes (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). In contrast, they claim that under 
insurance if a researcher is granted access to the insurer’s records, it is possible to 
assess the policyholder’s risk ex ante (when purchasing the insurance policy) and the 
realisation of the policyholder’s risk ex post (once a loss-causing event occurs). The 
insurer may not be privy to all of the information that is available to the policyholder 
at the time of the loss, such as the state of mind of the insured when an accident 
occurred. Nevertheless, it is possible to directly link the choice of coverage level to 
observable outcomes, such as the claims experience of the insured (Cohen & 
Siegelman, 2010).   
 
Empirical testing of the theoretical predictions under imperfect information has been 
carried out in various insurance contexts (Altman, Cutler & Zeckhauser, 1998; 
Chiappori & Salanié, 2000; Cardon & Hendel, 2001; Fang, Keane & Silverman, 2008; 
Finkelstein & Poterba, 2004; Puelz & Snow, 1994; Saito, 2006). The central approach 
to test the presence of adverse selection within these empirical studies was to examine 
the correlation between insurance coverage and risk (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). 
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Löfgren et al. (2002) also review a number of empirical studies that have tested for 
the presence of a coverage-risk correlation and find that the evidence for a positive 
coverage-risk correlation is mixed at best. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) argue that the 
one should not expect the question of whether a coverage-risk relationship exists to be 
answered in exactly the same manner (or to apply the identical methodology even to 
answer the question) in all insurance segments, lines or markets. Therefore, empirical 
studies that arrive at opposing conclusions should not be viewed as necessarily 
contradictory (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  According to the authors, empirical 
studies that have been informed by theoretical reasoning, provide ample reasons to 
expect the existence of adverse selection to vary across segments, lines and insurance 
markets. Factors such as the type of insurance product, individual purchaser’s 
characteristics, institutional and regulatory factors all effect whether adverse selection 
is likely to be present and if present, the extent to which adverse selection is pervasive 
within the specified insurance segment, line or market. 
 
3.2.1. Formulation of the Coverage‐Risk Specification 
 
As discussed previously, the key prediction of adverse selection theory is to observe a 
discernible positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk. Cohen and 
Siegelman (2010: 40) reiterate the common prediction as follows: 
“…policyholders who are known to themselves (but not to their insurer) to be 
high risk will tend to choose higher insurance coverage (lower deductibles); thus, 
coverage and risk are expected to be positively correlated”. 
The authors suggest that when insurers offer a menu of insurance policies, the 
coverage-risk correlation is expected to manifest itself in the tendency of high risk 
individuals opting for policies with more comprehensive cover (lower deductibles). If, 
however, insurers offer only a single policy, then the coverage-risk correlation would 
suggest that high risks are more likely to purchase insurance than low risks (Cohen & 
Siegelman, 2010). Furthermore, they emphasise that: 
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“…the prediction of a coverage–risk correlation implies that coverage will be 
correlated with risk, controlling for all relevant policyholder characteristics that 
are observable to the insurer” (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010: 44).   
According to Chiappori, Jullien, B. Salanié and F. Salanié (2006), the coverage-risk 
correlation is a fairly robust conjecture within the context of adverse selection and it 
does appear in a wide variety of insurance lines and markets. Therefore, throughout 
the many empirical studies that investigate the presence of adverse selection, the 
coverage–risk correlation has been the primary estimation mechanism within many of 
the studies’ empirical specification.   
 
If one has access to insurers’ individual policyholder data, the conventional way to 
test for the coverage-risk correlation is to run a regression with the following 
specification: 
Equation 3-15: Regression Specification for Testing the Relationship between Risk and Coverage 
(Cohen & Siegelman, 2010) 
࢘࢏ ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢼࢉ࢏ ൅ ࢽ࢏,࢑ࢄ࢏ ൅ ࢿ࢏ 
where	 ࢘࢏	 is	 a	 variable	 representing	 the	 ex	 post	 realisation	 of	 the	 ࢏࢚ࢎ	 policyholder’s	 risk,	 ࢉ࢏	
represents	the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder’s	choice	of	coverage,	and	ࢄ࢏	represents	a	࢑ ൈ ૚	column	vector	of	࢑	
characteristics	for	the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder	that	are	known	to	the	insurer	and	potentially	relevant	for	
classifying	the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder’s	risk.	ࢿ࢏	represents	the	residual. 
 
Equation 3-15 can be extended to include a measure for expected coverage as Dionne, 
Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) recommend. The inclusion of expected coverage can 
address the problems of non-linearities or misspecifications. It is possible to obtain 
expected coverage by estimating the choice of coverage equation.  In Equation 3-15, 
the left-hand side of the equation could be a continuous variable, such as the total cost 
of claims (benefits paid out); a dichotomous variable, such as the number of claims; or 
simply a dummy variable indicating whether or not a claim was submitted (Cohen & 
Siegelman, 2010).  
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An alternative approach suggested by Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000) is the 
bivariate model described in Equation 3-16  and Equation 3-17, where the two equations 
are estimated either simultaneously or sequentially depending upon the estimated 
correlation between the residuals from each equation (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). If 
the correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at a predetermined 
confidence level, then the two regressions should be estimated simultaneously. 
Otherwise, the two regression equations from the bivariate model should be estimated 
sequentially. If a positive correlation is found between the two residuals, this would 
be consistent with a positive coverage-risk correlation (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
 
Equation 3-16: Coverage Specification under Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000)’s Bivariate 
Regression Model (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010) 
ࢉ࢏ ൌ ࢌሺࢄ࢏ሻ ൅ ࢿ࢏ 
where	ࢉ࢏	represents	the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder’s	choice	of	coverage,	and	ࢄ࢏	represents	a	࢑ ൈ ૚	column	
vector	of	࢑	characteristics	for	the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder	that	are	known	to	the	insurer	and	potentially	
relevant	 for	 classifying	 the	 ࢏࢚ࢎ	 policyholder’s	 risk.	 ࢿ࢏	 represents	 the	 coverage	 specification	
residual. 
 
Equation 3-17: Risk Specification under Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000)’s Bivariate 
Regression Model (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010) 
࢘࢏ ൌ ࢍሺࢄ࢏ሻ ൅ ࣁ࢏ 
where	࢘࢏	 is	a	variable	 representing	 the	ex	post	 realisation	of	 the	 ࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder’s	 risk,	 and	ࢄ࢏	
represents	a	࢑ ൈ ૚	column	vector	of	࢑	characteristics	for	the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder	that	are	known	to	
the	 insurer	and	potentially	 relevant	 for	classifying	 the	࢏࢚ࢎ	policyholder’s	risk.	ࣁ࢏	 represents	 the	
risk	specification	residual. 
 
A further non-parametric test that Chiappori and Salanié (2000) suggest may 
overcome the relatively restrictive functional forms described in Equation 3-15, 
Equation 3-16 and Equation 3-17, is the non-parametric procedure based upon the ߯ଶ 
tests for independence. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) explain Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000)’s methodology, whereby they create 2௠ cells from ݉ exogenous dummy 
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variables. Under each cell, a 2 ൈ 2 matrix is generated from two dummy variables. 
The first being coverage, which is equal to 1 if high and 0 otherwise. The second 
being risk, which is equal to 1 if the policyholder has had at least one loss-causing 
event and 0 otherwise. The authors then test for independence of coverage from risk, 
conditional upon being in a particular cell (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
 
A limitation of the empirical investigation undertaken by this thesis is that only 
aggregated medical scheme data is available. Thus, it is not possible to utilise 
Chiappori and Salanié (1997, 2000)’s methodology. Equation 3-15, Equation 3-16 and 
Equation 3-17 are all specifications that are applied to individual data in order to test 
for the coverage-risk relationship. Although, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) criticise 
Dahlby (1983) and Dahlby (1992), for her utilisation of aggregated data to test for the 
coverage-risk correlation, it can be argued that without any loss of generality, it is still 
valid to employ aggregated data to ascertain the presence (or lack) of a coverage-risk 
correlation within insurance markets.  
 
Yes, it would certainly be beneficial to have full access to the individual data of all 
medical schemes within South Africa. In particular, data relating to the claims 
incurred (benefits paid out), coverage levels and contributions at the medical scheme 
member level. However, most importantly, the current regulatory framework that 
applies community-rating and open enrolment, immediately excludes any possibility 
of including characteristics that would be used to assess the risk of a medical scheme 
member or their beneficiaries. Therefore from Equation 3-15, Equation 3-16  and 
Equation 3-17 perspective,	 ௜ܺ, which represents a k ൈ 1 column vector of ݇ 
characteristics for the ݅௧௛ policyholder that are known to the insurer and are 
potentially relevant for classifying the ݅௧௛ policyholder’s risk become untenable for 
this study. In South Africa’s case, after the year 2000, the only two relevant 
classification variables would essentially revert to income and the number of 
dependents.  
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Moreover, medical schemes have been vehemently against disclosing any of their 
individual member data for fear of potential exploitation by other competing medical 
schemes. It is only since the proposed implementation of the Risk Equalisation Fund 
(REF) that individual medical scheme beneficiary data has been shared by medical 
schemes with the Council for Medical Schemes. Since the enabling legislation for the 
REF has not been enacted by parliament yet, the Council for Medical Schemes is still 
in the process of assessing the latest data that they have received from medical 
schemes. In any event, the Council for Medical Schemes has no intention of releasing 
the individual medical scheme data into the public domain and therefore, it is not 
possible at this stage to obtain individual medical scheme data within South Africa. 
Nevertheless, a test for the coverage-risk correlation is indeed possible within South 
Africa’s private health insurance sector; it merely requires some innovative 
reformulation of the empirical specification. Refer to Chapter Four for a detailed 
discussion relating to the empirical investigation undertaken by this thesis. 
 
3.2.2. Contradictory Evidence 
 
Despite the acceptance of the theoretical findings emanating from the seminal 
literature by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973, 1974) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
during the 1970s, it is only until the 1980s did the empirical testing of these 
theoretical findings get underway. Since then numerous empirical studies have tested 
for the presence of adverse selection in a variety of insurance segments, lines and 
markets. These studies include Puelz and Snow (1994), Altman et al. (1998), 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000), Cardon and Hendel (2001), Fang, Keane and Silverman 
(2008), Finkelstein and Poterba, (2004), and Saito (2006). Since the empirical studies 
have provided contradictory evidence as to the presence of the coverage-risk 
correlation, it is useful to examine a selection of these findings.  
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Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market 
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) note that in the automobile insurance market, three early 
studies suggested the existence of a positive coverage–risk correlation (Dahlby, 1983; 
Dahlby, 1992; Puelz & Snow, 1994), but these findings were challenged by 
subsequent research. Dahlby (1983) examined the impact of prohibiting statistical 
discrimination in the Canadian automobile insurance market. By simulating the 
impact of prohibiting statistical discrimination, in this case with respect to the gender, 
She finds that not only does society end up purchasing less insurance, but society pays 
more for insurance as well (Dahlby, 1983). Furthermore, Dahlby (1983, 1992) finds 
that females are not prepared to subsidise males (insurers can no longer charge males 
and females differential premiums ceteris paribus) and therefore, a significant portion 
of females are predicted to leave the voluntary collision insurance market. Dahlby 
(1983, 1992)’s empirical analysis suffered from aggregated data with respect to 
coverage (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Puelz and Snow (1994) utilised individual data 
and established the existence of adverse selection within the automobile insurance 
market. Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) criticised Puelz and Snow (1994) 
for failing to take nonlinear effects into account. Once nonlinear effects were 
considered, Dionne et al. (2001) found that there was no residual adverse selection in 
each risk class (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).141  
 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000)’s study of the French automobile insurance market 
failed to detect a positive correlation between coverage and risk. The study focused 
upon a relatively homogeneous group of novice drivers. The drivers within the study 
had between one and three years driving experience. In France, automobile insurance 
is sold in two broad categories: 
1. a mandatory contract covering only third-party liability; and 
2. a broader optional contract that also covers first-party losses to the policyholder 
and the policyholder’s vehicle, even if the policyholder is at fault.  
                                                     
141 Dionne et al. (2001)’s utilised a different dataset in their empirical analysis to the data utilised in 
Puelz and Snow (1994)’s study.  
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Although optional contracts come in a variety of deductible “flavours”, the authors 
managed to simplify the analysis by looking only at the choice between the minimum 
mandatory coverage and any type of expanded coverage (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). 
 
Most of the data utilised by the insurer to set premiums was available to undertake the 
empirical analysis. In addition, the choice of contract by each policyholder and the 
nature of the accident(s) for which the policyholder claimed coverage were also 
available. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) highlight the several variants of the coverage–
risk correlation estimation procedure that was undertaken by Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000), which included:  
1. estimating two independent probit specifications for the type of contract 
purchased and the probability of an accident, and then testing whether the 
residuals are correlated; 
2. estimating the two probit specifications as a bivariate probit and directly testing 
whether the estimated correlation parameter is zero; and  
3. utilising a variety of discrete non-parametric methods, based upon testing whether, 
conditional upon the values of the key explanatory variables, loss probability and 
type of coverage are independent of each other in contingency tables.  
 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000)’s results indicate that individuals that are more likely to 
submit claims (higher probability of having accidents) do not purchase more 
insurance (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
 
Richaudeau (1999) also examined the French automobile insurance market where the 
focus was upon the choice between basic third-party coverage and comprehensive 
insurance (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).142 The data included in Richaudeau (1999)’s 
                                                     
142 Comprehensive insurance includes cover for third-party liability plus damage to the policyholder’s 
own vehicle in at-fault situations. 
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study, consisted of detailed risk-classification variables143 for individual policyholders 
and their motor vehicles. There was also information concerning the total number of 
reported (and unreported) accidents for each policyholder. A probit regression was 
estimated to test for a positive correlation concerning the decision to purchase basic 
third-party coverage versus comprehensive insurance (Richaudeau, 1999). After 
controlling for the independent variables that explain the decision choice, the error 
term would be indicative of the individual’s riskiness. The subsequent step included 
using the risk measure as an explanatory variable in a specification seeking to explain 
the number of accidents in which the policyholder was involved in during a given 
year (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  Richaudeau (1999)’s results suggest that 
individuals who drive regularly are more likely to purchase comprehensive insurance 
even though they are not essentially higher risk. Even though this does not adhere to 
the traditional adverse selection definition, it should not be misinterpreted as 
insurance-induced risky behaviour - in other words the presence of moral hazard 
(Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). 
 
Cohen (2005) tests the theoretical predictions of adverse selection models using data 
from the Israeli automobile insurance market. In contrast with Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000)’s study, the author finds evidence that is consistent with the presence of 
adverse selection within this market. Utilising a similar methodology to Chiappori and 
Salanié (2000), the author finds no correlation between coverage and risk for novice 
drivers (those with fewer than three years’ driving experience) but does find a positive 
and statistically significant correlation for drivers with more than three years’ 
experience. The reasoning suggested is that as individuals gain driving experience 
they acquire knowledge of their risk type, which induces a positive coverage-risk 
correlation (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
 
New policyholders with driving experience also tend to possess superior knowledge 
over the insurer. Among these individuals, the average number of claims was 36 
                                                     
143 The number of miles driven per annum is an example of a risk-related variable that was included in 
the analysis. Refer to Richaudeau (1999) for a detailed list of the risk-related variables included in the 
study. 
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percent higher for those who select a low deductible as opposed to those that select 
the mean deductible (Cohen, 2005). It is argued that individuals that switch to a new 
insurer are disproportionately people with a poor claims history and they are inclined 
to under-report their past claims history when joining a new insurer (Cohen, 2005). 
This may suggest that new policyholders actively seek to select against their new 
insurer by pooling with policyholders that had better claims histories (Cohen & 
Siegelman, 2010). Cohen (2005)’s empirical results with respect to more experienced 
drivers do not suggest that one should expect to detect a positive coverage-risk 
correlation within the French automobile insurance market as studied by Chiappori 
and Salanié (2000). The author argues that the reason stems from the fact that French 
insurers share information about policyholders’ risks, while this is not the case in 
Israel. 
 
Another study by Saito (2006), this time analysing the Japanese automobile insurance 
market, concluded that there was only a weak and statistically insignificant positive 
relationship between the purchase of own-vehicle coverage and accident risk for both 
novice and experienced drivers. Utilising the bivariate probit estimation methodology 
as outlined by Chiappori and Salanié (2000), he uncovers a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between risk and the purchase of a zero-deductible policy 
(Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Moreover, the author finds that drivers in high-risk 
prefectures in Japan were not more likely to opt for zero-deductible or own-vehicle 
policies compared to those drivers in low-risk prefectures (Cohen & Siegelman, 
2010).  
 
Saito (2006) does identify an important caveat in relation to the findings of his 
empirical study. Although, he affirms that the robustness of his results have been 
carefully scrutinised, the empirical methodology is unable to address the situation 
where an individual has an accident, but simply does not claim under the insurance 
policy. The so-called “accident ≠ claim” phenomenon is likely to distort the accurate 
assessment of an individual’s risk. For example, an individual who may have a 
number of accidents and yet does not claim under their insurance policy, would 
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essentially appear to be a low-risk individual despite their obvious inherent riskiness. 
Therefore, one may be misled by the inaccurate assessment of risk that leads to a 
negative relationship between risk and the purchase of a zero-deductible policy. The 
author stresses that the “accident ≠ claim” issue cannot simply be disregarded, since 
data from the Japanese police department imply that this problem is not trivial. He 
highlights that the statistics surrounding the theft of motor vehicles in Japan indicate 
that, over four prefectures, the average percentage of cars stolen equated to 0.10 
percent during 1999 (11,411 cars were stolen out of a total of 11,880,389 cars), 
whereas the insurance data from Saito (2006)’s study demonstrated a much higher 
theft rate amongst insured drivers (0.22 percent or 67 cars were stolen out of a total of 
30,000 private-use cars). Hence, this implies that insured drivers are more likely to 
have their cars stolen, which is consistent with a positive coverage-risk correlation 
and thus, the predictions of adverse selection theory. 
 
Adverse Selection in the Health Insurance Market 
Adverse selection in the health insurance market has undergone extensive empirical 
investigation. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) reviews fourteen separate studies that 
analyse the tendency of higher risk individuals to select more generous benefit plans 
within the health insurance context. The empirical results from these studies all 
suggest the presence of some form of adverse selection (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). 
However, Browne and Doerphinghaus (1993), Buchmueller, Couffinahl, Grignon and 
Perronnin (2004), and Ettner (1997) do not find evidence of a positive correlation 
between coverage and risk. 
 
In their analysis of the premium differential across health-insurance plans; Altman, 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) find that adverse selection occurs within the health 
insurance sector as a result of low-risk individuals exiting from generous plans rather 
than high-risk individuals opting into the more generous plans. Altman et al. (1998) 
also coin an interesting term, namely, adverse retention: 
232 
 
“Adverse retention is the tendency for people who stay put to magnify cost 
differentials between plans, as they will if they differ in age and costs are more 
than linear with age” (Altman et al., 1998: 122). 
In Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998)’s examination of data from the Massachusetts Group 
Insurance Commission, they provide a compelling argument of intramarket selection. 
The authors examined the differences amongst employees, in particular, those 
employees that select more generous fee-for-service plans versus those that elect to 
enrolee in an HMO. They find that employees opting for the fee-for-service 
arrangements were more likely to suffer a medical event, such as having a heart-attack 
or a stroke, than their HMO counterparts.  
 
Cutler and Reber (1998) investigate the private employee health insurance provided 
by Harvard University. Harvard University elected to alter the structure of their 
healthcare plans; this was achieved by moving away from subsidising only their most 
generous plans and towards a fixed-dollar subsidy irrespective of the generosity of the 
plan selected by employees (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). This translated into an 
annual increase of approximately $500 to the cost of the most generous plans. Cohen 
and Siegelman (2010) suggest the positive coverage-risk correlation hypothesis was 
dramatically borne out. Cutler and Reber (1998) found that lower-risk employees 
abandoned the most generous plan. This was most evident in employees that left the 
more generous plans in favour of opting rather for the HMO option, as they were on 
average 4 to 5 years younger and had lower healthcare expenses than those who 
remained (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010).  
 
According to Saito (2006), the empirical findings against a coverage-risk correlation 
may be specific to the automobile insurance market. Indeed, he mentions that the 
empirical findings differ across various studies undertaken in other insurance markets. 
For example, Ausubel (1999) found evidence of the presence of adverse selection in 
the credit card market144, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) in the annuity market, and 
                                                     
144 Ausubel (1999: 1) examine “…the results of large-scale randomized trials in preapproved credit 
card solicitations for direct evidence of adverse selection”. 
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Barrett and Conlon (2003) in the health insurance market. Cawley and Philipson 
(1999) findings coincide with Saito (2006)’s results, where they found evidence 
supporting the absence of adverse selection in the life insurance market.  
 
Another important aspect that may influence whether or not adverse selection is 
present within insurance markets relates to the effect of rate regulation. Harrington 
and Danzon (2000) demonstrate that rate suppression in workers' compensation 
insurance results in an increase in the frequency and / or severity of employee injuries 
claims (Saito, 2006). As discussed previously, Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) 
argue that community-rating does not induce an adverse selection death spiral in the 
health insurance market. Therefore, according to Saito (2006) any investigation that 
attempts to test for the presence of a positive coverage-risk correlation should be 
undertaken with due regard for the similarities, nuances and differences across 
insurance lines and markets.   
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
Developments within South Africa’s medical schemes market do provide a unique 
opportunity to test the underlying implications of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s 
analysis whereby in a competitive market, the consequences of pooling heterogeneous 
risks classes can be explored. Community rating and open enrolment provide an 
opportunity to test the theoretical predictions emanating from the seminal literature by 
Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Spence (1973, 1974) and Wilson 
(1977), whereby information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection. The seminal 
literature predicts that where risk classification is restricted and price controls are 
enforced, adverse selection would cause the market to contract and potentially 
collapse (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
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A suitable procedure to detect whether adverse selection is present within the South 
African private health insurance sector is to determine if there is a positive coverage-
risk correlation. The existence of such a correlation is a necessary condition to detect 
the presence of adverse selection.  
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4 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS 
 
The chapter discusses the empirical methodology adopted by this thesis to test for the 
presence of adverse selection in the South African private health insurance sector. To 
determine whether a positive coverage-risk correlation does exist, a panel data 
estimation procedure is undertaken. In this chapter, the method of study and empirical 
findings are reported. Also, several reasons why one may find the absence of adverse 
selection in insurance markets are outlined.  
 
After the seminal work by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973, 1974), and Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976), considerable research has been devoted to creating models to test for 
the theoretical predictions emanating from adverse selection theory (Cohen, 2005). 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis as discussed in Chapter 3, demonstrate that 
in competitive insurance markets adverse selection may lead to the failure of 
insurance pools to form, as was the case in the United States where insurers did not 
offer insurance cover in so-called red-lined areas.  
 
It was in fact the perceived presence of adverse selection within the South African 
private health insurance sector after the deregulation that took place during the late 
1980s and early 1990s that was identified by the South African government as the key 
determinant in reformulating the regulation governing medical scheme business in the 
country (Reekie, 1999). Prior to the current regulatory environment, Doherty and 
McLeod (2003) argued that the application of the concept of risk-rating had a negative 
impact upon medical scheme coverage. According to Doherty and McLeod (2003), 
high risk individuals, such as the elderly and unhealthy, had their monthly 
contributions loaded as they represented a greater risk to the medical scheme. 
Moreover, medical schemes imposed life-long exclusions for pre-existing conditions 
and in certain cases, the elderly and/or unhealthy were simply excluded from coverage 
altogether.  
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Therefore, government believed that the deregulation of medical schemes had led to a 
deterioration in medical scheme coverage for precisely those individuals who required 
medical scheme cover the most – the elderly and unhealthy. As a consequence, the 
first-democratically elected government sought to correct, what in its point of view, 
was a manifestation of the negative effects of the adverse selection phenomenon 
within the South African private health insurance sector (Reekie, 1999). The 
reformulation of the regulation culminated in the implementation of the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and the accompanying regulations.  The stated reforms, 
more especially open enrolment and community rating, were touted by the 
government as necessary to address the undesirable effects of adverse selection.  As 
discussed previously, despite government’s misinterpretation of the concept of 
adverse selection, the question was never raised whether or not in fact adverse 
selection is indeed a feature of the South African private health insurance market.  
 
To apply the theoretical literature of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in constructing a 
suitable empirical specification to test for the presence of adverse selection, it is first 
necessary to establish that South Africa’s private health insurance sector is indeed 
competitive. This issue was addressed in Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.2.5) whereby the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was computed over the period 1993 to 2009. The 
results suggest that the medical schemes sector is sufficiently competitive. 
 
To empirically test for the presence of adverse selection within the South African 
private health insurance market, the specifications described in Chapter Three; 
Equation 3-15, Equation 3-16 and Equation 3-17, may all be desirable methodologies. 
However, all of these specifications represent methodologies that can be applied only 
to individual insured data in order to test for the positive coverage-risk correlation. 
But as the medical schemes data available for this study is aggregated, the empirical 
methodology undertaken by this study will draw upon the approach outlined by 
Dahlby (1983; 1992).  
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4.1. Data and Panel Structural Design 
 
To test for the presence of adverse selection, it is necessary to detect a positive 
coverage-risk correlation (Chiappori & Salanié, 2000). While not a sufficient 
condition to confirm the presence of adverse selection, it is nevertheless a necessary 
condition. Hence, the absence of a positive coverage-risk correlation is adequate to 
confirm the absence of adverse selection. Alternatively, it is possible to detect the 
presence of adverse selection by employing Akerlof (1970)’s Lemons Principle that 
implies that as if low-risks are driven out of the insurance market by the high risks, 
one would expect to observe a deterioration in the risk profile of those that remain 
behind in the insured pool. It is precisely this observation that will direct the empirical 
specification of this study. 
 
Data 
The data utilised for the empirical analysis was collected from the Council for 
Medical Schemes’ Annual Reports over the period 1993 to 2010. Due to the reporting 
cycle of the Council for Medical Schemes, the sample covers the period 1993 until 
2009 (inclusive). Each Annual Report published by the Council for Medical Schemes 
provides annual data concerning the operations of registered medical schemes within 
South Africa over a particular year. The data is disaggregated by registered medical 
scheme, which includes both open and restricted medical schemes. Some of the 
variables published in these reports include”: the total number of medical scheme 
beneficiaries, gross contribution income (risk and savings-related contributions), gross 
administration expenses, gross relevant healthcare expenditure (healthcare benefits 
paid to healthcare providers on behalf of medical scheme beneficiaries), year-end 
reserve position and the solvency ratio of for each individual medical scheme. 
 
Exempt (or Bargaining Council) medical schemes were excluded from the dataset, as 
the reporting of these schemes by the Council for Medical Schemes has been 
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inconsistent. In fact, the Council for Medical Schemes ceased reporting the detailed 
membership figures for these schemes from 2005 onwards. By the time the Council 
for Medical Schemes ceased reporting detailed membership data in relation to the 
exempt or Bargaining Council medical schemes, they only constituted just over 4 
percent of all medical scheme members. Therefore, they represent only a small 
fraction of the medical scheme population. In addition, since exempt or Bargaining 
Council schemes are exempt from certain provisions under the prior and current 
legislation governing medical scheme business, it is not appropriate to include them in 
the analysis as one would ostensibly be comparing “apples” with “pears”.  
 
With respect to the data contained within the Annual Reports published by the 
Council for Medical Schemes, it is important to note that there were changes in the 
registration status of certain medical schemes over the sample period – from exempt 
or Bargaining medical scheme to registered medical scheme. Therefore, medical 
schemes that gained registered status were included as part of the panel from the date 
(year) their registration was accepted by the Council for Medical Schemes. For 
example, medical schemes such as Transnet and Polmed that were previously 
classified as ‘exempt’, were given registered status from the year 2000 onwards.  The 
inclusion of these relatively large medical schemes coincided with the effective 
implementation date of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 (McLeod & 
Ramjee, 2007). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the once-off rise in 
membership figures that occur in 2000 due to this reclassification.  
 
In each year of the sample period, new medical schemes were registered, some were 
liquidated and yet others amalgamated with one another. Thus, it was necessary to 
correct the panel for possible ‘double-counting’.  Over the sample period there were a 
total of 234 individual medical schemes that were considered	ሺܰ ൌ 234ሻ, but it must 
be noted that not every medical scheme had the full complement of observations for 
each variable over the entire seventeen-year sample period (1993-2009) ሺܶ ൌ 17ሻ. In 
some cases, this was due to the entry, exit and consolidation of medical schemes; but 
in others it was simply a case of the failure by the medical scheme to report the 
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necessary data to the Council for Medical Schemes. Therefore, for estimation 
purposes the panel dataset is unbalanced. 
 
The following variables were utilised to construct the variables required for the panel 
estimation specification:   
 ID: represents a unique identifier for each medical scheme, which is required to 
adequately capture the cross-sectional individual-specific (medical scheme) 
aspects within the empirical estimation.  
 South African Consumer Price Index (CPIX) (excluding interest rates on 
mortgage bonds - CPIX): can be used to derive a measure of the annual consumer 
inflation rate. The CPIX was utilised to convert all the monetary series from 
nominal into real terms (relative to 2009 prices). 
 Total number of medical scheme beneficiaries (BENEF): represent the total 
number of registered medical scheme members and their dependents. This 
variable was utilised as a scale parameter, by which certain variables could be 
transformed to reflect the values per medical scheme beneficiary. 
 Total number of medical scheme members (MEM): represent the total number of 
registered medical scheme members. 
 Net Annual Contribution Income (or Gross Annual Risk Contribution Income) 
(NCONT): refers to gross annual contribution income less the contributions made 
towards medical savings accounts during that corresponding year. Gross annual 
contribution income simply refers to the contributions (premiums) paid annually 
by medical scheme members to registered medical schemes in return for medical 
scheme cover. These contributions include the non-risk contributions (savings 
contributions) paid into medical savings accounts on behalf of the medical scheme 
member. Since the savings contributions represent contributions made by medical 
scheme members to pay out-of-pocket healthcare expenses, they essentially do not 
represent a benefit that the medical scheme beneficiary receives as part of the 
“insurance” portion of their medical scheme cover.   
 Net annual claims incurred (NCLMS): Net annual claims incurred are the annual 
claims paid out to healthcare providers for services rendered to the medical 
scheme member or their dependents. Net annual claims incurred do not include 
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out-of-pocket expenses paid to healthcare providers from members’ medical 
savings accounts.  
 Gross annual administration expenses (ADMIN): refer to the annual 
administration expenses of operating the medical scheme, but they do not include 
broker fees, managed healthcare expenditure or the net income / (expense) on 
commercial reinsurance. 
 Solvency ratio (SOLVR): refers to the solvency ratio of a medical scheme. 
Regulation 29 of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 prescribes the 
minimum accumulated funds that need to be maintained by medical schemes 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2010). Accumulated funds refer to the net asset 
value145 of the medical scheme excluding inter alia funds set aside for specific 
purposes and unrealised non-distributable profits (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2010). Accumulated funds expressed as percentage of gross contributions, or 
solvency ratio, must be maintained at a minimum level of 25 percent.146  (Council 
for Medical Schemes, 2010). The solvency ratio provides an indication of the 
financial soundness and sustainability of a medical scheme (Council for Medical 
Schemes, 2010). 
 
To obtain the specific variables utilised in the empirical specification as described in 
Equation 4-8 and Equation 4-9, a number of adjustments were necessary. First, the 
variables NCLMS, NCONT and ADMIN series were deflated using the CPIX 
variable, so that the variables were inflation-adjusted, and thus, reflected real values 
as opposed to nominal values – relative to 2009 prices. To prevent an inherent bias 
appearing within the empirical model, specifically from the relationship between net 
contribution income and the total number of members, that purely stems from the fact 
that as more people join a medical scheme (an increase in the total number of medical 
scheme members) it will automatically translate into an increase in the value of net 
contribution income (new member’s contributions would augment current net 
contribution income) Therefore, it was necessary to modify the inflation-adjusted 
                                                     
145 Net assets refer to total assets of the medical scheme less total liabilities of the medical scheme. 
146 The minimum accumulated funds required to ensure that the solvency ratio is kept at the required 
level of 25 percent, is more commonly referred to as the reserves of the medical scheme (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2010). 
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variables (NCLMS*, NCONT* and ADMIN*), so that they reflected the average 
value per medical scheme beneficiary per month. Therefore, the transformations are 
described in Equation 4-1, Equation 4-2 and Equation 4-3. 
 
Equation 4-1: Bias Adjustment to Inflation-Adjusted Net Annual Claims Incurred 
ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ
∗࢏࢚
࡮ࡱࡺࡱࡲ࢏࢚ ൈ ૚ ૚૛ൗ   for ࢏ ൌ ૚,… ,ࡺ and  ࢚ ൌ ૚,… , ࢀ 
where	ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚	refers	to	the	net	claims	incurred	(in	real	terms),	per	average	medical	scheme	
beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm),	 	 for	medical	 scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	 time	࢚	 ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	
ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࢏࢚∗ 	refers	to	the	net	annual	claims	incurred	for	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	time	࢚	(in	real	
terms	–	2009	prices)	and	࡮ࡱࡺࡱࡲ࢏࢚	denotes	the	total	number	of	medical	scheme	beneficiaries	in	
medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	time	࢚.	 
 
Equation 4-2: Bias Adjustment to Inflation-Adjusted Net Annual Contribution Income 
ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ
∗࢏࢚
࡮ࡱࡺࡱࡲ࢏࢚ ൈ ૚ ૚૛ൗ   for ࢏ ൌ ૚,… ,ࡺ and  ࢚ ൌ ૚,… , ࢀ 
where	 ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚	 refers	 to	 the	 net	 contribution	 income	 (in	 real	 terms),	 per	 average	 medical	
scheme	 beneficiary	 per	 month	 (pabpm),	 for	 medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	
ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	 ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࢏࢚∗ 	 refers	 to	 the	 net	 annual	 contribution	 income	 of	 medical	 scheme	 ࢏	
observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	 (in	 real	 terms	 –	 2009	 prices)	 and	 ࡮ࡱࡺࡱࡲ࢏࢚	 denotes	 the	 total	 number	 of	
medical	scheme	beneficiaries	in	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	time	࢚.	 
 
Equation 4-3: Bias Adjustment to Inflation-Adjusted Gross Annual Administration Expenses 
࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ
∗࢏࢚
࡮ࡱࡺࡱࡲ࢏࢚ ൈ ૚ ૚૛ൗ   for ࢏ ൌ ૚,… ,ࡺ and  ࢚ ൌ ૚,… , ࢀ 
where	 ࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚	 refers	 to	 the	 gross	 administration	 expenses (in	 real	 terms),	 per	 average	
medical	 scheme	beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm),	 	 for	medical	 scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	 time	࢚	
ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࢏࢚∗ 	refers	to	the	gross	annual	administration	expenses	of	medical	scheme	
࢏	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	 (in	 real	 terms	 –	 2009	 prices)	 and	࡮ࡱࡺࡱࡲ࢏࢚	 denotes	 the	 total	 number	 of	
medical	scheme	beneficiaries	in	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	time	࢚.	 
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Given the three distinct regulatory regimes governing medical scheme business in 
South Africa it is appropriate to consider the inclusion of two separate structural 
breaks within the random-effects empirical specification (Equation 4-9). The first 
structural break ሺܦଵሻ is defined to occur in 1994, to distinguish between the pre-
deregulation regime, where medical schemes did not apply appropriate insurance and 
risk management principles, and thus, suffered consecutive underwriting losses and 
displayed poor solvency positions; and the Reekie (1999) inspired deregulation of 
medical scheme business covering the period from 1994 until 2000. Therefore, the 
second structural break	ሺܦଶሻ  is defined to occur in 2000, so as to capture the effect of 
the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998.147 Both structural 
breaks are believed to be fundamental, mutually exclusive, changes in the structure of 
the medical schemes industry. Thus, for the first structural break, ܦଵ is assumed to be 
zero prior to 1994, one from 1994 until 1999, and then reverts back to zero from 2000 
onwards. The second structural break ሺܦଶሻ is defined to be zero prior to 2000 and then 
one from 2000 onwards.  
 
Panel Data Methodology 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) refer to panel data as repeated measurements at different 
points in time on the identical individual unit, such as an individual or medical 
scheme. Panel data regressions attempt to capture both the variation over units, as in 
the case of conventional regressions examining cross-sectional data, and variation 
over time (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The standard errors of panel data estimators 
need to be adjusted since each time period of data is not independent with respect to 
the other time periods in the panel.  
 
Hsiao (2003) identifies a key benefit in employing a panel data estimation procedure; 
namely, it controls for individual (or unit) heterogeneity. By construction, a panel data 
                                                     
147 The Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 was only came into full force after January 2000.  
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specification implies that units (medical schemes) are heterogeneous (Baltagi, 2008). 
The standard specification for a panel data regression can described as follows: 
Equation 4-4: Standard Specification under a Panel Data Estimation Framework (Baltagi, 2008) 
࢟࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢄ࢏࢚ᇱ ࢼ ൅ ࢛࢏࢚  for ࢏ ൌ ૚,… ,ࡺ and  ࢚ ൌ ૚,… , ࢀ 
where	 ࢏	 refers	 to	medical	 schemes	 and	 ࢚ denotes	 time.	 Therefore,	 the	 subscript	 ࢏	 denotes	 the	
cross‐sectional	dimension	and	࢚	denotes	time‐series	dimension.	ࢻ	is	a	scalar	or	intercept	term,	ࢼ	
denotes	 a	 ࡷ ൈ ૚	 vector	 of	 slope	 coefficients	 	 and	 ࢄ࢏࢚	 is	 the	 ࢏࢚ࢎ	 observation	 of	 ࡷ	 explanatory	
variables.	࢛࢏࢚	denotes	the	disturbance	term	(Baltagi,	2008).	 
 
The most common panel data specifications use a one-way error component 
specification model for the disturbance term ݑ௜௧ and for this study it will be no 
different. Equation 4-5 describes the one-way error component specification for the 
disturbance term ݑ௜௧. 
Equation 4-5: One-Way Error Component Model for the Disturbance Term (Baltagi, 2008) 
࢛࢏࢚ ൌ ࣆ࢏ ൅ ࢜࢏࢚  for ࢏ ൌ ૚,… ,ࡺ and  ࢚ ൌ ૚,… , ࢀ 
where	ࣆ࢏	describes	the	unobservable	individual‐specific (medical	scheme)	effect	and		࢜࢏࢚	denotes	
the	remainder	disturbance	term	(Baltagi,	2008).	 
 
The distinction between fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) panel data 
models is often misleading because under both types of models, the ߤ௜ term that 
describes the unobservable individual-specific effects is viewed to be stochastic in 
nature (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). However, under fixed-effects models the ߤ௜ are 
assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated whereas the remainder disturbances 
ݒ௜௧ are independent and identically distributed ൫ݒ௜௧~ܫܫܦሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ൯ (Baltagi, 2008). 
Under FE models, the	ߤ௜’s are permitted to be correlated with the regressors ௜ܺ௧, 
which allows a limited form of endogeneity (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Moreover, 
the ௜ܺ௧ are assumed to be independent of the ݒ௜௧ ∀	݅ and ݐ (Baltagi, 2008). Baltagi 
(2008) argues that fixed-effects panel data models are therefore; more suitable when 
one is examining a specific set of individuals or firms, which is indeed the case in this 
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study where one is investigating all registered medical schemes in South Africa over 
the period 1993 and 2009.  
 
Under the FE framework, when ܰ is large, there tends to be too many parameters to 
estimate and as a consequence one loses a significant number of degrees of freedom 
(Baltagi, 2008). If one is able to assume that ߤ௜ is random, then the loss of degrees of 
freedom can be avoided. Under the random-effects panel data model framework, it is 
assumed that ߤ௜~ܫܫܦ൫0, ߪఓଶ൯, ݒ௜௧~ܫܫܦሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ and the ߤ௜ are independent of the ݒ௜௧. 
Furthermore, ௜ܺ௧ are assumed to be independent of both the ߤ௜ and ݒ௜௧ ∀	݅ and ݐ 
(Baltagi, 2008). He suggests that the RE model is an appropriate specification when 
one is drawing ܰ individuals (medical schemes) randomly form a large population. 
An example of this would be when one is conducting household panel studies, where 
ܰ is typically large and therefore and a FE model would lead to a significant loss of 
degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2008).  
 
The rationale behind a RE model is that, unlike the FE model, the variation across 
medical schemes is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables (or regressors) included within the model. Greene (2008) refers to this as: 
“…the crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the 
unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the 
regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not” Greene 
(2008: 183).  
Therefore, if one believes that the differences across medical schemes have some 
influence upon the net claims incurred (pabpm) then a RE would be more appropriate. 
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Testing for Stationarity 
Testing for unit roots in conventional time-series studies is now a relatively 
straightforward exercise, but testing for stationarity in panel data models does require 
additional considerations (Baltagi, 2008). Harris and Tzavalis (1998, 1999), Maddala 
and Wu (1999), Hadri (2000), Choi (2001), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003) and Breitung and Das (2008) have all made significant contributions 
in outlining appropriate methodologies to test for unit roots within panel data. Many 
of the tests for unit roots require a strongly balanced panel. Maddala and Wu (1999) 
and Choi (2001) propose an alternative Fisher-type test that does not require the panel 
dataset to be balanced, which precisely describes the nature of the panel dataset 
employed by this study.  
 
Levin et al. (2002) argue that individual unit root tests have limited power against 
alternative hypotheses and this is particularly the case in small samples (Baltagi, 
2008). Therefore, as cited by Baltagi (2008), Levin et al. (2002) propose that a more 
powerful unit root, where the null hypothesis for each individual time series within 
the panel dataset contains a unit root versus the alternative hypothesis that each time 
series is stationary. The suggested starting point for testing the hypothesis is given by 
the specification described in Equation 4-6, from which Augmented-Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests can be undertaken: 
 
Equation 4-6: Levin et al. (2002)’s Initial Specification to Test for Unit Roots in Panel Data 
Studies (Baltagi, 2008) 
∆࢟࢏࢚ ൌ ࣋࢟࢏,࢚ି૚ ൅෍ࣂ࢏ࡸ
࣋࢏
ࡸୀ૚
∆࢟࢏࢚ିࡸ ൅ ࢻ࢓࢏ࢊ࢓࢚ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚  for ࢓ ൌ ૚, ૛, ૜. 
where	࢟࢏࢚	describes	 the	designated	data	series	that	one	 is	examining	for	 the	presence	of	a	unit	
root.	࣋࢏	describes	 the	 lag	order	under	conventional	ADF	regressions	(Baltagi,	2008).	ࢊ࢓࢚	 is	 the	
vector	of	 deterministic	 variables	 and	ࢻ࢓࢏	 is	 the	 corresponding	 vector	 of	 coefficients	 for	model	
࢓ ൌ ૚, ૛, ૜.	The	models	are	defined	by	ࢊ૚࢚ ൌ ሼ∅ሽ,	ࢊ૛࢚ ൌ ሼ૚ሽ	and	ࢊ૜࢚ ൌ ሼ૚, ࢚ሽ	(Baltagi,	2008).	 
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Since the lag order of ߩ௜ is unknown, Levin et al. (2002) propose a three-step 
procedure to test their hypothesis (Baltagi, 2008). Maddala and Wu (1999), and Choi 
(2001) propose an alternative Fisher-type test for unit roots. Following Baltagi 
(2008)’s exposition, let ܩ௜்೔ be a unit root test statistic for the ݅௧௛ group as defined 
within Equation 4-6, and assume that as the time series observations for the ݅௧௛ group 
tend towards infinity ሺ ௜ܶ → ∞ሻ, then ܩ௜்೔ ⟹ ܩ௜, where ܩ௜ is a non-degenerate random 
variable (Baltagi, 2008).148  
 
Baltagi (2008) then define ݌௜ to be the asymptotic probability value of a unit root test 
for the cross-section ݅, that is  ݌௜ ൌ ܨ൫ܩ௜்೔൯, where ܨሺ∙ሻ is the distribution function of 
the random variable ܩ௜. From these assumptions, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi 
(2001) construct their Fisher-type test, which is given by the following specification:  
 
Equation 4-7: Fisher’s Inverse Chi-Squared Test Statistic to Test for Unit Roots in Panel Data 
(Maddala & Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001; Baltagi, 2008) 
ࡼ ൌ െ૛෍࢒࢔ሺ࢖࢏ሻ
ࡺ
࢏ୀ૚
 
 for ࢏ ൌ ૚,… ,ࡺ 
where	 ࡼ	 is	 Fisher’s	 inverse	 chi‐square	 test	 statistic	 for	 unit	 roots	 and	 ࢖࢏ is	 the	 asymptotic	
probability	value	of	a	unit	root	test	for	the	cross‐section	࢏	(Baltagi,	2008).	 
 
Equation 4-7 combines the ݌-values from all unit root tests of each cross-section ݅ to 
obtain the test for the unit root of the panel data. Baltagi (2008) note 
that	െ2݈݊ሺ݌௜ሻ~߯ሺଶሻଶ , therefore as  ௜ܶ → ∞ for finite ܰ, it implies that ܲ~߯ሺଶேሻଶ . 
Besides having the advantage of applying the Fisher test to unbalanced panel datasets, 
the Fisher test can utilise different lag lengths for in the individual ADF regressions 
                                                     
148 A non-degenerate random variable is a random variable that cannot be constant.  
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(Baltagi, 2008). A disadvantage of the Fisher test is that it does require Monte Carlo 
simulations to derive the corresponding ݌-values.149  
 
Hausman Test 
From the initial observations outlining the FE and RE panel data models, it is 
suggestive that a FE model is an appropriate specification for this thesis’ medical 
scheme panel dataset. The reason for this conjecture is that this study is considering a 
predefined set of medical schemes (all registered medical schemes in South Africa 
over the period 1993 and 2009) rather than a random sample from a large population 
of medical schemes. Nevertheless, there is a formal test that can be applied; namely, 
the Hausman test. The test is based upon Hausman (1978) and looks at the differences 
between the FE and RE estimators (Baltagi, 2008).  
 
Baltagi (2008) stresses that the interpretation of the Hausman test is far too often 
elegantly characterised by the rejection of the null hypothesis implying an acceptance 
of the FE specification over the RE specification. However, the author argues that one 
needs to also consider the testable restrictions implied by the FE specification as 
outlined by Chamberlain (1984) before one can accept the outcome of the Hausman 
test.  
 
Panel Structural Design 
To test for the presence of adverse selection within the South African medical scheme 
industry over the period 1993 until 2009, it will be necessary to employ Akerlof 
(1970)’s Lemons Principle that implies that if low-risks are driven out of the 
insurance market by the high risks, one would expect to observe a deterioration in the 
risk profile of those that remain behind in the insured pool. This is similar to the 
                                                     
149 Another limitation of the Fisher-type tests as proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001), 
is that these tests are designed under the assumption that the individual time series within the panel are 
cross-sectionally independently distributed.  
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mechanism employed by Dahlby (1983) to detect the presence of adverse selection 
within the Canadian automobile insurance market.  
 
Therefore, if adverse selection is indeed present within the medical scheme industry, a 
decrease in the total number of medical scheme members one would expect a 
corresponding increase in the net claims incurred per average medical scheme 
beneficiary per month (effectively the benefits paid out or the coverage provided by 
the medical scheme) holding all other factors constant.150 Hence, this empirical study 
proposes regressing net claims incurred (in real terms) per average medical scheme 
beneficiary per month ሺܰܥܮܯܵܣሻ on the total number of medical scheme members 
ሺܯܧܯሻ, net contribution income (in real terms) per average medical scheme 
beneficiary per month ሺܰܥܱܰܶܣሻ, gross administration expenses (in real terms) per 
average medical scheme beneficiary per month ሺܣܦܯܫܰܣሻ and the solvency ratio 
ሺܱܵܮܸܴሻ. Both a fixed-effects model and random-effects model has been estimated. 
Even though, the Hausman test suggests that FE model is superior to the RE model, 
the RE model is included as it captures the two structural breaks that were necessary 
to highlight the impact of the three distinct regulatory regimes. Before the estimation 
models were estimated, Fisher-type tests as proposed by Choi (2001) were run to test 
for unit roots (test for the stationarity) of the series included in the empirical 
specification.  
 
The empirical specifications for both the fixed-effect model and random-effects 
models are described by Equation 4-8 and Equation 4-9 respectively.  
 
  
                                                     
150 Note the total number of medical scheme members is proposed as a dependent variable in the 
empirical specification, since medical scheme members are effectively the decision-makers when it 
comes to electing to exit the medical schemes market or not.  
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Equation 4-8: Fixed-Effects Panel Data Specification to test for a Positive Coverage-Risk 
Correlation 
ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢼ૚ࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૜࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૝ࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚
൅ ࢛࢏࢚ 
where	ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚	refers	to	the	net	claims	incurred	(in	real	terms),	per	average	medical	scheme	
beneficiary	 per	month	 (pabpm)	 for	medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	 ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	
ࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚	denotes	the	total	number	of	medical	scheme	members	in	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	
time	 ࢚;	 ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚	 refers	 to	 the	 net	 contribution	 income	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	medical	
scheme	beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm)	for	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚;	࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚	
refers	 to	 the	 gross	 administration	 expenses	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	 medical	 scheme	
beneficiary	 per	 month	 (pabpm)	 	 for	 medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚;	 and	 ࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚	
denotes	 the	 solvency	 ratio	 of	 medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚.	 	࢛࢏࢚	 denotes	 the	
disturbance	term. 
 
Equation 4-9: Random-Effects Panel Data Specification to test for a Positive Coverage-Risk 
Correlation 
ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢼ૚ࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૜࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૝ࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚
൅ ࢼ૞ࡰ૚ ൅ ࢼ૟ࡰ૛ ൅ ࢛࢏࢚ 
where	ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚	refers	to	the	net	claims	incurred	(in	real	terms),	per	average	medical	scheme	
beneficiary	 per	month	 (pabpm)	 for	medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	 ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	
ࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚	denotes	the	total	number	of	medical	scheme	members	in	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	
time	 ࢚;	 ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚	 refers	 to	 the	 net	 contribution	 income	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	medical	
scheme	beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm)	for	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚;	࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚	
refers	 to	 the	 gross	 administration	 expenses	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	 medical	 scheme	
beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm)		for	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚;	ࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚	denotes	
the	 solvency	 ratio	 of	medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	observed	 at	 time	 ࢚;	ࡰ૚	denotes	 the	 first	 structural	
break	 that	demarcates	 the	pre‐deregulation	and	post‐deregulation	periods	 (at	 time	࢚ ൌ ૚ૢૢ૝);	
and	ࡰ૛	denotes	 the	 second	 structural	 break	 that	demarcates	 the	post‐deregulation	period	and	
the	post‐implementation	 	of	 the	Medical	Schemes	Act	No.	131	of	1998	 	 (at	 time	࢚ ൌ ૛૙૙૙).	࢛࢏࢚	
denotes	the	disturbance	term. 
 
In both, Equation 4-8 and Equation 4-9, the primary coefficient of interest is ߚଵ as it is 
the indicator of the presence of adverse selection. If ߚଵ ൏ 0 and it is statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level, the implication is 
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that an decrease in the total number of medical scheme members leads to an expected 
ߚଵ unit increase in the net claims incurred per average medical scheme beneficiary per 
month (effectively the benefits paid out or the coverage provided by the medical 
scheme) holding all other factors constant. Thus, confirming the presence of adverse 
selection. 
 
4.2. Empirical Findings 
 
Before undertaking the estimation of Equation 4-8 and Equation 4-9, it is necessary to 
test the panel for stationarity. Although, panel methods to test for unit roots and 
cointegration are based upon the time series derivatives of these tests, they 
nevertheless do require additional considerations as outlined previously (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009). In this study, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)’s Fisher-type 
test (based upon Augmented-Dickey-Fuller tests) is employed to test for unit roots in 
a panel data context.151 One is testing the null hypothesis that all panels within the 
dataset contain unit roots (that is they are non-stationary) against the alternative 
hypothesis that at least one panel is stationary. The results are presented in Table 4-1. 
 
  
                                                     
151 Refer to Equation 4-8 and Equation 4-9 for an outline of the specification, and refer to Maddala and 
Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) for a detailed exposition. 
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Table 4-1: Fisher-Type Unit-Root Test Results (based upon Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests)152 
Number of Panels  234 
Asymptotics  T୧ → ∞ 
ADF Regressions  1 Lag 
AR Parameter  Panel‐Specific
ܪ଴: All Panels contain Unit Roots 
ܪଵ: At least one Panel is Stationary  
  NCLMSA MEM NCONTA ADMINA  SOLVR
Inverse Chi‐Squared Test Statistic ሺܲሻ  384.4074* 700.2675** 282.0400 506.1093**  857.8220**
݌‐value  0.0414 0.0000 0.9880 0.0000  0.0000
Degrees of Freedom 338  340  338  340  338 
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™. * indicates statistical significance at the 95 percent 
confidence level (or 5 percent significance level), whilst ** indicates statistical significance at the 99 
percent confidence level (or 1 percent significance level). 
 
The results from Table 4-1 suggest that the null hypothesis that all the panels contain 
unit roots for each of the series (with the exception of	ሺܰܥܱܰܶܣሻ) is rejected at the 
95 percent confidence level ሺܰܥܮܯܵܣሻ and in certain cases even at the 99 percent 
confidence level ሺܯܧܯ, ܣܦܯܫܰܣ, ܱܵܮܸܴሻ. This implies that these series are all 
indeed stationary ሺܰܥܮܯܵܣ,ܯܧܯ, ܣܦܯܫܰܣ, ܱܵܮܸܴሻ. Despite adjusting for 
consumer inflation, the results in Table 4-1 suggest that net contribution income per 
average medical scheme beneficiary per month ሺܰܥܱܰܶܣሻ do appear to have a unit 
root for each of the 234 corresponding panels (the null hypothesis cannot be rejected), 
which is indicative of nonstationarity This may be indicative of the fact that net 
contribution income per average medical scheme beneficiary per month has 
consistently outpaced consumer inflation and in addition, annual increases in 
contribution income have far-exceeded those increases that would be suggested by the 
corresponding increases in net claims incurred. Once a time trend term is included in 
the Fisher-type test for the ܰܥܱܰܶܣ series, the Inverse Chi-Squared Test Statistic (ܲ) 
is equal to 409.26 with a corresponding ݌-value of 0.0047. Thus, the hypothesis of all 
panels containing unit roots would be rejected, implying stationarity.   
 
                                                     
152 Panel means were included, but a time trend and drift term were excluded from the estimation. 
252 
 
Before progressing with the fixed-effects estimation procedure it is useful to examine 
the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables, which are presented in Table 4-2. 
The variables take on values within the expected ranges, except perhaps in the case of 
the solvency ratio. Due to a few outliers, for example, a solvency ratio of 665.44, 
which implies that the medical scheme has a solvency ratio in excess of 66500 percent 
was not erroneous. For certain small medical schemes, their accumulated funds 
expressed as a percentage of gross contribution income, may indeed “exaggerate” the 
solvency position of the scheme.  
 
Table 4-2: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data Variables  
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          id |      2282    1355.585    420.7717       1001      11581 
        year |      2282    2001.671     4.86638       1993       2009 
        name |         0 
         mem |      2282    18217.13    53858.32          2     917580 
       benef |      2282    45684.02    129944.2          7    2041908 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       solvr |      2243    1.466461    17.95076      -1.27     665.44 
      nconta |      2278    707.1358    338.2774   .6635127   5967.875 
      nclmsa |      2268    643.8344    325.7581   .7880425    3880.09 
      admina |      2280    63.68664    120.3532          0   4328.769 
          d1 |      2282    .3540754     .478337          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          d2 |      2282    .5692375    .4952915          0          1 
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™. 
 
Now under a panel dataset, it is important to recognise that dependent and explanatory 
variables may potentially vary over both time and cross-sectional units (medical 
schemes). Variation over time or a particular medical scheme is referred to as within 
variation, whilst variation across medical schemes is referred to as between variation. 
A one-way FE model will only have explanatory power if each medical scheme’s net 
claims incurred (pabpm) above or below the medical scheme’s mean value for net 
claims incurred (pabpm) is significantly correlated with the medical scheme’s 
explanatory variables values above or below the medical scheme’s vector of mean 
values for the explanatory variables. It is precisely for this reason, that it is termed the 
within estimator, since it depends upon the variation within the unit (medical scheme). 
If a coefficient of a regressor with little within variation will be imprecisely estimated 
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and if at the extreme, there no within variation it will not be identified at all.  
Therefore, any characteristic that does not vary over time for each medical scheme 
should not be included in the model. Before progressing with the fixed-effects and 
random-effects estimation, it is necessary to examine the relative importance of within 
variation and between variation of a variable. These results are presented in Table 4-3 
for the relevant variables utilised in the estimation models. 
 
Table 4-3: Summary of within and between variation for a Selection of the Panel Data Variables 
utilised in both the FE and RE Estimation Models153 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
nclmsa   overall |  643.8344   325.7581   .7880425    3880.09 |     N =    2268 
         between |              246.907   42.01705   2157.237 |     n =     234 
         within  |             218.3928  -799.0138   3898.539 | T-bar = 9.69231 
                 |                                            | 
mem      overall |  18217.13   53858.32          2     917580 |     N =    2282 
         between |             38728.12       16.5   442242.8 |     n =     234 
         within  |             28872.78  -422802.7   493554.3 | T-bar = 9.75214 
                 |                                            | 
nconta   overall |  707.1358   338.2774   .6635127   5967.875 |     N =    2278 
         between |             241.7246   54.61786   1412.789 |     n =     234 
         within  |             243.3142   -500.964   5650.381 | T-bar = 9.73504 
                 |                                            | 
admina   overall |  63.68664   120.3532          0   4328.769 |     N =    2280 
         between |             60.92193          0   684.3386 |     n =     234 
         within  |             108.2964  -618.1652   3708.117 | T-bar = 9.74359 
                 |                                            | 
solvr    overall |  1.466461   17.95076      -1.27     665.44 |     N =    2243 
         between |             13.33038   -.266225   191.3691 |     n =     234 
         within  |             12.92185  -163.1143   475.5374 | T-bar = 9.58547 
                 |                                            | 
d1       overall |  .3540754    .478337          0          1 |     N =    2282 
         between |             .2644329          0          1 |     n =     234 
         within  |             .4396969   -.479258   1.263166 | T-bar = 9.75214 
                 |                                            | 
d2       overall |  .5692375   .4952915          0          1 |     N =    2282 
         between |             .3394262          0          1 |     n =     234 
         within  |             .4306384  -.3398534    1.42638 | T-bar = 9.75214  
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™. 
 
 
Time-invariant regressors would have a zero within variation and individual-invariant 
regressors would have zero between variation. Only the regressors ܯܧܯ and ܱܵܮܸܴ, 
have more variation across medical schemes (between variation) than over time 
(within variation), so within estimation may lead to some efficiency loss.  
 
                                                     
153 Note Stata™ uses lowercase	݊ to denote the number of medical schemes and uppercase ܰ to denote 
the total number of individual-time observations. 
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The estimation results for the one-way fixed-effects panel specification (Equation 4-8) 
are presented in Table 4-4. Additional diagnostic tests were run on the FE 
specification, to test for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Serial correlation is 
typically not a problem with panels that have short time horizons (in this case ܶ ൌ
17). From the residual plots there is no discernible indication that autocorrelation is 
present. The regression results are robust and do not appear to suffer from any 
misspecification bias. Weak form multicollinearity between the variables ܯܧܯ, 
ܰܥܱܰܶܣ and ܣܦܯܫܰܣ was uncovered. This is likely the result of the 
transformation, whereby both net contribution income and gross administration 
expenses were divided by the total number of medical scheme beneficiaries to obtain 
the relevant explanatory variables	ܰܥܱܰܶܣ and ܣܦܯܫܰܣ. 
 
Table 4-4: Regression Output - Fixed-Effects Model 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2230 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       234 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5797                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.7635                                        avg =       9.5 
       overall = 0.6683                                        max =        17 
 
                                                F(4,1992)          =    686.86 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2744                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      nclmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         mem |  -.0000105   .0001151    -0.09   0.927    -.0002362    .0002151 
      nconta |   .6884398   .0137345    50.12   0.000     .6615044    .7153752 
      admina |  -.0564018   .0465238    -1.21   0.226    -.1476421    .0348385 
       solvr |  -.1268806   .2648344    -0.48   0.632    -.6462621    .3925008 
       _cons |   162.5896   9.918471    16.39   0.000      143.138    182.0413 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  130.52776 
     sigma_e |   149.3946 
         rho |  .43290455   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(233, 1992) =     6.34           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™ . 
 
The regression results in Table 4-4 indicate that the standard deviation of the 
individual effect ሺߤ௜ሻ (from Equation 4-5) is reflected in the Stata™ output by the 
value for sigma_u, which in this case equates to 130.52776. sigma_e gives value of 
the standard deviation of the remainder disturbance term (or idiosyncratic error), 
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which is equal to 149.3946. In Table 4-4, rho represents the fraction of unexplained 
variance due to differences among medical scheme variables. The proportion of 
variance due to the individual-specific (medical scheme) effect is 43.29 percent. Thus, 
the balance is due to the idiosyncratic error, which implies that the majority of the 
variance in net claims incurred (pabpm) (ܰܥܮܯܵܣ) is caused by the regressors. 
 
The ܴଶሺݓ݅ݐ݄݅݊ሻ value from Table 4-4 suggests that the variation within the medical 
schemes explains 57.97 percent of the variation in the data. Thus, the regression fit of 
the company over time is poor. The ܴଶሺܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ሻ which measures the squared-
correlation between cross-sectional unit means and the predicted values of the 
independent variable, shows that 76.35 percent of the variation in net claims incurred 
(pabpm) (ܰܥܮܯܵܣ) is explained by the explanatory variables. ܴଶሺ݋ݒ݁ݎ݈݈ܽሻ, which is 
a measure the goodness-of-fit for the entire regression specification, indicates that 
model explains only 66.83 percent of the variation in net claims incurred (pabpm) 
(ܰܥܮܯܵܣ). Finally, the ܨ-test statistic ሺܨሺ1, 62ሻ ൌ 686.86ሻ indicates that the 
coefficients attaching to the regressors are statistically significantly different from 
zero simultaneously at the 99 percent confidence level (݌-value	൏ 0.01); thus, 
implying that the model is a good fit.  
 
From Table 4-4, it is possible to substitute the estimation results into Equation 4-8 to 
obtain Equation 4-10.  
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Equation 4-10: Fixed-Effects Estimation Results 
ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ૚૟૛. ૞ૡૢ૟ െ ૙. ૙૙૙૙૚૙૞ሺࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ૙. ૟ૡૡ૝૜ૢૡሺࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚ሻ
െ ૙. ૙૞૟૝૙૚ૡሺ࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚ሻ െ ૙. ૚૛૟ૡૡ૙૟ሺࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚ሻ 
where	ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚	refers	to	the	net	claims	incurred	(in	real	terms),	per	average	medical	scheme	
beneficiary	 per	month	 (pabpm)	 for	medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	 ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	
ࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚	denotes	the	total	number	of	medical	scheme	members	in	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	
time	 ࢚;	 ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚	 refers	 to	 the	 net	 contribution	 income	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	medical	
scheme	beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm)	for	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚;	࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚	
refers	 to	 the	 gross	 administration	 expenses	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	 medical	 scheme	
beneficiary	 per	 month	 (pabpm)	 	 for	 medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚;	 and	 ࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚	
denotes	the	solvency	ratio	of	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚. 
 
 
The only explanatory variable that is highly significant is net contribution income 
(pabpm) ሺܰܥܱܰܶܣሻ. The null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically 
significantly different from zero is soundly rejected at even the 99 percent confidence 
level.  The coefficient attaching to ܰܥܱܰܶܣ indicates that a one unit increase in net 
contribution income (pabpm) leads to an expected 0.6884  unit increase in net claims 
incurred (pabpm) holding all other factors constant. This is in-line with one’s a priori 
expectations, since as policyholders pay more for medical scheme coverage; they may 
be induced to increase healthcare expenditure by increasing their utilisation of their 
current medical scheme benefits. Although, the direction of causality is commonly 
viewed in reverse, the relationship does still hold true, if one considers that net 
contribution income does influence net claims incurred. 
 
The key coefficient of interest is the one attaching to the total number of medical 
scheme beneficiaries ሺܯܧܯሻ. Although, ߚመଵ ൌ െ0.0000105, is negative implying 
that a decrease in the total number of medical scheme beneficiaries leads to an 
expected increase in net claims incurred (pabpm) holding all other factors constant. 
Therefore, it would appear to be supporting the view that adverse selection is indeed 
present in South Africa’s private health insurance market. Since it suggests that those 
members who would be the first to opt out of medical scheme coverage would be the 
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low risks – this would lead to a deterioration in the risk profile of those that remain 
behind in the medical scheme pool, which gets reflected in higher net claims incurred 
(pabpm). However, the null hypothesis that ߚመଵ is statistically significantly different 
from zero cannot be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. Hence, there would 
appear to be no discernible adverse selection present in South Africa’s private health 
insurance sector.  
 
The estimation results for the one-way random-effects panel specification (Equation 4-
9) are presented in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5: Regression Output - Random-Effects Model 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      2230 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       234 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5910                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.7532                                        avg =       9.5 
       overall = 0.6673                                        max =        17 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =   3589.31 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      nclmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         mem |  -.0001135   .0000948    -1.20   0.231    -.0002994    .0000724 
      nconta |   .6819877   .0153989    44.29   0.000     .6518065    .7121689 
      admina |  -.0117186   .0461817    -0.25   0.800    -.1022331    .0787958 
       solvr |   .2789999   .2422866     1.15   0.250    -.1958731     .753873 
          d1 |   2.810207   13.41257     0.21   0.834    -23.47795    29.09837 
          d2 |    46.1219    14.7822     3.12   0.002     17.14931    75.09449 
       _cons |   137.6362   14.69897     9.36   0.000     108.8268    166.4457 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  80.024676 
     sigma_e |  146.46916 
         rho |  .22988516   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™ . 
 
The estimation of the RE model produces almost identical results to the FE model 
with one key exception; namely, the RE specification included two dummy variables 
to take into account the structural breaks in regulatory regime identified previously. 
Only the second dummy variable proves to be statistically significantly different from 
zero at the 95 percent confidence level. This indicates that the implementation of the 
Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 did cause a sustained structural change to the 
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private health insurance sector in South Africa. In particular, since 2000, net 
contribution income (pabpm) increased by R46.12 per average medical scheme 
beneficiary per month purely as a result of the change in regulatory regime (holding 
all other factors constant). 
 
From Table 4-5, it is possible to substitute the estimation results into Equation 4-9 to 
obtain Equation 4-11.  
 
Equation 4-11: Random-Effects Estimation Results 
ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ૚૜ૠ. ૟૜૟૛ െ ૙. ૙૙૙૚૚૜૞ሺࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ૙. ૟ૡ૚ૢૡૠૠሺࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚ሻ
െ ૙. ૙૚૚ૠ૚ૡ૟ሺ࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ૙. ૛ૠૡૢૢૢૢሺࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚ሻ
൅ ૛. ૡ૚૙૛૙ૠሺࡰ૚ሻ ൅ ૝૟. ૚૛૚ૢሺࡰ૛ሻ ൅ ࢛࢏࢚ 
where	ࡺ࡯ࡸࡹࡿ࡭࢏࢚	refers	to	the	net	claims	incurred	(in	real	terms),	per	average	medical	scheme	
beneficiary	 per	month	 (pabpm)	 for	medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	 observed	 at	 time	 ࢚	 ሺ૚ૢૢ૜ െ ૛૙૙ૢሻ.	
ࡹࡱࡹ࢏࢚	denotes	the	total	number	of	medical	scheme	members	in	medical	scheme	࢏	observed	at	
time	 ࢚;	 ࡺ࡯ࡻࡺࢀ࡭࢏࢚	 refers	 to	 the	 net	 contribution	 income	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	medical	
scheme	beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm)	for	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚;	࡭ࡰࡹࡵࡺ࡭࢏࢚	
refers	 to	 the	 gross	 administration	 expenses	 (in	 real	 terms)	 per	 average	 medical	 scheme	
beneficiary	per	month	(pabpm)		for	medical	scheme	࢏	and	observed	at	time	࢚;	ࡿࡻࡸࢂࡾ࢏࢚	denotes	
the	 solvency	 ratio	 of	medical	 scheme	 ࢏	 and	observed	 at	 time	 ࢚;	ࡰ૚	denotes	 the	 first	 structural	
break	 that	demarcates	 the	pre‐deregulation	and	post‐deregulation	periods	 (at	 time	࢚ ൌ ૚ૢૢ૝);	
and	ࡰ૛	denotes	 the	 second	 structural	 break	 that	demarcates	 the	post‐deregulation	period	and	
the	post‐implementation		of	the	Medical	Schemes	Act	No.	131	of	1998		(at	time	࢚ ൌ ૛૙૙૙). 
 
Importantly, once again the key coefficient ߚመଵ is negative implying that a decrease in 
the total number of medical scheme beneficiaries leads to an expected increase in net 
claims incurred (pabpm) holding all other factors constant. However, the null 
hypothesis that ߚመଵ is statistically significantly different from zero cannot be rejected at 
the 95 percent confidence level. Hence, it confirms the absence of adverse selection in 
South Africa’s private health insurance sector.  
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A summary of the regression results for both the FE and RE models are presented in 
Table 4-6. 
 
Table 4-6: Summary of FE and RE Estimation Results 
---------------------------------------- 
    Variable |     FE           RE       
-------------+-------------------------- 
         mem | -.00001053   -.00011352   
             |  .00011505    .00009485   
      nconta |  .68843981    .68198769   
             |  .01373446    .01539886   
      admina |  -.0564018   -.01171862   
             |  .04652375    .04618169   
       solvr | -.12688064    .27899993   
             |  .26483441    .24228661   
          d1 |               2.8102074   
             |               13.412572   
          d2 |               46.121899   
             |               14.782203   
       _cons |  162.58962    137.63622   
             |  9.9184706    14.698972   
-------------+-------------------------- 
           N |       2230         2230   
          r2 |  .57969821                
        r2_o |  .66826035    .66730164   
        r2_b |    .763482    .75319802   
        r2_w |  .57969821    .59100765   
     sigma_u |  130.52776    80.024676   
     sigma_e |   149.3946    146.46916   
         rho |  .43290455    .22988516   
---------------------------------------- 
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™ . 
 
As discussed previously, a useful test to determine which model, FE or RE, is more 
appropriate is the Hausman test.  Under the null hypothesis that individual effects are 
random, the estimators under both the FE and RE should be similar because both are 
consistent. Essentially, it tests whether the individual-effects errors ሺߤ௜ሻ are correlated 
with the regressors and thus, the null hypothesis is that they are not.  
 
In this study, an extension of the Hausman test is employed, whereby one specifies 
that both the covariance matrices are based upon the (same) estimated disturbance 
variance from the efficient estimator. This tends to be a preferred method, since in 
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certain cases, the conventional Hausman test may to lead to variance estimates that 
are negative definite and therefore, estimated standard errors cannot be determined.  
 
Table 4-7: Hausman Test - Fixed-Effects versus Random-Effects 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       FE           RE         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         mem |   -.0000105    -.0001135         .000103         .000071 
      nconta |    .6884398     .6819877        .0064521               . 
      admina |   -.0564018    -.0117186       -.0446832         .012788 
       solvr |   -.1268806     .2789999       -.4058806        .1253236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       18.99 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0008 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
Source: Output generated within Stata™ . 
 
Table 4-7 suggests that the null hypothesis that the difference in the coefficients 
between the FE and RE estimates results is rejected as the ݌-value of the ߯ሺସሻଶ  test 
statistic is less than 0.05. Therefore, the Hausman test results indicate that the FE 
model is preferred.  
 
4.3. Reasons for the Absence of the Positive Coverage‐Risk Correlation 
 
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) examine several explanations for why a positive 
coverage-risk correlation may not be observed. These reasons include why members 
of medical schemes may not possess superior informational advantages over their 
corresponding medical schemes, or the inability of members to utilise whatever 
advantage they do possess. It is also necessary to discuss the factors that may have a 
negative coverage-risk correlation, which would have an offsetting effect upon the 
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positive coverage-risk relationship. Interactions between risk and risk aversion 
(propitious selection) are important as they have a direct influence upon the 
individual’s decision to purchase insurance. Recall adverse selection theory 
emphasises the idea that high-risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance 
than low-risk individuals. In addition, to the possible correlation between low-risk and 
high risk-aversion, low-risk may also be correlated with other variables associated 
with a greater tendency to purchase insurance (Fang, Keane & Silverman, 2008).  
Consider, for example, cognitive ability. The authors examine senior citizens in the 
United States and their choice to purchase supplementary Medigap insurance.154 Fang, 
Keane and Silverman (2008)’s empirical results demonstrate that individuals with 
higher cognitive ability (as measured by survey analysis) are associated with 
increased demand for insurance, since it is suggested that more sophisticated 
individuals are better able to understand the need for insurance. Moreover, higher 
cognitive ability is associated with better health, because more sophisticated 
individuals take better care of themselves.  
 
In a recent contribution, Koufopoulos (2007) identifies certain circumstances where 
the coverage-risk correlation does not arise. Koufopoulos (2007: 603) suggests that:  
“If there is one loss level, in the presence of fixed administrative costs, 
asymmetric information plus competition among insurance companies implies a 
positive relationship between coverage and the accident probability only if, in 
equilibrium, all agents choose contracts offering strictly positive coverage”.  
The implication is that if certain individuals opt for zero coverage, that is elect to 
remain uninsured, the positive coverage-risk relationship may not hold true. With 
multiple loss levels, he demonstrates that the positive relationship between coverage 
and the accident probability holds true if and only if the level of indemnity offered by 
the high-coverage policy is constant with respect to loss size. If the level of indemnity 
is a strictly monotonic function with respect to loss size, the coverage-risk correlation 
may be zero or negative (Koufopoulos, 2007). If the level of indemnity increases as 
loss size increases, he proves that even if the equilibrium contracts offer strictly 
                                                     
154 Medigap insurance is a supplementary health insurance policy that serves as a ‘top-up’ to Medicare. 
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positive coverage and administration costs are negligible, the coverage-risk 
correlation may be zero or negative. 
 
4.3.1. Absence of Private Information 
 
Theoretical models of adverse selection, such as the analysis presented by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis, do present the notion of information asymmetry in a 
highly-stylized manner according to Cohen and Siegelman (2010). The idea that 
somehow the insured has superior information about their risk profile than the 
insurance company is unrealistic. They assert that this is particularly the case in 
insurance lines such as automobile insurance. The extent to which the insured has 
private information about their risk profile is questionable. Indeed, Chiappori and 
Salanié (2000) argue that the absence of a positive coverage-risk correlation may be 
explained by the lack of superior information on the part of the insured.  
 
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) present a useful example to illustrate. Consider an 
individual  ݅’s expected loss is given by the following specification:  
 
Equation 4-12: Expected Loss Cost for Individual ࢏ under insurance (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010) 
ࡱሾࡸ࢏ሿ ൌ ࢖ሺࢄ࢏ሻ ∙ ࡸሺࢅ࢏ሻ 
where	ࡱሾࡸ࢏ሿ	denotes	the	expected	loss	for	individual	࢏.	ࢄ	and	ࢅ	are	vectors	of	all	the	explanatory	
variables	 that	 describe	 the	 probability	 ሺ࢖ሻ	 and	magnitude	 of	 loss	 ሺࡸሻ.	 These	 include	 variables	
whose	values	are	unknown	to	both	the	insurer	and	insured	(Cohen	&	Siegelman,	2010). 
 
The possible variables within vector ܺ could include factors such as the insured’s 
temperament, aggressiveness, average speed, number of kilometres driven within a 
predefined period, extent of traffic congestion en route to the place of employment 
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and so on (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). Variables in vector ܻ could include the make 
and model of the insured’s motor vehicle. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) suggest that 
there are several ways in which imperfect information may manifest itself within 
Equation 4-12. First, the insured may be completely unaware of certain factors in either 
ܺ or ܻ, or the insured may only have incomplete information about certain factors; 
thus, generating possible random errors or biases. Second, the insured may not be 
aware of the functional forms that transform these factors, such as behaviour or 
environment, into estimates of the probability and magnitude of a loss. Lastly, the 
authors suggest that a factor completely unknown to anyone – luck – may influence 
the variance of the probability or size of the loss across all the insureds. Therefore, 
even if the insured has some private knowledge concerning certain factors within ܺ 
and ܻ, it is doubtful that the insured will have a significant advantage over the insurer 
in determining one’s individual expected loss (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). 
 
Moreover, it is further doubtful that the insured will be familiar with the value of 
these factors or their corresponding functional forms that influence the probability and 
expected magnitude of loss for other policyholders. In the case of automobile 
insurance, a driver may be aware of his or her own driving ability or style; however, 
in order to have superior private information, the insured would need to be aware 
about how his or her driving ability compares to those of others within the insured 
pool (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). It is indeed debatable to suggest that the insured 
possesses such information. For example, Svenson (1981) finds that 80 percent of all 
drivers believe that their driving ability would place them within the top 20 percent of 
safest drivers (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). The probability of having an accident is 
generally underestimated by individuals as people’s perception of their driving ability 
is somewhat elevated. In the United Kingdom, Guppy (1993) finds that drivers 
underestimate the probability of having an accident.  
 
It is argued by Cohen and Siegelman (2010), that even if a policyholder knew about 
their own objective values for the factors in vectors ܺ and ܻ, it is certainly debatable 
that they would know how to translate these into a probability or to accurately 
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estimate the size of loss, and then compare these to the premium that they are being 
charged by the insurance company and subsequently, make an informed decision 
about what is their appropriate level of coverage. Even if the insured could determine 
the actuarially fair premium that they should be charged by the insurance company, 
this figure would most certainly deviate from the premium charged by the insurance 
company. The insurance company loads premiums to recover administration and other 
operational expenses, and reward shareholders for the cost of capital. Take for 
example, the total distance travelled by the insured during a month.155 An individual 
may be fully aware of this distance, but they are naïve with respect to its significance 
in determining the   probability of loss or magnitude of loss (Butler, 1996).  
 
In addition, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) discuss the proficiency at which individuals 
can accurately predict uncertain outcomes. Outcomes with negligible probabilities are 
often poorly predicted by people. For example, if two possible outcomes ܣ and ܤ 
have probabilities of 0.0001 and 0.00001 respectively, people to group both outcomes 
together as being highly unlikely. However, outcome ܤ is essentially ten times less 
likely than outcome ܣ. In the case of predicting one’s own life expectancy, people do 
appear to perform admirably, but their ability to predict what exactly their demise will 
be is generally unsuccessful (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). 
 
Therefore, the common assumption within adverse selection theory that individuals 
possess superior private information compared to the insurer may be violated in 
certain insurance segments or markets.  
 
  
                                                     
155 Insurance companies have started offering policies whereby the premiums are directly determined 
by the distance that the insured travels within a given time period. This has become practical due to 
cost-effective global positioning system (GPS) devices that can be easily installed in a motor vehicle.  
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4.3.2. Private Information Distributed Unevenly Amongst Policyholders 
 
Cohen (2005) finds that in Israel, a positive coverage-risk correlation can be detected 
amongst policies sold to drivers with 3 or more years driving experience. But when 
the author considers insurance policies sold to drivers with less than 3 years driving 
experience, the coverage-risk correlation is absent. Cohen (2005)’s empirical results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that only individuals with significant driving 
experience can glean enough private information to yield a coverage-risk correlation 
when they purchase an insurance policy from a new insurer. Therefore, Cohen and 
Siegelman (2010) suggests that whether policyholders have private information that 
can yield a positive coverage-risk correlation may depend upon the insurance product 
and particularly, the type of individuals purchasing the insurance policy. In other 
words, for a particular insurance product, there may be a subset of policyholders who 
possess private information, whilst the remaining pool of insureds does not possess 
any private information.  
 
Therefore, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) assert that if one focuses upon the subset of 
insureds with private information, then it is likely that one would observe a positive 
coverage-risk correlation. However, this would not be the case for the members of the 
pool who do not possess private information. Hence, if one examined the entire pool 
and the members who do not have private information, were sufficiently large, then 
the authors contend that the coverage-risk correlation may not be uncovered. 
 
4.3.3. Failure to Utilise Private Information 
 
The next observation that may lead to the failure to detect a positive coverage-risk 
correlation concerns the situation whereby policyholders do not utilise private 
information that they do possess. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) maintain that for a 
coverage-risk correlation to occur: 
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“…it does not suffice for policyholders to have private information about their 
risk type; they must also adjust their purchasing decisions on the basis of this 
information” (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010: 65).  
Policyholders that act upon their private information when it comes to insurance 
purchasing decisions would make the necessary adjustments to their coverage levels 
and associated premium levels through their insurance contract choices. Yet, 
behavioural economics suggests that individuals often do not actively pursue optimal 
choices when the stakes are not sufficiently high. The authors argue that this precisely 
the case, for example, in automobile insurance, when individuals decide upon 
deductible levels. Further evidence of this lack of optimal decision-making is found in 
Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos (2002), where senior citizens do not utilise their 
private information concerning their mortality to make optimal decisions regarding 
their retirement and social welfare benefits. 
 
Pauly, Withers, Viswanathan, Lemaire, Hershey, Armstrong and Asch (2003), as cited 
by Cohen and Siegelman (2010), note that individuals have more on their minds than 
attempting to take advantage of potential benefits that could extract within their 
insurance transactions. Furthermore, Pauly et al. (2003) prove that the demand for life 
insurance is insensitive to changes in either price or relative risk. Therefore, Cohen 
and Siegelman (2010) conclude that even when individuals can predict their own risk 
better than insurance companies, they choose not to act upon this information by 
adjusting their insurance coverage levels.  
 
4.3.4. Insurers possess Superior Information 
 
Another possibility that should be considered as to why one may not observe a 
positive correlation between coverage and risk is that insurers may actually possess 
superior information concerning the insured’s risk profile – in other words, the 
traditional view of information asymmetry, but in reverse.  Chiappori and Salanié 
(2000) do examine this possibility in their analysis of the automobile insurance 
267 
 
market in France. Historical claims experience, statistical and underwriting techniques 
that are based upon both subjective and objective criteria allow insurers to assess risk 
fairly accurately and thus, permit insurers to extricate superior information relating to 
the risk of the insured (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
 
Even though the insured may have relevant (hidden) information concerning their 
individual risk status, it is nevertheless possible for the insurer to utilise proxy 
measures that reveal this hidden information. Brockett and Golden (2007) illustrate 
this feature, when they examine the relationship between a person’s credit score and 
risk.156 The authors demonstrate how a person’s credit score can be utilised as a proxy 
measure to predict the likelihood of a person experiencing a loss under an automobile 
insurance policy. The relationship between a person’s credit score and their risk in 
relation to automobile insurance is remarkably robust (Brockett & Golden, 2007). 
Therefore, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) posit that an insurer may simply need an 
individual’s credit score in order to predict the person’s riskiness. In addition, the 
insurer’s assessment may indeed prove to be better than the individual’s assessment of 
their own risk even if the person possesses superior information about certain aspects 
of their own (risky) behaviour (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). 
 
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) also argue that it is plausible to suggest that the insurer 
may be in a better position to forecast risk (using the factors that it is aware of) than 
the insured. 
 
  
                                                     
156 A credit score refers to a single measure that summarises the information contained in factors that 
affect a customer’s default probability with respect to the obligations under a credit agreement that is 
often entered into with a financial institution. 
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4.3.5. Interaction between Risk and Risk Aversion (Propitious Selection) 
 
Thus far, the previous reasons have focused upon the reasons why an individual may 
not possess, or may simply fail to utilise superior information vis-à-vis the insurance 
company. An alternative explanation for the absence of a positive coverage-risk 
correlation is that certain factors may in fact induce a negative coverage-risk 
correlation, which could offset any positive coverage-risk correlation due to adverse 
selection (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Hemenway (1990) coined the term of 
propitious selection to describe the situation where there is an observable negative 
relationship between coverage and risk. A low-risk individual may be induced to seek 
out more generous (comprehensive) private health insurance cover because they are 
highly risk averse. Conversely, high risk individuals may elect higher deductibles with 
respect to private health insurance as their degree of risk aversion is weak. The result 
of this behaviour favours insurers, since the insured population is less risky than 
overall population (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
 
As cited by Cohen and Siegelman (2010), DeMeza and Webb (2001) provide an 
elegant theoretical model to illustrate why individuals that are more cautious with 
respect to their driving habits may exhibit a tendency to purchase higher coverage 
levels with respect to automobile insurance. However, DeDonder and Hindricks 
(2006) argue that to sustain a negative coverage-risk correlation, it is not sufficient to 
show that strongly risk averse individuals are more likely to demand greater coverage 
levels – there risk may also appear lower as they take more precautions through their 
cautious behaviour. But it is also necessary to demonstrate that individuals, who are 
weakly risk averse, exhibit a decreasing willingness to pay for insurance (Cohen & 
Siegelman, 2010). Utilising simulation techniques, Karagyozova and Siegelman 
(2007) prove that even large negative values for the correlation between coverage and 
risk are unable to prevent a market from unravelling due to imperfect information.  
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Cohen and Siegelman (2010) discuss the findings of Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry 
(2008). Cutler et al. (2008) investigate the absence of a positive coverage-risk 
correlation by examining five different insurance markets; namely, life, health, 
annuities, long-term care, and Medigap. A key aspect underlying Cutler et al. (2008)’s 
analysis concerns an individual’s tolerance for risk vis-à-vis their actual risk. The 
authors find that individuals may indeed vary their risk tolerance in addition to their 
riskiness. By examining, insurance coverage levels, several risk indicators and risk 
tolerance, they empirically test how these three factors are related to one another 
(Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). The results of their analysis suggest that individuals who 
elect not take precautions to reduce risk are less likely to purchase any of the five 
insurance types studied. Moreover, these same individuals display higher expected 
claims under life insurance and long-term care insurance but have lower expected 
claims for annuities (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Cutler et al. (2008) do not detect a 
systematic relationship with respect to expected claims for these individuals under 
private health insurance or Medigap. 
 
Thus, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) conclude that models describing the ability of 
propitious selection to negate the positive coverage-risk correlation under adverse 
selection remain a contestable question.   
 
4.3.6. Institutional and Regulatory Factors 
 
An individual’s decision to purchase insurance and indeed the selection of the 
appropriate coverage level may be influenced by “institutions” such as insurance 
intermediaries who attempt to match individuals with insurers (Cohen & Siegelman, 
2010). Therefore, these influences may induce a negative correlation between 
coverage and risk. Cummins and Doherty (2006) argue that intermediaries may 
mitigate informational asymmetries and therefore reduce adverse selection. Although, 
the extent to which intermediaries (brokers) in South Africa’s medical schemes sector, 
can mitigate informational asymmetries is somewhat limited by the regulatory 
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environment that prohibits risk classification. Nevertheless, medical scheme brokers 
can steer individuals towards certain benefit options and thus, they may have an 
undue influence upon the coverage levels selected by medical scheme members.  
 
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) also contend that the marketing activities of insurers 
should be considered under institutional factors. In South Africa, it is precisely the 
marketing techniques of medical schemes that have allowed them to target their 
products (and benefit options) for a specific “audience” – this is in spite of the 
regulatory environment that enforces community-rating and open enrolment. As 
discussed previously, it these marketing activities that have permitted medical 
schemes to effectively cherry-pick lower risks.   
 
Regulation prohibiting risk classification is also put forward by Cohen and Siegelman 
(2010) as another factor that may contaminate the relationship between coverage and 
risk. For example, in the case of South Africa, where medical schemes may not 
discriminate on the basis of current or past health status, this may induce high risk 
individuals to purchase more generous medical scheme cover (move to more 
comprehensive benefit options) not because of informational asymmetries, but rather 
as a result of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the high risks. Due to community-
rating, high risks realise that their premiums are effectively subsidised by low risks 
and thus, it is merely rational economic behaviour to purchase additional medical 
scheme cover as they are essentially receiving the extra cover at a discount. It is the 
inability of medical schemes to utilise certain risk-related information that leads to the 
risk-related cross-subsidisation. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
The empirical findings suggest that there is no discernible adverse selection present 
within the South African medical scheme market. Hence, the notion that the 
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promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 was necessary to address 
the negative consequences of adverse selection is proven to be false. Several reasons 
have been offered as to why one may detect no positive coverage-risk correlation in 
certain insurance markets, lines or segments. As an avenue for further empirical 
research, these reasons should be explored within the context of the medical scheme 
industry in South Africa.   
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5 REGULATORY CAPTURE 
 
This chapter seeks to describe the theories of economic regulation that explain the 
observed behaviour of government intervention. This is achieved by reviewing the 
seminal literature within the area. Four distinct schools of thought regarding 
regulatory capture are discussed extensively. 
 
Government has the ability to utilise public resources and exercise executive powers 
to bestow advantages (or disadvantages) upon industries. As Stigler (1971) argues the 
government can act as a potential resource or threat to any industry. Through the 
process of legislative policymaking and enforcement, the state has a further ability 
whereby it can create a framework to drive political or social objectives. Regulation is 
a mechanism that can incentivise individuals or institutions to behave in a particular 
manner that the state deems to be in the public interest (Stigler, 1971). When 
compared to the most powerful interest group or citizen, the state possesses the ability 
to coerce.   
 
Levine and Forrence (1990) argue that the appropriateness of government 
intervention, whereby the activities of a firm or even the operation of an entire 
industry are regulated, should be judged solely upon the ability of the intervention to 
remedy market distortions where they exist. Laffont and Tirole (1991) focus upon the 
following primary distortions that potentially prevent markets to form or operate: 
destructive competition, monopoly pricing, information asymmetries and 
environmental externalities. 
 
Economic regulation refers to the actions available to government whereby they can 
impose taxes, offer subsidies or directly institute legislative and administrative 
controls with respect to contribution rates (rate regulation), product innovation, 
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market activities, and entry and exit barriers. Stigler (1971: 3) describes the theory of 
economic regulation as an attempt to: 
1. Explain the nature and form of regulation; 
2. Describe the effect that regulation has upon the allocation of resources; and  
3. Identify the participants that receive the benefits or suffer the burdens of 
regulation.   
 
Two major theories have been offered to explain the motivation behind government 
intervention and regulation. The first of these theories, public interest theory, 
emphasises the role of central government to correct market distortions. According to 
Ippolito (1979: 55) public interest theory describes government regulation as an 
attempt to create:  
“…a governmental corrective device that improves market performance in 
instances in which competition fails”.  
The key premise behind public interest theory is that regulation is necessary to 
maximise social welfare. Although, market distortions may offer a convenient pretext 
to intervene, regulation should only be undertaken if it is in the public interest. The 
definition of what is in the public interest may indeed be an ambiguous construct. 
  
The second, capture theory, and its natural extension, the economic theory of 
regulation provide an alternative view of why government may choose to regulate. 
Stigler (1971) brings attention to the role of special interest groups in the formulation 
of regulation. It is argued that special interest groups capture the regulator (or 
regulatory process) for their own benefit.   
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5.1 Theories of Economic Regulation 
 
Theories of economic regulation that explain the observed behaviour of government 
intervention have been well-documented (Adams & Tower, 1994; Laffont, 1994; 
Posner, 1974; Priest, 1993; Shleifer, 2005; Stigler, 1971). Stigler (1971) broadly 
identifies two primary theories of economic regulation. Stigler (1971: 3) outlines the 
first as: 
“...[being regulation that is] instituted primarily for the protection and benefit of 
the public at large or some large subclass of the public”.  
Often referred to as public interest theory, the theory can be traced back to Pigou 
(1932), but it was only until the theory was adequately articulated by Stigler (1971) 
and Posner (1974) did it become possible to subject the theory to appropriate scrutiny 
and empirical investigation.  
 
The second view is that the political process is somehow directed by  
“an imponderable shifting mixture of diverse forces” (Stigler, 1971: 3). The latter 
view may be misinterpreted as the belief that government intervention is tainted with 
uncertainty and directed by irrational behaviour on the part of its agents. It is in fact 
considerably more systematic. Whilst various versions of this view have been 
expounded, it is usually termed as capture theory. Capture theory’s origin can be 
traced back to Marx’s view that large corporations capture the regulatory institutions 
(and processes) to the detriment of labour. Stigler (1971) extended this theory by 
noting that even small business or industries may have the ability to usurp the 
regulatory process. Under capture theory: 
“…regulation is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups, 
struggling among themselves [to maximise the benefits to their members]” 
(Posner: 1974: 336).  
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A third strand of regulation theory, namely, the economic theory of regulation, is 
derived as a version of capture theory from Stigler (1971), but includes elements from 
both public interest theory and capture theory. Adams and Tower (1994) declare that 
the economic theory of regulation proves to be theoretically and empirically superior 
in explaining government intervention. But this view is not shared by all 
contemporary researchers; Priest (1993) uses the early history of public utility 
regulation as a lens through which to view and to critique the competing public 
interest and capture (including economic) theories of regulation. He finds that neither 
the public interest theory nor capture theories of regulation are adequate. 
 
5.1.1 Public Interest Theory 
 
Public interest theory developed from two premises. First, that economic markets are 
fragile and if left unhindered these markets tend to behave in an inefficient (or 
inequitable) manner (Posner, 1974). Second, government regulation is seen as 
relatively costless.   Hence, government intervention is a response to “public demands 
for the rectification of palpable and remediable inefficiencies and inequities in the 
operation of the free market” (Posner, 1974: 336). Public interest theory thus endorses 
the view that the government intervenes to maximise social welfare through the 
process of instituting regulation to rectify market imperfections. Regulation of 
insurance companies “has traditionally been promoted as an exercise in safeguarding 
the public interest” (Adams & Tower: 1994: 165). 
 
Government’s role is to correct market imperfections, such as monopoly pricing and 
environmental externalities (Laffont & Tirole, 1991). Corporate failures, such as the 
collapse of the automobile insurance company, Vehicle and General, in 1971 caused 
the United Kingdom government to improve financial disclosure and tighten solvency 
regulations (Finsinger, Hammond & Tapp, 1985).  Hence, regulation is seen as 
reactionary rather than pre-emptive. At the extreme, regulation may be a response to a 
perceived market failure (Wilson, 1964). The underlying principle behind public 
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interest theory emphasises the role that regulation plays as a redistribution mechanism 
to enhance social welfare by correcting the misallocation of resources (Wilson, 1980: 
138). While regulatory agencies suffer from informational asymmetries, they are 
nonetheless viewed as benevolent maximisers of social welfare (Laffont & Tirole, 
1991: 1089). According to Adams and Tower (1994), under the public interest theory, 
regulators are viewed as independent and neutral arbitrators responding to the public’s 
call to correct market imperfections and failures. A simple illustration of the 
conceptual model is represented in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: Adams and Tower (1994: 165)’s Public Interest Theory – Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of regulation to serve the public interest does generate ambiguity with 
respect to what exactly defines “in the public interest”. One definition proposed for 
the public interest is that it describes “…the best response to a situation in terms of all 
the interests and of the concepts of value which are generally accepted in our society” 
Redford (1954: 1108). Therefore, the author suggests that somehow public interest 
encapsulates a common set of values that society possesses. It is precisely these 
shared values that underpin a set of principles, which rather than mechanical rules, are 
flexible enough to allow government to drive society’s interactions to improve overall 
societal welfare. Bonbright (1961) promotes the view that the protection of consumers 
is paramount and any regulatory action that does so can, by definition, be regarded as 
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acting within the public interest. He is of the opinion that by linking the public interest 
to the protection of consumers renders the government “…as an instrument for the 
attainment of [societal] welfare” (Bonbright, 1961: 29).  
 
In fact, the promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 is argued by 
some to be precisely an attempt to adhere to the principle of consumer protection. The 
introduction of community rating and open enrolment were argued by the South 
African government as necessary to overcome the situation whereby increasingly the 
elderly and unhealthy were being excluded from health insurance coverage (Reekie, 
1999). Therefore, the new regulatory framework governing medical schemes in South 
Africa was seen as a response to an observable deterioration in the coverage levels of 
those who were precisely in need of health insurance cover the most. It was a 
response to protect consumers (albeit a subset of consumers) and thus, the new 
legislation was in the public interest.  
 
A parallel can be drawn with the situation that Friendly (1962) discusses with respect 
to the regulation of the short-term insurance market in the United States. The author’s 
review of a number of regulatory commissions uncovers a deep-seated concern for 
anti-competitive monopoly pricing practices and cartel-type pricing arrangements 
through so-called rating bureaus that can ultimately lead to destructive competition. 
Regulators at the time were concerned that new entrants to the market were driving 
prices (premiums) downwards and at the same time the new insurers were able to 
press service advantages over established insurers.157 It rendered established insurers 
unable to compete. Regulators were afraid that insurance cover was being priced 
effectively “at a discount” (premiums were inadequate) and this generated greater 
insolvency risk. Thus, regulators decided that the public interest was best served by 
prescribing a pricing scheme that maintained a fair rate of return but at the same time 
                                                     
157 This included having alternative distributional channels for the sale of insurance – direct writers 
versus independent agents.  
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discouraged unfair and destructive pricing practices (Friendly, 1962).158  The author 
hints at capture theory here, as he observes that special interest groups can have a 
significant influence upon the formation of regulatory policy. 
 
This raises a related issue with respect to the South African government’s stated goal 
in the provision of health insurance cover to encourage the subsidisation of high risk 
members by low risk members through community rating and open enrolment.  Is this 
goal consistent with the concept of in the public interest? Government’s defence of 
this stated goal is that a form of market distortion was evident in South Africa’s health 
insurance sector prior to the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 
1998; namely, adverse selection. Adverse selection was argued to be self-evident in 
the inability of the elderly and infirm to obtain affordable health insurance cover. As 
outlined in Chapter Two, the idea that low risks drive out higher risks from the health 
insurance market is a complete misinterpretation of the concept of adverse selection.  
 
Furthermore, to argue that any activity that protects consumers is in the public interest 
relegates the theory of public interest to a mere mechanical rule that dictates that basis 
for in the public interest is housed within the primary objective of protecting 
consumers. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) concur with the view that the notion of in 
the public interest is ambiguous. This ambiguity itself has played an influential role in 
the evolution of insurance regulation (Kimball, 1961).  
 
Harrington and Niehaus (1999) examine the evolution of insurance regulation in the 
United States and from their discussion it is evident that the regulation of insurance 
evolved as a response to two competing ideologies as to who ought to be responsible 
for insurance regulation; namely, state versus federal regulation. This debate is one 
example of the general debate in political philosophy and economics over the 
                                                     
158 Friendly (1962) vehemently disagreed with view that the new pricing arrangement could be seen as 
being in the public interest. Friendly (1962) questions just how can the service offerings of an insurer 
that attract a lower price be deemed as counterproductive? The concept of a fair rate of return also 
raises further concerns as how it is determined.  
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advantages and disadvantages of centralisation of government power versus 
decentralisation (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). Therefore, people that favour a 
decentralisation of power tend to view state regulation more kindly than do those who 
favour greater centralisation of power. A method to evaluate either approach, is to 
consider the comparative efficiency of state versus federal regulation, but uncertainty 
concerning the magnitude of the costs and benefits associated with each system leads 
to a diversity of opinion (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999).  
 
Paul v. Virginia159, the Southeastern Underwriters Association case and the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act were all key events that drove the direction of insurance 
regulation in the United States. The United States Supreme Court judgement in the 
case of Paul v. Virginia implied that states had the power to regulate insurance and 
that the federal government did not. This decision was upheld for approximately 75 
years in many other cases that argued that insurance constituted interstate commerce. 
During the 1870s, numerous insurance companies became insolvent as a result of 
major fires that occurred in Boston and Chicago (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). The 
increased number of insurer insolvencies helped spur the development of insurance 
rating bureaus, precursor organisations to the insurance advisory organisations that are 
currently found in the United States. Rating bureaus set property (short-term) 
insurance rates that would be charged by most companies, in principle to ensure 
adequate prices and therefore reduce insolvency risk. Here the public interest 
argument was evoked whereby ensuring that insurance prices were adequate protected 
consumers by reducing insolvency risk. Indeed, within the United States many states 
either permitted or encouraged the development of rating bureaus, and in some cases 
state regulators began to regulate their activities. In certain circumstances, state 
regulators even determined the rates that had to be charged by all insurance 
companies (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999).   
                                                     
159 Mr. Paul was an agent for a group of New York fire insurers. Virginia law required out-of-state 
insurers and their agents to be licensed by the state. According to Harrington and Niehaus (1999), Mr. 
Paul refused to pay the security deposit that was required to obtain a license and he kept on selling fir 
insurance policies. He was subsequently arrested and fined $50. Mr. Paul and the New York insurers 
challenged the conviction, arguing in part that the sale of insurance across borders was interstate 
commerce and thus that the Virginia law was unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate 
commerce. In 1868, the United States Supreme Court reached an interesting verdict – it held that 
insurance was not commerce and therefore was not subject to laws affecting interstate commerce. Since 
insurance was not commerce, Virginia's law was not unconstitutional (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). 
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Harrington and Niehaus (1999) discuss that in response to a request from the Missouri 
Attorney General in 1942, the antitrust division of the United States Department of 
Justice began to investigate the activities of a large rating bureau known as the 
Southeastern Underwriters Association. This association was subsequently indicted by 
the United States Attorney General for alleged violations of the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act. The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits price fixing and related non-
competitive activities. The charges against the Southeastern Underwriters Association 
included restraining and monopolising commerce, fixing prices and agents' 
commissions, attempting to force buyers to buy from member insurers, denying non-
member insurers access to reinsurance from member insurers, and refusing to do 
business with agents who represented non-member insurers. The Southeastern 
Underwriters Association’s defence against this legal action was that the Sherman 
Antitrust Act did not apply to insurance because according to Paul v. Virginia 
insurance was not commerce. Although, the Southeastern Underwriters Association 
argued that many of these practices were beneficial given the nature of insurance, they 
decided not enter these arguments into their defence against the legal action. A federal 
district court upheld this view and dismissed the case. However, the United States 
Attorney General appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
 
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court did not decide on the merit of the charges 
against the Southeastern Underwriters Association, but rather on the validity of the 
precedent emanating from Paul v. Virginia. It was adjudged that insurance was indeed 
commerce and that when insurance was sold across state borders then insurance 
would be regarded as interstate commerce. The implication of this decision gave the 
United States federal government jurisdiction in the regulation of insurance and 
further, the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to insurance. Harrington and Niehaus 
(1999) point out that the decision did not prohibit state regulation, but it held that state 
regulation that were in breach of federal regulation were invalid. The outcome of the 
Southeastern Underwriters Association case led to considerable uncertainty with 
respect to the scope of state regulation and the taxation of insurers. In addition, 
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questions were raised as to the legality of the operations of the insurance industry, 
particularly with respect to utilisation of rating bureaus (Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). 
 
According to Harrington and Niehaus (1999), the uncertainty that was created by the 
Southeastern Underwriters Association decision, mobilised representatives from both 
the insurance industry and state insurance regulators to seek out legislation aimed at 
clarifying the role of state regulation with respect to insurance. In 1945 the United 
States Congress responded by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Two key 
provisions within the McCarran-Ferguson Act are that: 
1. continued regulation and taxation of insurance by the states is in the public 
interest; and  
2. insurance is to be exempt from federal antitrust law, provided that the relevant 
activities are subject to state regulation and do not involve “any agreement to 
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation” 
(Harrington & Niehaus, 1999). 
 
The key issue underlying Paul v. Virginia, the Southeastern Underwriters Association 
case and the McCarran-Ferguson Act involved who was indeed responsible for the 
regulation of insurance – state versus federal regulation. Harrington and Niehaus  
(1999) provide a detailed account of the arguments in favour and against state and 
federal regulation. But as the McCarran-Ferguson Act argues continued regulation 
and taxation of insurance by state regulators is in the public interest. As stated by the 
authors, insurance regulation reflects the objective of promoting safety and soundness, 
given that unregulated market incentives and conditions might not produce an 
efficient level of solvency risk.  
 
Kimball (1961) contends that only with tangible objectives can regulation truly be 
made to serve the public interest. Kimball (1961: 477) suggests that in terms of 
insurance, primary role of regulation should be to “…facilitate the successful 
282 
 
operation of the enterprise itself”. Harrington and Niehaus (1999) concur with 
Kimball (1961) arguing that central to the successful operation of an insurer is the 
insurer’s solvency. Specifically, Kimball (1961) maintains that insurer solvency can 
best be managed through the regulation of insurance premiums. In other words, the 
author advocates the implementation of rate regulation within the insurance context. 
Two types of rate regulation are common within the insurance market: 
1. Rate Compression: this type of rate regulation refers to the situation where 
insurance companies are prevented from setting premium based upon an 
individual’s characteristics such as age, gender, current health status and other 
risk-related characteristics. 
 
2. Rate Suppression: can be defined broadly as government suppression of insurance 
rates below levels that would exist otherwise without rate regulation. 
 
Harrington (1992) considers why certain insurance lines may be especially vulnerable 
to rate suppression. Higher insurance costs, particularly when higher-than anticipated 
claims costs are experienced, can encourage regulatory authorities to reduce insurance 
rates or limit insurance rate increases via regulation. Once again this may be viewed 
as being in the public interest. He contends that within a competitive insurance 
market, persistent rate suppression should lead to a reduction in product quality or exit 
by insurers. Therefore, both outcomes should discourage regulators from 
implementing rate suppression. This can be summarised in the statement:   
“If quality responses are constrained, the threat of widespread exit alone should 
give politicians and regulators considerable pause before persistently suppressing 
rates” (Harrington, 1992: 186).  
 
Harrington (1992) finds that there is a pattern of insurers exiting the market in certain 
states in the United States, but the pattern has not been widespread or rapid in any 
particular state. Thus, by implication the negative consequences of rate suppression 
that are anticipated may simply be an over-exaggeration, but the author argues that 
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this is difficult to reconcile with the poor underwriting results experienced and 
increased number of exits from the certain lines by insurance companies. A possible 
explanation may be that rate suppression only suppresses premiums to a level that 
provides a fair rate of return for insurance companies.  
 
The idea behind rate regulation is to protect consumers by ensuring that premiums are 
adequate to mitigate insolvency risk. Indeed, the concern for solvency manifests itself 
in the stipulation that premiums must not be “inadequate” (Kimball, 1961: 482). 
Kimball (1961: 480) describe the first reason as to why rate regulation protects 
consumers as:  
“Insurance is one important modern way that man seeks security in a world in 
which it does not exist naturally. It is thus not surprising that all systems of 
insurance regulation regard the financial solvency of the insurance enterprise as 
the central aim, for if nothing else, insurance must ‘insure’”. 
Ippolito (1979) maintains that the costs associated with insolvency, but not limited to 
the time of the actual event of insolvency, can be so excessive that the threat of 
insolvency alone justifies government intervention. Indeed, the costs of financial 
distress just prior to insolvency may induce an insurer to go insolvent. 
Frech and Samprone (1980) examine the welfare implications of rate regulation using 
the deregulation that had taken place in certain states in the United States between 
1947 and 1974. They explain that rate regulation in the property-liability insurance 
market at that time took place according to the following procedure: insurers or rating 
bureaus would submit insurance rates to the state insurance department for approval 
prior to them being utilised. These rates would become effective once approved by the 
state insurance department or once a pre-determined amount of time had passed. As 
soon as the rates were approved, an insurance company was not permitted to change 
them unless a deviation request was filed and approved by the state insurance 
department (Frech & Samprone, 1980). The authors suggest that rate regulation 
protects consumers in two distinct ways: 
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1. If pricing is left to competitive forces it can lead to aggressive price competition 
that will result in inadequate insurance rates and therefore rate regulation is an 
instrument of the government to protect against insolvencies; and 
 
2. Since many insurers were permitted and encouraged to set insurance rates in 
concert by subscribing to rating bureaus, rate regulation serves as a means to 
monitor and prevent abusive cooperative pricing practices. 
 
Frech and Samprone (1980) point out that while rate regulation generally translates 
into higher insurance premiums for consumers (implies a negative effect upon societal 
welfare), the benefits derived from increased non-price competition (through perhaps 
the additional services that insurers may provide) can lead to welfare gains for 
consumers. An examination of two lines of automobile insurance (automobile liability 
and automobile physical damage insurance) in the United States provide mixed 
evidence that rate regulation leads to a societal welfare loss (Frech & Samprone, 
1980). 
 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) maintain that due to the ambiguity of what can be 
ascribed as the motive to act in the public interest, regulation in the public interest 
should focus upon the efficiency (or lack thereof) of the market and not as a 
redistributive tool to correct injustices between producers and consumers. MacAvoy 
(1979) contests that the United States government enacted legislation that was solely 
concerned with market efficiency. Acting within the public interest could be viewed 
as introducing regulation that addresses the concerns of society that producers do not 
fully account for the social costs of their activities. Indeed, he maintains that 
legislation, such as health and safety regulations and pollution restrictions, are 
amongst several reasons why government may intervene in a market.  
 
Redford (1954) also highlights that in the pursuit of the public interest, a compromise 
amongst competing values is required to address conflicts that arise between short and 
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long-term interests. The role of knowledgeable specialists in the regulatory process is 
well-documented by the author. Many issues involving the regulation of health 
insurance require a certain degree of technical competence, it is therefore necessary 
for the authorities to employ skilled staff that is able to understand the implications of 
certain regulations. Regulatory agencies need to monitor implementation and enforce 
compliance. Redford (1954) encourages the involvement by specialists (even those 
outside of the regulatory agency such as consultants) in the regulatory process as he 
argues they are more likely to provide practical solutions.  
 
Schubert (1957) extends Redford (1954)’s assertions by implying that regulators act 
as benevolent entities that create the appropriate environment in order to pursue the 
public interest. Thus, the deployment of technical expertise within the regulatory 
agency, which may occur via contracting out to consultants with the requisite 
knowledge to assist with certain technical matters, could be viewed as one of Schubert 
(1957)’s so-called “creative forces” that help in the pursuit of the public interest. It is 
questionable to believe that regulators possess the aptitude and perhaps more 
importantly, willingness to pursue the public interest. Individuals who are appointed 
as regulators often have undue influence in setting the agenda to promote the public 
interest and therefore, Friendly (1962: 1294) stresses the importance of appointing 
regulators that have “…higher intellectual power and moral courage”. The author 
emphasises that regulators should have an arms-length relationship with the regulated 
industry (or market). The role of the regulator should be seen as an adjudicator rather 
than as “…a business manager” (Friendly, 1962: 1285).   
 
Important within the context of the regulatory environment in the health insurance 
sector, Adams and Tower (1994) argue that a lack of information (information 
asymmetries) and disclosure can warrant regulatory intervention. The assumption that 
individuals possess superior information with respect to their risk than the insurance 
company, and their unwillingness to share such information may not be due to some 
“moral defect” in character, but rather as the authors put it individuals’ ignorance with 
respect to the value of such information to the insurer in order to assess an 
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individual’s risk. They argue that the absence of adequate information with respect to 
either party to a transaction may cause a breakdown in market signals and therefore 
lead to malfunctions within the market. It is difficult to accept such a view in the 
health insurance context when one considers individuals that would elect not to share 
information with the insured simply because they are unaware of the relative 
importance of such information to the insurer. However, if one considers the situation 
where consumers lack information concerning the financial soundness of an insurer or 
technical provisions within a policy, it is quite acceptable to argue that the regulator 
should ensure that consumers have enough information to make optimal purchasing 
decisions.  
 
In fact, Adams and Tower (1994) argue that the primary function of the regulator 
should be to ensure that consumers and producers have all the relevant information 
timeously so as to make optimal decisions. The regulator should not attempt to 
manage the activities of either producers or consumers (Adams & Tower, 1994; 
Booth, 1997). The regulator’s objective of reducing information asymmetries is not 
designed to mitigate the risk of insolvency. In truth, if the regulator acts as a facilitator 
for the free-flow of information it is conceivable that consumers (or for that matter 
producers) may misinterpret this information. Consumers may simply ignore 
information made available to them. Moreover, it is not the purpose of regulation to 
eliminate insolvencies, insolvencies are a natural feature of any market whereby 
inefficient producers are ‘forced’ to exit. As Booth (1997: 680) points out 
“…insurance failure should, therefore, never be regarded as a prima facie case for 
further regulation”. 
 
Posner (1974) argues that if public interest theory were correct, regulation would 
mainly be observable in highly-concentrated industries or industries that generate 
significant externalities. Theoretical and empirical research suggests that this is not 
the case (Posner, 1974).  The regulatory process is often marred by inefficiencies and 
unintended consequences, and thus the assumptions behind the public interest theory 
and its associated explanatory power is questionable. It is suggested that the 
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disappointing performance in the regulatory process can be explained by weaknesses 
in personnel and procedures rather than inherent flaws in the nature of the process or 
its objectives.  
 
According to Booth (1997), there are three key shortcomings of the public interest 
view: First, it only considers one aspect of market failure. The second shortcoming is 
that the public interest view assumes that the correction of a market imperfection will 
automatically improve economic welfare. The author contends that the final 
shortcoming is that under the public interest view there is a temptation to consider any 
market problem as a market failure requiring regulatory intervention. Therefore, 
authorities may be inclined to introduce any number of regulations to direct any 
activity by insurers (or consumers) that is considered to be in the public interest. This 
is underscored by the following statement: 
“There is more incentive for the law to grow, finding more and more ‘special 
cases’, which require regulation to correct failures in the market…it may be 
tempting for regulators to intervene to try to perfect what they regard as an 
imperfect market at every possible opportunity” (Booth, 1997: 683). 
Booth (1997) is merely reiterating John Stuart Mill who articulated this idea more 
than a century ago:  
“…the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public 
with purely personal conduct is that when it does interfere, the odds are 
that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place” (Mill, 1859/2010: 54). 
 
A reformulated version of the public interest theory proposes that regulatory agencies 
are created for bona fide public purposes. But these agencies are then mismanaged 
leading to potentially unfavourable (and unintended) consequences. This 
reformulation of the public interest theory remains inadequate since socially 
undesirable results of regulation are frequently sought by interest groups that have an 
influence over the development of the regulatory framework (Posner, 1974). Further, 
the evidence to suggest that mismanagement occurs within the regulatory agency is 
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surprisingly weak. Much of this evidence is consistent with the rival, capture theory of 
regulation: 
“...where the typical regulatory agency operates with reasonable efficiency to 
attain deliberately inefficient or inequitable goals set by the legislature” (Posner, 
1974: 337).  
 
Doron (1979) departs from the public interest theories of regulation by proposing yet 
another reformulation. He suggests that in some cases while regulation may be 
initiated to advance the public interest, the practical consequences may simply be 
compatible with the self-interest of the industry. To demonstrate this view the author 
examines the effects of regulation imposed upon the tobacco industry. 
 
Posner (1974) reports that the neutrality of the regulator often breaks down and this 
leads to a departure from the objectives of public interest theory. Meier (1991: 708) 
proposes three possible reasons for the regulator’s failure to protect and promote the 
public interest: 
1. bureaucratic incompetence; 
2. the lack of skills and resources internally; and 
3. the complexity of technical issues 
 
First, the regulatory agency will often fall victim to disinterest by staff and this may 
translate into incompetence. Wilson (1980: 147) suggests that bureaucratic 
incompetence is rather the consequence of inflexibility and additional constraints that 
are a feature of the political system. Second, Mitnick (1980) attributes the inability of 
regulatory agents to operate effectively to a lack of required skills, capacity and 
financial resources. Meier (1991) cites the lack of regulatory capacity as the major 
contributing factor for the sharp rise in insolvencies in the US insurance sector during 
the 1980s.  The third reason relates to the technical complexity that is often associated 
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with insurance products and issues, particularly, in the case of life and health 
insurance.   
 
Smith, Louberge and Shapiro (1986) put forward a fourth possible reason for the 
failure by regulators to safeguard the public interest. Regulators are not benevolent 
participants, but rather they pursue their own self-interest. Mayers and Smith (1981) 
explains that regulators may deliberately introduce additional rules and encourage 
further regulation to preserve their function and satisfy their political masters.  Posner 
(1974: 340) identifies that a serious flaw in any version of the public interest theory, is 
that it contains no linkage or mechanism by which a perception of the public interest 
is translated into legislative action.160 It is not sufficient to presume that a voter will 
vote for a particular candidate, who promises to carry out policies that are perceived 
to be in the public interest, there may be other policies that benefit the individual voter 
more (Posner, 1974: 340). According to Posner (1974), the public interest theory fails 
as a conceptual framework to explain the observed behaviour of participants in the 
regulatory process. Rahman (1992) concludes that public interest theory has two 
shortcomings; it does not take into account economic realities and it does not 
acknowledge that governments are made up of self-motivated interest groups.  
 
5.1.2 Capture Theory 
 
Capture theory maintains that theory of economic regulation is not remotely about the 
public interest, but rather a process by which interest groups seek to promote their 
own self-interests (Posner, 1974: 341). Regulation is viewed as “a partisan political 
process conferring benefits upon politically effective groups, which capture and 
dominate the regulatory process” (Adams & Tower, 1994: 167 cite Noll & Owen, 
1983 and Reagan, 1987).  Posner (1974) distinguishes between two hypotheses of 
capture theory; namely, the Marxist/Muckraker view and the Political Scientist 
perspective.  
                                                     
160 “In the theory of markets, the efforts of individuals to promote their self-interest through transacting 
brings about the efficient allocation of resources” (Posner, 1974: 340). 
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The Marxist/Muckraker view is a more radical interpretation of capture theory, 
whereby capitalists are considered to be a dominant participant in the regulatory 
process. The regulatory process promotes the interests of the capitalist whilst 
simultaneously alienating labour.  Adams and Tower (1994: 167) suggests that where 
markets have relatively unregulated industries and weak protection for consumers, it 
is indicative from the radical perspective that capitalist (corporate) interests are 
dominant to the detriment of the public. The idea that large corporations ultimately 
control regulation is defective, given that a great deal of economic regulation also 
serves the interests of smaller firms or non-industry groups (Posner, 1974 and Stigler, 
1971).  
 
Political scientists do not subscribe to the radical view advocated by the Marxists and 
Muckrakers. But rather considers the regulatory process as the outcome of 
opportunistic capture by politically effective groups. Figure 5-2 illustrates the 
conceptual capture theory model ascribed to by the political scientists. Industry 
groups are successful in capturing regulatory favour, because according to Feroz 
(1987) they possess: 
1. superior economic resources; 
2. interest in the beneficial outcome that can be derived by controlling the 
regulatory process;  
3. sound organisational capabilities; and 
4. a comparative advantage with respect to industry-specific technical 
knowledge. 
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Figure 5-2: Adams and Tower (1994: 168)’s Political Scientist View of Capture Theory – 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stigler (1971: 4-6) discusses the four primary reasons why industry groups devote 
resources in an attempt to capture the regulatory process:  
 Direct subsidy – An obvious avenue for industry groups is to seek a direct cash 
subsidy from government. For example, in the 1960s almost all universities in the 
United Kingdom were publically funded. Although more recently there has been 
an irrevocable change in the balance between public and private funding, direct 
public subventions still account for on average around two thirds of total funding 
for universities in the United Kingdom (Greenaway & Haynes, 2003).161 Stigler 
(1971) points out that industry groups with significant influence do not tend to 
seek out cash subsidies, because unless the number of beneficiaries can be 
restricted through an effective device, the subsidy funding will be distributed more 
thinly amongst a growing number of rivals.   
 Control over Entry – Many devices are sought by industry groups to limit the rate 
of entry by new rivals into established oligopolistic industries. These include 
peculiar pricing (rate) regulation and vertical integration. It is likely that this form 
of pricing regulation introduced through the concept of community rating in South 
Africa’s health insurance sector, has permitted medical schemes and their 
associated administrators to consolidate their dominant positions in the 
marketplace.  
  Substitutes and Complements – Industry groups will often make an effort to 
influence regulation with respect to substitutes and complements. Stigler (1971) 
                                                     
161 Greenaway and Haynes (2003) also discuss how the mechanisms to disburse public funding to 
tertiary educational institutions have changed. There has been a shift away from block grants to fund 
teaching and research, to earmarked funding, which is partly formulaic and partly performance-based. 
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uses the example of butter producers, who wish to suppress margarine and 
encourage bread production.  
 Price Controls – Price controls are essential to achieve competitive rates of return. 
Stigler (1971) notes that if there are an adequate number of firms within an 
industry, price discrimination becomes problematic in the absence of government 
intervention. 
 
Authors such as Gormley (1986), suggest that the ability of industry groups to capture 
the regulatory process is directly related to the degree of complexity within an 
industry. Politicians that find issues too technical or complex within an industry are 
likely to discount their importance. Therefore, under these circumstances politicians 
would favour a system of self-regulation (Meier, 1991).  
 
Posner (1974) questions the validity of capture theory viewing it as a hypothesis 
rather than a theory with theoretical foundations. Posner (1974: 342) takes exception 
to the characterisation of the interaction between the regulatory agency and the 
industry group as a “metaphor of conquest”. Rahman (1992) criticizes the political 
scientist’s view of capture theory since it has weak explanatory and predictive power. 
Moreover, Rahman (1992: 113) states that: 
“...no reason is suggested as to why the regulated industry should be the only 
interest group able to influence a regulatory agency...Lastly, it ignores a good 
deal of evidence that the interests promoted by regulatory agencies can also be in 
accord with those of other groups rather than that of the regulated firms alone”.   
 
5.1.3 Economic Theory of Regulation 
 
The economic theory of regulation was first articulated by Stigler (1971). At first 
glance, it appears to be a refined version of capture theory. It discards the assumption 
of “pristine legislative purpose” and admits the possibility of other interest groups 
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“capturing” the regulatory process (Posner, 1974: 343). Stigler (1971) expands the 
tenets of capture theory to embrace the concept of public choice. Public choice is 
described by Mueller (1976: 395) as “... the economic study of non-market decision 
making or simply the application of economics to political science”. The theory 
perceives regulation to be an economic good governed by the traditional laws of 
supply and demand. Figure 5-3 describes the relationship between participant groups 
under the economic theory of regulation.   
 
Figure 5-3: Adams and Tower (1994: 171)’s Economic Theory of Regulation – Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stigler (1971)’s contention with the notion of a “pristine legislator” was its 
inconsistency with actual experience. He discusses an example in the United States 
where oil import quotas were introduced. The quotas were designed to protect the 
public by ensuring that there was a stable oil supply during times of conflict. The 
author contends that a tariff-based system would have been better as it would generate 
a significant stream of revenue for the government, and these funds could be allocated 
in such a way as to shore-up the oil supply chain to protect the United States economy 
during times of conflict. The oil quotas had the effect of merely benefitting the local 
oil producers at the expense of the consumers. Moreover, he answers the question as 
to why a well-organised and powerful special interest group like the oil industry, 
which is able to take advantage of the regulatory environment, would seek the 
coercive powers of the state rather than a cash subsidy. 
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This example serves to exemplify the underlying principles behind Stigler (1971)’s 
argument in favour of the economic theory of regulation. If the government provided 
a generous cash subsidy to local oil producers, the industry would see an influx of 
new entrants eager to receive these subsidies and thereby hinder incumbents’ ability 
to extract economic rents (Stigler, 1971). The allure of cash subsidies may be a 
motivator for companies to actively lobby for cash subsidies from the state, but the 
dilution of these subsidies through the influx of new entrants suggests that there are 
even greater gains to be had from cultivating the coercive powers of the state.  Stigler 
(1971: 4) describes the coercive powers of the state in the following bold statement:  
“The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even 
the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce. The state can seize money by 
the only method which is permitted by the laws of a civilised society, by 
taxation. The state can ordain the physical movements of resources and the 
economic decisions of households and firms without their consent. These powers 
provide the possibilities for the utilisation of the state by an industry to increase 
its profitability.” 
 
An example of the regulation that favours one particular industry over another 
competing industry is discussed by Stigler (1971) in his examination of the railroad 
industry versus freight transportation by road. In the United States at the time of the 
Great Depression, public investment in infrastructure benefited the interstate and 
highway road network, which in turn saw the trucking industry gain market share in 
the long-haul freight business. This prompted the railroad industry to lobby for stricter 
regulation of the long-haul freight business. The railroad industry managed to gain 
assistance and protection from the government, but according to the author the costs 
to society were not offset by the benefits that the railroad industry enjoyed.  
 
To understand how it is possible for certain special-interest groups to acquire the 
coercive powers of the state, it is necessary to examine the political process and its 
interaction with markets. Stigler (1971) points out that the political process is vastly 
different from the processes that govern markets. If a referendum is called on a 
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particular issue, say to prohibit the drinking of tea, and the outcome of the referendum 
is that the majority is in favour of this prohibition. The result of referendum would 
have to be followed by the entire population of the country, despite your individual 
vote (and objection) against such a proposal.  In this example, it is clear that the 
political process underlying a democracy requires everyone to take a decision 
simultaneously. The political process incurs great costs as everyone’s opinion has to 
be gauged to decide a particular issue at a single point in time. This cost may simply 
be transferred when voters elect representatives that are employed to take decisions on 
their behalf. Therefore, Stigler (1971: 10) argues that: 
 “…the political decision does not predict voter desires and make preparations to 
fulfil them in advance of their realisation”.  
A further observation is that the political process requires the involvement of society 
as a whole, and not merely individuals who are directly involved or those that have an 
inherent interest in the outcome of the political decision. This is in contrast to the 
market where this is not required. For example, individuals who are afraid of flying, 
do not need to make choices between air travel and a train journey (Stigler, 1971). 
Companies that transport goods over long distances, however, would need to 
continuously evaluate the costs and benefits from both modes of transport before 
arriving at a decision. As Stigler (1971) suggests the company would essentially be 
“voting” on the issue on a continual basis. The political decision making process must 
include everyone, it cannot “…allow participation in proportion to interest and 
knowledge” (Stigler, 1971: 11).  
 
The political process therefore suffers from a potential lack of participation by voters 
(apathy if you will). This non-participation may occur as a result of a number of 
reasons – it may simply be the case that individuals are unfamiliar or disinterested in 
certain issues. To overcome this problem Stigler (1971) suggests that government can 
effectively segment itself through the decentralisation of decision-making. The 
segmentation may take place with respect to elected representatives. For example, 
certain representatives may take up specific causes or merely devote themselves to 
particular policy issues involving education as opposed to healthcare. The existence of 
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political parties is simply another method by which politically-charged individuals 
can organise themselves according to a predefined set of policies.  It allows persons 
that run for political office to seek out the support from specific groups of individuals 
and should they commit themselves to implement the wishes of their constituency, 
they also conceivably increase their likelihood of being elected.  
 
The desire to be re-elected and remain in office, may encourage certain 
representatives to withdraw their support for a particular economic policy that would 
be seen to be harmful to their constituents (Stigler, 1971). One example is some 
politicians may seek favour by voting against austerity measures, which increase taxes 
and cut welfare benefits or social grants. He does suggest that a representative who 
could be assured of re-election if they voted against say austerity measures would 
undoubtedly do so. Special interest groups are not precluded from benefiting from the 
desires of representatives to be re-elected. For example, if a representative were to 
vote against legislation that favours a certain industry through subsidies or other 
financial support may encourage these industry members to support other candidates. 
Stigler (1971: 12) states it bluntly “[t]he industry which seeks political power must go 
to the appropriate seller, the political party”. In summary, Stigler (1971)’s view is that 
regulation is an economic good and the political process that supports this regulation 
has associated costs which must be met by industries who seek to capture the coercive 
powers of the state. The author’s argument appears to support the view that 
government intervention is driven by the desire of elected representatives to maintain 
political office.  
 
Peltzman (1976: 212) contends that industry groups’ interests still prevail in the 
market because they possess informational advantages over consumers or politicians. 
Regulation is supplied by policymakers as long as the demand from politically 
effective groups exceeds the opposition to the regulation (Rahman, 1992: 115).  
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Unlike public interest theory, the economic theory of regulation asserts that 
government intervention does not attempt to remedy market imperfections, but rather 
like capture theory it accommodates the idea that regulation exists to promote the 
interests of politically effectual industry participants (Adams & Tower, 1994: 170 
cites Stigler, 1971). It is further suggested that within an industry that has many 
competitors, the economic theory of regulation predicts that the demand for regulation 
will be greatest. Conversely, where there is a highly-concentrated industry with fewer 
companies, it is likely that an industry’s interests will be best served through self-
regulation (Adams & Tower, 1994).   
 
Posner (1974) acknowledges that Stigler (1971)’s economic theory of regulation 
requires refinement and he goes further to highlight the absence of empirical support 
favouring this view of regulation. However, he does admit that the economic theory of 
regulation is far more compelling than the public interest view of regulation. Posner 
(1974) does not dismiss the possibility that regulation (and their corresponding 
regulatory agency) may be created with good intentions and it can be viewed as an 
honest attempt to pursue the public interest. It is difficult to believe though that even 
if a market failure is correctly identified, regulators will possess the appropriate 
interventions to correct this market failure and bring about a more efficient outcome. 
He argues that the lack of technical knowledge and the sheer complexity of markets is 
a significant obstacle in preventing regulators from achieving what may be their well-
placed objectives. 
 
In addition, the costs of legislative supervision of regulators are generally prohibitive. 
The process whereby legislators engage with the private sector via negotiation and 
consultation incurs further costs. These costs may not simply be of a financial nature 
and can include after all the need to devote an inordinate amount of time to 
understand the complexities of industry dynamics, engage in difficult negotiations and 
develop appropriate regulatory interventions.  Therefore, Posner (1974) proposes that 
legislators will increasingly delegate duties to regulatory agencies and as a result they 
will relinquish control over them. The so-called life-cycle theory of regulation 
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promotes the idea that in the early stages of a regulator’s life-cycle, legislators are 
prepared to devote time to tackle regulatory-related issues and oversee the functioning 
of the regulatory agency. However, over time this interest and willingness dissipates 
as attention is drawn away to other areas of concern. Considering all these factors, he 
quite cynically comments that it is no wonder that regulatory agencies fail in fulfilling 
their key objectives. In fact, there failure may distort the efficient functioning of 
regulated markets (Posner, 1974). 
 
5.2 Chicago School of Regulatory Capture 
 
Stigler (1971)’s economic theory of regulation does not preclude the possibility of 
regulatory capture. Unlike the authoritarian notion of capture by industry groups in 
capture theory, economic theory argues that through the superior information that 
regulated firms possess they are able to capture the regulatory process for their own 
benefit (Peltzman, 1976). Boehm (2007) distinguishes between regulatory capture 
and regulatory opportunism. Regulatory capture occurs when regulated firms capture 
reforms for their own narrow interest. Regulatory opportunism on the other hand 
describes the situation whereby regulations are captured by politicians, who abuse 
their regulatory powers for their own purposes. Corruption, regulatory capture and 
regulatory opportunism represent transaction costs of regulation, and they undermine 
the stated objectives of reforms (Estache & Martimort, 1999).   
 
The capture or interest-group theories can be traced back to Montesquieu and Marx. 
Karl Marx promoted the view that large corporations controls institutions and 
consequently controls regulation, which adversely affects the working classes 
(Laffont & Tirole, 1991). Stigler (1971) extended the paradigm to include the 
possibility that smaller organisations and interest groups may also have a direct 
influence upon the regulatory process. Moreover, utilising, Buchanan (1965) and 
Olson (1965)’s theory of collective action, it was possible for Stigler (1971) to explain 
how “regulation is acquired by the industry, and designed and operated primarily for 
its benefit” (Stigler, 1971: 3). Stigler and Friedland (1962) was a precursor to Stigler 
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(1971)’s seminal paper on the theory of economic regulation, where the authors 
investigated the influence regulators had upon prices in the electricity sector in the 
United States. Stigler and Friedland (1962) undertook a regression analysis, where 
prices were a function of various variables and a dummy variable for regulation. It 
was concluded that there was no discernable difference between regulated and non-
regulated public utilities. Therefore, they proposed the hypothesis that regulation’s 
objective is to promote the interests of industry groups rather than maximise social 
welfare. 
 
George Stigler (1971), Sam Peltzman (1976), Richard Posner (1971, 1974, and 1975) 
and Gary S. Becker (1983, 1986) constitute the main contributors from the Chicago 
School. These contributions are also referred to as the interest-group theories, since 
they are based upon Olson (1965)’s collective action argument. The emergence of 
powerful consumer groups and the regulatory experience during the 1970s led some 
researchers such as Peltzman (1976) to take a broader view of Stigler (1971)’s 
contribution (Laffont & Tirole, 1991: 1090). Government agents arbitrate among 
competing interests and this is not necessarily in favour of business.   
 
Although, Peltzman (1976) formalises Stigler (1971)’s economic theory of regulation, 
he reaches a different conclusion. He asserts that frictions that are present within the 
political process hinder a dominant group’s expansion and their ability to extract all 
the potential benefits. The notion is predicated on the view that well-placed special-
interest groups that wield considerable influence upon regulators, cannot completely 
capture a regulatory agency because the regulator will have sufficient political 
pressure to “…exclusively [serve] a single economic interest” (Peltzman, 1976: 211). 
Peltzman (1976: 212) contends that industry groups’ interests still “prevail” in the 
market because they possess informational advantages over consumers or politicians. 
The author put forward the following equation whereby the legislator attempts to 
maximise net votes or a majority ܯ: 
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Equation 5-1: Expected Number of Votes for the Legislator (Peltzman, 1976) 
ࡹ ൌ ࢔ࢌ െ ሺࡺ െ ࢔ሻࢎ 
where	ࡹ	represents	the	expected	number	of	votes	that	the	candidate	would	receive,	that	is	the	
chance	 of	 re‐election,	 ࢔	 is	 the	 number	 of	 potential	 voters	 in	 the	 beneficiary	 group,	 ࡺ	 is	 total	
number	of	potential	voters,	ࢌ	represents	that	net	probability	that	a	beneficiary	will	grant	support	
and	ࢎ	represents	the	net	probability	that	he	who	is	taxed	ሺࡺ െ ࢔ሻ	opposes	the	legislator. 
 
The model Peltzman (1976) sets out a regulatory process whereby a transfer of wealth 
is at stake.  More particularly, he considers the political process as if control of the 
relevant taxing authority rests upon direct voting. He assumes that there are two 
groups, the beneficiary group who ultimately benefits from political favours by the 
legislator and a non-beneficiary group that receives no favours. Now, beneficiaries 
pay with both votes and dollars, where the dollars for the legislator serve to mitigate 
against opposition (Peltzman, 1976).  In Peltzman (1976: 214)’s model, “…direct 
political support [votes] is the object sought directly by the regulator”. The legislator 
seeks to maximise net votes or a majority in his favour. The author asserts that greater 
majorities are assumed to imply greater security of tenure. According to Peltzman 
(1976), the crucial decision that the regulator (or would-be regulator) has to make is 
with respect to the numerical size of the group he promises favours to and hence, the 
reciprocal group that he or she taxes.   
 
Further assumptions that Peltzman (1976) makes include that: 
 ݂ and ݄	are not equal to zero or unity, and depend upon the amount of the group 
member's gain or loss;  
 Gains and losses are equal per capita within groups; 
 Ignorance does not lead to perverse or biased voting – in other words if a 
beneficiary is not sufficiently informed to vote for his or her benefactor, then his 
or her voting decision are not biased in favour of or against the benefactor. 
Peltzman (1976) suggest that the person either abstains or votes by tossing a fair 
coin. 
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Peltzman (1976) defines the probability of support as follows: 
Equation 5-2: Probability of Support (Peltzman, 1976) 
ࢌ ൌ ࢌሺࢍሻ 
Where ࢍ is the per capita net benefit, and is given by: 
ࢍ ൌ ࢀ െࡷ െ ࡯ሺ࢔ሻ࢔  
where	ࢌ	represents	that	net	probability	that	a	beneficiary	will	grant	support,	ࢀ	is	the	total	dollar	
amount	transferred	to	the	beneficiary	group,	ࡷ	represents	the	dollars	spent	by	beneficiaries	 in	
campaign	funds,	lobbying	etc.	to	mitigate	opposition	and	࡯ሺ࢔ሻ	represents	the	cost	of	organizing	
both	 direct	 support	 of	 beneficiaries	 and	 efforts	 to	 mitigate	 opposition.	 This	 organization	 cost	
increases	with	n,	but	no	restrictions	are	stipulated	with	respect	to	the	shape	of	the	marginal	cost	
curve	(Peltzman,	1976). 
 
From Equation 5-2, the number of votes in support depends upon ݊, in the following 
two offsetting ways: a larger ݊ translates into a broader base of support, but at the 
same time dilutes the net gain per member and therefore the probability of a 
member’s support would also decline (Peltzman, 1976). He proposes that the 
legislator chooses both ܭ and ܶ. Now, the total dollar amount transferred to the 
beneficiary group ܶ is described in Equation 5-3. 
 
Equation 5-3: Total amount transferred to the Beneficiary Group (Peltzman, 1976) 
ࢀ ൌ ࢚࡮ሺࡺ െ ࢔ሻ 
where	 ࢀ	 is	 the	 total	 dollar	 amount	 transferred	 to	 the	 beneficiary	 group,	 ࢚	 represents	 the	
corresponding	 tax	 rate	 on	 ࡮,	 which	 is	 the	 wealth	 of	 each	 member	 outside	 of	 the	 beneficiary	
group.	 ࢔	 is	 the	 number	 of	 potential	 voters	 in	 the	 beneficiary	 group	 and	ࡺ	 is	 total	 number	 of	
potential	voters	(Peltzman,	1976). 
 
Peltzman (1976: 216) proposes that the “[o]pposition is assumed to be generated by 
the tax rate and mitigated by voter education expenditures per capita ሺݖሻ”. Therefore, 
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݄, which represents the net probability that he who is taxed (from the non-beneficiary 
group) opposes the legislator, can be determined as follows:  
 
Equation 5-4: Probability of Opposition (Peltzman, 1976) 
ࢎ ൌ ࢎሺ࢚, ࢠሻ 
Where ࢠ, the per capita expenditure on voter education, can be determined by the 
following: 
ࢠ ൌ ࡷሺࡺ െ ࢔ሻ 
where	 ࡷ	 represents	 the	 dollars	 spent	 by	 beneficiaries	 in	 campaign	 funds,	 lobbying	 etc.	 to	
mitigate	opposition,	࢔	 is	 the	number	of	potential	voters	 in	 the	beneficiary	group	and	ࡺ	 is	 total	
number	of	potential	voters	(Peltzman,	1976). 
 
To summarise, Peltzman (1976)’s model demonstrates that the legislator will attempt 
to maximise Equation 5-1, that is maximise ܯ, by considering the competing interest 
groups; namely the beneficiary group ሺ݊ሻ and the non-beneficiary group ሺܰ െ ݊ሻ. It 
will be necessary for the legislator to assess the relative probabilities of political 
support provided by the beneficiary group and opposition from the non-beneficiary 
group, denoted by ݂ and ݄, respectively (Peltzman, 1976). From Equation 5-1, it is 
clear that he incorporates his view that a legislator does not serve a single economic 
interest – one has both the beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups competing for 
political support (or opposition as it may be). Furthermore, it is noted that as the non-
beneficiary group (or public-at-large) increases their involvement in political activity 
(as the total number of potential voters increase, implicitly so does the total number of 
members of the non-beneficiary group) there will be a greater chance that the non-
beneficiary group’s interests being pursued. Yet, if the probability of non-beneficiary 
opposition ሺ݄ሻ declines then it is more likely that the beneficiary group will benefit 
from the favours of the legislator and by inference have the ability to mould 
legislation to their benefit (Peltzman, 1976).  
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Crucial to Peltzman (1976)’s analysis is the assumption that the public is informed 
and politically active. Stigler (1971) articulated that without a vocal public, there is 
little incentive for a regulator to act in the public interest. Booth (1997) successfully 
argues that the regulation of insurance is likely to be an inconsequential issue for 
voters that are considering the re-election of a legislator. 
 
Becker (1983) presents a model similar to Peltzman (1976), which once again 
considers the influence of various interest groups within the political or regulatory 
process. He argues that the influence and ultimately the policy outcomes depend upon 
the strength of the respective pressure groups. Becker (1983: 372) proposes that the 
competition: 
“...between these pressure groups for political influence determines the 
equilibrium structure of taxes, subsidies and other political favours”.  
Therefore, the crucial outcome from Becker (1983)’s model is that a regulator will 
accommodate broader economic interests, which contradicts the: 
“… all-or-nothing outcomes implied by many other formal models of political 
behaviour, where the ‘majority’ clearly wins and the ‘minority’ clearly loses” 
(Becker, 1983: 372 – 373). 
 
Along the lines of Peltzman (1976), Becker (1983) for simplification purposes, 
proposes that there are two competing groups, those that pay taxes and those that 
receive subsidies. As in Peltzman (1976), the model introduces a political process that 
centres around a transfer of wealth mechanism. Both groups attempt to maximise their 
income. The author specifically concentrates on impact that the deadweight costs have 
on the competition between the two groups. For example, an increase in deadweight 
cost of a subsidy will translate into a lower revenue figure from taxes, which in turns 
lowers the contributions that can be made to the subsidised group. Hence, the 
subsidised group will have fewer incentives to lobby for subsidies going forward. 
Equally, high deadweight costs associated with tax will stimulate greater political 
pressure from the taxed interest group to reduce their tax liability. 
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The ability of any group to engender political influence is a function of each group’s 
relative efficiency in putting forward their agenda compared to the other competing 
groups. What is more the relative efficiency of each group is itself a function of the 
capacity of the group to restrict free-riders. Free-riders create an externality upon the 
other members of a group, because they effectively increase the costs of lobbying, 
since they are able to avoid their obligations. Becker (1983) maintains that a group, 
which is able to restrict the activities of free-riders, will benefit greatly from improved 
efficiency. As a consequence, he argues that the more successful groups are likely to 
be small and relatively homogenous. Generally, homogenous groups would imply that 
the members of each group are identical with respect to all aspects. In the context of 
Becker (1983), a homogenous group refers to a group where the costs and benefits of 
pressure are equal. He does acknowledge that larger firms may be able to take 
advantage of economies of scale and therefore achieve greater success in the political 
process.  This translates into the observation that groups who seek subsidies will 
generally be small relative to the groups that pay taxes. The author points to the 
political success of farmers in rich countries and urban dwellers in poor countries as 
examples. As the total number of taxpayers rise, he argues that the deadweight costs 
of tax would decline since there is a reduction in the tax paid per capita. Boehm 
(2007) states that as opposed to Stigler (1971), a single interest group cannot 
completely dictate their agenda to the legislator since other interest groups are able to 
exert political pressure as well. If the two groups outlined in Becker (1983)’s model 
were homogenous, it would imply that both group’s political influence would be 
offsetting – thus, the aggregate influence would be zero. 
 
Becker (1986) examines the issue of regulatory capture and finds support for 
Peltzman (1976)’s assertions that while the political clout of an industry acquiring 
regulation is important, Becker (1986: 230) concludes that “…it is not always 
decisive. The public’s interest can be and is maintained in most states”. Peltzman 
(1976) and Becker (1983)’s extensions to Stigler (1971)’s model do demonstrate that 
the public interest view of regulation is not unattainable. Empirical findings that 
examine the regulation of the insurance industry are ambiguous at best. Empirical 
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results published in Joskow (1973), and Frech and Samprone (1980) do favour Stigler 
(1971)’s hypothesis, whereas Ippolito (1979)’s results are more consistent with 
Peltzman (1976)’s assertions.  
 
Boehm (2007) notes an apparent shortcoming of Stigler (1971)’s economic theory of 
regulation, namely, how can the theory explain the proclivity towards deregulation by 
industry groups. In the South African health insurance sector prior to the 
promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, it was evident that there 
was a period of deregulation. It permitted medical aid schemes to apply principles of 
sound risk management and managed care in the design of products, benefit coverage 
levels, contribution rates and healthy-lifestyle incentive schemes. Boehm (2007) 
argues that these periods of deregulation can be seen as a period of re-regulation. In 
South Africa, the 1989 and 1993 Medical Scheme Amendment Acts are a case in 
point, where the deregulation of medical schemes was achieved through the 
reformulation of the legislation.  
 
5.3 Virginia School of Regulatory Capture 
 
The Virginia School has its origin in Public Choice economics and its scholars have 
the flavour of Austrian economists such as von Hayek, Mises and Schumpeter. Whilst 
also considering competition among pressure groups for political influence, the 
Virginia School focuses upon the social welfare implications ensuing from these 
activities – the theory of rent seeking. Boehm (2007) suggests that in a narrow sense, 
public choice is concerned with the failures of government. The belief is that all 
political-empowered participants, including politicians and civil-service servants, are 
self-interested actors that follow their own interests. Moreover, government is thought 
to have insurmountable difficulties in correcting market failures or, at least, if they 
can correct these market failures, it is only possible at a cost that is in excess of the 
costs emanating from the market failures themselves. In a wider sense, he contends 
that public choice is the application of economic methods of analysis to political 
institutions and governmental decision-making. 
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The Austrian school of thought does provide one of the clearest counterarguments 
against the assertions underpinning the public interest view of regulation. According 
to the Austrian philosophy, the public interest view is unattainable. The argument that 
somehow regulators are in possession of all the required knowledge in terms of costs 
and consumer preferences is fallacious. The public interest will be pushed aside by the 
motives of self-interested regulators who are led by a narrow incentive set. Another 
key focus of the Austrian view is that market is the most effective disseminator of 
information. According to Booth (1997: 693) “…[variety] can exist in a market which 
can lead to the satisfaction of more preferences than in a regulated market”.   
 
The Virginia School acknowledges that some form of insurance regulation will 
always be present, but it is unlikely that the regulation will address market mischiefs. 
Hayek (1960: 222) remarks that a:  
“…functioning market economy presupposes certain activities on the part of the 
state”.  
The magnitude of regulation is perhaps less of concern when compared to the actual 
activities underlying government intervention. Hayek (1960) maintains that a 
centrally planned economy will lead to a market that does not function properly.  
 
Hayek (1960) goes further by arguing that a framework of general laws is the most 
prudent course of action by government legislators since the impact will be more 
predictable. A general set of laws should not allow for bureaucratic discretion because 
any civil servant does not possess all the necessary information to take discretionary 
steps (Hayek, 1960). Moreover, by permitting bureaucrats to operate in a 
discretionary environment, it spawns the potential for market participants to receive 
contradictory signals as to how they should operate. Therefore, he asserts that a more 
appropriate regulatory framework would be based upon a set of predefined principles 
that favour generalities rather than specifics. The author contends that regulation for 
the most part will simply impose additional costs in terms of production and hinder 
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product innovations. Therefore, the objective of regulation must indeed be meaningful 
considering the considerable costs that it imposes.  
 
Within an environment of general rules and principles, Hayek (1976) considers the 
ability of market participants to learn from their mistakes and this capacity to 
assimilate knowledge allows for the development of a sophisticated economy. He 
does not believe that the accumulation of knowledge is attainable by a central 
authority. The following statement emphasises this point: 
“Even in the modern welfare societies the great majority and the most important 
of the daily needs of the great masses are met as a result of processes whose 
particulars government does not and cannot know” (Hayek, 1976: 2).  
Hayek (1976) is adamant that a market should be allowed to develop within an 
appropriate set of regulations. The author views the development of an economy as a 
dynamic process, which evolves as market participants adapt to changing 
circumstances, evaluate promising avenues of commerce and abandon those that 
prove to be unsuccessful. 
 
As a further extension to this discussion, Hayek (1988) argues that civilisation has 
only progressed due to ability of individuals to learn through their interactions with 
one another in terms of trade and exchange. According to the author, government 
intervention evidenced in Ancient Greece impeded the improvement and cultural 
evolution that was taking place at the time. He asserts that markets are propelled not 
by the provocation through government intervention, but rather by the desire for 
knowledge by individuals. According to Hayek (1988: 46), the development of any 
institution occurs because of the:  
“…experimental process of adaptation to unforeseen change by the observation 
of abstract rules which, when successful could lead to the increase of numbers 
and the formation of regular patterns”.  
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Booth (1997) concurs with Hayek (1976, 1988)’s view concerning the importance of 
knowledge accumulation and suggests that the “litmus-test” for the introduction of 
any regulation should be whether or not it undermines the ability of market 
participants to acquire knowledge once mistakes are made. He maintains that the 
presence of deficiencies that hinder participants from acquiring knowledge from 
adverse events is the true test to determine if regulation is warranted. For example, the 
introduction of measures to avoid the repetition of past failures may prevent market 
participants from acquiring this knowledge. 
 
Booth (1997) strongly objects to any attempt by regulators to protect investors from 
risk. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 is a point in question, whereby 
governments came to the rescue of financial institutions that essentially failed to 
adequately measure and manage the inherent risks they took on in their “blind” 
endeavours to earn superior returns. He argues that regulations to safeguard investors 
from their own decisions can easily be construed as protecting investors from market 
mechanisms. Attempts to shield investors from risk may simply be political and 
according to Booth (1997) the timeframe in which investors may acquire knowledge 
to correct past mistakes may be too prolonged and therefore untenable. Hence, the 
desire by regulators to respond promptly to financial scandals encourages regulatory 
action. 
 
Tollison (1998) states that interest-group theory is concerned with lobbying and the 
theory of rent seeking is concerned with the costs associated with lobbying. Tullock 
(1967) demonstrated that in addition to the welfare loss attributable to the market 
power of a monopoly, there is additional wastage of resources to protect the 
monopoly’s position against competition and regulation (Boehm, 1997). Other 
contributors to the Virginia School include Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Downs 
(1957). Downs (1957) attempts specifically to integrate government and private 
decision-makers into a single general equilibrium theory.  To summarise, regulation is 
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created not to serve the public interest, but rather to create and protect oligopolistic 
rents.162  
 
5.4 Tollbooth Theories 
 
Politicians and bureaucrats are viewed as active participants in the capture of the 
regulatory process, whereby they attempt to extort rents from private firms and 
industries (Soto, 1989; Shleifer & Visny, 1994; and Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
& Visny, 1998). Under the Tollbooth theory, the political establishment and 
regulatory agents may erect obtrusive regulation to simply extract benefits from 
regulated industries.  
 
Corruption becomes an avenue for regulated industries to circumvent these inefficient 
regulations. In the process of his research, Soto (1989) and a group of researchers 
undertook an experiment whereby they established a small business in Lima, Peru. 
The idea was to attempt to establish a small business by adhering to all regulations 
and without paying any form of bribe to hasten regulatory procedures (Soto, 1989). 
During this process, the researchers were approached no less than ten times by 
unscrupulous regulatory agents seeking to extort bribes.  In two of the cases, it was 
necessary to pay the bribes otherwise it would have been impossible to establish the 
business. The process to establish the business took all of 289 days (Soto, 1989). 
Thus, according to the view espoused by the Tollbooth theories, corruption is often 
considered as necessary to overcome unfair or inefficient legislation and regulations 
(Boehm, 1997).  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) examine the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and 
create a bargaining model that investigates why regulators seek to maintain control 
over privatised firm through the regulatory process. In line with the Tollbooth theories 
                                                     
162 According to rent-seeking theories, these oligopolistic rents may be fully or partially wasted in the 
industry’s attempt to compete for these rents.   
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of regulatory capture, regulators are reluctant to relinquish control since they are able 
to extract rents from the privatised firm through corrupt practices. Examples of which 
occur in many countries and Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 1007) observe that the 
heightened regulatory control:  
“…might shed light on the large amount of corruption [present] in countries 
[such as] Italy or the Philippines, where firms are privately owned…and [these 
firms] pay enormous bribes to politicians who control them through regulation.” 
 
Boehm (2007) suggests that Shleifer and Vishny (1994), however, remain vague 
concerning the type of regulation imposed upon newly privatised-firms in order to 
extract these rents through coercive means. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) also remain 
silent with respect to the structure of the industry in which the privatised firm finds 
itself and according to Boehm (1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1994) fail to address the 
significant trade-off between the opportunities for corruption through introduced 
regulation and the costs related to market imperfections if privatised firms are left 
unregulated. 
 
Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) empirically test for the 
existence of the tollbooth theory. Regulations considered by Djankov et al. (2002) 
include entry regulation, start-up requirements, number of procedures, official costs of 
following these procedures and minimum official time for a start-up to begin 
operations. As stated by Boehm (1997), the regulations considered should ensure for 
example, a minimum level of quality of goods that are supplied by new entrants, and 
further hinder entrants from operating according to fly-by-night strategies. Djankov et 
al. (2002) find that more regulation induces higher levels of corruption and larger 
underground economies.  Furthermore, Djankov et al. (2002) find that efficient 
governments do not impose significant entry regulations and according to Djankov et 
al. (2002) provides evidence against the public interest theories of regulation in favour 
of the public choice view. 
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Rose-Ackerman (1999) warns against inferences that perceive certain regulations to 
be ‘unfair’ or ‘inefficient’. Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that it provides for 
example, an excuse for multinational companies that operate in developing economies 
to engage in corrupt practices, since they view certain regulations as being unfair (or 
inefficient) and therefore opportunities to circumvent these become justifiable.   This 
gives firms license to decide which laws and regulations they consider to be just and 
efficient and therefore by implication those that should be adhered to. Rose-Ackerman 
(1999) insists that such conduct would certainly not be tolerated in most developed 
economies. Many believe environmental or health and safety regulations are unfair as 
they confer competitive disadvantages upon certain companies (Boehm, 1997).  
 
The consideration that somehow a well-placed payoff is justified as it leads to higher 
profits in the future is intolerable (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). These corrupt practices, 
according to Rose-Ackerman (1999), are extremely harmful to the development of 
credible democratic institutions, which assist in stimulating economic growth and the 
general upliftment of the population within developing economies. Boehm (1997: 8) 
conclude that: 
“…[e]ven if it is certainly true and perhaps even inevitable that certain laws are 
inefficient or even unfair – [where does one draw the line?]”.  
 
5.5 Toulouse School of Regulatory Capture 
 
Laffont and Tirole (1991, 1993) assimilate both the Chicago and Virginia Schools to 
arrive at a theory of regulatory capture that considers two important elements; namely, 
asymmetric information and the principal-agent conflict. These contributions have 
been broadly grouped as part of the Toulouse School of Regulatory Capture. They 
state that in the absence of information asymmetries, firms would be unable to extract 
rents and thus, the theory of regulatory capture based upon rent-seeking would fall 
short. Spiller (1990) discusses the potential principal-agency conflict that can arise 
between regulator and legislature.  
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Levine and Forrence (1990) examine the merits of the public interest and capture 
theories of regulation within the context of agency and information theory. The notion 
that governing institution operate as a “black box” is a drawback of both the public 
interest and capture theory (Levine & Forrence, 1990: 171). The authors suggest 
though that capture theory is far more successful in describing regulatory activities 
and serves as a suitable theoretical construct from which further research can be 
undertaken. It is the contention of the authors that most governmental institutions 
(including regulatory agencies) are able to operate without much oversight by the 
public or by legislators, who should themselves answer to the electorate. Thus, the 
difficulty with regulation is  
“…the inability of voters or their intermediaries to effectively limit and control 
regulation within the complex political system” (Levine & Forrence, 1990: 171).  
Levine and Forrence (1990) acknowledge the concerns raised by Posner (1974), 
whereby they also recognise the cost of acquiring accurate information with respect to 
a regulated industry and the uncertainty that pervades interactions between regulator, 
industry representatives and the public-at-large. It is these concerns that form the basis 
for the analysis undertaken by Levine and Forrence (1990), whereby they attempt to 
explain how the electorate’s concerns are translated into policy.  
 
Kalt and Zupan (1984) attempt to judge:  
“…the empirical importance of the altruistic, publicly interested goals of rational 
actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes” (Kalt & Zupan, 1984: 
279). 
Levine and Forrence (1990) utilise Kalt and Zupan (1984)’s framework to examine 
the situation where the principal-agent relationship between the voter and the 
politician ultimately leads to what can be referred to as slack (frictions resulting from 
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agency conflicts).163 This feature permits a politician to side-step his or her 
responsibility to the electorate. Levine and Forrence (1990) assert that slack enables 
special interest-groups to persuade legislators to treat them favourably. Levine and 
Forrence (1990) do recognise that this particular principal-agent view does deviate 
somewhat from the traditional capture theory of regulation in the following manner: 
“…unlike special-interest policies, they are not ‘sold’ to subsets of the polity in 
return for support. Rather, these acts or policies are other-regarding” (Levine & 
Forrence, 1990: 177).  
This implies that under certain circumstances, where agency costs together with other 
informational costs are significant, the public would be unable to recognise that a 
particular issue is in the public interest and therefore, they might now demonstrate 
support for the regulator (Levine & Forrence, 1990). Levine and Forrence (1990) 
suggest that under these circumstances, regulatory policy would not be formed to 
simply cultivate support from a particular industry so as to gain political traction. 
 
Stigler (1971) indicates that slack encourages politicians to maximise their own 
private utility, which is precisely the view shared by Levine and Forrence (1990). In 
addition, Levine and Forrence (1990) attest to the fact that regulators who seek out 
industry support do so not only to remain in office but also to enhance their future 
employment opportunities in the private sector. Regulators do have a choice to either 
cultivate slack or indeed consume it, and therefore Levine and Forrence (1990) 
maintain that regulators do not necessarily “default” to the capture route. According to 
Levine and Forrence (1990) this can be seen: 
“…when a regulator has slack, she can invest it in office holding or wealth by 
pursuing special interest policies, or she can consume it by pursuing other-
regarding policies not favoured by her relevant polity. This slack is valuable 
either way, and it should not be surprising that regulation is often conducted so 
as to create or increase it” (Levine and Forrence, 1990: 180).  
                                                     
163 Kalt and Zupan (1984) assess the nature and significance of publicly-interested objectives in a 
particular instance of economic policymaking. They consider the voting patterns of the United States 
Senate with respect to coal strip-mining regulation. 
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Levine and Forrence (1990) conclude that the propensity for regulatory capture is in 
fact a function of the degree to which slack is present. In other words, if increased 
publicity about a certain issue does not meaningfully reduce the level of slack present 
then the possibility of capture remains. It is not necessarily true that the simple 
presence of slack will translate into regulatory capture. Legislators may also pursue 
their own private interests or agenda, which does not coincide with the view held by 
the public (Levine & Forrence, 1990). 
 
The model described by Laffont and Tirole (1991, 1993: 465) assumes that the 
regulatory agency (agency) regulates firms’ rate of return and prices. The regulated 
firm (agent) provides the agency with information concerning its costs. The agency 
has the capacity and time to discover the true nature of the firm – is the firm operating 
efficiently (at low cost) or inefficiently (at high cost)? The legislature (principal) on 
the other hand has to accept the information provided by the regulator and hence, an 
opportunity arises for the agency to collude with the agent to hide information from 
the principal. Laffont and Tirole (1991, 1993)’s primary contribution to the theory of 
regulatory capture concerns the incorporation of information asymmetries, which 
Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) do not adequately take this into 
account. Laffont and Tirole (1991) posit that these information asymmetries enable a 
regulator to favour either the industry or consumers. The superior information 
conferred upon the regulator enables regulators to entrench their positions. Regulators 
may utilise this private information to seek higher office or simply improve future 
employment opportunities within the private sector (Laffont & Tirole, 1991, 1993).   
 
Laffont and Martimort (1997) explore the implications of collusion between agents 
and its impact on the regulatory process and market behaviour. They consider the 
problem when information is distributed amongst several agents whose objectives are 
not aligned with that of their principal. The mechanism that allows agents to align 
their behaviour to that of the principal is a key cornerstone of organisational design 
(Laffont & Martimort, 1997). Laffont and Martimort (1997) first outline the 
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Revelation Principle, which they suggest is a fundamental building-block in 
understanding this mechanism design problem. According to Laffont and Martimort 
(1997: 875), the success of this principle in explaining the mechanism is two-fold: 
1. “…[I]t provides a simple way to characterize the set of implementable 
allocations when information is decentralized; [and] 
2. [I]t gives the right framework for conducting normative analysis under 
asymmetric information, i.e., for comparing different allocation 
mechanisms” (Laffont & Martimort, 1997: 875). 
However, Laffont and Martimort (1997) do acknowledge that the Revelation Principle 
suffers from several implausible assumptions:  
1. “…[i]t presumes that communication is costless between the principal and 
the agents” (Laffont & Martimort, 1997: 875);  
2. It postulates a Bayesian-Nash behaviour between agents, whereby it is 
assumed that agents behave non-cooperatively. This implies that binding 
agreements between them are unenforceable or at least “…the principal can 
prevent these agreements at no cost” (Laffont & Martimort, 1997: 875). 
Laffont and Martimort (1997) deviate from the Revelation Principle mechanism by 
considering a mechanism design problem where agents can communicate between 
themselves and ultimately collude under asymmetric information. Consistent with 
Laffont and Tirole (1991), Laffont and Martimort (1997) stress the importance of the 
information structure between agents; private knowledge is a significant determinant 
of agents’ ability to extract rents. 
 
A further extension of the Toulouse School is the so-called life-cycle theory of 
regulatory agencies as suggested by Martimort (1999), and Estache and Martimort 
(1999). Boehm (2007: 10) describes the life-cycle theory as follows:  
“...a new regulatory agency undergoes a life-cycle: when established during a 
regulatory reform, the agency is subject to close scrutiny by the government and 
even by the general public, but with time the attention focuses on other topics 
and the day-to-day activities of the regulator are less in the spotlight of public 
attention”.  
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The theory emphasises that at the beginning the regulator faces intense pressure to 
operate effectively and protect consumers. But this pressure soon dissipates while the 
pressure by the industry to protect its interests remains constant. Therefore, the 
regulator becomes more likely to be dominated by the interests of the regulated firms.  
 
Martimort (1999) attests to the fact that the dynamic life-cycle hypothesis is an 
adequate framework to explain regulatory capture. Over time greater opportunities 
will avail themselves to interest groups to collude with a regulator due to the 
accumulation of private information, which is inherent in the relationship between the 
interest group and the regulator (Martimort, 1999). Therefore, legislators will respond 
by implementing more stringent rules and limiting the regulator’s discretion. As a 
consequence, a regulated industry would find themselves submerged in bureaucratic 
layers, which he describes as bureaucratisation.  The author describes the growth in 
red tape as “…an optimal dynamic response to the threat of capture” (Martimort, 
1999: 931). 
 
More recent contributions concerning the economic theory of regulation and 
regulatory capture have included Besley and Coate (2003) who find that elected 
regulators may favour consumers rather than a regulated industry. They recognise that 
when regulators are appointed, there is a proclivity for regulation to become 
“bundled” with other issues (Besley & Coate, 2003: 1177). The model that Besley and 
Coate (2003) propose studies the situation where one has a majority of the population 
that are consumers and a minority of representatives from a regulated industry. They 
go further to assume that members of political parties organise themselves along lines 
other than via regulation. Therefore, Besley and Coate (2003: 1177) assert that when: 
“…regulators are appointed, [political] parties may be tempted to field 
candidates who would appoint pro-stakeholder regulators to further their 
interests in the public spending dimension … By contrast, if regulators are 
elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so [from a political 
party’s perspective] the electoral incentive is to run a pro-consumer candidate”.   
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Grace and Phillips (2008) utilise Besley and Coate (2003)’s contribution when they 
examine the career prospects of legislators involved in the regulation of the United 
States automobile insurance market. Grace and Phillips (2008) find that the career 
prospects of legislators have an observable influence upon how an industry is 
regulated. In particular, they  note that regulators who are not career-politicians, in 
other words, those who anticipate in the future that they will move into the private 
sector are most likely be lenient towards the regulated industry. Naturally, this type of 
strategic behaviour will not harm their future employment prospects.  
 
But Grace and Phillips (2008) observe that a regulator who simply adopts a soft-touch 
to regulation per se may experience little benefit in terms of future employment 
prospects in the private sector. It can be argued that a regulator may need to behave 
far more strategically, in the sense that they need to portray a considerable shift 
towards a regulated industry.  Therefore, starting from a point that is extremely 
prejudicial towards the regulated industry and then moving gradually (or even rapidly) 
towards the regulated industry may indeed provide greater benefits as this 
demonstrates a considerable shift in favour toward the regulated industry that should 
be rewarded. A further point that Grace and Phillips (2008) make, is before regulators 
can hope to secure future employment opportunities within a regulated industry they 
will need to demonstrate their technical competence coupled with their favourable 
disposition.  
 
For career politicians that will not rely upon future employment opportunities within 
the private sector, a contrary conclusion is observed whereby they are found to be 
more likely to favour consumers and thus, apply more stringent regulation (Besley & 
Coate, 2003; Grace & Phillips, 2008). Grace and Phillips (2008) observe that 
insurance premiums are found to be almost 5% lower for the case where a regulator 
has been identified as a consumer advocate. It is clear that the private interests of the 
regulator are best served currying favour with the electorate that the regulated 
industry if there is no intention to vacate political office. This is reaffirmed in the case 
of elected rather than appointed regulators (Grace & Phillips, 2008). However, Grace 
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and Phillips (2008) do not find that elected legislators will automatically favour 
consumers over regulated industries. This result is contrary to the widely-held belief 
that elected officials will always act in the interests of consumers. To illustrate the 
authors outline the institutional differences between insurance and public utility 
regulation within the United States. They point out that:  
“State public utility commissions are composed of multiple commissioners and 
the size of the board typically ranges from three to seven commissioners. In 
contrast, the number of commissioners who exercise authority over insurance 
rate regulation is generally one” (Grace and Phillips, 2008: 129). 
It is believed to be far easier for an industry to monitor and influence the behaviour of 
a single commissioner as opposed to multiple commissioners. Thus, Grace and 
Phillips (2008) suggest that as the complexity of the regulatory agency grows and the 
number of commissioners increase, the marginal cost of influencing the regulatory 
process will rise as well. Moreover, a regulator’s propensity to be either strict or 
lenient will also depend upon the extent of monopoly power they hold over private 
information.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
As Stigler (1971) asserts, government intervention does not attempt to remedy market 
imperfections, but rather regulation is promulgated to promote the interests of 
politically-effectual industry participants. According to Peltzman (1976), economic 
theory argues that through the superior information that regulated firms possess they 
are able to capture the regulatory process for their own benefit. 
Therefore, this thesis concurs with the proposition advocated by Stigler (1971), 
whereby the new regulatory framework instituted by the South African government 
through the implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, may have 
been acquired by the industry or at least by the providers of healthcare. 
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6 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1. Contributions and Theoretical Implications 
 
South Africa’s private health insurance sector has undergone two major 
reformulations of the regulatory environment since the late 1980s. The first significant 
regulatory intervention took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the 
government sought to deregulate the medical scheme industry in order to address the 
consecutive underwriting losses that were commonplace amongst medical schemes 
during the 1980s.  As Doherty and McLeod (2003) argued, the Medical Schemes 
Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989 and the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 
1993 was a direct response to calls by the medical schemes industry to free it from the 
controls that it claimed hampered its ability to address cost escalation.  
 
Under the Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 19 of 1989, medical schemes were 
able to apply the concept of risk-rating in their determination of contribution rates and 
benefit coverage options. The Medical Schemes Amendment Act No. 23 of 1993 
removed the statutory minimum benefits and guaranteed payment of claims. Thus, 
Reekie (1999) believed that the deregulation created a regulatory environment that 
promoted competition, and removed the obstacles that hindered the application of 
insurance and risk management principles within the private healthcare financing 
sector. Evidence to support this view was implicitly observed when one considers the 
degree of concentration of the medical schemes industry, as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), as it remained relatively sanguine during the 
1990s and by 1997, the HHI touched a low of only 0.0265.   
 
A key observation that emerged after the deregulation was that medical scheme 
coverage became increasingly unaffordable for those who required healthcare services 
the most; namely, the elderly and unhealthy.  Despite Reekie (1999: 4)’s assurances 
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that “…the [healthcare] cost explosion had been reigned in” once the principle of 
managed care had become a legal possibility with the deregulation of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s; Doherty and McLeod (2003) observed that the healthcare cost 
escalation lingered well into the 1990s. Therefore, the first democratically-elected 
government in South Africa considered that the Medical Schemes Act No. 72 of 1967 
and in particular, the subsequent amendments, were inconsistent with the objective to 
provide universal access to affordable healthcare for all South Africans. In particular, 
the government considered that the phenomenon, whereby medical schemes were 
actively cherry-picking the low risks and deliberately excluding those who 
represented the highest risk to the scheme – the elderly and unhealthy, as a 
manifestation of adverse selection. 
 
The seminal literature on the theory of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1973, 1974; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) is very clear about what constitutes adverse 
selection.  Adverse selection theory predicts that policyholders who are high risk, and 
have better knowledge about their risk characteristics than the insurance company are 
likely to purchase higher insurance coverage (lower deductibles). Thus, central to the 
discussion of adverse selection is the notion that the premiums charged to an 
individual (or homogenous risk group that they belong to) should reflect their risk 
status and therefore, align appropriately to the expected benefits that they are likely to 
receive under a medical scheme policy. If this is not the case, individuals who end up 
subsidising other individuals that have a higher propensity to require healthcare 
services than themselves, will be more likely to opt out of insurance. Thus, 
government’s view of what constitutes adverse selection does not coincide with the 
seminal literature.  
 
Nevertheless, government advocated the key reason behind the redrafting of the 
medical scheme legislation was to address the negative consequences of adverse 
selection. The promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and 
accompanying regulations sought to bring about government’s objective of providing 
universal access to affordable private healthcare for all South Africans through the 
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application of three key elements – open enrolment, community-rating and the PMBs 
package.  
 
Therefore, the primary purpose of this research was to provide an alternative 
explanation as to why the South African government promulagated the Medical 
Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and accompanying regulation.  Therefore, it was 
necessary to ascertain if adverse selection was indeed the reason behind the 
implementation of the current regulatory framework governing the private healthcare 
financing sector in South Africa. To answer the research question, the central issue 
centres around proving whether the medical schemes industry is indeed plagued by 
the adverse selection phenomenon. To do this it was first necessary to demonstrate 
that South Africa’s medical scheme industry is sufficiently competitive despite the 
legislation. After this was confirmed, it meant that the seminal literature discussing 
the theory of adverse selection would indeed be applicable.  
 
An empirical methodology was thus devised to test for the presence of adverse 
selection within South Africa’s medical scheme industry. An examination of prior 
empirical studies in numerous jurisdictions and different insurance markets suggested 
focussing upon using an empirical procedure that would detect a positive coverage-
risk correlation.  According to the predictions underlying adverse selection theory, 
policyholders who are high risk, and have better knowledge about their risk 
characteristics than the insurance company are likely to choose higher insurance 
coverage (lower deductibles). Therefore, one would expect that there would be 
discernible coverage and risk relationship, in particular, a positive correlation between 
coverage and risk. While not a sufficient condition to confirm the presence of adverse 
selection, it is nevertheless a necessary condition (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Hence, 
the absence of a positive coverage-risk correlation is adequate to discount the 
presence of adverse selection.  
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Utilising an empirical methodology that would directly test for the absence of a 
positive coverage-risk correlation in South Africa’s medical scheme industry proved 
difficult to implement given the aggregated medical scheme data available through the 
Council for Medical Schemes.164  Therefore, this thesis utilised a similar procedure to 
Dahlby (1983, 1992) that applied Akerlof (1970)’s Lemons Principle to aggregated 
data from the Canadian automobile insurance sector.  The central premise of Dahlby 
(1983, 1992)’s empirical investigation was to suggest that if adverse selection is 
present, it implies that as people exit the insurance market, it is precisely the low risk 
who would opt of insurance, and this would be reflected in a deterioration of the risk 
profile of those who remained behind in the insured pool.   
 
Therefore, the empirical procedure adopted in this thesis was to test whether a 
decrease in the total number of medical scheme members would translate into an 
increase in net claims incurred per average medical scheme beneficiary per month – 
thus, implying a deterioration in the risk profile of those who continued to have 
medical scheme coverage. The empirical findings of this thesis indicated that there 
was no discernible negative relationship between the total number of medical scheme 
members and net claims incurred (pabpm). Therefore, adverse selection does not 
appear to be a feature of South Africa’s private healthcare financing sector.   
 
Thus, the South African government’s claim that adverse selection (as a consequence 
of the deregulation that took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s) is 
responsible for the deterioration in medical scheme coverage for the elderly, 
unhealthy or poor is fallacious.  
 
 
                                                     
164 The empirical studies that directly tested for the positive coverage-risk correlation utilised individual 
insured data that could detect implicitly the link between an insured’s contract (and coverage) choices 
relative to their observed risk. Refer to empirical studies such as Chiappori and Salanié  (2000), Cardon 
and Hendel (2001), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Cohen (2005), Saito (2006), and Fang, Keane and 
Silverman (2008). 
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6.1.1 Regulatory Capture as Alternative Explanation 
 
Since the absence of adverse selection in South Africa’s medical scheme industry has 
been established, it can be argued that the current regulatory framework through the 
application of open enrolment and community-rating has failed to deliver upon 
government’s objective of universal access to affordable healthcare for all South 
Africans. The anecdotal evidence provided in this thesis suggests that rather than 
becoming more affordable, medical scheme coverage has become far more expensive 
for the average medical scheme beneficiary per month and the medical scheme 
benefits (coverage) received by beneficiaries has deteriorated further under the current 
regulatory environment. This raises doubts concerning the real reasons behind why 
government instituted the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998.  
 
It can be argued that medical schemes have managed to continue to operate 
successfully within an environment that prohibits risk-rating; this may be partly due to 
careful marketing practices and astute product offerings that allow medical schemes to 
continue to cherry-pick lower-risk individuals. At the same time, the costs of 
healthcare expenditure have continued to increase unabated, and this suggests that the 
healthcare providers remain incentivised to over-supply healthcare services due to the 
continued reliance upon the fee-for-service reimbursement arrangement.   Therefore, 
one may argue that the regulatory framework governing the South African private 
health insurance sector has been “captured” by either the medical schemes (and their 
associated administrators) or by private healthcare providers (or both).   Therefore, 
government’s reasoning that the pervasiveness of adverse selection within the medical 
scheme sector, required government intervention (through the enactment of the 
Medical Schemes Act No.131 of 1998), as it was in the public interest to mitigate 
adverse selection, does not hold up to scrutiny.  
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This thesis concurs with the proposition advocated by Stigler (1971), whereby the 
new regulatory framework instituted by the South African government through the 
implementation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998, although not originally 
sought by the medical scheme industry, may have been acquired by the industry or at 
least by the providers of healthcare. Thus, even though the industry protested and 
made their objections heard at the time the regulation was formulated, the explanation 
that the industry has managed to operate the new regulatory framework primarily for 
its benefit is certainly plausible.  This has been achieved through careful adjustment to 
their product offerings and coverage plans, coupled with astute marketing practices, 
and potentially certain other exogenous factors such as risk aversion (propitious 
selection) that influences the individual’s demand for health insurance. Therefore, it is 
postulated that regulatory capture may be the alternative explanation for why the 
current legislation governing the medical scheme industry came about but perhaps, 
more importantly, on how it is currently being exploited by medical schemes and 
healthcare providers. 
 
Whilst in the case of the South African medical scheme industry, it may be suggested 
that it was not the case that the industry sought out particular regulation to extract 
some form of benefit, prior to the promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 
of 1998. But rather the regulation was thrust upon the private health insurance sector 
with theoretically adverse consequences. It is this thesis’ assertion that despite the 
theoretical predictions that the new regulatory framework would induce an adverse 
selection death spiral through opportunistic behaviour on the part of medical scheme 
beneficiaries, medical schemes and their associated administrators have managed to 
take advantage of the lack of adverse selection in the medical scheme sector and 
exploit the regulatory framework through various astute adjustments to their menu of 
policy options and benefit plans. In addition, medical schemes have intelligently 
formulated their marketing practices and activities to target in particular low-risk 
individuals.    
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It is this thesis’ view that the risk of regulatory capture within South Africa’s health 
insurance sector may manifest itself in the spirit of the Toulouse School. The merit of 
the Toulouse School and authors such as Spiller (1990) is the acknowledgement of the 
principal-agent relationships inherent to any type of regulation (Boehm, 2007: 11). 
Spiller (1990) identifies that regulated firms and regulators can collude to extract and 
divide rents from the regulator’s principal (legislature). However, in South Africa’s 
health insurance sector, it is argued that the risk of regulatory capture may take the 
form of passive capture of the regulator.  The objectives sought by the South African 
government through the promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 
was to create a private healthcare financing system that offered affordable and 
universal health insurance coverage to the public-at-large.  In particular, the aim was 
to provide affordable cover for those who had previously fell outside of the private 
healthcare financing net and those who were increasingly excluded from coverage; 
namely, the elderly and unhealthy. In essence, the government sought to establish a 
national health insurance system to be funded via private medical scheme 
contributions where higher income (and healthier) individuals subsidised lower 
income (and less healthy) segments of the population. Far from achieving these 
objectives, the reverse has occurred partly as a result of the misinterpretation of the 
concept of adverse selection by the South African government, but more importantly 
as a result of the ability of the industry to ‘capture’ the regulatory framework.  
 
The risk of regulatory capture is increased as the medical scheme industry can make 
use of their superior technical knowledge and informational advantages over the 
regulator to extract benefits and pursue their own self-interest. Further, the assumption 
that the regulator can uncover the real nature of a regulated medical scheme appears 
to be overly-optimistic (Laffont & Tirole, 1991, 1993). Grace and Phillips (2008) 
argue that in the case of insurance regulation it is unlikely that other government 
officials (those not directly involved in the regulatory process) will be able to acquire 
accurate information regarding the profitability of the industry. This would translate 
into a lower marginal cost to influence the regulator. It suggests that regulatory 
capture or even collusive-type behaviour is quite possible within the insurance 
context.    
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Government’s stated objective in the provision of healthcare in South Africa, is for 
the healthy (and wealthy) to subsidise the unhealthy (and poor), but this is 
incompatible with the functioning of a competitive market and therefore, it raises the 
question whether government’s goal is at all consistent with the concept of in the 
public interest. Indeed, Peltzman, Levine and Noll (1989) attempt to gauge the 
efficacy of the economic theory of regulation and compare its development with that 
of the actual regulatory environment in various sectors.  Upon reflection, Peltzman et 
al. (1989) assert that the economic theory of regulation generally fits the regulatory 
experience better than the public interest theory. The graphical representation of the 
theory of economic regulation by Beard, Kaserman and Mayo (2003) also supports 
Peltzman et al. (1989)’s view. The failure of the new regulatory framework to meet 
the objectives of universal access and affordable private health insurance for all, does 
indeed raises questions concerning the inability of the regulatory reforms to translate 
into desired outcomes. 
 
Even though the four distinct schools of thought (Chicago School, Virginia School, 
Tollbooth Theories and the Toulouse School) relating to the economic theory of 
regulation all have merit, it is this thesis’s view that regulatory capture is likely to 
have taken place within the spirit of the Toulouse School – whereby in South Africa’s 
private health insurance sector medical schemes (and/or healthcare providers) have 
passively captured the regulator or regulatory environment. But this assertion can only 
be confirmed through further empirical research that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
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6.2. Limitations of the Research 
 
The primary limitation of the research stems from the fact that individual medical 
scheme beneficiary data was unavailable from the Council for Medical Schemes or 
indeed forthcoming from medical schemes themselves. Individual medical scheme 
beneficiary data, such as contribution payments, benefit plan and coverage choices, 
and claims experience would have been most useful in confirming the thesis’ 
conclusion that adverse selection is absent in South Africa’s private health insurance 
sector. The lack of individual medical scheme beneficiary data prevented one from 
directly testing for the positive coverage-risk correlation as undertaken by studies 
such as Chiappori and Salanié  (2000), Cardon and Hendel (2001), Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2004), Cohen (2005), Saito (2006), and Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008). 
While not a sufficient condition to confirm the presence of adverse selection, a 
positive coverage-risk correlation is nevertheless a necessary condition (Cohen & 
Siegelman, 2010). Hence, the absence of a positive coverage-risk correlation would 
have been adequate to confirm the absence of adverse selection.  
 
Another limitation identified centres around examining more specifically the reasons 
why the absence of adverse selection may be observed in South Africa’s private 
health insurance sector. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) provide an excellent discussion 
surrounding the possible reasons for the absence of a positive coverage-risk 
correlation and therefore, the absence of adverse selection. This thesis would have 
benefited from using individual medical scheme beneficiary data to ascertain, which 
precise reason(s) can explain the observed absence of adverse selection in South 
Africa’s medical schemes industry.  
 
From the seminal theoretical literature on adverse selection, it is often assumed that 
positive coverage-risk correlation is conditional upon the menu of coverage offered by 
the insurer, which through the self-selection mechanism as described by Salop and 
Salop (1976), induce policyholders to reveal their risk type. Cohen and Siegelman 
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(2010) posit an important aspect that was not considered within this thesis’ exposition 
of the theoretical adverse selection literature; namely, that perhaps additional private 
information may be revealed by the insured’s choice of insurance contract and level of 
coverage (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). 
 
6.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Many reasons are discussed by Cohen and Siegelman (2010) to explain why one may 
not observe a positive coverage-risk correlation within insurance markets; however, 
an interesting area of theoretical and empirical research could be undertaken to 
examine the situation whereby despite the presence of a positive coverage-risk 
correlation, adverse selection may still not be present. Recall a positive correlation 
between coverage and risk is not a sufficient condition to confirm the presence of 
adverse selection, but it is nevertheless a necessary condition. They suggest that such 
a correlation may arise even in the absence of adverse selection due to moral hazard. 
The authors provide an insightful statement into the distinction between adverse 
selection and moral hazard: 
“Unlike adverse selection, which has to do with “hidden information,” moral 
hazard has to do with “hidden action.” The risk of an accident and the losses it 
produces may be a product not only of the policyholder’s (unalterable) “type” 
but also of his or her [behaviour]. A policyholder may invest in precautions that 
reduce the probability or the size of the loss. The purchase of insurance 
diminishes the policyholder’s incentives to invest in such precautions because 
the insured policyholder no longer captures their full benefits, at least part of 
which accrue to the insurer instead” (Cohen &  Siegelman, 2010: 71).  
Therefore, another avenue of research in South Africa’s private health insurance 
sector could involve investigating the extent to which moral hazard is a feature of the 
medical scheme sector. In particular, the extent to which it affects the behaviour of 
medical scheme members and their dependents. Since this thesis establishes the 
absence of adverse selection, data permitting, further research could investigate 
whether indeed a positive coverage-risk correlation does exist. If so, it may explain 
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the presence of moral hazard within the medical schemes sector. Under health 
insurance, it is plausible to believe that medical scheme beneficiaries may behave in 
such way that does not reduce the motive to prevent loss despite having medical 
scheme coverage. A claim triggered under health insurance cover is usually 
accompanied by a physical ailment or medical incident that is most often deliberately 
avoided by individuals.  
 
A key assumption behind much of the adverse selection theory revolves around the 
assumption that the insured has better information about their risk type than the 
insurer does – this is not necessarily valid for all insurance markets and products 
(Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Indeed, part of the reason why one negates the presence 
of adverse selection in South Africa’s medical scheme industry may be due to the 
violation of this assumption. The extent to which individuals know their health status 
and the likelihood of requiring healthcare treatment for certain medical conditions 
may be limited. Therefore, it could be useful to seek out those benefit plans (options) 
and products where members can be expected to have relevant private information. 
 
The empirical section of this thesis proved the absence of adverse selection for the 
entire population of registered medical schemes. However, it may be possible that 
within a certain subset (or subclass) of medical schemes, adverse selection could be 
present. Indeed, this may even be the case for specific options offered by medical 
schemes. Therefore, separate tests should be undertaken to investigate whether the 
relationships estimated under the fixed-effects model are consistent when subsamples 
or subsets based upon certain criteria (size of medical scheme, geographical 
concentration of members, and demographic characteristics of members) are 
considered.  Cohen (2005) find that policyholder’s driving experience may be a key 
determinant as to whether a positive coverage-risk correlation is present or not.    
 
Risk aversion’s role in influencing an individual’s decision to purchase medical 
scheme cover, their choice of medical scheme option or coverage levels is yet to be 
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adequately investigated in South Africa. Indeed, the extent to which propitious 
selection results in low-risk individuals opting for more generous medical scheme 
plans or comprehensive options, may explain the absence of adverse selection in the 
private health insurance market. Therefore, the ability of propitious selection to offset 
the so-called adverse selection death spiral would be a most interesting avenue for 
future research.   
 
The empirical investigation undertaken by this thesis examined net claims incurred 
and net contribution income (net of claims incurred or contributions paid into medical 
savings accounts (MSAs)), so as to focus upon the health “insurance” aspect. But an 
interesting observation from the assessment of the medical schemes sector in Chapter 
2, uncovers that increasingly members of medical schemes are bearing a significantly 
greater proportion of their healthcare-related expenditure. This is despite the 
restrictions imposed upon MSAs under the current legislative framework. Restrictions 
such as upper limits appear to have had little impact in reducing the utilisation of 
these risk-sharing arrangements. Another key determinant in the transfer of risk from 
the medical schemes back onto members is the deterioration in benefit levels through 
careful manipulation of the menu of available coverage options to members. Thus, it 
appears that medical scheme members are bearing a greater proportion of their risk, 
but at the same time paying more for their reduced cover. Further research into these 
observations would be beneficial in extracting the underlying causes for the high rates 
of increase in contributions relative to the modest increases in claims.    
 
In the United States, many people reacted unenthusiastically to the cost-control 
methods that managed care organisations initiated. The reason for this was the 
perception that the cost-control methods would damage the quality of healthcare 
provision. This is perhaps part of the reason why managed care has received a less 
than favourable reception in many circles. While the deregulation experienced in 
South Africa during the late 1980s and early 1990s paved the way for a managed care 
system to develop, it failed to gain widespread implementation. South Africa faced 
numerous obstacles that hindered the adoption of a managed care framework, such as 
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the resistance from healthcare providers and capacity constraints. Reekie (1999) 
argues that only through the widespread implementation of managed care principles 
can South Africa address the excessive medical inflation that has been endemic within 
the private healthcare sector for many decades. However, Doherty and McLeod 
(2003) also mention that the incentives, specifically the fee-for-service reimbursement 
system, encourages healthcare providers to over-supply healthcare services and 
medical scheme beneficiaries to over-utilise healthcare benefits; and these are 
therefore, identified as key cost accelerants. This has been further exacerbated by the 
outflow of medical expertise and the scarcity of quality healthcare facilities. To 
overcome the problem of over-utilisation of healthcare in general, it is possible for 
healthcare providers to be offered financial incentives to restrict care. Eggleston 
(2000: 174) states that: 
“Since providers have considerable influence over treatment decisions, supply-
side cost sharing can be a powerful instrument for controlling healthcare costs”. 
Indeed, Reekie (1999) and Doherty and McLeod (2003) would concur with Eggleston 
(2000)’s sentiments. The South African government has also responded by proposing 
the creation of a statutory price determination authority with the intention of bringing 
back multilateral tariff negotiations.  The idea is to steer medical schemes and 
healthcare providers towards equitable and affordable outcomes through a mandatory 
arbitration mechanism. If implemented, it will be appealing to investigate the extent to 
which this mechanism will be successful in arresting private healthcare financing 
costs.   
 
Moreover, further research into how the proposed National Health Insurance (NHI) 
system for South Africa will impact upon the private health insurance sector should be 
undertaken. Perhaps, as further details are published concerning the NHI, it will be 
possible to ascertain the exact cost of such a system for the country, the extent to 
which medical scheme operations will be affected and how the objective of universal 
coverage will be achieved.  
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6.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) argued that the quintessential challenge for the South African 
healthcare system was to develop a mechanism to promote cross-subsidisation 
between the healthy, younger (and wealthier) population and the unhealthy, elderly 
(and poor) population. Thus, McIntyre et al. (2007) advocate that it was necessary to 
reformulate the healthcare regulatory environment and in particular the legislation 
governing medical scheme business, to create a legislative framework that would 
function as a redistribution device to address the inequitable distribution of resources 
(and quality of care delivered) between the public and private healthcare sectors in 
South Africa. Indeed, this idea was reflected in the stated objective of the government 
at the time when the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 was implemented. The principles 
of open enrolment and community-rating contained within the new legislation sought 
to create the mechanism whereby certain medical scheme members (young, healthy or 
wealthy) would subsidise others (elderly, unhealthy or poor). It was believed that 
these principles were in the public interest. However, the regulatory reforms 
underpinning the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 move away from the version 
of equity that advocates that people should pay according to the expected benefits that 
they are likely to enjoy under medical scheme coverage.  Many would argue that 
indeed risk-related and income-related cross subsidisation will lead to inefficient 
outcomes that hinder the functioning of a competitive market. Therefore, it raises the 
question of whether the regulatory reforms are in the public interest at all. 
 
Government argued that the primary reason behind the redrafting of the medical 
scheme legislation towards the end of the 1990s was to address the negative 
consequences of adverse selection that it believed had manifested itself in the inability 
of the elderly, poor and unhealthy to obtain affordable private healthcare cover.  
Therefore, the promulgation of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998 and 
accompanying regulations sought to bring about government’s objective of providing 
universal access to affordable private healthcare for all South Africans. Considering 
this thesis’ empirical findings it is evident that adverse selection does not appear to be 
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a feature of South Africa’s private healthcare financing sector.  Hence, the 
government’s claim that adverse selection (as a result of the deregulation that took 
place during the late 1980s and early 1990s) is responsible for the deterioration in 
medical scheme coverage for the elderly, unhealthy or poor is simply false.  
 
Having established that the ostensible reason for the current legislation does not stand 
up to scrutiny, the alternative explanation provided is that the current regulatory 
environment may have been acquired by the medical scheme industry itself or at least 
by the healthcare providers benefiting from its financing arrangements (Stigler, 1971).  
 
Furthermore, despite the theoretical predictions that the current regulatory framework 
(applying the principles of open enrolment and community-rating) would induce an 
adverse selection death spiral, the medical scheme market continues to operate 
successfully albeit under significant cost escalation. The reason suggested is that 
medical schemes have managed to take advantage of the absence of adverse selection 
as they continue to exploit the regulatory framework by cherry-picking lower-risks 
through various judicious alterations to benefit options and astute marketing activities.  
 
Government has once again responded to the failure of the current legislation to 
improve medical scheme coverage and arrest rampant cost escalation. Three key 
reforms that are about to be rolled-out in an attempt to re-assert government’s 
objective of universal coverage include the Risk Equalisation Fund (REF), gradual 
implementation of the National Health Insurance (NHI) system and the creation of a 
statutory price determination authority.  
 
The Risk Equalisation Fund (REF) will institute financial transfers across medical 
schemes, whereby the REF would receive funds from medical schemes with lower 
risk profiles and make corresponding payments to medical schemes with higher risk 
profiles (McLeod et al., 2004).  Neuhaus (1995) argues that this is essential if the 
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principle of community-rating is applied within an insurance market. The NHI system 
would guarantee a full range of healthcare services to everyone, regardless of their 
ability to pay. In addition, any medical treatment received under the NHI standard 
benefit package would be free at the point of service. Finally, the statutory price 
determination authority would bring medical schemes and healthcare providers 
together to negotiate, with a mandatory arbitration mechanism, appropriate pricing for 
healthcare services. Medical schemes will have to justify what they can afford to pay 
for healthcare services, whilst healthcare providers will have to justify what they 
believe they are entitled to receive for their healthcare services.  
 
South Africa is therefore about to institute another set of regulatory reforms that 
represent the most significant reform of the private health insurance sector in more 
than a decade. Will these reforms achieve government’s stated objective of universal 
health coverage, on what timescale and at what cost? Only time will tell.  
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